

AX0024 2391035Z

PP HQ BA DE NY SD

DE AX

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FM: ALEXANDRIA (196B-NEW)

TO: DIRECTOR FBI PRIORITY

ATTN: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, TECHNICAL SERVICES
DIVISION.

ADIC NEW YORK PRIORITY

SAC BALTIMORE PRIORITY

SAC DETROIT PRIORITY

SAX NEW YORK PRIORITY

SAC SAN DIEGO PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

UNSUBS; AKA

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE)

TELEMAIL SYSTEM. FBW; CONSPIRACY OO:AX

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

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FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

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Telephone Rm.	
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64 JAN 24 1984

2 OCT 14 1983

Keep me informed

info with AX again 9/29/83

PAGE TWO ALEXANDRIA (196B-NEW) UNCLAS

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND RECEIVING OFFICES, GENERAL TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE) OWNS AND OPERATES A COMPUTER NETWORK KNOWN AS TELENET WHICH LINKS VARIOUS SUBSCRIBER COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES THROUGH A TIE-IN SYSTEM IN NUMEROUS CITIES. ACCESS IS OBTAINED BY CALLING A PUBLISHED TELEPHONE NUMBER IN VARIOUS CITIES. TELENET HAS MOST RECENTLY BEEN IN THE NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA AS A RESULT OF UNAUTHORIZED ENTRIES GENERATING FROM THE MILWAUKEE AREA BY A GROUP OF EXPLORER BOY SCOUTS.

WITHIN THE TELENET SYSTEM IS A SERVICE CALLED TEEMAIL WHICH OFFERS A COMPUTERIZED MESSAGE CAPABILITY BETWEEN TEEMAIL CUSTOMERS AND WITHIN ANY TEEMAIL SUBSCRIBERS COMPANY. EACH TEEMAIL SUBSCRIBER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING UP AN "IN HOUSE" ADMINISTRATOR TO OVERSEE ALL ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE CUSTOMERS TEEMAIL SERVICE, INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF LEVELS OF ACCESSABILITY BY EMPLOYERS OF THE SUBSCRIBER COMPANY.

RECENTLY, IT HAS COME TO THE ATTENTION OF GTE THAT COMPUTERS OF CERTAIN TEEMAIL SUBSCRIBERS HAVE BEEN ACCESSED BY A GROUP OF INTRUDERS FROM DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. THE INTRUDERS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BANDED TOGETHER IN GROUPS KNOWN AS "INNER CIRCLE" AND "OPERATIONS CIRCLE" HAVE GAINED ACCESS TO CERTAIN SUBSCRIBERS COMPUTERS BY DETERMINING PASSWORDS ASSIGNED TO SUBSCRIBER ADMINISTRATORS, AND ESTABLISHING PIRATE "BULLETIN BOARDS" WITHIN THE SUBSCRIBER SYSTEM, AS WELL AS BROWSING THROUGH SUBSCRIBER FILES. THESE

PAGE THREE ALEXANDRIA (196B-NEW) UNCLAS

"BULLETIN BOARDS" HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITHOUT THE SUBSCRIBERS KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT AND MAINTAIN THEIR OWN DEGREE OF SECURITY.

ONCE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT CERTAIN TELEMAL CUSTOMERS FILES WERE BEING INFILTRATED GTE WAS ABLE TO RETRIEVE MESSAGES POSTED ON THE BULLETIN BOARDS AND DETERMINED THAT TRAFFIC BETWEEN "INNER CIRCLE" MEMBERS DISCUSSED ON AUGUST 15, 1983, AN OPERATION KNOWN AS "ULTIMATE RIPOFF". IN ONE OF THE MESSAGES ON THE BULLETIN BOARD ON 8/15/83, UNSUB [] NOTED TO UNSUB [] THAT HE [] PICKED THE WRONG SYSTEM BECAUSE CODE 21256 IS A DEMO SYSTEM AND "YOU CAN'T REALLY DO ANYTHING WITH IT". [] ADVISED [] HE WAS SUPPOSED TO GET INTO SYSTEM C21267. FOR THE INFORMATION OF RECEIVING OFFICES, BOTH ACCOUNT NUMBER 21256 AND C21267 ARE TELEMAL ACCOUNTS ASSIGNED TO CITIBANK, NEW YORK, NY.

A SECOND MESSAGE POSTED ON 8/15/83 FROM [] ANNOUNCED A CONFERENCE (PRESUMABLY A TELECONFERENCE) FOR LATER THAT EVENING WHERE THE TOPICS UNDER DISCUSSION WULD INCLUDE "COSMOS", ULTIMATE RIPOFF" AND "BLU - STUFF". FURTHER TRAFFIC ON THAT DATE ISSUES CAUTION TO MEMBERS OF THE CIRCLE TO PURGE MESSAGES ONCE THEY ARE RETRIEVED OFF THE BULLETIN BOARD, AS WELL US ISSUING CAUTIONS TO MEMBERS NOT TO USE TELEPHONES FOR COMMUNICATIONS RELATED TO THE ULTIMATE RIPOFF.
~~"7752-53 4853-11"~~. ANOTHER MESSAGE ON 8/15/83 ASKS THE QUESTION "WHO IS GOING INTO THE BANKS AND PICK UP THE MONEY"?

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PAGE FOUR ALEXANDRIA (196B-NEW) UNCLAS

ON LATE AFTERNOON, 8/25/83 GTE ADVISED ALEXANDRIA THAT A FURTHER REVIEW OF THEIR SYSTEM HAS UNCOVERED OTHER INTRUDERS NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCERNABLE TO GTE WHICH INDICATES THIS INTRUSION PROBLEM IS FAR MORE WIDESPREAD THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. GTE IS COMPILING DATA AT THE PRESENT TIME AND A MEETING IS SET FOR AM, 8/29/83 BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF GTE AND FBI, AX DIVISION TO DISCUSS THESE LATEST FINDINGS. /M

IN THE MEANTIME, RECEIVING OFFICES SHOULD BE ALERT TO THE FACT THAT US ATTORNEY ELSIE MUNSELL, EDVA HAS BEEN CONTACTED AND IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE PERPETRATORS COULD BE SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF T 18, USC, SECTION 1343, (WIRE FRAUD), AND T 18, USC SECTION 371, (CONSPIRACY) AT A MINIMUM.

CALLS ARE ENTERING THE SYSTEM THROUGH TELENET PORTS IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN; SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; NEW YORK, NY.; WHITE PLAINS, NY AREA AND BALTIMORE, MARYLAND AREA. GTE IS MAKING A CONCERTED EFFORT TO WRITE A PROGRAM INTO THE SYSTEM THAT WILL ALLOW FOR A 24 HOUR A DAY LIVE MONITOR ON ACCOUNTS KNOWN TO BE ACCESSED BY MEMBERS OF THE CIRCLE GROUPS AND IT IS ALSO ANTICIPATED THIS WILL BE IN FULL OPERATION BY 8/29/83.

PRIOR TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE LATEST INTRUSIONS, GTE HAD ESTIMATED LOSSES TO GTE AT APPROXIMATELY \$20,000 PER MONTH, BASED ON MANPOWER AND SERVICE TIME. THE LATEST INTRUSION FINDINGS TEND TO MAKE THIS A CONSERVATIVE FIGURE.

PAGE FIVE ALEXANDRIA (196B-NEW) UNCALS

ALEXANDRIA IS ASSUMING OO IN THIS MATTER INASMUCH AS CTIM COMPANY IS IN AX TERRITORY AND DISCUSSION WITH USA HAS INDICATED VENUE COULD LIE IN EDVA. SINCE GTE, VIENNA, VA. OPERATES ENTIRE TELEMAL SYSTEM NATIONWIDE AND HAS CAPABILITY TO MONITOR THE ENTIRE SYSTEM, AX IS LOGICAL CHOICE FOR COORDINATION OF INVESTIGATION.

A MORE EXPLICIT AND DETAILED COMMUNICATION WILL FOLLOW, TO INCLUDE ALL DISEERNABLE INFORMATION THAT MAY BE OF ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING UNSUBS, AS SOON AS THIS INFORMATION CAN BE COMPILED.

IN VIEW OF NATIONWIDE COMMUNICATIONS WORDERS OF AMERICA (CWA) STRIKE AGAINTS THE BELL PHONE SYSTEM, THIS COMMUNICATION IS BEING SUPPLIED TO OFFICES HAVING AN INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST SO THAT PRELIMINARY CONTACTS CAN BE MADE WITH TELEPHONE COMPANY PERSONNEL IN AFFECTED JURISDICTIONS.

AT THE PRESENT TIME, ALL RECEIVING OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE TELEPHONE COMPANY (TELCO) SECURITY PERSONNEL IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHAT, IF ANY, TYPE OF AUTHORIZATION IS NEEDED TO PLACE TRAPS ON INCOMING TELENET ACCESS LINES IN THE AFFECTED AREAS IN AN EFFORT TO TRAP CALLS PLACED BY UNSUBS. IN THE EVENT IT IS NECESSARY FOR GTE MONITORING PERSONNEL TO MAKE IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH TELCO PERSONNEL IN AFFECTED AREAS WHEN UNSUBS COME ON LINE, RECEIVING OFFICES SHOULD ADVISE ALEXANDRIA OF NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF TELCO SECURITY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN CONTACTED IN THIS MATTER, AS WELL AS ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS THAT TELCO REQUIRES FOR PLACEMENT OF TRAPS ON THE GTE LINES.

PAGE SIX ALEXANDRIA (196B-NEW) UNCLAS

SUTEL RESULTS OF TELCO CONTACTS TO AX BY COB 8/29/83.

NY SHOULD SPECIFICALLY NOTE THAT NO LEAD IS AT THIS TIME SET FORTH FOR CONTACT WITH CITIBANK, INASMUCH AS GTE IS COMPILING DATA TO ALERT CITIBANK OFFICIALS AS TO THE DEGREE AND SEVERITY OF ATTEMPTED PENETRATION.

BT

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PP HQ

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FM BALTIMORE (196B-1048) ^{FBI SOCIAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION}
TO DIRECTOR, FBI (196B-NEW) PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

UNSUBS: AKA

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TELETYPE UNIT

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INNER CIRCLE; OPERATIONS CIRCLE

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE)

TELEMAIL SYSTEM. FBW; CONSPIRACY, OO: AX.

RE ALEXANDRIA TEL TO DIRECTOR DATED, AUGUST 27, 1983.

ON AUGUST 29, 1983, [REDACTED], CHESAPEAKE

AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY, CONSTELLATION PLACE, BALTIMORE, MARY-
LAND, TELEPHONE NUMBER (301) 393-4152, ADVISED HE IS NOT PRESENTLY
KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE PROCEDURE FOR PLACING TAPS. AFTER CONSULTING
WITH HIS LEGAL AND DATA PROCESSING DEPARTMENTS HE WILL PROVIDE THE
BALTIMORE OFFICE WITH THE NECESSARY DETAILS.

LEAD: BALTIMORE AT BALTIMORE: MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]

AND REPORT RESULTS TO ALEXANDRIA, ASAP.

BT

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Memorandum



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 Director's Sec'y _____

To: Mr. Revell

Date August 30, 1983

From: [Redacted]

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Subject: UNSUBS; AKA [Redacted]
 [Redacted] "INNER CIRCLE; OPERATIONS CIRCLE; UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELEMAL SYSTEM; PBW; CONSPIRACY;
 OO: AX

PURPOSE:

To provide information concerning the unauthorized access to Telemail, a service in the General Telephone and Electronics Company (GTE) Telenet system which links various subscriber companies and Government agencies.

4/8
Telemail System

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED:

Director _____
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 Exec. AD-Inv. _____
 Exec. AD-LES _____

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DETAILS:

GTE owns and operates a computer network known as Telenet which links various subscriber businesses, companies, and government agencies in numerous cities. Within the Telenet system is a service known as Telemail. This service offers a computerized message capability between Telemail customers.

Recently, GTE learned that computers of some of their Telemail subscribers have been accessed by unauthorized intruders, some of whom have organized into groups using group names such as "Inner Circle" and "Operations Circle". The unauthorized access is accomplished by obtaining passwords assigned to subscribers; thereafter, the subjects create a "bulletin board", an information source

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1 - Mr. Revell

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]
 1 - [Redacted]
 1 - [Redacted]
 1 - [Redacted]

KD: SM (8)

SEP 16 1983

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[redacted] to Mr. Revell Memorandum
RE: UNSUBS; AKA [redacted]

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for other unauthorized accessors which has its own type of security system. GTE has been able to retrieve messages posted on the "bulletin boards" and has learned that the subjects have operations with code names of "Ultimate Rip-Off", "Cosmos", and "Blu-Stuff". Some of these messages also contain access information; one message involved access to accounts assigned to Citibank, New York, New York. One message on 8/15/83, asked "Who is going into the banks and pick up the money?"

At this time, GTE is uncovering evidence of numerous intrusions from Detroit, Michigan; San Diego, California; New York, New York; and Baltimore, Maryland. GTE is writing a program into their system which should be operational by 8/29/83, which will allow 24 hour a day monitoring of all accounts known to be accessed by the subjects.

The United States Attorney (USA), Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA), has advised that the subjects could be violating the Fraud By Wire and Conspiracy statutes. Also, the USA believes venue could lie in the EDVA since GTE in Vienna, Virginia operates the Telemail system nationwide and has the capability to monitor the entire Telemail system.

Close liaison will be maintained with appropriate GTE personnel and Alexandria will continue their investigation regarding this matter.

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PP HQ DE

DE AX

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FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

DETROIT PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

ATTENTION: SA [REDACTED] (DETROIT)

UNSUBS; [REDACTED]; ET AL; UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELEMAIL SYSTEM; FBW, CONSPIRACY; [REDACTED]

(OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPES TO DIRECTOR, AUGUST 27, 1983, AUGUST 30,
1983, AND SEPTEMBER 2, 1983, AND AX TELCALL TO SA [REDACTED]
(FBIHQ), 9/6/83.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND DETROIT, INVESTIGATION IN
THIS MATTER HAS REVEALED SIGNIFICANT, EXTENSIVE INTRUSIONS INTO
AND UNAUTHORIZED USE OF GTE'S TELEMAIL SYSTEM BY AT LEAST THREE
SEPARATE GROUPS OF "HACKERS" (INNER CIRCLE, PHALSER'S, AND WILKECON).
THESE "HACKERS" WORK IN CONCERT WITH EACH OTHER, SHARING INFORMATION
IN METHODS BY WHICH ACCESS IS GAINED INTO THE ACCOUNTS OF

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
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FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

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Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

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LEGITIMATE TELEMAL CUSTOMERS. THE "HACKERS" HAVE CREATED THEIR OWN FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTS AND AT LEAST 20 KNOWN TELEMAL ACCOUNTS AND HAVE CAUSED THE TERMINATION OF TWO LEGITIMATE CUSTOMERS (COCA-COLA, USA AND RAYTHEON COMPANY).

GTE HAS DETERMINED THAT THE HACKERS HAVE HAD ACCESS TO THIS SYSTEM SINCE AT LEAST EARLY JULY, 1983, AND THE INITIAL ESTIMATE OF LOSS WAS \$20,000 PER MONTH, AND THIS WAS BEFORE THE DISCOVERY OF THE LAST TWO GROUPS (PHAL SERS AND WILKECON) AND THE TERMINATION OF THE RAYTHEON ACCOUNT ON AUGUST 29, 1983. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOR THE TELEMAL SYSTEM, INDICATED THAT IF ANOTHER ACCOUNT IS TERMINATED BY THE "HACKERS," THE ENSUING LACK OF CUSTOMER CONFIDENCE IN TELEMAL COULD RESULT IN MANY SUBSCRIBERS WITHDRAWING, FURTHER RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE TELEMAL PROGRAM.

INVESTIGATION BY DETROIT (SA [REDACTED]) HAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ONE OF THE PRIME SUBJECTS AS [REDACTED], AKA, [REDACTED]. THIS "HACKER" IS A PART OF THE INNER CIRCLE AND THE WILKECON GROUP. DETROIT HAS FURTHER BEEN OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER THROUGH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. THE SOURCE IS

[REDACTED] OF SA [REDACTED] AND HAS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THIS SOURCE IS EXTREMELY

KNOWLEDGEABLE OF AND [REDACTED]

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ALEXANDRIA HAS BEEN WORKING WITH GTE TO TRACK THE TELEMAL
INTRUSIONS BY THE HACKERS. AN EXTENSIVE LIST OF USER NAMES
(USUALLY FALSE) AND TELEPHONE AREA CODES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED.
IT IS THOUGHT THAT A MEETING BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA FBI, GTE PERSONNEL,
AND SA [REDACTED] AND HIS SOURCE WOULD BE EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE IN
TERMS OF IDENTIFYING THE REAL IDENTITIES OF MANY OF THE "HACKERS."

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ACCORDINGLY, BUREAU APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR SA [REDACTED]
(DETROIT) AND HIS SOURCE TO TRAVEL TO ALEXANDRIA ON OR ABOUT
SEPTEMBER 7, 1983, FOR A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH ALEXANDRIA FBI
AND GTE PERSONNEL.

SAC DETROIT AND SAC ALEXANDRIA CONCUR.

VERBAL AUTHORIZATION GRANTED BY FBIHQ IN RE TELCALL.

BT

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7 SEP 8 1953

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UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE)
TELEMAIL SYSTEM; FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

TITLE CHANGED TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS AND ALIASES. TITLE
PREVIOUSLY CARRIED AS UNSUBS; AKA [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; INNER CIRCLE;
OPERATIONS CIRCLE; UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELEMAIL SYSTEM; FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX).

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, AUGUST 27, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES,
REVIEW OF TELEMAIL SECURITY LOGS BY GTE INDICATES THAT AT LEAST 17
LEGITIMATE USERS OF TELEMAIL HAVE BEEN PENETRATED BY CAPTIONED
SUBJECTS. IN ADDITION THREE TELENET INTERNAL SYSTEMS AND ONE FIRM
IN CANADA HAVE BEEN PENETRATED.

INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT THE "PHALERS" IS A GROUP WITH SOME
KNOWLEDGE OF AND POSSIBLY CONNECTED TO THE "INNER CIRCLE". THE
CONTENT OF "PHALSER" MESSAGES INDICATES OLDER PERSONS (THAT IS, NOT
TEENAGERS) WITH MORE SOPHISTICATION THAN INNER CIRCLE MEMBERS. IT
IS THE OPINION OF GTE SECURITY PERSONNEL THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE
PHALERS CAUSED THE TERMINATION OF TWO ENTIRE TELEMAIL ACCOUNTS, ONE

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ON AUGUST 25, 1983, AND ANOTHER ON AUGUST 29, 1983. TELEMAL, AS WELL AS THE AFFECTED USERS, SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL LOSS DUE TO THOSE TERMINATIONS.

ON AUGUST 30, 1983, SA [REDACTED] (ALEXANDRIA) MET WITH USA ELSIE L. MUNSELL, EDVA, AND DRAFTED A PROTOTYPE COURT ORDER FOR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES AND A SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT. THESE TWO DOCUMENTS WILL BE FACSIMILED FROM THE USA, EDVA, TO THE USA'S OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, AND SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. THEY ARE DESIGNED SO THAT THE CASE AGENT AND EACH FIELD OFFICE CAN SIMPLY FILL IN HIS NAME, FIELD OFFICE, NAME OF THE TELEPHONE COMPANY, AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS PROVIDED BY ALEXANDRIA AND THEN PRESENT TO A UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

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THE NUMBERS TO BE PROVIDED ARE "TELENET NETWORK DIAL IN" NUMBERS THAT ARE BEING USED BY UNSUBS TO ENTER THE TELEMAL SYSTEMS. ONCE LOCAL PHONE COMPANIES HAVE BEEN SERVED WITH COURT ORDERS AND TRAP AND TRACE PROCEDURES ARE IN PLACE, THESE STEPS WILL TAKE PLACE:

1. TELEMAL WILL BEGIN REAL TIME MONITORING OF THE ACCOUNTS USUALLY ACCESSED BY UNSUBS.

2. WHEN UNSUB IS DETECTED ON ONE OF THE NUMBERS PROVIDED TO

FIELD OFFICES, GTE [] OR SA []

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[] (ALEXANDRIA) WILL IMMEDIATELY CALL THE APPROPRIATE PHONE COMPANY SECURITY MANAGER (USING NAME AND NUMBER PROVIDED BY EACH FIELD OFFICE TO ALEXANDRIA) AND REQUEST INITIATING OF TRAP AND TRACE TO DETERMINE HOME PHONE NUMBER OF UNSUB.

3. THE INVOLVED FIELD OFFICE WILL THEN BE CONTACTED AND ADVISED OF THE CALL. THAT FIELD OFFICE WILL BE EXPECTED TO OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION GAINED FROM THE TRAP AND TRACE AND PROVIDE SAME TO ALEXANDRIA. FOR INFORMATION OF ALL OFFICES, AREA CODE 313 IS USED MOST OFTEN BY []. AREA CODE 619 IS USED BY [] AND OCCASIONALLY []. AREA CODE 914 IS USED BY [] AND AREA CODE 212 IS USED BY []. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION OF NEW YORK INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THAT [] MAY BE IDENTICAL TO [], TELEPHONE NUMBER [].

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LEADS: AT THIS TIME ALL RECEIVING OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO:

1. CONTACT THE USA'S OFFICE AND ALERT THEM TO THE INCOMING FACSIMILE OF THE COURT ORDER FOR TRAP AND TRACE AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT AND OBTAIN NAME OF AUSA HANDLING THE MATTER IN YOUR DISTRICT.

2. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NOTIFY LOCAL PHONE COMPANY OF SIGNING

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OF COURT ORDER AND HAVE PHONE COMPANY INSTITUTE TRAP AND TRACE MEASURES ON NUMBERS PROVIDED.

3. NOTIFY ALEXANDRIA BY TELCALL WHEN TRAP AND TRACE PROCEDURES ARE READY IN YOUR DIVISION.

4. PROVIDE ALEXANDRIA (ATTN: SA [REDACTED]) WITH THE NAME AND NUMBER OF PHONE COMPANY SECURITY PERSON TO BE CALLED WHEN AN UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS IS DETECTED BY GTE.

5. ALERT PHONE COMPANY SECURITY THAT THE CALL WILL BE COMING FROM GTE [REDACTED] (TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] OR SA [REDACTED] (ALEXANDRIA PHONE NUMBER 703-683-2680). (AT THIS TIME, REAL TIME MONITORING BY GTE WILL BE FROM 8:00 AM TO 5:00 PM, EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME.)

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6. PROVIDE ALEXANDRIA WITH NAME AND EXTENSION OF CASE AGENT TO BE NOTIFIED IF TRAP AND TRACE INSTITUTE IN HIS DIVISION.

TELENET DIAL IN NUMBERS AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME ARE AS FOLLOWS:

BALTIMORE: AREA CODE, PREFIXES 962, 727, 224. FULL NUMBERS TO FOLLOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DETROIT: AREA CODE 313/964-2813, AREA CODE 313/964-5538.

NEW YORK (SOUTHERN DISTRICT): 914/328-9199, 914/328-9160, 914/328-9161, 914/328-9162, 914/328-9163.

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NEW YORK (EASTERN DISTRICT OR SOUTHERN DISTRICT): 212/785-3860.

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TELETYPE UNIT

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PP HQ OC NY BA DE SD BT 012

DE AX

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

P 02 2200Z SEPT 83

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

OKLAHOMA CITY PRIORITY

NEW YORK PRIORITY

BALTIMORE PRIORITY

DETROIT PRIORITY

SAN DIEGO PRIORITY

BOSTON PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

ATTENTION: SA [REDACTED], SQUAD SEVEN, BALTIMORE

ATTENTION: SA [REDACTED], DETROIT

ATTENTION: SA [REDACTED], SAN DIEGO

ATTENTION: SA [REDACTED], NEW YORK

CHANGED: UNSUBS; [REDACTED], AKA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Exec. AD Inv.	
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] (LNU) INNERCIRCLE OPERATION CIRCLE; PHALERS; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE ELECTRONICS

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(GTE) TELEMAL SYSTEM; FBW, CONSPIRACY, (OO:ALEXANDRIA)

TITLE CHANGED TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS AND ALISES.

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPES TO THE DIRECTOR DATED AUGUST 27, 1983, AND AUGUST 30, 1983. (COPIES OF REFERENCED TELETYPE ARE BEING AIRMAILED TO OKLAHOMA CITY AND BALTIMORE. ALSO BEING AIRMAILED TO OKLAHOMA CITY AND BALTIMORE ARE A PROTOTYPE COURT ORDER AND AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE COURT ORDER FOR A TRAP AND TRACE ON DESIGNATED NUMBERS.)

INFORMATION COPY BEING PROVIDED BOSTON BECAUSE IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT INTRUDERS WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN THAT AREA AND GTE TELEMAL DIAL-IN NUMBERS IDENTIFIED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES, A

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PAGE THREE AX 196A-33 UNCLAS

THIRD CIRCLE OF INTRUDERS (THOSE ADDED TO TITLE IN THIS TELETYPE)
HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY GTE. THESE SUBJECTS ARE ALL CONNECTED WITH

[REDACTED] WHO APPEARS TO BE OPERATING UNDER THE 405 AREA

CODE (OKLAHOMA CITY AREA) AND USES THE NAME [REDACTED] (SHORT FOR [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] FOR HIS GROUP.

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF TELEMAL USER COMPANIES KNOWN TO
HAVE BEEN PENETRATED BY ONE OR MORE OF THE THREE MAIN GROUPS
GINNERCIRCLE, PHALERS OR [REDACTED] AMERICAN HOSPITAL SUPPLY; IBM;
COCA COLA USA; EDUNET; NATIONAL SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED;
RAYTHEON; NASA; JET PROPULSION LABORATORIES; TIME, INCORPORATED;
3M COMPANY; TIMECOR; TRW; HUGHES AIRCRAFT CORPORATION; NORTHROP
CORPORATION; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; BMW; MARAVEN
CORPORATION; TIL SYSTEMS (CANADIAN); RADA; IN ADDITION TO THREE
INTERNAL GTE TELENET ACCOUNTS. ONE OR MORE OF THE GROUPS HAS
ALSO PENETRATED ITT DIALCOM, THE SOURCE, COMPUSERV AND TIMENET,
ALL OF WHICH ARE ELECTRONIC MESSAGE NETWORKS TOTALLY INDEPENDENT
FROM GTE'S TELEMAL.

THE PHALERS HAVE ALSO GAINED ACCESS TO THE DOD ARP-NET
SYSTEM. IN A MESSAGE ON AUGUST 28, 1983, [REDACTED] DESCRIBES
THE DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY IN DETAIL, TO

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PAGE FOUR AX 196A-33 UNCLAS

INCLUDE THE DARPE HQ BUILDING LOCATION, FTS LOCATOR NUMBER, AND THE NAMES OF THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SOME OF ITS RESEARCH PROJECTS TO INCLUDE: "NUCLEAR MONITORING RESEARCH, LAZER BEAM AND PARTICLE TECHNOLOGY" AND OTHERS.

ON AUGUST 29, 1983, [] LEFT A MESSAGE TO [] AND [] TITLED "ARPA AND OTHER ODDITIES" AND READING AS FOLLOWS:

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"SOME OF THE INFO IS DATED BUT MOST IS STILL GOOD TO USE. DOD PENTAGON FTS CENTREXESR: 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697. AUTOVON INBOUND EXTENSIONS ARE: 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227. USE EIGHT TO INITIATE AUTOVON ACCESS. BE CAREFUL ON THIS, THEY MONITOR IT EXTENSIVELY. OTHER WASH DC AREA CENTREXESR: CAPITOL - 225, CIA: 351-1100, WH.SHE.: 395, GSA: 472, GSFC: 982, IRS: 556-5000, FCC: 632, NASA: 755, NRC: 492, SEC.SRVC.: 634-5100, SEL.SRVC.: 724-0424. WEATHER: 655-4000."

ALTHOUGH THE ABOVE INFORMATION MAY NOT BE CLASSIFIED, IT INDICATES THAT THE INTENT OF THESE SUBJECTS IS TO PENETRATE ANY AND EVERY COMPUTER SYSTEM THEY CAN AND TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL WAYS OF ILLEGALLY ACCESSING LONG DISTANCE PHONE LINES (THEY ROUTINELY USE STOLEN SPRINT OR MCI LONG DISTANCE CODES).

TO FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THE INTENTIONS OF THE PHALERS, THE

PAGE FIVE AX 196A-33 UNCLAS

FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PROVIDED (GTE HAD CHANGED THE PASSWORD ON AN INTERNAL SYSTEM, PREVENTING [REDACTED] FROM USING IT. HACKERS CALLED THAT BEING BUSTED.) MESSAGE IS FROM [REDACTED] TO PHALERS ON JULY 18, 1983. SUBJECT: "ANOTHER FUCKING BUST" TEXT: "A PRIVATE AREA I HAD SET UP ON EVAL GOT TAKEN DOWN TODAY AND I'M FUCKING PISSED ABOUT IT IF I GET INTO SYSADM YOU SCUMBAGS AT GTE TELENET ARE FINISHED SIGNED THE IRATE [REDACTED]." FOR INFORMATION, ACCESS TO "SYSADM" WOULD ALLOW A PERSON TO DISRUPT THE ENTIRE TELENET TELEMAIL SYSTEM.

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ON AUGUST 31, 1983, IN A MESSAGE TO HIS GROUP, [REDACTED] INDICATED HE WAS TO BE INTERVIEWED BY A NEWSPAPER REPORTER ON SEPTEMBER 1 OR 2, 1983, CONCERNING PHONE "PHREAKING AND HACKING".

FURTHER, IN A MESSAGE FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] ON AUGUST 30, 1983, 12:57 AM, [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE ([REDACTED]) WOULD BE FLYING INTO "OKC" AIRPORT ON AMERICAN AIRLINES AND ARRIVING AT APPROXIMATELY 1:00 PM ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1983. THIS MESSAGE IS SIGNED [REDACTED] AT 1:12 AM ON AUGUST 30, 1983, [REDACTED] LEAVES A MESSAGE TO [REDACTED] SAYING HE WILL BRING SOME GOOD TAPES AND "HOOCHIE" THROUGH THE AIRPORT. [REDACTED] ENDS THIS MESSAGE BY SAYING "I'M FEELING REAAAAAALLLLLLLLL GOOD,

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YA KNOW". AT 1:18 AM, AUGUST 30, 1983, [] SAID TO []
"THROUGH THE AIRPORT?? YOU THINK A KILO WOULD BE A BIT OBVIOUS.
I'M NO JOHN DELOREAN YA KNOW" AT 1:30 AM, AUGUST 30, 1983,

[] SAID TO [] "WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE DOGS EAT MY LEG?"
AT THIS TIME, ALEXANDRIA HAS NO WAY OF DETERMINING THE CREDIBILITY
OF THE REFERENCES TO DRUGS IN ABOVE QUOTES SINCE THESE "HACKERS"
ARE PRONE TO EXAGGERATION IN THEIR COMMUNICATIONS. IT IS CLEAR,
HOWEVER, THAT [] AND OTHERS IN [] GROUP ARE
CHRONIC INTRUDERS INTO THE GTE TELENET SYSTEM.

INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THAT TWO TELEPHONE NUMBERS GIVEN
BY [] TO OTHERS IN THE CIRCLE ARE [] AND []
THESE NUMBERS MAY BE SUBSCRIBED TO BY [] AND []
[] . FURTHER, []
IS USING THE FOLLOWING TELENET DIAL AND NUMBERS: []
[] , AND []

LEADS: OKLAHOMA CITY. 1) UPON RECEIPT OF COPIES OF
REFERENCED TELETYPE AND PROTOTYPE COURT ORDER AND AFFIDAVIT, WILL
INSERT LOCAL DATA, AGENT'S NAME, LOCAL TELENET DIAL-IN NUMBERS,
PHONE COMPANY NAME, ETC., AND CONDUCT LEADS AS SET OUT FOR ALL
OFFICES IN ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE DIRECTOR, AUGUST 30, 1983.

2) WILL CONFIRM SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION FOR TELEPHONE NUMBERS

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

3) WILL CONTACT AMERICAN AIRLINES AND ATTEMPT TO VERIFY RESERVATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 20, 1983, BY [REDACTED] (OR VARIATIONS) FOR A FLIGHT ARRIVING AT APPROXIMATELY 1:00 PM ON THAT DATE. (NOTE THAT THE NAME [REDACTED] MAY BE AN ALIAS REFERRING TO KEY BISCANE, FLORIDA.)

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4) WILL REVIEW LOCAL NEWSPAPERS FOR ANY RECENT ARTICLES ON "HACKING OR PHONE PHREAKING" WHICH MAY GIVE INDICATION OF IDENTITY OF ANY OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PARTICIPANTS.

BT

000 010 256 2050Z

PP HQ

00 AX

DE OC

P 13 1945Z SEP 83

FM OKLAHOMA CITY (196A-1270) (P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY

ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) IMMEDIATE

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; OO: ALEXANDRIA.

RE OKLAHOMA CITY TELCALL TO ALEXANDRIA, SEPTEMBER 13, 1983;
ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR AND OTHERS, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983.

OKLAHOMA CITY HAS DETERMINED FROM CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OFFICIALS THAT THEY WOULD PREFER THE
TRAP AND TRACE THROUGH THE USE OF A COURT ORDER. ON SEPTEMBER 13,
1983, A COURT ORDER WAS OBTAINED, SIGNED BY U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
DAVID RUSSELL, WDO, OKLAHOMA CITY. THIS ORDER WAS SERVED THIS

12 SEP 21 1983

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Off. of Liaison & Int. Affs.	
Director's Sec'y	

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CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] OFFICIALS HAVE DETERMINED
THAT ALEXANDRIA SHOULD FURNISH ON A DAILY BASIS TO OKLAHOMA CITY
[REDACTED]

THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED TO SA [REDACTED] AND
IF SA [REDACTED] IS NOT AVAILABLE, THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED
TO SA [REDACTED] OR SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]

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OKLAHOMA CITY, UPON RECEIPT OF INFORMATION FROM ALEXANDRIA,
[REDACTED]

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FOR THE FURTHER INFORMATION OF ALEXANDRIA, INQUIRY AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, NORMAN, OKLAHOMA, DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IS A PROFESSOR IN [REDACTED] RECORDS IN
THE REGISTRAR'S OFFICE ALSO INDICATE THAT [REDACTED] AND

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PAGE THREE OC 196A-1270 UNCLAS

[REDACTED] ARE STUDENTS ENROLLED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
OKLAHOMA AT NORMAN.

OKLAHOMA CITY IS MAKING NO FURTHER INQUIRY CONCERNING [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AT THIS TIME PENDING THE OUTCOME OF TRAP AND TRACE
ACTIVITY.

ALEXANDRIA, AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA - WILL FURNISH TO
OKLAHOMA CITY ON A DAILY BASIS INFORMATION SO AS TO ALLOW TRAP AND
TRACE PROCEDURES TO BE COMPLETED IN THE OKLAHOMA CITY AREA.

BT

#

AX0012 256 0436Z

00 HQ AL BA BS BU DE LA NY TELETYPE UNIT

DE AX

P 13 2100Z SEPT 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

ALBANY IMMEDIATE

BALTIMORE ROUTINE (INFO)

BOSTON ROUTINE (INFO)

BUFFALO IMMEDIATE

DETROIT ROUTINE (INFO)

LOS ANGELES IMMEDIATE

NEW YORK ROUTINE (INFO)

OKLAHOMA CITY IMMEDIATE

OMAHA IMMEDIATE

PHOENIX IMMEDIATE

SAN DIEGO ROUTINE (INFO)

BT

UNCLAS

CHANGED: "MAINFRAME"; FBW; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

TITLE CHANGED TO REFLECT CODE NAME FOR THIS CASE. TITLE

Exec AD-Adm.	
Exec AD-Inv.	
Exec AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

12 SEP 21 1983

9/30/83 - Code name
approved by Div 6. Bureau
index negative on "mainframe" &
AS verbally advised that
code name was approved

NOV 25 1983

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PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

PREVIOUSLY CARRIED AS "UNSUBS; [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED] ET AL; UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELEMAIL SYSTEM; FRAUD BY WIRE;
CONSPIRACY. (OO:AX)".

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RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, AUGUST 27, AUGUST 30,
AND SEPTEMBER 2, 1983. (COPIES OF REFERENCED TELETYPES BEING
AIR MAILED TO ALBANY, BUFFALO, LOS ANGELES, OKLAHOMA CITY,
OMAHA AND PHOENIX.)

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES,
INVESTIGATION HAS IDENTIFIED 18 DIFFERENT SUBJECTS, EACH USING
AT LEAST ONE (SOME AS MANY AS FOUR OR FIVE) ALIASES, WHO ARE
CONTINUOUSLY ACCESSING GTE TELEMAIL.

[REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED] WAS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] FOR THE "INNERCIRCLE", AND ILLEGAL TELEMAIL ELECTRONIC
"MAIL BOX", WHICH HE CREATED AFTER BREAKING THE PASSWORD FOR
AMERICAN HOSPITAL SERVICES CORPORATION, A LEGITIMATE TELEMAIL
USER.

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HE THEN CREATED "USER ACCOUNTS" IN THIS MAIL BOX FOR A NUMBER
OF USERS INCLUDING: [REDACTED] AND
OTHERS.

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PAGE THREE AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

[REDACTED] IS NOW [REDACTED] FOR AN ILLEGAL ACCOUNT CALLED TRIPLEX,
WITH THE FOLLOWING USERS: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A PROBABLE ALIAS) CREATED TWO ILLEGITIMATE
ACCOUNTS IN THE LEGITIMATE ACCOUNT OF BMW CORPORATION AND CREATED
USER ACCOUNTS FOR [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] BOTH ACCOUNTS ARE CURRENTLY
ACTIVE.

[REDACTED] (A PROBABLE ALIAS) CREATED USER ACCOUNTS IN
A LEGITIMATE ORGANIZATION NAMED RADA AND CREATED AN ILLEGAL ACCOUNT
CALLED [REDACTED] (FOR [REDACTED]) IN RADA. HIS USERS ARE:

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

THERE ARE TWO OTHER ILLEGAL ACCOUNTS WHOSE SYSADM ARE UNKNOWN
AND THEY CONTAIN USERS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

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FOR INFORMATION OF BUFFALO, [REDACTED] (FEMALE, WITH TWO
CHILDREN) AND [REDACTED] (MALE, POSSIBLY A REAL ESTATE SALESMAN)

PAGE FOUR AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

CONSISTENTLY ACCESS TELEMAIL THROUGH TELENET DIAL-IN NUMBERS

[] OR [], FROM THE [] AREA.

THE CONTENT OF THE MESSAGES INDICATED THAT [] HAS JUST BEGUN

COLLEGE CLASSES. [] PREVIOUSLY USED THE NAME []

AND []. HIS MESSAGES INDICATE HE MAY BE ASSOCIATED

WITH A HOME BUILDER, POSSIBLY [], IN A SALES CAPACITY.

FOR INFORMATION OF ALBANY, [] SENDS MESSAGES TO

[] AND [] AND [] USES A PRIVATE

DIAL-IN NUMBER (THAT IS, HE DOES NOT HAVE TO CALL FROM ANOTHER

NUMBER) ASSIGNED TO CORNELL UNIVERSITY. THIS NUMBER IS []

[] MESSAGES ALSO INDICATE HE IS NOW IN COLLEGE. HIS

ROOMMATE IS [] (LNU) AND [] USES THE NAME [] IN

HIS COMMUNICATIONS.

FOR INFORMATION OF PHOENIX AND OKLAHOMA CITY, []

[] SENDS MOST OF HIS MESSAGES TO [] OR [] AND []

IS CALLING FROM THE [] AREA USING TELENET DIAL-IN

NUMBER [] CONTINUES TO MENTION A TRIP TO VISIT

[] IN OKLAHOMA CITY OR NORMAN, OKLAHOMA, AND THAT HE WILL BE

BUYING MORE "HOOCHIE" (MARIJUANA) TO TAKE WITH HIM ON THAT TRIP.

SPECIFICALLY [] STATED HE WAS GOING TO FLY INTO OKLAHOMA CITY

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PAGE FIVE AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

AIRPORT ON SEPTEMBER 20, BY AMERICAN AIRLINES AND ARRIVE AT
APPROXIMATELY 1:00 PM.

FOR INFORMATION OF OKLAHOMA CITY, [REDACTED] HAS BEEN REFERRED
TO IN MESSAGES AS [REDACTED] AND LIVES WITH HIS FATHER. FURTHER,
REVIEW OF HIS MESSAGES INDICATE THE MAILING ADDRESS OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS REFERRED
TO AS A "REMAIL" ADDRESS. [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] BOTH USE
[REDACTED] AS A DIAL-IN NUMBER AND THEIR MESSAGES INDICATE THEY
KNOW AND VISIT EACH OTHER. DETROIT SOURCE ALSO PROVIDED THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
DETROIT SOURCE ALSO STATED THAT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FOR INFORMATION OF LOS ANGELES, [REDACTED] AKA
[REDACTED] IS KNOWN TO HAVE A FIRST NAME OF [REDACTED]. THE DETROIT SOURCE
PROVIDED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] . ACCORDING TO THE DETROIT SOURCE, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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FOR INFORMATION OF OMAHA, [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]
IS APPARENTLY DOING BUSINESS AS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] , PHONE NUMBER
[REDACTED] , WITH A HOME PHONE OF [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] USES DIAL-IN NUMBER [REDACTED] , AND LEAVES
MESSAGES FOR [REDACTED] AND OTHERS IN THE [REDACTED] GROUP.

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FOR INFORMATION OF SAN DIEGO, [REDACTED] LEAVES MESSAGES FOR
[REDACTED] AND THE TRIPLEX GROUP AND [REDACTED] AND THE [REDACTED] GROUP.

FOR INFORMATION OF BALTIMORE, NO FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS FROM
[REDACTED] HAVE BEEN NOTED FROM THE 301 AREA CODE.

FOR INFORMATION OF NEW YORK, INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THAT
[REDACTED] IS CALLING TELEMAL FROM [REDACTED] , A NUMBER WITH
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION AS FOLLOWS: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] FURTHER, [REDACTED]
IS THOUGHT TO BE [REDACTED], WITH A HOME PHONE OF [REDACTED] LISTED
TO [REDACTED] DETROIT SOURCE HAS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
FOR INFORMATION OF ALL OFFICES, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, EASTERN
DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, INTENDS TO BRING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AGAINST
ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MATTER. EARLIER OFFICES INVOLVED WERE
REQUESTED TO GET COURT ORDERS FOR TRAP AND TRACE IN ADDITION TO OR
IN LIEU OF A CUSTOMER REQUEST ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF USA, EDVA.
HOWEVER, SOME OFFICES REPORTED THAT THE LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES
INDICATED THAT A CUSTOMER COMPLAINT WOULD BE MORE EXPEDIENT.
THEREFORE AT THIS TIME COURT ORDERS FOR TRAP AND TRACE ARE NOT BEING
REQUESTED, BUT RATHER ALL OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO GIVE THE NAME OF
THE PERSON AT THE TELEPHONE COMPANY THAT ATTORNEY [REDACTED] GTE,
MAY CONTACT TO REQUEST, ON THE BEHALF OF GTE, THAT A TRAP AND TRACE
BE INSTITUTED. FURTHER, IF A LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPANY HAS A PARTICULAR
FORM WHICH NEEDS TO BE EXECUTED, EACH OFFICE WILL IMMEDIATELY
FACSIMILE SUCH FORM TO ALEXANDRIA TO BE SIGNED AND RETURNED BY GTE
PERSONNEL.

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LEADS: ALBANY AT ITHICA (CORNELL UNIVERSITY): WILL OBTAIN
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION FOR TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

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BUFFALO AT ROCHESTER, NEW YORK: 1. WILL NOTIFY LOCAL TELEPHONE
COMPANY SECURITY MANAGER THAT [REDACTED], ATTORNEY FOR GTE
TELEMAIL, VIENNA, VIRGINIA, WILL CALL TO REQUEST TRAP AND TRACE ON
NUMBERS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], TO BE FOLLOWED BY LETTER
OF CONFIRMATION OR EXECUTED FORM, IF PROVIDED BY PHONE COMPANY.

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2. WILL PROVIDE ALEXANDRIA WITH THE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF PERSON
TO BE CONTACTED AND DIAL-IN NUMBERS TO BE GIVEN TO THE LOCAL TELEPHONE
COMPANY FOR TRAP AND TRACE. 3. WILL PROVIDE ALEXANDRIA WITH
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION ON ANY NUMBERS OBTAINED BY THE TELEPHONE
COMPANY FROM TRAP AND TRACE. 4. WILL ASCERTAIN IF [REDACTED] IS A
BUILDER IN THE ROCHESTER AREA AND DISCRETELY INQUIRE ABOUT A
SALESMAN WITH FIRST NAME OF [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED].

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PHOENIX AT TUCSON, ARIZONA: WILL CONDUCT LEADS NUMBER 1,
2 AND 3, AS SET OUT FOR BUFFALO, USING DIAL-IN NUMBER [REDACTED].

LOS ANGELES AT LOS ANGELES: 1. WILL CONDUCT LEADS NUMBER 1,
2 AND 3, AS SET OUT FOR BUFFALO, USING DIAL-IN NUMBERS [REDACTED],

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[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]. 2. WILL CONFIRM SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION
ON PHONE NUMBERS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], AND ATTEMPT TO

PAGE NINE AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

OBTAIN AN ACCURATE HOME ADDRESS FOR [REDACTED] AND/OR [REDACTED].

OMAHA AT OMAHA: 1. WILL CONDUCT LEADS NUMBER 1, 2 AND 3, AS SET OUT FOR BUFFALO, USING DIAL-IN NUMBER [REDACTED]. 2. WILL CONFIRM SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION ON [REDACTED] AND OBTAIN SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION ON [REDACTED].

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NEW YORK AT STONYBROOK: 1. WILL CONDUCT DISCRETE INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER [REDACTED] IS A DORMITORY OR CLASSROOM BUILDING. 2. ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL IDENTIFIERS ON [REDACTED]. 3. WILL CONFIRM SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION ON [REDACTED] AND ATTEMPT TO DISCRETELY DETERMINE IF [REDACTED] LIVES AT THAT ADDRESS.

OKLAHOMA CITY AT NORMAN, OKLAHOMA: 1. WILL OBTAIN ANY IDENTIFIERS ASSOCIATED WITH [REDACTED] TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] [REDACTED], TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED], AND [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. 2. WILL DETERMINE IF A PROFESSOR WITH THE NAME [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] IS ON THE FACULTY AT UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA.

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BT

AX0017 2520136Z

PP HQ

DE AX

P 092130Z SEPT 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

CHANGED; UNSUB; [REDACTED]

AKA [REDACTED]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

10 SEP 83 01 50Z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

080178

p1,2

10/1/83

[REDACTED]

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(LNU); INNER CIRCLE;

OPERATIONS CIRCLE; PHALERS; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AKA [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

DE 54
(LNU);

(LNU); [REDACTED]

12 SEP 16 1983

57 DEC 28 1983



[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO
GENERAL TELEPHONE ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELEMAIL SYSTEM; FBW, CONSPIRACY
(OO:AX)

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TITLE CHANGED TO REFLECT THE NAMES OF ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS AND
NEW ALIASES OF OTHER SUBJECTS.

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPES TO THE DIRECTOR, AUGUST 27, 1983;
AUGUST 30, 1983; SEPTEMBER 6, 1983; AND TELCAL TO SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], DIVISION 6.

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IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER OF SUBJECTS AND ALIASES INVOLVED, THE FACT
THAT THE UNSUBS ARE CONTINUALLY CREATING NEW NAMES FOR THEMSELVES
AND THE FACT THAT ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS ARE BEING CONTINUOUSLY
IDENTIFIED, THE CODE NAME "MAINFRAME" IS SUGGESTED FOR THIS CASE. //

FOR INFORMATION, IN THIS CASE, SUBJECTS ARE HACKING INTO A
"MAINFRAME", THAT IS A COMMERCIAL COMPUTER, RATHER THAN HACKING AT
SOFTWARE (I.E. PACKMAN GAMES).

SEARCH OF BUREAU INDICES CONDUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1983, WAS
NEGATIVE FOR SUGGESTED CODE NAME AND AUTHORITY HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR
ITS USE BY SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1983, IN RE TELCAL.

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BT

470/

Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Adm. Servs. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Insp. _____
 Intell. _____
 Lab. _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Tech. Servs. _____
 Training _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Revell

Date September 7, 1983

From :

Subject : UNSUBS;

AKA

[Redacted]

(LNU) SCANNER CIRCLE OPERATION CIRCLE;
 PHALSER;

[Redacted]

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELEMAL SYSTEM; FBW, CONSPIRACY, OO: ALEXANDRIA

GTE TELEMAL SYSTEM

PURPOSE:

To provide update information concerning this investigation of unauthorized accesses to the General Telephone and Electronics Company (GTE) Telemail system.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____
 Director _____
 Exec. AD-Adm. _____
 Exec. AD-Inv. _____
 Exec. AD-LES _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Tech. Servs. _____
 Training _____

DETAILS:

GTE owns and operates a computer network known as Telenet which links various subscriber businesses and government agencies in numerous cities. Within Telenet is a service known as Telemail

KD: sm (7)

DE-83 196-4713-443

1 - Mr. Revell

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

OCT 11 1983

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EIGHT 148/2
TWO

[redacted] to Mr. Revell Memorandum
RE: UNSUBS; [redacted]

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which offers computerized message capability between Telemail customers. Recently, GTE learned that their Telemail system has been accessed by unauthorized intruders. The intruders obtain subscriber passwords and create "bulletin boards" which provide access and other information to other intruders.

Currently, three loosely organized groups or circles of intruders have been identified by the Alexandria Field Office. The "Inner Circle" seems to consist of younger intruders some of whom are in the Detroit, Michigan area; the "Phalsers" seem to be more malicious and have penetrated and eliminated some records and communications associated with CoCa Cola Company and Raytheon; and the [redacted] group (short for [redacted]) which seems to operate out of the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma area.

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These groups are known to have penetrated Telemail user companies and agencies such as IBM; NASA; Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Time, Incorporated; TRW; Hughes Aircraft Corp.; Northrop Corp; U.S. Department of Agriculture; BMW; and National Systems Management, Inc. Additionally, the "Phalsers" gained access to the Department of Defense (DOD) ARPNET system. In a message dated 8/28/83, [redacted] described the DOD advanced Research Projects Agency in detail including its location and some of its research projects such as "nuclear monitoring research, lazer beam, and particle technology". [redacted] also left messages and information concerning access of ARPNET.

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In one instance in July 1983, GTE prevented [redacted] from accessing an internal system by changing the password. [redacted] responded with an irate message that she was very angry at being prevented from accessing the system. She threatened that if she can access "SYSADM" then GTE Telenet "is finished". Access to "SYSADM" would allow a person to disrupt the entire Telemail system.

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Messages left on "bulletin boards" are providing information of lead value as Alexandria Field Office attempts to identify the unauthorized intruders of the GTE Telemail system. Meanwhile, trap and trace procedures are being instituted in Baltimore, Detroit, New York, and San Diego which will determine the home telephone numbers of the intruders once the trap and trace procedures have started.

AX0008 287 2231Z

OO HQ AL BU DE LA NY OC OM PH SD

DE AX

P 014 1700Z OCT 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR IMMEDIATE

ALBANY ROUTINE

BUFFALO ROUTINE

DETROIT ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEW YORK ROUTINE

OKLAHOMA CITY ROUTINE

OMAHA ROUTINE

PHOENIX ROUTINE

SAN DIEGO ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAIN FRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; (OO:AX) DE-71

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, OCTOBER 6, 1983, AND
OCTOBER 13, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES, 7 OCT 18 1983

84 DEC 27 1983

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

14 OCT 03 23 07Z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec AD-Adm.	
Exec AD-Inv.	
Exec AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Insp.	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

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b6
b7C

b6
b7C

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

SEARCHES CONDUCTED ON OCTOBER 13, 1983, IN NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONEYBROOK AND PORT JEFFERSON) AND SAN DIEGO ALSO RECOVERED PERSONAL COMPUTERS IN EVIDENCE OF HACKING.

NO OTHER SEARCHES ARE ANTICIPATED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IN THIS MATTER.

FOR INFORMATION OF NEW YORK, ALEXANDRIA IS CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY UNSUB, AKA, [REDACTED], WHO IS A MAJOR HACKER THOUGHT TO BE IN THE NEW YORK AREA. NEW YORK IS THEREFORE REQUESTED TO EXPEDITE TRANSFER OF EVIDENCE FROM SEARCH OF WUSB RADIO STATION AND RESIDENCE AT [REDACTED] SINCE THAT SUBJECT IS AN ASSOCIATE OF [REDACTED] AND IT ^{IS} EXPECTED THAT A TRUE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OR ADDRESS WILL BE IN SEIZED PAPERS.

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FOR INFORMATION OF ALL OFFICES, REQUESTS BY ALEXANDRIA IN REFERENCED TELETYPES TO TRANSFER ALL HARDWARE, ETC., TO USA'S OFFICE, 701 PRINCE STREET, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314, ATTENTION: AUSA [REDACTED], SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED THAT ALEXANDRIA CASE AGENT WILL ACTUALLY RECEIVE THE EVIDENCE AT THAT OFFICE TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE CHAIN OF CUSTODY IS REFLECTED ON ENCLOSED FD-192'S.

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BT

AX0016 287 0133Z

OO HQ

DE AX

P 014 2230Z OCT 83

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR IMMEDIATE

ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS SECTION, WHITE COLLAR CRIME UNIT.

BT

INCLAS

02 "MAINFRAME" FBW; CONSPIRACY (OO: AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE DIRECTOR OCTOBER 6, 1983, OCTOBER 13, 1983 AND OCTOBER 14, 1983.

AS THE BUREAU IS AWARE, EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE HAS BEEN ATTRACTED TO THIS CASE AND SEVERAL INQUIRES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRUSION INTO DOD COMPUTER SYSTEMS.

THIS PRESS INTEREST APPARENTLY STEMS FROM STATEMENTS BY FAMILY MEMBERS OF A RESIDENCE SEARCHED IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

FOR INFORMATION, INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE HAS NOT REVEALED ANY KNOWN PENETRATION OF DOD COMPUTER SYSTEMS. INTRUDERS IN THE TELEMAIL COMPUTER DID PASS ON THE FACT THAT, IN THE RECENT PAST, A NEW SYSTEM, MILNET, WAS SPLICED OUT OF ARPANET. GTE PERSONNEL INDICATED THAT THIS WAS PUBLIC SOURCE INFORMATION AND

64 DEC 27 1983

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PAGE TWO AX (196A-633) UNCLAS

NEED NOT BE DERIVED FROM ELECTRONIC INTERCEPTION.

ALTHOUGH NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION, IT
APPEARS THAT ARPANET IS A COMPUTER NETWORK SYSTEM SET UP
TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES CONDUCTING RESEARCH
EXACG FUNCTION OF MILNET IS UNKNOWN TO THIS OFFICE

BT

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 9/30/83

MAINFRAME;
 Re: FBW; CONSPIRACY;
 OO: ALEXANDRIA

By attached teletype, Alexandria advises that investigation into this matter (previously captioned "Unsubs," [redacted], Et Al; unauthorized entry into GTE Telemail System") has revealed that unauthorized intruders into the GTE Telemail System in eight cities throughout the U.S. have been identified. Alexandria is now drafting affidavits for search warrants and it is anticipated that by 10/3/83 those affidavits will be facsimiled to the eight field offices for presentation to local Federal Magistrates. When the desired search warrants have been authorized, they will be simultaneously executed so as to prevent subjects from notifying each other resulting in the possible destruction of evidence.

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Enclosure

1 - Mr. Revell

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - Night Duty Desk

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 b7C

KD: [initials] (7)

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs. [initials]

Laboratory _____

Crim. Inv. [initials]

Legal Coun. _____

Director _____

Off. of Cong.

& Public Affs. _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Ident. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Inspection _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Intell. _____

Training _____

AX0006 2722159Z

RR HQ AL BU DE LA NY OC OM PX SD
DE AX

R 292030Z SEPT 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

ALBANY ROUTINE

BUFFALO ROUTINE

DETROIT (28E-347) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

OKLAHOMA CITY (196A-1270) ROUTINE

OMAHA ROUTINE

PHOENIX ROUTINE

SAN DIEGO (196B-1018) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME; FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES,
INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THE SOURCE OF INCOMING CALLS TO GTE'S

196-4713-

2 OCT 6 1983

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

29 SEP 83 22 24z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec AD-Adm.	
Exec AD-Inv.	
Exec AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Insp.	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

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b7C

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

TELEMAIL SYSTEM IN EIGHT DIFFERENT CITIES. ALEXANDRIA (SA [REDACTED]) IS WORKING WITH AUSA [REDACTED], EDVA, TO DRAFT AFFIDAVITS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS TO BE EXECUTED IN THESE EIGHT CITIES.

ALEXANDRIA ANTICIPATES THAT ALL AFFIDAVITS WILL BE DRAFTED BY OCTOBER 3, 1983, AND THEY WILL BE FACSIMILED TO THE APPROPRIATE FIELD OFFICE FOR PRESENTATION TO THE LOCAL AUSA FOR REVIEW AND PROMPT PRESENTATION TO A FEDERAL MAGISTRATE. ALEXANDRIA WILL REQUEST THAT ALL OFFICES NOTIFY ALEXANDRIA (SA [REDACTED]) BY TELCALL WHEN WARRANT IS SIGNED SO THAT ALEXANDRIA MAY COORDINATE THE SIMULTANEOUS EXECUTION OF THE SEARCHES IN ALL CITIES. THIS IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SUBJECTS FROM NOTIFYING OTHER SUBJECTS OF THE ONGOING SEARCHES, RESULTING IN THE POSSIBLE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE. AT THIS TIME, PROBABLE CAUSE IS AVAILABLE AND AFFIDAVITS ARE BEING DRAFTED FOR THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

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b7C

1. ALBANY DIVISION (ITHICA), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ROOM OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

2. BUFFALO DIVISION (ROCHESTER), RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

3. DETROIT DIVISION, RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
4. LOS ANGELES, RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5. OKLAHOMA CITY, RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

6. OMAHA, RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

7. PHOENIX, RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

8. SAN DIEGO, RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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FOR INFORMATION OF NEW YORK, INVESTIGATION TO DATE INDICATES A
STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT [REDACTED], AGE [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED], TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED], IS

[REDACTED], A MAJOR HACKER IN TELEMAL. FURTHER, TRAP AND TRACE BY
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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b7E

TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED], AND ALSO
TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED], CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS INFORMATION
UNCLEAR.

b6
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b7E

LEADS: NEW YORK AT NEW YORK: 1.) WILL DETERMINE IF THERE IS
ANOTHER TELEPHONE LINE LISTED TO THE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], ADDRESS AS HACKERS ALSO HAVE A SEPARATE LINE FOR THE
COMPUTER. 2.) WILL OBTAIN SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION ON TELEPHONE
NUMBER [REDACTED]. 3.) WILL OBTAIN FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CURRENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM TRAP AND TRACES,
SPECIFICALLY NOTING TELEPHONE NUMBERS [REDACTED];
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

OMAHA AT COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA: WILL OBTAIN SPECIFIC ADDRESS
AND DESCRIPTION OF RESIDENTS OF [REDACTED], TELEPHONE
NUMBER [REDACTED] (COMPUTER PHONE) AND [REDACTED] (PLEASE
REPLY BY TELEPHONE CALL TO ALEXANDRIA - SA [REDACTED].)

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b7C

PHOENIX AT TUCSON, ARIZONA: WILL OBTAIN ALL IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], TELEPHONE NUMBERS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED].

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PAGE FIVE AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

SPECIFICALLY, DOES A 17 OR 18 YEAR OLD MALE LIVE AT THAT ADDRESS
AND ARE BOTH PHONE NUMBERS LISTED TO [REDACTED]. (PLEASE
REPLY BY TELEPHONE CALL TO ALEXANDRIA - SA [REDACTED].)

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BUFFALO AT ROCHESTER, NEW YORK: SINCE MESSAGES RECORDED FROM
[REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY OF TWO COMPUTER
TERMINALS AT THE ADDRESS [REDACTED].

ROCHESTER WILL PROVIDE DESCRIPTION OF RESIDENCE, SPECIFICALLY
LOOKING FOR AN ATTACHED BUILDING SERVING AS AN OFFICE (FOR EXAMPLE,
A CONVERTED GARAGE OR ADDITION TO THE HOUSE). (PLEASE REPLY BY
TELEPHONE CALL TO ALEXANDRIA - SA [REDACTED].)

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BT

AX0010 2791800Z

RR HQ AL BU DE LA NY OC OM PX SD

DE AX

R 6 0048Z OCT83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

ALBANY ROUTINE

BUFFALO ROUTINE

DETROIT (28E-847) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEW YORK (SECTION M-1) ROUTINE

OKLAHOMA CITY (196A-1270) ROUTINE

OMAHA ROUTINE

PHOENIX ROUTINE

SAN DIEGO (196B-1018) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, SEPTEMBER 29, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES,

ALEXANDRIA IS FORWARDING BY EXPRESS MAIL 12 AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
7 OCT 83 01 14Z
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Insp.	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

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196-4713-8

OCT 13 1983

[Handwritten signature]

57 NOV 25 1983

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

OF SEARCH WARRANTS TO BE EXECUTED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

1.) ALBANY DIVISION - ALBANY, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ROOM OF [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

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ALBANY DIVISION - ITHACA, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ROOM OF [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

2.) BUFFALO DIVISION - ROCHESTER, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

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3.) DETROIT DIVISION - DETROIT, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

4.) LOS ANGELES DIVISION - BEVERLY HILLS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

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LOS ANGELES - IRVINE, [REDACTED]

RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED] (TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBER IS [REDACTED])

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LOS ANGELES - IRVINE, [REDACTED] RESIDENCE [REDACTED]

OF [REDACTED] SUBJECT USES ALIAS [REDACTED]

LOS ANGELES - IRVINE, [REDACTED]

RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] SUBJECT USES ALIAS [REDACTED]

5.) DETROIT DIVISION - SCARSDALE, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AKA

[REDACTED]

6.) OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISION - NORMAN, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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7.) OMAHA DIVISION - COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED]

8.) PHOENIX DIVISION - TUCSON, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] SUBJECT USES ALIAS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FOR INFORMATION OF SAN DIEGO, ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION HAS
INDICATED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

SUBSCRIBED TO BY [REDACTED]

MAY NOT BE THE RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] (LNU), AKA [REDACTED]

THEREFORE NO SEARCH WILL BE EXECUTED AT THIS TIME.

FOR ALL OFFICES, SOME SUBJECTS HAVE STATED IN MESSAGES THAT THEY HAVE "SELF-DESTRUCT MECHANISMS" SET UP ON METAL BOXES CONTAINING MAGNETIC TAPES, DISCS, ETC., THAT WILL REMOVE ALL INFORMATION IF THE BOX IS OPENED IMPROPERLY. IN PARTICULAR, SUBJECT [REDACTED], IN [REDACTED], HAS STATED THAT TO PROPERLY OPEN THE METAL BOX CONTAINING HIS TAPES, ONE MUST PLACE A MAGNET ON THE UPPER LEFT CORNER OF THE LID WHILE OPENING.

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ALL SUBJECTS ROUTINELY USE STOLEN LONG DISTANCE SPRINT, MCI OR METROFONE ACCESS CODES AND MOST HAVE "BLUE BOXES, BLACK BOXES OR SILVER BOXES" TO ILLEGALLY ACCESS LONG DISTANCE LINES. HOWEVER, THESE "BOXES" MAY NOT BE BOXES AT ALL. THE MORE MODERN ONES ARE ACTUALLY COMPUTER TAPES THAT PROGRAM THE HOME COMPUTER TO ACCESS THE LONG DISTANCE LINES. THESE TAPES MAY BE LABELED "TSPS".

FINALLY, ALL SUBJECTS HAVE NOTEBOOKS, FILES, ETC., LISTING ALIASES, TRUE NAMES AND HOME PHONE NUMBERS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS THAT WOULD BE CRUCIAL FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL UNSUBS IN THIS MATTER.

FOR INFORMATION, SAC, ALEXANDRIA, IS NOT MAKING A PRESS RELEASE IN THIS MATTER, AND SINCE SOME SUBJECTS ARE JUVENILES, REQUESTS THAT RECEIVING OFFICES COMPLY.

LEADS FOR ALL OFFICES:

1.) SINCE IT IS KNOWN THAT MANY OF THESE SUBJECTS ARE IN FREQUENT TELEPHONE VOICE CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL SEARCHES TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME TO PREVENT SUBJECTS FROM WARNING EACH OTHER. THEREFORE ALL SEARCHES SHOULD BEGIN AT 9:00 EASTERN TIME (6:00 AM PACIFIC) ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1983.

2.) EACH AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR A SEARCH IS REQUESTED TO CALL ALEXANDRIA (SA [REDACTED]) ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1983, TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS OR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING THE RESIDENTS TO BE SEARCHED (ALEXANDRIA FTS 967-1200).

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3.) SHOULD LOCAL AUSA'S HAVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE WARRANTS, THEY SHOULD CONTACT AUSA [REDACTED], EDVA, FTS 557-9100.

4.) EACH AGENT SWEARING TO AFFIDAVITS SHOULD REQUEST THAT THEIR MAGISTRATE SEAL THE AFFIDAVIT TO PROTECT INFORMANT INFORMATION AND/OR TECHNIQUES USED IN THE INVESTIGATION.

5.) SEIZED PROPERTY SHOULD BE HANDLED AS FOLLOWS: A.) COPIES OF ALL NOTES, FILES, ETC., SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE ALEXANDRIA OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR REVIEW FOR LEAD INFORMATION.

PAGE SIX AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

B.) ALL HARDWARE, COMPUTERS, TAPES, DISCS, ORIGINAL NOTES, ETC., SHOULD BE PROTECTIVELY PACKAGED AND SHIPPED TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY, EDVA, 701 PRINCE STREET, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314, ATTENTION AUSA [REDACTED]. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED TO X-RAYS, MAGNETS, OR EXTREME HEAT OR COLD DURING SHIPPING AS THIS COULD CAUSE A LOSS OF DATA ON THE TAPES, DISCS, ETC. C.) BEFORE AND AFTER PHOTOGRAPHS OF COMPUTER SET-UPS, MODEMS, ETC., ARE REQUESTED.

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BT

AX0009 3111829Z

RR HQ BS CG CO DN HO LA NY

DE AX

R 071730Z NOV 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BOSTON ROUTINE

CHICAGO ROUTINE

COLUMBUS ROUTINE

DENVER ROUTINE

HOUSTON ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEW YORK ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAIN FRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, OCTOBER 6, 1983, AND
OCTOBER 13, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF BOSTON, CHICAGO, COLUMBUS, DENVER, AND
HOUSTON, ON OCTOBER 12 AND 13, 1983, A TOTAL OF 15 SEARCHES WERE
EXECUTED IN NINE CITIES IN CAPTIONED MATTER. SEARCHED WERE FOR

196-4713 9

12 NOV 18 1983

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
NOV 18 1983	
FBI - NEW YORK	
Adm.	Asst. Dir.
Ident.	Intell.
Inspection	Lab.
Legal Coun.	Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
Rec. Mgmt.	Tech. Servs.
Training	
Director's Sec'y	

[Redacted]

[Handwritten signature/initials]

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[Handwritten signature/initials]

[Redacted]

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER-RELATED PARAPHERNALIA USED TO ILLEGALLY ACCESS GTE'S ELECTRONIC MESSAGE DELIVERY SYSTEM CALLED TEEMAIL. ALL INTRUDERS INTO THE SYSTEM USED ALIASES. EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN SEARCHES REVEAL PHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES FOR ADDITIONAL UNSUBS.

FOR INFORMATION OF CHICAGO, UNSUB [REDACTED] (LNU), AKA: [REDACTED] [REDACTED], AKA: [REDACTED], WAS ALLEGEDLY ARRESTED LOCALLY IN CHICAGO DURING THE LAST YEAR FOR TELEPHONE FRAUD, INCLUDING ILLEGAL USE OF PAY PHONES AND OBTAINING ADDITIONAL TELEPHONE LINES WITHOUT PAYING. THE TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAME [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] (LNU).

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ALL OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS ON PHONE NUMBERS OR POST OFFICE BOX NUMBERS PROVIDED AND ANY AND ALL ADDITIONAL IDENTIFIERS AVAILABLE.

LEADS: BOSTON, AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. WILL OBTAIN CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS ON TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED].

CHICAGO, AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. 1) WILL OBTAIN CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS ON TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]. 2) WILL CONTACT LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER FOR ANY INFORMATION ON CHARGES AGAINST [REDACTED] (LNU), AKA: [REDACTED].

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PAGE THREE AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

AKA: [REDACTED], POSSIBLY INVOLVING ADDITIONAL TELEPHONE LINES
AT THE SAME ADDRESS AS TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED].

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b7C

COLUMBUS, AT COLUMBUS, OHIO. WILL OBTAIN CUSTOMER NAME AND
ADDRESS FOR TELEPHONE NUMBERS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
DENVER, AT DENVER COLORADO. WILL OBTAIN CUSTOMER NAME AND
ADDRESS FOR TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

WILL ALSO OBTAIN ALL IDENTIFIERS ON [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]. THIS BOX NUMBER IS SUBSCRIBED TO BY

[REDACTED], WHICH IS AN ALIAS.

HOUSTON, AT HOUSTON, TEXAS. WILL OBTAIN CUSTOMER NAME AND
ADDRESS FOR TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

LOS ANGELES, AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. WILL OBTAIN
CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS FOR TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED], AND

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b7C

[REDACTED]
NEW YORK, AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. WILL OBTAIN CUSTOMER NAME
AND ADDRESS FOR THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS: [REDACTED]

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b7C

BT

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Area 10	_____
Area 11	_____
Area 12	_____
Area 13	_____
Area 14	_____
Area 15	_____
Area 16	_____
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Area 69	_____
Area 70	_____
Area 71	_____
Area 72	_____
Area 73	_____
Area 74	_____
Area 75	_____
Area 76	_____
Area 77	_____
Area 78	_____
Area 79	_____
Area 80	_____
Area 81	_____
Area 82	_____
Area 83	_____
Area 84	_____
Area 85	_____
Area 86	_____
Area 87	_____
Area 88	_____
Area 89	_____
Area 90	_____
Area 91	_____
Area 92	_____
Area 93	_____
Area 94	_____
Area 95	_____
Area 96	_____
Area 97	_____
Area 98	_____
Area 99	_____
Area 100	_____

b7C

ALSO SEIZED (BRANDS UNKNOWN).

Per Sup [redacted] 14/1/83 11 (prints) Contract firm address [redacted]

Leads handled by Div 6 & needs [redacted]

Div 8 supports not necessary [redacted]

10/5/83

6250

SYS. [redacted] SEC.

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

ANALYSIS OF THIS EVIDENCE WILL REQUIRE A PERSON FAMILIAR WITH THE VARIOUS TYPES OF EQUIPMENT AND ABLE TO RETRIEVE INFORMATION FROM THE DISCS, OBTAIN A PRINT-OUT AND ALSO INTERPRET ANY CODED OR PROGRAMMED MATERIAL PRESENT.

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT A MINIMUM OF TWO TO THREE WEEKS FULL-TIME ANALYSIS WILL BE REQUIRED, WITH THE WORK TO BE DONE AT THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. [REDACTED] *FOIA b7*

AUSA [REDACTED], EDVA, IS THE ATTORNEY HANDLING THIS CASE.

HE HAS WORKED IN A SIMILAR MATTER WITH [REDACTED] PHD, AND

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] STATED [REDACTED] WOULD BE AVAILABLE AS A CIVILIAN CONSULTANT AND ABLE TO PERFORM THE ABOVE MENTIONED ANALYSES, WITH COMPENSATION AT THE PREVAILING HOURLY RATE.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

1.) WILL INFORM ALEXANDRIA WHETHER BUREAU EXPERTS ARE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE ANALYSIS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

2.) IF NOT, WILL INFORM ALEXANDRIA IF APPROVAL IS GRANTED TO OBTAIN THE SERVICES OF [REDACTED] TO PERFORM ANALYSES.

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BT

AIRTEL

From: Director, FBI
(Attn: Photographic Processing Unit, Rm. 1B903)

Date: 10/26/83

TO: SAC, OMAHA (196A-922)

Subject: **MAIN FRAME**
FBW; CONSPIRACY
OO: ALEXANDRIA

FBIHQ USE ONLY

	Initials	Date
Received		
Developed		
Printed		
Enlargements		
Slides		
Copied		
Other		

1. ENCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHIC WORK RELATES TO:

☒ Current Investigation ☐ Mug Shot ☐ Other

2. ENCLOSURE(S)

Film To Be Processed

Size	Color	B&W	Quantity
4x5			
135	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		1
126			
120			
Slides			

Movie Film or Microfilm

Size	Color	B&W	Quantity
16mm			
35mm			
8(super)			
70mm			
AHU			

Negatives To Be Printed

Size	Color	B&W	Quantity
8x10			
4x5			
135			
120			
126			
220			
110			

Other

Item	Quantity

3. WORK REQUESTED

Processing

- ☐ Process only
☒ Process & make print
☐ Process & make contact print
☐ Slides to be processed
☐ Slides to be duplicated
☐ _____
☐ _____

Prints To Be Made

- (From 135, 126, and 110)
☒ 3 1/2 x 5 ☐ 5x7
 _____ # prints from each frame
☐ Color ☐ B&W
 (From 120 and 4x5)
☐ 4x5 ☐ 8x10
 _____ # prints from each frame
☐ Color ☐ B&W

Prints To Be Made

- (Prints from slides)
☐ 3 1/2 x 5 ☐ 5x7
☐ 8x10

Custom Prints

- (From any size negative or slide)
 Quantity _____
 Size _____
☐ Color ☐ B&W

4. PROCESSING CENTER

MAILED 11	REMARKS
	NOV 4 1983
FBI	

R021042110

DEC 2 1983

NOT RECORDED

NOV 16 1983

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

- ☒ Mail Room: Show shipment date and registry number.
☐ Shipping Room: Show shipment date; bill of lading number, initial invoice; invoice to be placed in administrative file.

ENC.

MAIL ROOM ☒

44-60C 11/28/78 POC
11/28/78

INSTRUCTIONS

GENERAL

All photographic work must be submitted under the substantive case caption when it relates to an investigative matter. Include FBIHQ file number when available. All other photographic processing forms (including FD-482) are obsolete and should not be used. The FD-523 is to be utilized for all photographic processing work forwarded to FBIHQ except employee identification and/or credential cards. Requests for official FBI identification and credential cards must be submitted on form FD-464, Attention: Property Procurement and Management Section.

The FD-523 may be filled out in legible hand printing or typing so that all six pages can be read. The following information is set forth to assist in properly filling out this form. Remove third sheet only (yellow field copy) and submit the remaining five pages.

1. ENCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHIC WORK RELATES TO:

All photographic work submitted should be checked as Current Investigation, Mug Shot, or OTHER in appropriate block. If "OTHER" is checked a short description of what it is should be stated under item #4 (Remarks).

2. ENCLOSURE(S):

Film To Be Processed - Check appropriate column for Color, Black and White film, alongside the size of the film. Also, indicate the number of sheets or rolls or cassettes in the quantity column. Slides refer to **EXTACHROME ONLY, DO NOT SEND KODACHROME**.

Movie Film Or Microfilm - Check appropriate block for size and quantity. **DO NOT SEND COLOR MOVIE FILM.**

Negatives To Be Printed - Check appropriate block for size; Color or Black and White and quantity submitted. If 135mm negatives are to be printed, indicate by frame number, do not cut up into individual frames. The same applies to any roll film.

Other - Enclosures to be copied e.g. photographs, documents, objects, etc.

3. WORK REQUESTED:

Processing - Only means to develop the film and **NO COPIES or PRINTS** e.g. microfilm.

Process and Print - Means to develop film and make one or more prints.

Slides To Be Processed - Means Ektachrome film to be developed and slides mounted.

Slides To Be Duplicated - Means process slide film and make one or more duplicates of each slide.

Prints To Be Made - From 135, 126 and 110 film, check size 3 1/2 x 5 or 5 x 7. These are the only size prints available from our machine printers. Check Color or Black and White.

From 120 and 4x5 Film - Check size 4x5 or 8x10 and indicate Color or Black and White. These are the only size prints available from our machine printers.

Slides - Prints made directly from slides. Machine prints can be made in sizes 3 1/2 x 5, 5 x 7 and 8 x 10.

Custom Prints - From any size negative or slide, indicate quantity and size of prints either Color or Black and White. Custom prints are available in various sizes but require extensive special handling. This type of printing is done on special request and proper justification **must** be furnished under item #4 (Remarks).

4. REMARKS:

Justification for custom prints: Any special instruction or short description of "other" photographic work in item #1 of this form.

No Personal Work should be submitted for processing. Any requests which may be misinterpreted as personal in nature should be explained and approval granted by the Special Agent in Charge or his/her designee.

AIRTEL

To: Director, FBI
(Attn: Photographic Processing Unit, Rm. 1B903)

Date: 10/26/83

NOV 4 1983

From: SAC, OMAHA (196A-922)

Subject: MAIN FRAME
FBW: CONSPIRACY
OO: ALEXANDRIA

FBIHQ USE ONLY

Received	Initials <i>CE</i>	Date <i>11/1/83</i>
Developed	<i>CE</i>	<i>11/2/83</i>
Printed		
Enlargements	<i>2x7</i>	<i>11-3-83</i> (36)
Slides		
Copied		
Other		

1. ENCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHIC WORK RELATES TO:

☒ Current Investigation ☐ Mug Shot ☐ Other

2. ENCLOSURE(S)

Film To Be Processed

Size	Color	B&W	Quantity
4x5			
135	x		1
126			
120			
Slides			

Movie Film or Microfilm

Size	Color	B&W	Quantity
16mm			
35mm			
8(super)			
70mm			
AHU			

Negatives To Be Printed

Size	Color	B&W	Quantity
8x10			
4x5			
135			
120			
126			
220			
110			

Other

Item	Quantity

3. WORK REQUESTED

Processing

- ☐ Process only
☒ Process & make print
☐ Process & make contact print
☐ Slides to be processed
☐ Slides to be duplicated
☐ _____
☐ _____

Prints To Be Made

- (From 135, 126, and 110)
☒ 3 1/2 x 5 ☐ 5x7
 _____ # prints from each frame
☐ Color ☐ B&W
 (From 120 and 4x5)
☐ 4x5 ☐ 8x10
 _____ # prints from each frame
☐ Color ☐ B&W

Prints To Be Made

- (Prints from slides)
☐ 3 1/2 x 5
☐ 5x7
☐ 8x10

Custom Prints

- (From any size negative or slide)
 Quantity _____
 Size _____
☐ Color ☐ B&W

Film rec'd & ret'd with *print*
 to *OM* *PMJ* NOV 4 1983
 Init/date _____

4. REMARKS

(include trial date or other
mandatory deadline and any
other specific instructions)

1cc retained in Rm 1B903
 1 letter retained in Rm 1B903
 Ack: SPS, LAB
 Work Completed:

Film processed: *OM*Prints made: *PMJ*Slides made: *PMJ*Init/date: *PMJ* NOV 4 1983

58710

196-4713

NOT RECORDED

12 OCT 31 1983

11-16

ENCLOSURE

17 DEC 2 1983

AX0006 302 0245Z

RR HQ

DE AX

P 028 2000Z OCT 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

29 OCT 83 03 38Z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Adams	
Mr. Allen	
Mr. Baker	
Mr. Bell	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

BT
UNCLAS

MAIN FRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, OCTOBER 18, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, SA [REDACTED] (ALEXANDRIA), HAS CONTACTED TWO DIFFERENT FIRMS IN ORDER TO GET ESTIMATES ON THE COST OF RETRIEVING INFORMATION FROM FLOPPY DISKS RETRIEVED IN SEARCHES. [REDACTED] HAS OFFERED TO PERFORM SERVICES AT A RATE OF \$75 PER HOUR. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE AT NIGHTS AND ON WEEKENDS TO PERFORM THIS TASK.

SA [REDACTED] HAS ALSO CONTACTED MICRO RESEARCH, INC., AND THAT FIRM HAS OFFERED THE SERVICES OF ONE OF ITS TECHNICIANS AT THE RATE OF \$45 PER HOUR. [REDACTED] OF MICRO RESEARCH, INC., ALSO INDICATED THAT HE COULD PROVIDE HIS TECHNICIAN ON AN AS-NEED BASIS TO DO THE WORK AT THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN

23 NOV 10 1983

SEE CID ADDENDUM PG. 3

80

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

ALEXANDRIA, ELIMINATING ANY DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE EVIDENCE.

ALEXANDRIA IS STILL ESTIMATING TWO TO THREE WORK WEEKS TIME NECESSARY TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY INFORMATION. AT THE RATE OF \$45 PER HOUR, THIS WOULD EQUATE TO \$360 PER DAY, OR FOR THREE FULL WEEKS WORK THIS WOULD COME TO APPROXIMATELY \$5,400. THERE WILL BE SOME INCIDENTAL EXPENSES, FOR EXAMPLE, PURCHASING OF COMPUTER PRINTOUT PAPER, ETC.

AS ALEXANDRIA HAS ALREADY RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY 30 BOXES OF EVIDENCE FROM OTHER OFFICES, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE BUREAU GIVE VERBAL AUTHORIZATION FOR MICRO RESEARCH, TO BEGIN THE ANALYSIS ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1983. [REDACTED]

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MICRO RESEARCH, INC., IS FORWARDING A WRITTEN STATEMENT TO THE ALEXANDRIA OFFICE INDICATING THAT HE WILL PROVIDE ONE TECHNICIAN ON AN HOURLY BASIS AT THE RATE OF \$45 PER HOUR TO PERFORM THE NECESSARY TASKS. TOTAL EXPENDITURE WILL NOT EXCEED \$ [REDACTED] AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONTRACT REVIEW UNIT, A BID AND CONTRACT PROCEDURE IS THEREFORE NOT REQUIRED.

b7E

BT

Teletype from Alexandria (196A-633)
Dated 10-29-83
RE: MAIN FRAME

ADDENDUM: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION (CID) KD:sm/M 11/1/83

The Financial Crimes Unit, White Collar Crimes Section, has reviewed the request of the SAC, AX that authority be granted to expend funds not to exceed \$ [] from the Field Support Account. These funds will be utilized to pay for a private consultant to review 200 - 300 floppy discs which were seized during the execution of numerous search warrants in various areas of the United States. Examination of the discs is necessary for evidentiary purposes.

b7E

Analysis of these discs requires a person familiar with the various types of computer equipment who can retrieve information found on the discs, obtain print-outs, and interpret any coded or programmed material on the discs. The Technical Services Division (TSD) advises they only have one employee with sufficient expertise and because of scheduling conflicts, he would be unable to devote two to three weeks full time to the task. The Contract Review Unit advises no contract need be negotiated if total fees are less than \$ [].

b7E

AX has solicited informal estimates from two qualified area consultants. The lowest estimate which also takes into consideration chain of custody of the evidence was for \$45/hour. It is estimated the computer technician will require two to three weeks ([]) to complete this task. (It should be noted that this consultant group, Micro Research, Inc., was recommended by TSD who has utilized their services in the past).

b7E

The Financial Crimes Unit, White Collar Crimes Section, recommends that AX be given authority to expend necessary funds, not to exceed \$ [], in order to have the necessary analysis conducted.

b7E

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. Laboratory
Crim. Inv. Legal Coun.
Director Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm. Ident. Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-Inv. Inspection Tech. Servs.
Exec. AD-LES Intell. Training

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date October 14, 1983

Re: MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; OO: ALEXANDRIA

It should be noted this code named case refers to an AX investigation concerning unauthorized access into the GTE computerized Telemail system.

By attached teletype, Alexandria advises that on 10/12/83, 12 simultaneous search warrants were executed by the FBI in 10 cities throughout the U.S. Seized during execution of the search warrants were home computers, modems, and numerous documents constituting evidence of computer "hacking". Three more search warrants are expected to be executed in the near future based on information obtained from the first 12 search warrant executions.

For background information, this case was initiated when GTE learned that unauthorized intruders were accessing their Telemail system and destroying records and disrupting services. Three organized groups of computer "hackers" were eventually identified and messages indicated these "hackers" had penetrated numerous company and agency computer systems. Further investigation resulted in identifying the true names and location of 12 of these "hackers" and thereafter sufficient evidence to support the search warrants was collected.

Enclosure

KD: ~~all~~ (11)

1 - Mr. Colwell
1 - Mr. Otto
1 - Mr. Young
1 - Mr. Revell
1 -

1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - Night Duty Desk

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SAC, AX advises no press release is anticipated regarding this matter at this time since some of the "hackers" are juveniles. However, it is possible comments made by GTE could spark the interest of the news media.

APPROVED *WJH*

Director *WJH*

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. *WJH*

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. _____

& Public Affs. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Training _____

AX0007 2861533Z

OO HQ AL BU DE LA OC

AX0007 2861533Z

PP HQ AL BU DE LA NY OC OM PX SD

DE AX

00131515Z OCT 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR IMMEDIATE

ALBANY ROUTINE

BUFFALO ROUTINE

DETROIT ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

OKLAHOMA CITY ROUTINE

OMAHA ROUTINE

PHOENIX ROUTINE

SAN DIEGO IMMEDIATE

BT

UNCLAS

MAIN FRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, OCTOBER 6, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES, ON
OCTOBER 12, 1983, BUREAU AGENTS EXECUTED SEARCH WARRANTS IN THE

OCT 18 1983

86 DEC

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Rec. Mgnt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

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b7c

196-4713-12

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

FOLLOWING CITIES: ALBANY, ITHACA, ROCHESTER, AND SCARSDALE, NEW YORK; DETROIT, MICHIGAN; OMAHA, NEBRASKA; NORMAN, OKLAHOMA; TUCSON, ARIZONA; BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA, AND IRVINE, CALIFORNIA (THREE). ALL SEARCHES RECOVERED HOME COMPUTERS, MODEMS, AND EVIDENCE OF "HACKING."

REFERENCED TELETYPE NOTES THAT SAC, ALEXANDRIA, IS NOT MAKING A PRESS RELEASE SINCE SOME SUBJECTS ARE JUVENILES. REFERENCED TELETYPE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED THAT USA, EDVA, IS HAVING DIFFICULTY ESTABLISHING PROSECUTIVE INTEREST IN CHARGING JUVENILES. CONSEQUENTLY, LITTLE PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED IN HIGHLIGHTING JUVENILE PARTICIPATION IN THIS CASE AT THIS TIME AND COULD PLACE US IN THE UNNECESSARY POSITION OF HIGHLIGHTING CRUCIAL EVIDENCE WHICH WE EXPECT SEARCHES TO PRODUCE.

FOR INFORMATION OF SAN DIEGO, DURING SEARCH IN [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], SUBJECT [REDACTED], PRODUCED THE NAME [REDACTED]
AKA, [REDACTED]
TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS FOR
THIS PHONE NUMBER IS [REDACTED] SAME ADDRESS. THERE IS
ALSO A SECOND LINE AT THAT ADDRESS, [REDACTED] ALEXANDRIA
MADE A PRETEXT PHONE CALL TO THAT NUMBER AND [REDACTED]

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PAGE THREE AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

ANSWERED THE PHONE. ALEXANDRIA THEREFORE TRANSMITTING AN
AFFADAVIT TO SUPPORT A SEARCH WARRANT TO SAN DIEGO BY FACSIMILE,
ATTENTION: SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]

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b7C

FOR INFORMATION OF NEW YORK, TRAP AND TRACE INFORMATION
OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDICATED THAT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TRAP AND TRACE HAS ALSO SHOWED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] AFFADAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT FOR BOTH
LOCATIONS WAS FACSIMILED TO USA, EDNY, AND PRESENTED TO
MAGISTRATE ON OCTOBER 12, 1983.

LEADS: SAN DIEGO, AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA. 1) WILL
PRESENT AFFADAVIT TO AUSA AND MAGISTRATE AND EXECUTE SEARCH
WARRANT AT [REDACTED], IMMEDIATELY.

b6
b7C

2) EVIDENCE SHOULD BE HANDLED AS SET OUT IN REFERENCED
TELETYPE.

PAGE FOUR AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

NEW YORK, AT STONEYBROOK AND PORT JEFFERSON, NEW YORK. 1)
WILL EXECUTE SEARCH WARRANT AT [REDACTED]
AND WUSB RADIO STATION, ROOM 340, BUILDING 37, STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW YORK AT STONEYBROOK IMMEDIATELY. 2) EVIDENCE SHOULD BE
HANDLED AS SET OUT IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

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b7c

BOTH NEW YORK AND SAN DIEGO ARE REQUESTED TO HAVE MAGISTRATE
SEAL AFFIDAVIT TO PROTECT IDENTITY OF COOPERATING SUBJECT AND/OR
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES.

BT

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 10/24/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: ENGINEERING SECTION, TECHNICAL
SERVICES DIVISION

FROM: SAC, DETROIT (28E-847) (P) (C-6)

CHANGED IO:

MAINFRAME;
FBW
(OO: ALEXANDRIA)

Title changed to reflect conversion from [redacted]
to Mainframe and change of Office of Origin from Detroit to
Alexandria.

Re Detroit airtel dated 10/19/83.

An individual within the [redacted] residence, using the
codename [redacted], is accessing the GTE Telemail
network, commandeering corporate accounts and denying access to
those accounts by legitimate users. In order to obtain further
evidence of the illegal and unauthorized access to Telemail and
other mainframe computers a request has been made and a court
order extension granted for a pen registers to be placed on the
telephone lines of [redacted]. In compliance with
M 10G section 10-10.3 the following information is provided:

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

② - Bureau
3 - Detroit
(1 - 66-5343)
MAH:lam
(5)

196-4713-75
1 NOV 2 1983

Approved: [Signature] Transmitted (Number) (Time) Per [Signature]

DE 28E-847

C.

[REDACTED]

D.

[REDACTED]

E.

[REDACTED]

F.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

DE003 2981930

RR HQ

DE DE

R 251930Z OCT 83

FM DETROIT (28E-847) (C-6)

TO DIRECTOR (ROUTINE)

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

MAINFRAME; FBN; CONSPIRACY

IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE FIELD SERVICE ACCOUNT (FSA),
DETROIT, BE AUTHORIZED FOR AN ADDITIONAL \$ [REDACTED] IN
CASE FUNDS FOR THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER. THE ORIGINAL
\$ [REDACTED] IN CASE FUNDS HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED AND ADDITIONAL
FUNDS ARE NECESSARY TO CARRY THE INVESTIGATION TO ITS
LOGICAL AND PROSECUTIVE CONCLUSION. THE FUNDS THUS FAR
HAVE BEEN USED TO PURCHASE COMPUTER RELATED EXPENSE ITEMS
SUCH AS PAPER, RIBBONS, SMALL ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS, AND
A CONSIDERABLE SUM PAYING LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE EXPENSES.

THE THRUST OF THE INVESTIGATION IS BEING FOCUSED ON
LOOSELY ORGANIZED EFFORTS BY INDIVIDUALS, NATIONWIDE, TO
GAIN ACCESS INTO GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATE COMPUTERS THROUGH

0/20/83
Authority granted for
add'l expenditure up to [REDACTED]
under case fund authority.

57 DEC 7 1983

Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	DB RHM
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

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b7C

196-4713-17
17 NOV 9 1983

PAGE TWO DE 28E-847 UNCLAS E F T O

VARIOUS DATA NETWORKS, I.E. TELENET AND ARPANET.

INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THESE INDIVIDUALS IF SHARED BY POSTING MESSAGES ON UNDERGROUND COMPUTER BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS (CBBS). THE MONITORING OF THESE CBBS HAS PROVIDED VAST AMOUNTS OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION WHICH LEAD TO THE IDENTIFYING OF SIX OF THE SUBJECTS IN THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED INVESTIGATION.

THE FIRST PHASE OF THIS INVESTIGATION WAS FOCUSED ON THE UNAUTHORIZED USERS PENETRATING THE GTE TELEMAIL COMPUTER SYSTEM, HOWEVER, OTHER COMPUTER SYSTEMS ARE BEING COMPROMISED BY THE SAME INDIVIDUALS AND OTHERS YET UNIDENTIFIED. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE MONITORING CONTINUE, NOT ONLY TO HAVE A CONSTANT FLOW OF INFORMATION, BUT TO INSURE OUR CREDIBILITY AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE INFORMATION CHAIN IN THE UNDERGROUND CBBS COMMUNITY.

THE ADDITIONAL FUNDS THAT ARE BEING REQUESTED WOULD BE USED TO COVER EXPENSES AS THEY RELATE TO THE MONITORING OF THOSE BOARDS; TELEPHONE BILLS, COMPUTER PAPER, PRINTER RIBBONS, AND RELATED EXPENSE ITEMS.

BT

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE	OF		
DATE	OCTOBER 28, 1983	CLASSIFICATION	UNCLAS
PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY		
#F007TTP DETDE HQ H0007 #H4YUUP 311530Z OCT 83			
START HERE			
FM	FM DIRECTOR, FBI		
TO	TO FBI DETROIT {SQUAD C-6} PRIORITY		
	BT		
14	UNCLAS		
	MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; 00: AX		
12	RE DE TELETYPE DATED 10/25/83.		
	APPROPRIATE AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED FOR DE TO EXPEND		
10	UP TO \$ [] MORE UNDER CASE FUND AUTHORITY AS REQUESTED IN		
	REFERENCED TELETYPE.		
8	BT		
6			
4			
2			
DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE			
APPROVED BY	DRAFTED BY	DATE	ROOM
HNH/KD	KD:SMJ/33	10-28-83	3841
			TELE EXT. 5594

1 - []
1 - FOF

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

18:37/RH
OCT 31 1983

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

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b7C

29 NOV 9 1983

ED SERVICES COMMITTEE

HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE

REPUBLICAN STUDY
COMMITTEE

REPUBLICAN POLICY
COMMITTEE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

ROBERT E. BADHAM
40TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2438 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-3611

DISTRICT OFFICE:
180 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE
SUITE 240
NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA 92660
(714) 844-4040

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

November 1, 1983


[Redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Congressional Affairs, Room 7240
10th and Pennsylvania Avenues, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear [Redacted]:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I have received from a number of my constituents with regard to the manner in which the FBI recovered computer equipment which was allegedly used in tapping into the commercial Telemail system run by GTE. I would appreciate your review of and comments on the enclosed correspondence. Please send your response to my Washington office to the attention of [Redacted].

I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Cordially,


Robert E. Badham
Member of Congress

REB:kd
enclosure

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

196-4713-15X

DEC 15 1983

ENCLOSURE
64 FEB 10 1984

ACK
11-23-83
ESH:SSS

Dear Robert Badham,

As a resident of Irvine, I am deeply concerned with the tactics the FBI used in our city a few days ago. I feel the local newspaper "The Register" has hit the nail on the head. I have enclosed a copy of the article for you to read. The laws were not made to harass people, but to protect them.

You as an elected official are put into office by the people in essence you are our voice. I would like you to look into this incident and see what can be done about the FBI. Please find out why they acted in the manner described. If this is allowed to pass by without an outcry from us, they will feel they can continue to confiscate anything they please in the future. I am looking forward to hearing from you on this matter and seeing what action you will take.

Thank you in advance for your attention in this matter.

Sincerely,

196-4713-15X

ENCLOSURE

The Register

A division of Freedom Newspapers, Inc.

"There is no security on this earth; there is only opportunity."

Gen. Douglas MacArthur

R. David Threshie Jr., publisher
K. E. Grubbs Jr., editorial pages editor
N. Christian Anderson, editor

R.C. Holles, co-publisher 1935-1970
C.H. Holles, co-publisher 1935-1979
Harry Holles, co-publisher 1975-1979

FBI storm tactics in Irvine

A few weeks ago the Woodbridge area in Irvine was leafletted by local police. Residents were warned to be careful about opening the door to strangers. The purpose, everyone thought, was a rash of rapes in the area. In light of subsequent developments, does it almost seem like an advance warning that the FBI was planning a dawn raid on teenage computer hackers? No, it couldn't be.

The way the FBI conducted those raids, even the fact that raids were conducted at all, raises disturbing questions. You might not be surprised at such activities in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. But in Irvine?

Based on information released to date, the four Irvine teen-agers were among perhaps a dozen in different parts of the country who may have tapped into the commercial Telemail system run by GTE, using it to send messages without paying the fees commercial clients pay.

If that's the extent of their wrongdoing, some law enforcement officials could have talked to the boys and their parents, explaining what they had done and informing them they would receive bills for their unauthorized use.

Perhaps something more serious is afoot. Perhaps these boys have, inadvertently or not, tapped into something else. Perhaps federal authorities really want to get at the mysterious San Diego fellow they know as The Cracker, who reportedly told the Irvine boys how to get into the Telemail system and may be into heavier things. If so, the low-key approach, seeking cooperation, could well have been the best way to do it.

Instead, the FBI conducted a heavy-handed, heavy-footed raid at dawn. When one family didn't answer the door (at 6:15 in the morning!), an agent actually broke into a boy's bedroom. FBI agents seized computers and com-

puter equipment, much of it expensive. There's doubt now about when (if ever!) the boys will get their equipment back.

Were these boys running a murder ring or something to justify such tactics? Hardly. To date they haven't been arrested or even charged with a crime. Yet the FBI has stolen (yes, that's the proper word) their equipment and may or may not give it back.


This should be a real shocker to anybody who believes the United States is, or ought to be, a free country.

It's difficult to see why the computer terminals were seized. In and of themselves, they can do little to establish what the boys did with them. If the FBI needed to establish that the boys had terminals, they could have made out a sworn statement to that effect and had the boys and their parents sign them.

Furthermore, if the boys really were up to something devious, taking their computers is a small deterrent. Access to computer terminals is relatively easy. Is the FBI prepared to confiscate everyone's home computer?

It is a sad day when law enforcement can walk into someone's home and seize property for an undetermined amount of time when a case is in its initial stages and indictments may not be sought for months. Yet some attorneys believe that if no indictment is issued, the parents may have to sue the government to get their boys' property back!

The FBI should put up or shut up. Either charge these boys with a crime and start prosecution immediately, or give them back their property. If no indictment is sought, the computers should be accompanied with a contrite apology and compensatory damages. Those responsible for this outrage should be punished or fired.

Otherwise, the FBI is operating on the same moral level as a burglar. 

194-4713-15X

ENCLOSURE

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/14/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

MAIN FRAME

FRAUD BY WIRE;
 CONSPIRACY
 (OO:AX)

[redacted] Et Al;
 FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
 (OO:MI)

b6
 b7c

Re Director's letter to SAC, Alexandria, 10/27/83.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two packets containing copies of evidence obtained in the "Main Frame" investigation.

Packet number one contains copies of printed and hand-written material seized during the search of the residence located at [redacted]. This is the residence of [redacted], aka [redacted] is [redacted] years-old and quotes in a recent Detroit newspaper indicated he claims to have penetrated Arpanet. The printed material in packet number one is apparently a listing of every Arpanet and Milnet host with the "connect address" or host number for each. The hand-written material also contains host names, connect addresses and also includes some user names and passwords. There is reason to believe that this information was shared freely with other hackers.

b6
 b7c

- (2-Bureau (Enc. 2)
 2-Albany (Info)
 2-Buffalo (Info)
 2-Detroit (Info)
 2-Los Angeles (Info)
 2-New York (Info)
 2-Oklahoma City (Info)
 2-Omaha (Info)
 2-Phoenix (Info)
 2-San Diego (Info)
 2-Alexandria

GDF:gaj
 (22)

ENCLOSURE

ENC. BEHIND FILE

176-4713-16

1 NOV 17 1983

b6
 b7c

Approved: 

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per 

4578
 196A-633-16
 NOT RECORDED OR INDEXED

AX 196A-633

Packet number two contains copies of messages left on teletype by hackers known as [redacted] and [redacted] (aliases). [redacted] has been tentatively identified as [redacted] [redacted] (years-old). True identity of [redacted] is unknown. Information contained in packet number two was apparently obtained from some other sources (one being the Defense Data Network Newsletter) and then entered into teletype to be shared with other hackers.

b6
b7C

For information of the Bureau, all offices conducting searches in the Main Frame case (Albany, Buffalo, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Oklahoma City, Omaha, Phoenix and San Diego) were requested to forward all evidence to Alexandria for analysis, therefore this response may constitute completion of lead in referenced letter for those offices.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

068

PAGE DATE	1 OF 2 11/4/83	CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS	PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
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#F068TTP AXIDE HQ H0068 #HTYUUP 041713Z NOV 83

START HERE

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI ALEXANDRIA {196A-633} PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

MAIN FRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; 00: ALEXANDRIA

REAXTEL 10/28/83 AND BUTELCAL TO ALEXANDRIA 11/3/83.

APPROPRIATE FBIHQ AUTHORITY HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR ALEXANDRIA
TO OBTAIN THE SERVICES OF A COMPUTER TECHNICIAN TO ANALYZE
FLOPPY DISCS SEIZED IN CAPTIONED MATTER.

ALEXANDRIA SHOULD INSURE THAT APPROPRIATE CHAIN OF CUSTODY
OF ALL EVIDENCE IS MAINTAINED AND THAT THE TOTAL COST OF
SERVICES DOES NOT EXCEED \$ [REDACTED]

IF ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMPUTER TECHNICIAN, WHEN HIS/HER
SERVICES ARE COMPLETED, AN ITEMIZED BILL SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO
ALEXANDRIA. ALEXANDRIA CAN THEN VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF THE
CHARGES AND FORWARD THE BILL WITH A FIELD PURCHASE ORDER {FPO}
TO FBIHQ WHO WILL THEN ISSUE A CHECK FOR THE SERVICES RENDERED.

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BEYOND THIS LINE

APPROVED BY HUNH/KD	DRAFTED BY KD: [REDACTED]	DATE 11/4/83	ROOM 3841	TELE EXT. 5660
------------------------	------------------------------	-----------------	--------------	-------------------

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - FOF

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

b7E

b6
b7C

64 DEC 7 1983

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

NOV 6 1983

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

NOV 18 1983

FBI/DOJ

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE

2

CONTINUATION SHEET



START HERE

BT

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE PAST THIS LINE

Date 11/10/83

To: ☐ Director
Att: _____

- ☐ SAC _____
- ☐ ASAC _____
- ☒ Supv.
- ☐ Agent _____
- ☐ SSS _____
- ☐ Rotor # _____
- ☐ Steno _____
- ☐ Typist _____
- ☐ M _____
- Room _____

FILE # AX 196A-633
Title "MAIN FRAME" b6
b7C
RE: [Signature]

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Acknowledge | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For information | <input type="checkbox"/> Return assignment card |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assign <input type="checkbox"/> Reassign | <input type="checkbox"/> Handle | <input type="checkbox"/> Return file <input type="checkbox"/> serial |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bring file | <input type="checkbox"/> Initial & return | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Call me | <input type="checkbox"/> Leads need attention | <input type="checkbox"/> Return with action taken |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Correct | <input type="checkbox"/> Open case | <input type="checkbox"/> Return with explanation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Deadline _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare lead cards | <input type="checkbox"/> Search and return |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Delinquent | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare tickler | <input type="checkbox"/> See me |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue | <input type="checkbox"/> Recharge file <input type="checkbox"/> serial | <input type="checkbox"/> Type |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Expedite | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> File | <input type="checkbox"/> Send to _____ | |

196-473-

— THIS LTR includes
NOT RECORDED
Limitation on total b6 11 DEC 2 1983

~~ENCLOSURE~~
~~NOT RECORDED~~
~~DEC 2 1983~~

3839
b6
b7C

See reverse side 63 DEC 5 1983 SAC Office Ar
FBI/DOJ



November 8, 1983

[redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation
300 No. Lee Street
Alexandria, VA 22314

Re: Computer Project

Dear [redacted]:

Micro Research will be pleased to help you in evaluating the computer materials you have in your possession. We will do it on-site at your offices, with the FBI providing the necessary hardware, software, and other required materials.

Point of contact will be [redacted] at our office. The billing rate will be \$45/hour to and from our office in Falls Church. Billing can be in any format acceptable to you. Cost of the project will not exceed \$ [redacted].

We look forward to helping you in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

Micro Research, Inc.



CWG:cf

a-fbi-iter

cc: [redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

b6
b7C

*BU file titled: "MAWFRAME"
FBW; Conspiracy
OO AX*

196-4713-

ENCLOSURE

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/16/83

Date

TO: Director, FBI
 FROM: PVO/ny SAC, Albany (196A-677) (P)
 SUBJECT: ① MAINFRAME
 FBW; CONSPIRACY
 (OO: Albany)

Re Alexandria teletype to Bureau dated 10/6/83.

Enclosed for Alexandria are three copies each of three FD-302s reflecting investigation within the Albany Division.

Albany will forward seized evidence from searches conducted within Albany Division on 10/12/83 under separate cover per instructions set forth in referenced Alexandria teletype.

2 - Bureau
 2 - Alexandria - Encs. (9)
 2 - Albany
 RAH/ed/smf
 (6)

CCIT

196-4713-18

NOV 23 1983



Approved: _____

Transmitted _____
(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

Memorandum



To : FBI Laboratory Division
Evidence Control Center
Room 2022 TL 241

JAN 8 4 ENTD

Date 11/18/83

b6
b7c

From : SA [redacted]

& Symbol

Spec-Prj MG
0774

Subject :

EQUUS ZED

Main Frame

TESTIMONY

Bufile # 196-4713
(circle one) Court Grand Jury Other - _____ Dates _____
Supporting: (circle one) Bureau Federal Local Workdays _____
City & State _____ Category 1 2 3 4
Testified? ☐ Yes ☐ No If No, then circle Reason Below for Appearing in Court but not Testifying.
01. Guilty Plea 03. Case Dismissed 05. Testimony not Needed
02. Case Continued 04. Stipulation 06. Mistrial
07. Other _____

Results of Trial _____ Judge _____
Prosecuting Attorney _____ Defense Attorney _____

OTHER COMMITMENTS

Bufile # 196-4713 City & State ALBUQUERQUE
Agency FBI Dates 11/2-7/83
(circle one) Bureau Federal Local Workdays 6

Purpose: (circle one)
01. Lecture/Training (Others) 06. Research/Data Acquisition
01A. Tours, Training, etc., at FBIHQ
02. Training (Self) 07. _____
03. Speech 08. Investigative Support
04. Pretrial Conference 09. Communication Support
05. Field Examination of Evidence 10. Conference/Meeting
11. Deposition

196-4713 -
Details/Unusual or Interesting Circumstances

64 MAR 5 1984

FEB 23

AIRTEL

Date:

18998

OCT 27 1983

SAC Buffalo (196A-529)
Subject: MAINFRAME
FBW

FBIHQ USE ONLY	
Initials	Date
Received	
Developed	
Printed	
Enlargements	
Slides	
Copied	
Other	

1. ENCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHIC WORK RELATES TO:
☒ Current Investigation ☐ Mug Shot ☐ Other

2. ENCLOSURE(S)

Film To Be Processed				Movie Film or Microfilm				Negatives To Be Printed				Other	
Size	Color	B&W	Quantity	Size	Color	B&W	Quantity	Size	Color	B&W	Quantity	Item	Quantity
4x5				16mm				8x10					
135				35mm				4x5					
126				8(super)				135					
120				70mm				120					
Slides				AHU				126					
								220					
								110					

3. WORK REQUESTED

Processing	Prints To Be Made	Prints To Be Made	Custom Prints
<input type="checkbox"/> Process only	(From 135, 126, and 110)	(Prints from slides)	(From any size negative or slide)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Process & make print	<input type="checkbox"/> 3 1/2 x 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 x 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 3 1/2 x 5	Quantity
<input type="checkbox"/> Process & make contact print	# prints from each frame	<input type="checkbox"/> 5 x 7	Size
<input type="checkbox"/> Slides to be processed	<input type="checkbox"/> Color <input type="checkbox"/> B&W	<input type="checkbox"/> 8 x 10	<input type="checkbox"/> Color <input type="checkbox"/> B&W
<input type="checkbox"/> Slides to be duplicated	(From 120 and 4x5)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> 4x5 <input type="checkbox"/> 8x10		
<input type="checkbox"/>	# prints from each frame		
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Color <input type="checkbox"/> B&W		

4. PROCESSING CENTER REMARKS

MAILED 8
OCT 27 1983
FBI

196-4713

NOT RECORDED

12 NOV 4 1983

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

- ☒ Mail Room: Show shipment date and registry number.
- ☐ Shipping Room: Show shipment date; bill of lading number, initial invoice; invoice to be placed in administrative file.

ENC.

MAIL ROOM ☒

November 25, 1983

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Robert E. Badham
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Badham:

Your November 1st inquiry regarding the FBI's investigation of unauthorized intrusions into the GTE Telemail system has been brought to my attention.

Since this is an ongoing investigation it would be inappropriate for me to comment specifically on any aspects of the case at this time. However, I would like to explain the FBI's investigative procedures and responsibilities in such investigations.

When we receive information indicating that a violation of a Federal law has occurred, is occurring or will occur and we determine there are items of evidentiary value, we obtain a judicially authorized search warrant for the premises where the evidence is believed to be located. As with any search warrant, the evidence being sought must be specifically described, as must the location to be searched. The time of execution of the search warrant is usually decided upon between the investigating Agent and the Federal prosecutor based on several needs, the most important of which would be the protection of the evidence. Although personal convenience to the subjects is a consideration, it is secondary to protection of the evidence. When the FBI is conducting an investigation, the fact that some of the alleged perpetrators may be juveniles does not diminish the seriousness of the crime nor does it lessen the FBI's responsibility to protect the victims from further illegal activity.

- 1 - Alexandria (196A-633) - Enclosures (3)
1 - Los Angeles - Enclosures (3)
1 - Administrative Unit, CID - Enclosures (3)
Room 5121
1 - [redacted] - Enclosures (3)
1 - Congressional Affairs Section - Enclosures (3)

ESH:srs (8)

62 FEB 10 1984

MAIL ROOM

DEC 15 1983

DO- CORRESPONDENCE

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MAILED 3
DEC 01 1983
FBI

- Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

Honorable Robert E. Badham

I hope the above information will be of help to you in corresponding with your constituents. If you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

Oliver S. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

NOTE: Above response suggested by SA [redacted] White-Collar Crimes Section, CID. The Congressman encloses a copy of a letter he has received from a number of his constituents with regard to the manner in which the FBI recovered computer equipment which was allegedly used in tapping into the commercial Telemail system run by GTE. He asks that the letter and the newspaper article entitled "FBI storm tactics in Irvine" be reviewed and comments furnished.

b6
b7C

APPROVED

Director

Exec. AD Adm.

Exec. AD Inv.

Exec. AD LES

Adm. Serv.

Crim. Inv.

Ident.

Intell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Insp.

Rec. Mgnt.

Tech. Serv.

Training

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date November 18, 1983

TO: DIRECTOR FBI (196-4578)
 ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION - ROOM 7159

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (196B-1018) (P)

MAIN FRAME;
 FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY
 00 : Alexandria

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE
 AND ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELENET SYSTEM OF
 CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
 FRAUD BY WIRE;
 ITSP
 00 : Milwaukee

Re Bureau airtel to Alexandria, et al, dated October 27, 1983.

Re communication requested that any evidence seized, during the investigation of captioned matters, be reviewed so as to assess any entry made into Department of Defense (DOD) computers. The brochure enclosed with the reference reviewed as to alpha listings and numeric listings. The evidence seized by search warrant in the San Diego Division revealed no evidence which would substantiate a successful entry into the DOD computer systems by the subject in the San Diego area.

3 - Bureau
 2 - Alexandria (196A-633)
 2 - Milwaukee (196B-798)
 2 - San Diego
 RDP/amr

(9)

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

b6
b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 196-4578-181

SYS. EVAL. SEC.

113
40 APR 3 1984

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ Airtel _____

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/29/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (196B-1160) (RM) (C)

SUBJECT: MAIN FRAME
 FBW, CONSPIRACY
 (OO: ALEXANDRIA)
 AX File: 196A-633



UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
 TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE);
 TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
 FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
 (OO: MILWAUKEE)
 MI File: 196B-798
 BU File: 196-4578

b6
 b7C

Re Director airtel to Alexandria dated 10/27/83.

Boston functioned as an auxiliary office in the above captioned Milwaukee case. Therefore, Boston is not in possession of any seized materials to review.

It is noted that the above referenced communication indicated that two enclosures of a sensitive nature were attached to the airtel. However, Boston received only one enclosure which was a blue covered pamphlet containing a list of letters and numbers titled alphabetical listing. It appears from the above referenced communication that Boston did not receive a separate enclosure which contains a numeric listing that is a "sign on" sequence to

- 2 - Bureau
 1 - Alexandria
 1 - Boston

CJD/elm

(4)

Approved: *JWG/WS*

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

DEC 5 1983

196-4578-
 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

BS 196B-1160

the computer. A search was conducted at the Boston Division for the missing enclosure. It is believed that the enclosure was inadvertently left off the airtel.

No further investigation outstanding in Boston. This matter has been placed in an RUC status.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/2/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, PHOENIX (196A-1325) (P)
 SUBJECT: MAINFRAME;
 FBW; CONSPIRACY
 OO: ALEXANDRIA

Re Director letter to Alexandria dated 10/27/83, and Alexandria airtel to the Director on 11/14/83.

Phoenix Division is unaware of any additional information concerning hackers entering Department of Defense computers other than that provided by Alexandria and Alexandria airtel to the Director, 11/14/83.

196-4713-20
 DEC 2 1983

- 2 - Bureau
 1 - Alexandria (196A-633) (info)
 2 - Phoenix

ERH: jlm
 (5)

1 CCAT/Via 0-7
 To Alexandria
 KO/CR
 12/8/83 1*

Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

64 JAN 12 1984

AX0005 3491933Z

RR HQ NY

DE AX

R 151830Z DEC 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

NEW YORK ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: NEW YORK, HAUPPAUGE RA

MAINFRAME; FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, OCTOBER 6, 1983.

INVESTIGATION IN THIS MATTER HAS REVEALED THAT THE TRUE NAME
OF [REDACTED] IS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND WAS PRESENT DURING THE SEARCH
OF THAT PREMISES ON OCTOBER 12, 1983.

[REDACTED] HAS TOLD SA [REDACTED], HAUPPAUGE RA, THAT HE WOULD
CONSENT TO BE INTERVIEWED IN THIS MATTER.

[REDACTED] HAS USED NUMEROUS ALIASES ON GTE TELEMAL INCLUDING
[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]. HE IS ALSO THE LEADER OF A
GROUP OF HACKERS AND PHONE FREAKS KNOWN AS THE "PHALERS".

TO DEC 21 1983

64 JAN 13 1984

Jel to Ax + NY
12/16/83
KD/HP

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Director's Sec'y	

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PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

[] ALSO IS REPORTED TO KNOW THE TRUE NAME OF [] ANOTHER
SUBJECT OF THIS INVESTIGATION.

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b7C

DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CONTEMPLATED INTERVIEW, INVOLVING
NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL UNSUBS AND OTHER COMPUTER SYSTEMS, IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY BACKGROUND INFORMATION TO AN
AO CASE AGENT.

AUTHORIZATION IS THEREFORE REQUESTED FOR SA []
TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK ON DECEMBER 20, 1983, TO CONDUCT SAID INTERVIEW,
WITH ASSISTANCE FROM A HAUPPAUGE RA AGENT. SAC, NEW YORK, AND SAC,
ALEXANDRIA, CONCUR. IF AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED SA [] WILL
BE ARRIVING AT ISLIP-MCARTHUR AIRPORT ON U.S. AIR FLIGHT 170 AT
9:09 AM ON DECEMBER 20, 1983.

b6
b7C

LEADS:

NEW YORK AT HAUPPAUGE RA: WILL SCHEDULE INTERVIEW WITH []
[] FOR DECEMBER 20, 1983.

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ALEXANDRIA REQUESTS THAT SA [] BE MET AT ISLIP-MCARTHUR
AIRPORT AT 9:09 AM ON DECEMBER 20, 1983.

BT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

038

PAGE	OF	CLASSIFICATION		PRECEDENCE
DATE	DECEMBER 16, 1983	UNCLAS		PRIORITY
<p>FM DIRECTOR FBI</p> <p>TO FBI ALEXANDRIA {196A-633} PRIORITY</p> <p>FBI NEW YORK</p> <p>ATTENTION HAUPPAUGE RA PRIORITY</p> <p>BT</p> <p>UNCLAS</p> <p>MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; 00: AX</p> <p>REAXTEL TO THE DIRECTOR, DATED 12/15/83.</p> <p>FBIHQ AUTHORIZES INVESTIGATIVE TRAVEL OF SA [REDACTED]</p> <p>ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.</p> <p>BT</p>				
DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE				
APPROVED BY	DRAFTED BY	DATE	ROOM	TELE EXT.
HNH/KO	KD:TDL {33}	12/16/83	3841	5554

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - TRAVEL FOLDER

64 JAN 18 1984

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

DEC 17 1983

06/6/83

18 DEC 21 1983

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

b6
b7Cb6
b7C

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. WJ
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To Mr. Revell

Date December 8, 1983

From :

b6
b7C

Subject : MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; OO: AX

PURPOSE:

To respond to the Director's request for comments by providing a current update on captioned matter which involves the unauthorized accessing of the General Telephone and Electronics Company (GTE) Telemail system.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED: WJ
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. WJ
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

DETAILS:

GTE owns and operates a computer network known as Telenet which links various subscriber businesses and government agencies in numerous cities. Within Telenet is a service known as Telemail which offers computerized message capability between Telemail customers.

An investigation since August, 1983 by Alexandria determined that three loosely organized groups of computer hackers had been accessing Telemail and had been browsing, altering, and destroying information maintained in the Telemail system. One hacker had left a message that he/she would disrupt the whole system if access to the administrative file could be achieved. Companies and agencies whose records were penetrated by these hackers include TRW; NASA; IBM;

KD:sm (7)

1 - Mr. Revell
1 -
1 -
1 - Mr. Collingwood

16 DEC 29 1983

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] to Mr. Revell Memorandum
RE: MAINFRAME

b6
b7c

Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Northrop Corporation; Hughes Aircraft Corporation; U. S. Department of Agriculture; and the Department of Defense ARPNET system.

As a result of investigation which identified some of these hackers, on 10/12 and 13/83, a total of fifteen search warrants were executed in nine cities throughout the United States. The searches resulted in seizing computers and computer-related paraphernalia which were utilized by the hackers to place long distance telephone calls and to illegally access, alter, or destroy information in the GTE Telemail system. The search warrant affidavits specified that any computer or computer-related paraphernalia was to be seized and that the unauthorized accessing of the Telemail system had resulted in violations of the Fraud by Wire Statute (Title 18 U.S. Code Section 1343) and the Conspiracy Statute (Title 18 U.S.C. Section 371).

Currently, Alexandria is in the process of reviewing all documents and information storage devices such as floppy discs which were seized during the execution of the aforementioned search warrants. Because of the volume of evidence seized, this review has been somewhat lengthy and is expected to take several more weeks. Once all evidence has been reviewed, the investigative findings will be provided to the United States Attorney's (USA) Office and a prosecutive decision as well as a prosecutive strategy will be formulated. Thereafter, if the USA's Office concurs, it is anticipated that this case will be presented to a Federal grand jury for prosecutive consideration.

The foregoing response was coordinated with John Collingwood, Legal Counsel Division.

Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Adm. Servs. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Insp. _____
 Intell. _____
 Lab. _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Off. Cong. &
 Public Affs. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Tech. Servs. _____
 Training _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

How to Punish Computer Trespass

When a group of Milwaukee computer hobbyists used their telephones to tamper with data stored in the computers of New York's Sloan-Kettering Institute and other major institutions last summer, law enforcement officials were caught flat-footed. There's no federal law against that kind of computer trespass, which is akin to rifling somebody else's filing cabinet.

That may be one reason the Federal Bureau of Investigation seized the equipment of several other computer owners in raids last month, including one at the State University at Stony Brook. In the absence of a specific law against computer offenses, the FBI reportedly planned to prosecute them under the laws against telephone fraud.

This showed that the federal government was serious about preventing similar occurrences in the future, as it should be.

But it also raised some questions: Since the computer owners were neither arrested nor charged with a crime, should the FBI

have marched off with their equipment?

The computer seizures were all authorized by search warrants. According to an affidavit filed with the warrant used at Stony Brook, telephone records showed that unauthorized calls into a national computer network had been placed from the home of the computer's owner and from the university radio station where he works.

The telephone records surely make strong circumstantial evidence. But the government must follow up by filing charges and then show that some genuine fraud has been committed. If it can't do that, the justification for the seizures will evaporate.

Computer break-ins are potentially dangerous. They facilitate various economic crimes as well as violations of privacy. Computer hobbyists with no criminal intent may inadvertently wipe out valuable information. But the punishment should fit the crime. If that means new laws are needed, it's up to Congress to provide them.

EDITORIAL

The Washington Post _____
 The Washington Times _____
 Daily News (New York) _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____
 The Los Angeles Times _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 USA Today _____
 NEWS DAY 16

Date 11-19-83

Page 14 FBI/DOJ

196-4713-23

RECEIVED

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/19/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)
 MAINFRAME
 FBW; CONSPIRACY
 (OO:AX)

VLM

Re Alexandria teletype to the Bureau, 10/6/83.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of an FD-515 and one copy of an internal GTE letter regarding captioned matter.

For information of the Bureau, investigation in captioned matter led to the execution of 15 searches on 10/12/83, and 10/13/83.

The searches resulted in the seizure of computers and computer-related paraphernalia at all locations. The seizure of the equipment effectively stopped the continuous and daily unauthorized access to the GTE Telemail system.

[redacted] GTE Telemail, stated that the majority of Telemail customers (and approximately 17 of the 19 customers mentioned in enclosed letter) can terminate their accounts with 30 days written notice. There are some customers (2 of the 19 mentioned) who are "re-sellers" of service and have a one year contract.

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 b7C

1cc Rm 3839
 2-Bureau (Enc. 3)
 1-Alexandria
 GDF:gaj
 (3)

ENCLOSURE

4713-24
 2 DEC 21 1983
 1-5-84Approved: H. J. [signature]

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

2-FD-515-ENCLOSURE - PREPARED AND
 HANDLED SEPARATELY

AX 196A-633

[] stated that representatives of American Hospital Supply Company (AHSC), NASA, Raytheon and other companies contacted her and were extremely concerned about how long the intruders were going to be in their accounts. It is [] opinion that, had the hackers not been identified by the FBI and prevented from accessing Telemail by the seizure of computers, a significant number of the penetrated companies would have terminated their Telemail services.

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As stated in the enclosed GTE letter, the financial impact of the unauthorized accesses extended far beyond the immediate revenue loss of affected customers. The potential loss is based on a loss of customer confidence in the security of the system, resulting in the termination of customer accounts and/or failure to obtain new customers.

That potential economic loss has been prevented by this investigation in that the vast majority of intruders were identified and had their computers seized. Further, GTE officers report no unauthorized accesses occurring since the date of the searches. This is attributed to a deterrent effect created by the media coverage in this case.



**GTE Telenet
Communications Corporation**

C. Thomas Taylor
Vice President,
Network Applications & Terminals

8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia 22180
(703) 442-1245

9 September 1983

[Redacted]
GTE Telenet
Program Office
8229 Boone Blvd.
Vienna, VA 22180

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: TELEMAIL SECURITY INVESTIGATION

Analysis of the financial impact of the current Telemail security problem indicates that nineteen customers have been affected. The monthly revenue for these customers as of July, 1983, amounts to \$297,971. Assuming that on the average, each of these customers would continue to use the service for minimum of three years, this equates to a potential loss of revenue from this customer group of \$10,726,956.

The three year impact amount is actually understated in that many of the nineteen customers are in their introductory phase with Telemail and would logically grow substantially over the July 1983 billing amount.

In addition to the customers that are directly affected, the entire Telemail business is indirectly affected by the severity of the security problem. In attempting to estimate the potential damage to the entire Telemail business, I have assumed a 50% loss factor pertinent to the 1984-1988 period. This amount consists of \$189,500,000.

Please let me know if you require additional material on this subject.

Sincerely,



b6
b7C

196 - 4713 - 24

FD-515 (Rev. 9-24-82)
ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT

(Submit within 30 days from date of accomplishment)

Date 12/19/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA
SUBJECT: MAINFRAME
FBW; CONSPIRACY
(OO:AX)

Bureau File Number
196A-633
Field Office File Number
03
Squad or RA Number

- ☐ X if a joint FBI/DEA (or other Federal Agency) operation.
☐ X if case involves corruption of a public official (Federal, State or Local).

Investigative Assistance or Techniques Used

Were any of the investigative assistance or techniques listed below used in connection with accomplishment being claimed? ☐ No ☒ Yes. If Yes, rate each used as follows:
1 = Used, but did not help
2 = Helped, but only minimally
3 = Helped, substantially
4 = Absolutely essential

1. Acctg Tech Assistance	6. ELSUR - Title III	11. Lab Div Field Support	16. Show Money Usage
2. Aircraft Assistance	7. Hypnosis Assistance	12. Pen Registers	17. Surveill. Sqd Asst
3. Computer Assistance	8. Ident Div Assistance	13. Photographic Coverage	18. SWAT Team Action
4. Consensual Monitoring	9. Informant Information	14. Polygraph Assistance	19. Telephone T. Records
5. ELSUR - FISC	10. Lab Div Exams	15. Search Warr Executed	20. Undercover Operation
			21. Visual Inves Analysis (V)

A. Preliminary Judicial Process (Number of subjects)	Complaints	Informations	Indictments	D. Recoveries, Restitutions, Court Ordered Forfeitures or Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP)
B. Arrests, Locates, Summonses & Subpoenas (No. of subjects)	Subject Priority (See Reverse)			Property or PELP Type Code *
FBI Arrests	A	B	C	Recoveries
FBI Locates				Restitutions
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Physically Resisted				Court Ordered Forfeitures
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Were Armed				Potential Economic Loss Prevented
Criminal Summons				
Subpoenas Served				
C. Release of Hostages: (Number of Hostages Released)	E. Civil Matters			
Hostages Held By Terrorists	Government Defendant			
All Other Hostage Situations	Government Plaintiff			
	Amount of Suit			
	Settlement or Award			
	Enter AFA Payment Here			

F. Final Judicial Process: Judicial District _____ (Use two letter state abbreviations per U.S. Post Office Guide. For Example - The Northern District of Texas as ND TX; The District of Maine as ME in the state field only.)

Subject 1 - Name _____ District _____ State _____ Subject's Description Code *

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction			In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine
			Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	
												\$
												\$
												\$
												\$

Subject 2 - Name _____ Subject's Description Code *

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction			In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine
			Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	
												\$
												\$
												\$
												\$

Subject 3 - Name _____ Subject's Description Code *

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction			In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine
			Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	
												\$
												\$
												\$
												\$

Attach additional forms if reporting final judicial process on more than three subjects.

Remarks:

2 DEC 22 1983
1-5-84 Denied
by CID

2 - Bureau
2 - Alexandria (1 - 196A-633) (1 - Statistics in Process) GDF:gaj (4)

* See codes on reverse side. Subject description codes in Section F are required only when reporting a conviction.

** Identify the other Federal Agency(ies) in the Remarks Section

Property Type Codes*	
Code No	Description
1	Cash (U.S. and foreign currency)
2	Stock, Bonds or Negotiable Instruments (checks, travelers checks, money orders, certificates of deposit, etc)
3	General Retail Merchandise (clothing, food, liquor, cigarettes, TVs, etc)
4	Vehicles (autos, trucks, tractors, trailers, campers, motorcycles, etc)
5	Heavy Machinery & Equipment (heavy equipment, computers, etc)
6	Bulk Materials (grain, fuel, raw materials, metals, wire, etc)
7	Jewelry (including unset precious and semiprecious stones)
8	Precious Metals (gold, silver, silverware, platinum, etc)
9	Art, Antiques or Rare Collections
10	Dangerous Drugs
11	Weapons or Explosives
12	Businesses or Assets Forfeited
20	All Other Recoveries (not falling in any category above)

Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP) Type Codes *	
Code No	Description
21	Blank Negotiable Instruments or Tickets
22	Counterfeit Stocks, Bonds, Currency or Negotiable Instruments
23	Counterfeit or Pirated Sound Recordings or Motion Pictures
24	Bank Theft Scheme Aborted
25	Ransom, Extortion or Bribe Demand Aborted
26	Theft From, or Fraud Against, Government Scheme Aborted
27	Commercial or Industrial Theft Scheme Aborted
30	All Other Potential Economic Loss Prevented (not falling in any category above)

*The case file must contain an explanation of the computation of the recovery value or loss prevented. An explanation airtel must accompany this report if the recovery is \$1 million or more, or if the PELP is \$5 million or more.

Subject Description Codes *
- Enter Description Code Only When Reporting a Conviction -

Organized Crime Subjects:

- 1A Boss, Underboss or Consigliere
- 1B Capodecina or Soldier
- 1C Possible LCN Member or Associate
- 1D OC Subject Other Than LCN

Known Criminals (Other Than OC Members):

- 2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
- 2B Top Thief
- 2C Top Con Man

Foreign Nationals:

- 3A Legal Alien
- 3B Illegal Alien
- 3C Foreign Official Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3D U.N. Employee Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3E Foreign Students
- 3F All Others

Terrorists:

- 4A Known Member of a Terrorist Organization
- 4B Possible Terrorist Member or Sympathizer

*If a subject can be classified in more than one of the categories, select the most appropriate in the circumstance.

Union Members:

- 5A International or National Officer
- 5B Local Officer
- 5C Union Employee

Government Official Or Employees:

- 6A Federal - Elected Official
- 6B Federal - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6C Federal - All Other
- 6D State - Elected Official
- 6E State - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6F State - All Other
- 6G Local - Elected Official
- 6H Local - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6J Local - All Other

Bank Officers Or Employees:

- 7A Bank Officer
- 7B Bank Employee

All Others:

- 8A All Other Subjects (not fitting above categories)

Instructions

Subject Priorities for FBI Arrest or Locates:

- A - Subject wanted for crimes of violence (i.e. murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- B - Subjects wanted for crimes involving the loss or destruction of property valued in excess of \$25,000 or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- C - All others

Claiming Convictions Other Than Federal:

It is permissible to claim a local (state, county or local) conviction if the FBI's investigation significantly contributed to the successful local prosecution. A succinct narrative setting forth the basis for claiming a local conviction must accompany this report. When claiming a conviction other than Federal, enter the word "LOCAL" in the "Conviction-Section" block, disregard the number of conviction counts, but enter the sentence in the appropriate blocks. Enter "LF" in the "In-Jail" block for all life sentences and "CP" for all capital punishment sentences.

Reporting Convictions:

Convictions should not be reported until the sentence has been issued. There are two exceptions to this rule. The conviction information can be submitted by itself if:

- 1. The subject becomes a fugitive after conviction but prior to sentencing.
- 2. The subject dies after conviction but prior to sentencing.

An explanation is required in the Remarks section for either of the above exceptions.

Rule 20 Situations:

The field office that obtained the process (normally the office of origin) is the office that should claim the conviction, not the office where the subject enters the plea in cases involving Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.

Investigative Assistance or Techniques (IA/Ts) Used:

-Since more than one IA/T could have contributed to the accomplishment, each IA/T must be rated.

-The IA/T used must be rated **each time** an accomplishment is claimed. (For example - if informant information was the basis for a complaint, an arrest, a recovery and a conviction and if separate FD-515s are submitted for each of the aforementioned accomplishments, the "Informant Information" block must be rated on each FD-515 even if it was the same information that contributed to all the accomplishments.)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/29/83

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 (ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ROOM 7159)

FROM : SAC, ALBANY (196A-677) (P)

SUBJECT: MAINFRAME
 FRAUD BY WIRE;
 CONSPIRACY
 (OO: ALEXANDRIA)

Re Alexandria airtel to the Bureau dated 10/27/83.

Copies of evidence seized from [] and []
 [] by the Albany Division were reviewed
 with respect to entry into Department of Defense Computers and
 the results were negative.

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It should be noted that all the evidence seized by the
 Albany Division was sent to the Alexandria Division. Albany only
 had available selected copies of this evidence for review.

[] materials contain the following notations:

1. The word []
2. DOB: []

b6
 b7c

Investigation in the Albany Division is continuing.

3 - Bureau
 2 - Alexandria
 (1-196A-633)
 2 - Albany
 RAH:dld
 (7)

196-4713-251

JAN 4 1984

267
 64 MAR 30 1984

ROUTING UNIT

Approved: [] Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

b6
 b7c

SAC, Alexandria

1/12/84

Director, FBI

MAIN FRAME

FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY

OO: ALEXANDRIA

AX File Number: 196-A-633

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
ELECTRONICS (GTE); TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER
COMPUTERS; FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
OO: MILWAUKEE
MI File Number: 196-B-798
Bufile: 196-4578

b6
b7C

ReBulet to SAC, Alexandria, et. al., dated 10/27/83,
captioned as above, in which recipients were requested to furnish
information regarding computer hackers.

To date, only four recipients have responded to this
request. It is imperative that recipients of instant letter
submit their responses immediately to the Technical Services
Division, Room 7159.

MAILED 13
JAN 12 1984
FBI

2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Buffalo
2 - Detroit
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Milwaukee

2 - Newark
2 - New York
2 - Oklahoma City
2 - Omaha
2 - Phoenix
2 - Tampa

1 - [redacted], Rm. 3841, TL #231
1 - [redacted], Rm. 1376, TL #153

RSM

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☐

2 JAN 13 1984

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XEROX
JAN 17 1984
JA

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 196-4578-

1 -
1 - FOF

b6
b7C

Airtel
Unclass

1-3-84

Director, FBI

SAC, Alexandria (196A-633)

VLM


MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; OO: AX

Re Alexandria airtel to the Bureau, 12/19/83.

A review by FBIHQ of the recently implemented parameters concerning PELP claims indicates that AX's PELP claim on the FD-515, which was enclosed with referenced airtel, cannot be accepted.

Under the new PELP guidelines, implemented for fiscal year 1984, any theft scheme against a commercial or industrial firm that is aborted by the FBI prior to its fruition will be claimed as a PELP only if the specific value of the loss can be firmly stated. Additionally, all PELP claims, no matter the value, must have a justification which will concisely explain the circumstances of the PELP and the value claimed. No claim will be allowed based on an estimate.

Although GTE states their potential loss was over \$10 million, that figure is an estimate of possible loss and does not refer to a specific \$10 million that was in jeopardy.



KD:sm (5)

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

JAN 5 1984

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date January 17, 1984

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (196-4578)
 ATTENTION: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION
 ROOM 7159

FROM: SAC, MILWAUKEE (196-B-798) (P)

SUBJECT: MAIN FRAME
 FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY
 OO: ALEXANDRIA
 AX File Number: 196-A-633

b6
 b7C

b6
 b7C

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
 ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
 FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
 OO: MILWAUKEE

Re Bureau letter to Alexandria, Et Al, dated 10/27/83;
 Milwaukee airtel to Bureau, Et Al, dated 11/8/83;
 Bureau letter to Alexandria, Et Al, dated 1/12/84.

The above referenced Milwaukee airtel to the Bureau was
 in response to the Bureau's initial request for information in
 the letter dated October 27, 1983. If the Bureau has misplaced
 referenced airtel, a copy has been enclosed.

3 - BUREAU (Encl. 1)
 2 - MILWAUKEE (196-B-798)

DCM/dgr

2 JAN 20 1984

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

X

64 MAY 1984

Approved:

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/8/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 (ATTENTION: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION,
 ROOM 7159)

FROM: SAC, MILWAUKEE (196B-798) (P)

[REDACTED]
 ET AL;
 UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO
 GENERAL TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE)
 TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMERS' COMPUTERS;
 FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
 OO: MILWAUKEE

b6
 b7C

Re Bureau airtel to Alexandria, dated 10/27/83.

Milwaukee has reviewed seized materials and found no references to Arpanet-linked systems. Bureau should be advised that the most capable hacker who is cooperating in this matter destroyed all records before consenting to interview. Also, the hacker subjects believed to have breached the system operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory are not cooperating and have not been served with, nor are they likely to be served with, search warrants.

Because auxiliary offices in captioned matter have no subjects in their divisions in this case, they will have no seized materials to review.

3 - Bureau
 2 - Albuquerque
 2 - Boston
 2 - Dallas
 2 - Newark
 2 - New York
 2 - Tampa
 ② - Milwaukee (196B-798)
 JGS:cal
 (17) cal



JGS

b6
 b7C

②

SERIALIZED INDEXED
 FILED

ⓧ

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) _____ Per _____

196-4713-276-788-109

ENCLOSURE

Airtel

11/29/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, BOSTON (196B-1160) (RUC)
SUBJECT: MAIN FRAME
FEW; CONSPIRACY
(OO: ALEXANDRIA)
AX File: 196A-633

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7c

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE);
TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
(OO: MILWAUKEE)
MI File: 196B-798
BU File: 196-4578

Re Director airtel to Alexandria dated 10/27/83.

Boston functioned as an auxiliary office in the above captioned Milwaukee case. Therefore, Boston is not in possession of any seized materials to review.

It is noted that the above referenced communication indicated that two enclosures of a sensitive nature were attached to the airtel. However, Boston received only one enclosure which was a blue covered pamphlet containing a list of letters and numbers titled alphabetical listing. It appears from the above referenced communication that Boston did not receive a separate enclosure which contains a numeric listing that is a "sign on" sequence to

2 - Bureau
1 - Alexandria
1 - Boston
GJD/elm
(4)

196B-1160-13

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 1 1983	
FBI - BOSTON	

196-4713-28

b6
b7c

the computer. A search was conducted at the Boston Division for the missing enclosure. It is believed that the enclosure was inadvertently left off the airtel.

No further investigation outstanding in Boston. This matter has been placed in an RUC status.

Memorandum



To : DIRECTOR, FBI

Date 1/19/84

From : SAC, BOSTON (196B-1160) (RUC)

Subject : MAIN FRAME;
FBW; CONSPIRACY
OO: ALEXANDRIA
AX: 196A-633



UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
ELECTRONICS (GTE); TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
FBW; ITSP
OO: MILWAUKEE
MI: 196B-798
BU: 196-4578



Re Bureau letter to Alexandria, 1/12/84 and Boston
airtel to the Bureau, 11/29/83.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of Boston's
RUC airtel dated 11/29/83, which responded to Bureau letter
to Alexandria, Et Al, dated 10/27/83. The airtel is self-explanatory
in that Boston, merely being a lead office for Milwaukee,
had no information relative to the request of the Bureau.

- ② - Bureau (Enc. 2) (196A-633)
2 - Alexandria (196A-633)
2 - Milwaukee (196B-798)
1 - Boston
WGS/dw
(7)

64 FEB 23 1984

196-4713-28



UNRECORDED COPY IN

196-4578-

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b6
b7c

AXO 022 021 0019Z

PP HQ

DE AX

P 20 2200Z JAN 84

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) P

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

ALBANY PRIORITY

BUFFALO PRIORITY

DETROIT PRIORITY

LOS ANGELES PRIORITY

NEW YORK PRIORITY

OKLAHOMA CITY PRIORITY

OMAHA PRIORITY

PHOENIX PRIORITY

SAN DIEGO PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY (XOO:AX).

RE AX TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, JANUARY 20, 1984.

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES WERE REQUESTED TO HAVE OWNERS INSPECT
AND SIGN A "HOLD HARMLESS" AGREEMENT PRIOR TO SEIZED PROPERTY. -A
QUESTION HAS ARISEN THE PROPRIETY OF HAVING SPECIAL AGENTS

64 FEB 16 1984


RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

21 JAN 84 10 10 2

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec AD-Adm.	
Exec AD-Inv.	
Exec AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

7 pm
14



Handwritten signature/initials

b6
b7c

17 JAN 24 1984



PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 CLAS

REQUEST "HOLD HARMLESS" AGREEMENTS.

RECEIVING OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO RETAIN EQUIPMENT WHICH IS
BEING SHIPPED TO THEM UNTIL ALEXANDRIA CAN OBTAIN CLASSIFICATION.
ALL OFFICES WILL BE NOTIFIED, ASAP.

BT

AX0006 0201726Z

RR HQ AL BU DE LA NY OC OM PX SD

DE AX

R 201726Z JAN 84

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

ALBANY ROUTINE

BUFFALO ROUTINE

DETROIT (28E-847) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEW YORK ROUTINE

OKLAHOMA CITY (196A-1270) ROUTINE

OMAHA ROUTINE

PHOENIX ROUTINE

SAN DIEGO (196B-1013) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: NEW YORK, BROOKLYN-QUEENS MRA

MAINFRAME: FBW; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, OCTOBER 6, 1983.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES.

196-4713-30 JAN 24 1984

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

ALEXANDRIA HAS COMPLETED REVIEW OF EVIDENCE SEIZED IN CAPTIONED MATTER. ALEXANDRIA IS RETAINING PRINT-OUTS, NOTES, FLOPPY DISCS, ETC., FROM EACH SUBJECT THAT HAVE EVIDENTIARY VALUE. HOWEVER, AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, THE COMPUTER HARDWARE AND NON-EVIDENTIARY MATERIAL ARE BEING FORWARDED TO EACH OFFICE FOR RETURN TO OWNER AT THIS TIME. EQUIPMENT IS BEING SENT FROM ALEXANDRIA VIA BUMAIL OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

LEADS:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO:

- 1.) RETURN EQUIPMENT TO OWNER AND RETAIN A RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF SAME.
- 2.) HAVE OWNER INSPECT EQUIPMENT AND SIGN A "HOLD HARMLESS" AGREEMENT STATING THAT HE/SHE HAS "INSPECTED EQUIPMENT LISTED ABOVE AND FOUND IT TO BE IN SATISFACTORY CONDITION. I FURTHER AGREE TO HOLD HARMLESS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FROM ANY CLAIMS CONCERNING SAID EQUIPMENT", OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT.
- 3.) IF OWNER IS UNWILLING TO SIGN SUCH A STATEMENT, THE EQUIPMENT WILL BE RETAINED BY LOCAL OFFICE UNTIL FINAL ADJUDICATION OF THIS MATTER WITH RESPECT TO THAT SUBJECT.

PAGE THREE AX 16A-633 UNCLAS

4.) FORWARD TWO COPIES OF ABOVE RECEIPTS TO ALEXANDRIA
WHEN OBTAINED.

BT

SSS

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 1/24/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, OMAHA (196A-922)(P)
 SUBJECT: MAIN FRAME
 FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY;
 OO: ALEXANDRIA
 AX File Number: 196A-633

[REDACTED]
 ET AL;
 UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
 TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE);
 TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
 FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP;
 OO: MILWAUKEE
 MI File Number: 196B-798
 Bufile Number: 196-4578

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 b7C

Re Bulet to SAC, Alexandria, et. al., dated 10/27/83
 and Bulet to Alexandria dated 1/12/84.

For information of the Bureau, Omaha Division conducted a search of the residence of [REDACTED] concerning the MAIN FRAME investigation conducted by the Alexandria Division. All items seized in this search were immediately sent to Alexandria. Accordingly, there is no way to determine if hackers involved in instant matter had made entry into the Department of Defense computers. In addition, efforts to interview [REDACTED] were negative, as he was instructed by his attorney not to consent to any interviews by the FBI.

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 b7C

- ② - Bureau
 1 - Alexandria (196A-633)(Info)
 2 - Omaha
 MJH:cac
 (5)

196-4713-31

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

17 JAN 27 1984

196-4578-
 IN USE BY ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1325219-001

Total Deleted Page(s) = 82

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Page 107 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 109 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
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Page 118 ~ Duplicate;
Page 140 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 141 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 142 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 143 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office ALEXANDRIA	Office of Origin ALEXANDRIA	Date 2/17/84	Investigative Period 8/28/83 - 2/10/84
Title of Case MAINFRAME		Report made by SA [redacted]	Typed By: gaj
		Character of Case FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY	

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PROSECUTIVE

REFERENCE: Alexandria teletype to the Bureau dated 8/27/83.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This summary is organized into seven separate summaries to more clearly reflect the groups of subjects involved. Also, those summaries concerning juveniles were prepared separately in order to facilitate transmittal to local prosecutors.

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in space below
Copies made: 2-Bureau 1-USA, Alexandria, Va. (Attn: AUSA [redacted]) 2-Alexandria (196A-633)		196-4713-32
		b6 b7c

Notations:

A*
COVER PAGE

AX 196A-633

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Narrative of Offense	B
Names of Defendants	C
Prosecutive Status	D
Witnesses	E
Evidence	F
Table of Contents for Report Forms (FD-302's)	1
Report Forms (FD-302's)	2

Report of: SA [redacted]
Date: 2/17/84

Office: Alexandria, Virginia b6
b7C

Field Office File #: 196A-633

Bureau File #:

Narrative of Offense:

General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) owns and operates a computer network known as Telenet which links various subscriber companies and Government agencies through a tie-in system in numerous cities throughout the United States. Access is obtained by calling a published telephone number in various cities.

Within the Telenet System is a service called Telemail which offers a computerized message capability between Telemail customers and any Telemail subscriber company. Each Telemail subscriber is responsible for designating an "in house" administrator to oversee all administrative functions of the customer's Telemail service, including the assignment of passwords to gain access to the system and the subscriber company. The administrator for a new user company may set up various subdivisions and individual users in his own company as he sees fit.

In August, 1983, GTE discovered that the accounts of approximately 18 Telemail subscribers had been accessed by unauthorized intruders from different areas of the country. The intruders gained access to certain customers' Telemail subscribers accounts by determining password assigned to Telemail subscribers through a process called "hacking". By this process, the "hacker" chose a subscriber account, such as Raytheon, NASA, USDA, RADA Corporation, Coca Cola USA, 3M Corporation. The "hacker" then tried numerous successive passwords (e.g., each letter of the alphabet, or the administrator's first name, etc.) until the correct password was discovered. Many hackers programmed their home computer to systematically try passwords for hours at a time. Once the hacker had broken a customer's password, he entered the Telemail System as if he were the legitimate subscriber. He did this by calling a published Telenet dial-in number and then placing his telephone on his modem hookup. This modem hookup allowed him to type on his home computer keyboard and have the impulses sent through the telephone system into the Telenet computer

B-1

AX 196A-633

system. He then typed in the command "Mail" and entered the Telemail message system. At this point the computer prompted him with "User Name?". He then typed in the words (for example) ADMIN/NASA. The computer then prompted with "Password?" and he then typed in the password that he had discovered through hacking. At this point he was accepted by the system as a legitimate subscriber, and was able to perform many of the functions that the subscriber can perform, all of which would be charged to the legitimate subscriber. At this point some of the hackers created a pirate subdivision in the legitimate subscriber organization, such as ADMIN/inner circle/NASA and set up user names in that new "pirate" account. User names may be any compilation of letters and numbers, but are usually a first initial, period, then last name (i.e., [redacted]). The hacker, as administrator of his own subdivision, then set up passwords for all his users, notified them of their user name and password and they could now enter Telemail with their names and passwords. These users could now leave messages on the system to an individual in the group, to the pirate administrator or (because the computer believed they are legitimate) to any other user (legitimate or illegitimate) in the entire Telemail system.

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On October 13, 1983, immediately before FBI Agents began a search of the WUSB Radio Station, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York, [redacted] told [redacted] to go into that room and remove certain items from that room to prevent those items from being seized. [redacted] did remove certain items from the room.

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AX 196A-633

NAME OF DEFENDANTS:

1.

[Redacted Name]

described as:

~~Race~~

~~Sex~~

~~Date of Birth~~

~~Social Security~~

~~Account Number~~

~~Address~~

[Redacted Description]

[Redacted]

yrs old

[Redacted Description]

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

2.

described as:

Race

Sex

Date of Birth

Social Security

Account Number

Address

Yes or No

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

3.

① [Redacted]

described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Hair
Eyes
Address

[Redacted]

☐

Yes old

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

PROSECUTIVE STATUS:

1. On August 30, 1983, the available facts in this matter were presented to Elsie Munsell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, who advised she would consider prosecution in the matter.

2. On October 13, 1983, the premises located at [REDACTED] and WUSB Radio Station, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York, was searched pursuant to a duly authorized federal search warrant and various computer paraphenalia were seized.

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AX 196A-633

WITNESSES:

1.

[REDACTED]

GTE Telemail
8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia
Telephone [REDACTED]

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b7C

Can provide details of GTE Telemail operations, methods of detecting unauthorized users and procedures for obtaining print-outs of customer messages.

2.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6
b7C

Can supply details of investigation.

3.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of WUSB Radio Station, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

4.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Can supply details of admissions made by [REDACTED] to him, as well as details about the extent of intrusion into GTE Telemail by [REDACTED] and others.

Full text in report section, pages 7 - 16, attached.

AX 196A-633

6.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

7.

[REDACTED]

Telephone [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Can provide details of [REDACTED] use of telephones
and computers at WUSB, as well as details concerning
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] involvement in removal of
evidence prior to FBI search.

b6
b7C

Full text in report section, pages 17 - 18, attached.

AX 196A-633

EVIDENCE:

1. Summary of 57 messages placed on GTE Telemail by [redacted] (originals in possession of [redacted] [redacted] GTE Telemail).

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b7C

2. Copy of 302 concerning search with attached list of items seized.

3. List of items from WUSB Radio Station, State University of New York, relevant to Telemail (originals in possession of Alexandria FBI).

4. List of items from [redacted] relevant to Telemail (originals in possession of Alexandria FBI).

b6
b7C

5. List of charges for [redacted] and [redacted] (original in possession of [redacted]).

6. Copy of messages sent to GTE Telemail [redacted] [redacted] (originals in possession of [redacted]).

b6
b7C
b7D

7. Copy of investigative reports provided by [redacted] [redacted] Attorney for State University of New York at Stony Brook, concerning [redacted].

b6
b7C

8. Copy of letter from [redacted] with enclosed copy of "2600" magazine.

b6
b7C

9. FD-302 summarizing trap and trace information received from [redacted]

b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 12/14/83

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user known as [redacted] and [redacted] on the GTE Telemail System.

b6
b7C

The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

1. July 9, 1983, 11:42 p.m. (All times Eastern Daylight Time) This message discusses a Source Account and states in part "Some of you mentioned hacking timecor and task force. What exactly are those and how are they accessible? I await your replies." Signed [redacted]
2. July 10, 1983, 4:28 a.m. Message reads as follows: "Hi, folks - [redacted] on assignment. The following will either be long and boring or informative and interesting, or maybe a combination. Looks like Southern Bell has some sort of relationship with Telenet." This is followed by a forwarded message from the Telenet Company that discusses "Southern Bell marketing opportunities for 1983/84."
3. July 14, 1983, 5:41 p.m. This is again a forwarded message concerning the Telemail Account of Citibank.
4. July 15, 1983, 3:21 a.m. This is a forwarded message from [redacted] to all members of the Phalse group. The message is a listing of the projections of the 1984 Telemail Revenues. This message lists every current and projected Telemail account number and the projected revenue for 1984.
5. July 15, 1983, 3:25 a.m. This is another message from [redacted] to all members of the Phalse group, concerning Telenet information.
6. July 15, 1983, 11:27 p.m. This message discusses the idea of a publication called "2600 Magazine" with articles to discuss phone phreaking and computer hacking.

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

SUB E

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :pej Date dictated 12/8/83

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

Continuation of FD-302 of Summary of Messages On 12/14/83 Page 2

7. July 10, 1983, 11:47 p.m.
8. July 11, 1983, 1:02 a.m.
9. July 16, 1983, 2:07 a.m. This message reads in part, "Yes, I have been thinking about distribution. So far we have reliable boxes in Colorado, Chicago and Long Island. I'm looking for a way right now of opening up a box in Grand Central Station or something." This message goes on to discuss ways that mail would immediately be forwarded to a different post office box so that the boxes could not be traced.
10. July 18, 1983, 3:02 p.m. This message states, [redacted] is the ID for the space station information." Signed [redacted] b6 b7C
11. July 18, 1983, 8:10 p.m.
12. July 18, 1983, 10:47 p.m. This is a message from [redacted] to [redacted]. The message begins, [redacted] (from [redacted]) and continues, "Give thanx, that you're not wanted dred (Sic) or alive. I'll be jammin with you tomorrow. Time to draw my brakes. What a plot! Police and thieves on my back. I gotta go back home to my tenament yard." [redacted] b6 b7C
13. July 24, 1983, 11:16 p.m. This message states, "I found this somewhere, but can't seem to get the procedure right. Any suggestions?" This is followed by the listing of a Telemail customer, computer application services and passwords for that customer.
14. July 25, 1983, 2:38 a.m.
15. August 2, 1983, 2:49 a.m. This message is entitled, "Your Telenet Guide," and discusses administrative functions of the Telemail system.
16. August 3, 1983, 1:30 a.m.
17. August 4, 1983, 4:05 a.m.
18. August 5, 1983, 7:03 p.m. In this message [redacted] is asking [redacted], aka [redacted], what the price range is for printing stationery. In a previous message, [redacted] indicated that [redacted] worked in a print shop. b6 b7C

AX 196A-633

Continuation of FD-302 of Summary of Messages On 12/14/83 , Page 3

19. August 8, 1983, 2:11 a.m. This message refers to [] and [] "hacking up a storm" on "Black". Black was their pseudonym for an IBM voice message system they were illegally using. b6 b7C
20. August 8, 1983, 10:13 p.m. This message reads as follows, [] but Phalse isn't known by anyone yet. Is it? This is really the only place I've seen mentioned of it, unless they have bugs on ADS (which I really doubt), there's no real record Phalse anywhere. I think perhaps we should change our name when hacking perhaps, but then again it's always possible that some faithful follower (Phalse groupies) will do things in our name (or we could say that, anyway!)"
21. August 17, 1983, 10:13 p.m.
22. August 21, 1983, 11:45 p.m. This message discusses, "Green, gold, and black." These are IBM voice message systems that these people were using illegally.
23. August 23, 1983, 9:48 p.m.
24. August 24, 1983, 11:34 p.m.
25. August 26, 1983, 4:45 p.m.
26. August 29, 1983, 4:17 p.m. This message is entitled, "Arpa" and states in part, "I was able to get inside their Centrex using that 800 number I told you about."
27. August 31, 1983, 12:43 a.m.
28. August 31, 1983, 4:08 p.m.
29. August 31, 1983, 11:20 p.m. The statement reads in part, "Hi, [] Good to see you got onto the system alright. Welcome to the Phalse network. Our purpose is to exchange all kinds of info as quickly and efficiently as possible. This system is one of our resources. If you'd like to see some of the stuff we've been up to, look in EMLE. The PW is the same as yours when you logged in." b6 b7C

AX 196A-633

Continuation of FD-302 of Summary of Messages On 12/14/83 Page 4

30. September 8, 1983, 3:56 a.m.
31. September 8, 1983, 5:37 a.m. In this message, [] forwards a message from a Telenet official to all Telenet users discussing unauthorized access to customer computer systems.
32. September 8, 1983, 10:15 a.m. This message reads as follows, "The situation at Telenet continues to be unsettled, as those of you on the 'A' System can see on the BBS. Therefore the the moratorium against hacking Telemail accounts has been extended until the end of September. At that time, we can continue with a vegence and introduce the new people into the ways of the 'usercode.'
A new Arpa update has been sent to those currently involved in the TAC HAC Project. We still do not have a date on password cutover, although the end of the year has hinted at for MILNET implementation. We still need guest accounts on MIT and SRI hosts, as well as a new FTP NOCS. Anyone with info on any of these should pass it on via the Arpa list.
And last but not least, another reminder not to take the Telemail Customer Survey they are touting on the BB. It is partly designed as a trap to validate authorized system users, and our unregistered area which stands out like a sore thumb should they take a closer look. Later, all." Signed, [] and is followed by "P.S.: OSUNY Lives!"
33. September 11, 1983, 5:13 p.m.
34. September 11, 1983, 5:19 p.m. This message states, "Folks, should we risk sending to these people from our own accounts? Personally I'd feel better if we had accounts over in their area in case as a clampdown or something. Please let me know the facts." Signed, []
35. September 12, 1983, 8:00 p.m.
36. September 12, 1983, 11:51 p.m.
37. September 13, 1983, 5:26 p.m.
38. September 14, 1983, 11:30 p.m.

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

AX 196A-633

Continuation of FD-302 of Summary of Messages, On 12/14/83, Page 5

39. September 17, 1983, 2:06 a.m.
40. September 17, 1983, 9:36 p.m.
41. September 18, 1983, 10:05 p.m.
42. September 18, 1983, 10:05 p.m.
43. September 19, 1983, 2:03 a.m.
44. September 24, 1983, 8:34 p.m.
45. September 25, 1983, 8:51 p.m.
46. September 27, 1983, 5:54 p.m.
47. September 28, 1983, 11:21 p.m.
48. September 29, 1983, 8:29 p.m. This message is an exhortation by [] for all members of the Phalse group to use the illegal systems more frequently to keep in contact with each other. b6 b7C
49. September 30, 1983, 5:23 p.m.
50. October 1, 1983, 3:22 a.m.
51. October 3, 1983, 12:05 p.m.
52. October 6, 1983, 12:13 a.m.
53. October 10, 1983, 1:42 a.m.
54. October 10, 1983, 7:05 p.m. This message is from [] to [] and states, "Can we talk via voice sometime soon? Leave me a MSG somewhere." b6 b7C
55. October 11, 1983, 1:11 p.m.
56. October 12, 1983, 11:56 p.m.
57. October 12, 1983, 12:13 a.m.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription
10/25/83

On October 13, 1983, at 11:55 AM, a search warrant was executed at room 240 of Student Union Building Number 37 at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, New York, by Special Agents (SA's) [redacted] and [redacted]. No pertinent property was found at this location.

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[redacted] of WUSB, advised that there was personal computer equipment belonging to [redacted] in room 227 of the same building and that the telephones in room 227 were part of the same system as those in room 240. [redacted] indicated that he had control over room 227 and would allow access. He proceeded to give his written consent for the Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to enter room 227.

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At 12:30 PM, Magistrate SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN of the Eastern District of New York at Brooklyn, New York, was contacted telephonically by Special Agent [redacted] and advised of the change in room locations and of [redacted] consent. SCHEINDLIN proceeded to authorize a search of room 227.

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At 12:35 PM a search of room 227 was begun and the search was terminated at 2:15 PM. The search and inventory of property taken were made in the presence of [redacted], a volunteer employee of WUSB and part time user of the computer system.

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At the time of the search, the Special Agents observed that the computer system in room 227 was connected to the telephone system.

Attached is a copy of the inventory of the property taken from room 227.

F-7

Reviewed on 10/13/83 at Stony Brook, New York File # BQ 196B-2942

A [redacted] PRO/, SA [redacted] Date Dictated 10/19/83
A [redacted] and [redacted] PRO/sfn

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Page 1 of 1

Don't forget to write.

b6
b7C

Y. LAURENT 2/4/1970

CO 2 (4456.5)

1942-1943

SMART MODEM (F 21369400)

12034 12035 12036 12037 12038 12039 12040 12041 12042 12043 12044 12045 12046 12047 12048 12049 12050 12051 12052 12053 12054 12055 12056 12057 12058 12059 12060 12061 12062 12063 12064 12065 12066 12067 12068 12069 12070 12071 12072 12073 12074 12075 12076 12077 12078 12079 12080 12081 12082 12083 12084 12085 12086 12087 12088 12089 12090 12091 12092 12093 12094 12095 12096 12097 12098 12099 12100 12101 12102 12103 12104 12105 12106 12107 12108 12109 12110 12111 12112 12113 12114 12115 12116 12117 12118 12119 12120 12121 12122 12123 12124 12125 12126 12127 12128 12129 12130 12131 12132 12133 12134 12135 12136 12137 12138 12139 12140 12141 12142 12143 12144 12145 12146 12147 12148 12149 12150 12151 12152 12153 12154 12155 12156 12157 12158 12159 12160 12161 12162 12163 12164 12165 12166 12167 12168 12169 12170 12171 12172 12173 12174 12175 12176 12177 12178 12179 12180 12181 12182 12183 12184 12185 12186 12187 12188 12189 12190 12191 12192 12193 12194 12195 12196 12197 12198 12199 12200 12201 12202 12203 12204 12205 12206 12207 12208 12209 12210 12211 12212 12213 12214 12215 12216 12217 12218 12219 12220 12221 12222 12223 12224 12225 12226 12227 12228 12229 12230 12231 12232 12233 12234 12235 12236 12237 12238 12239 12240 12241 12242 12243 12244 12245 12246 12247 12248 12249 12250 12251 12252 12253 12254 12255 12256 12257 12258 12259 12260 12261 12262 12263 12264 12265 12266 12267 12268 12269 12270 12271 12272 12273 12274 12275 12276 12277 12278 12279 12280 12281 12282 12283 12284 12285 12286 12287 12288 12289 12290 12291 12292 12293 12294 12295 12296 12297 12298 12299 12300 12301 12302 12303 12304 12305 12306 12307 12308 12309 12310 12311 12312 12313 12314 12315 12316 12317 12318 12319 12320 12321 12322 12323 12324 12325 12326 12327 12328 12329 12330 12331 12332 12333 12334 12335 12336 12337 12338 12339 12340 12341 12342 12343 12344 12345 12346 12347 12348 12349 12350 12351 12352 12353 12354 12355 12356 12357 12358 12359 12360 12361 12362 12363 12364 12365 12366 12367 12368 12369 12370 12371 12372 12373 12374 12375 12376 12377 12378 12379 12380 12381 12382 12383 12384 12385 12386 12387 12388 12389 12390 12391 12392 12393 12394 12395 12396 12397 12398 12399 12400 12401 12402 12403 12404 12405 12406 12407 12408 12409 12410 12411 12412 12413 12414 12415 12416 12417 12418 12419 12420 12421 12422 12423 12424 12425 12426 12427 12428 12429 12430 12431 12432 12433 12434 12435 12436 12437 12438 12439 12440 12441 12442 12443 12444 12445 12446 12447 12448 12449 12450 12451 12452 12453 12454 12455 12456 12457 12458 12459 12460 12461 12462 12463 12464 12465 12466 12467 12468 12469 12470 12471 12472 12473 12474 12475 12476 12477 12478 12479 12480 12481 12482 12483 12484 12485 12486 12487 12488 12489 12490 12491 12492 12493 12494 12495 12496 12497 12498 12499 12500 12501 12502 12503 12504 12505 12506 12507 12508 12509 12510 12511 12512 12513 12514 12515 12516 12517 12518 12519 12520 12521 12522 12523 12524 12525 12526 12527 12528 12529 12530 12531 12532 12533 12534 12535 12536 12537 12538 12539 12540 12541 12542 12543 12544 12545 12546 12547 12548 12549 12550 12551 12552 12553 12554 12555 12556 12557 12558 12559 12560 12561 12562 12563 12564 12565 12566 12567 12568 12569 12570 12571 12572 12573 12574 12575 12576 12577 12578 12579 12580 12581 12582 12583 12584 12585 12586 12587 12588 12589 12590 12591 12592 12593 12594 12595 12596 12597 12598 12599 12600 12601 12602 12603 12604 12605 12606 12607 12608 12609 12610 12611 12612 12613 12614 12615 12616 12617 12618 12619 12620 12621 12622 12623 12624 12625 12626 12627 12628 12629 12630 12631 12632 12633 12634 12635 12636 12637 12638 12639 12640 12641 12642 12643 12644 12645 12646 12647 12648 12649 12650 12651 12652 12653 12654 12655 12656 12657 12658 12659 12660 12661 12662 12663 12664 12665 12666 12667 12668 12669 12670 12671 12672 12673 12674 12675 12676 12677 12678 12679 12680 12681 12682 12683 12684 12685 12686 12687 12688 12689 12690 12691 12692 12693 12694 12695 12696 12697 12698 12699 12700 12701 12702 12703 12704 12705 12706 12707 12708 12709 12710 12711 12712 12713 12714 12715 12

Chlorophyll *a*, *b*, and total chlorophyll were determined by spectrophotometry.

Very truly yours,
John D. Rockefeller

[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

295000 207000 3 215000

PHILIP CASHMAN

I declare that this inventory is a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the above.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/14/83

The following is a review of items seized in a court-authorized search of the WUSB Radio Station premises at the State University of New York at Stonybrook on October 12/13 1983. The following items of relevance to this investigation were found:

1) A computer print-out labeled "Telemail System Command Manual," printed September 20, 1983. This print-out contains all Telemail System commands. This information would normally be obtainable only by a legitimate Telemail administrator.

2) This item is another copy of the "Telemail System Command Manual."

3) A computer print-out titled "CP/M Modem Program Version 7.4." This is a program that will automatically search for other computer numbers through the telephone system.

4) A computer print-out beginning "Welcome to My Data Base System." This print-out also contains the statement "Hello, [redacted]"

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5) A print-out entitled "Free Access Computerized BBS Directory." Copyright by Peter J. Keller. This print-out also bears the address [redacted] Data Base System, care of Tower Systems, 196 Main Street, Lincoln Park, New Jersey 07035, followed by the words Modem: 201/694-7425.

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6) A white envelope with the return address: [redacted]
[redacted] This envelope is addressed to WUSB Radio Station, Attention: [redacted]

b6
b7C

7) A print-out titled "Jerihug Computer Club Finances as of 6/10/82." This print-out contains a list of names and expenses.

8) A box of business cards labelled "Litel Systems, Incorporated, 285 Locust Drive, Rocky Point, New York." It also has the name [redacted] and the telephone number [redacted]

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Investigation on 11/10/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :kar Date dictated 11/14/83 Sub E

b6
b7C

9) A computer print-out listing numerous bulletin boards and telephone numbers.

10) A computer print-out of telephone numbers, including numerous Telenet access numbers and Arpanet access numbers. This print-out also includes a handwritten note: 914/725-4064, Osuny. It also bears the number 800/424-6000, followed by the words Telenet 800. This print-out also has a "Connect address" for the Source.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/14/83

The following is a review of items seized in a search of [redacted]

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1) A WUSB staff telephone directory, including the numbers for [redacted]

b6
b7C

2) A yellow piece of paper with the words "[redacted] and/or [redacted]" and the area code 213 followed by other phone numbers. One of these numbers is area code [redacted]

b6
b7C

3) Photocopy of article entitled "Telecorder" with a typewritten note signed [redacted] was a member of the Phalsers who went by the user name [redacted]

b6
b7C

4) Telephone bill for the number [redacted], dated August 22, 1983, with toll charges.

5) White envelope with the number [redacted] on it.

b6
b7C

6) 1982 personal pocket diary of [redacted]

7) A New York telephone brochure with numerous telephone numbers written on it.

8) Telephone bill for number [redacted], dated June 22, 1983.

b6
b7C

9) Telephone bill for the number [redacted], dated April 22, 1983.

10) Telephone bill for above number, dated May 22, 1983.

11) Telephone bill for above number, dated February 22, 1983.

12) An orange 3 by 5 card with numerous names and addresses on it.

Investigation on 11/10/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
Sub E

by SA [redacted]:kar Date dictated 11/14/83

b6
b7C

13) A computer print-out starting with "Dial Your Match Commands" and the words "TUC BBS," followed by a phone number.

14) A small scrap of yellow paper with the number [redacted] on it.

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b7C

15) A white scrap of paper with the address [redacted] .. (illegible), [redacted]

b6
b7C

16) A brown scrap of paper with the address [redacted]

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/20/84

The "floppy discs" that were seized in search of the WUSB radio station at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, New York, were examined by [REDACTED] a computer programmer. [REDACTED] indicated that the discs appear to have no information on them pertaining to GTE Telemail.

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b7C

Investigation on 1/17/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [REDACTED] :gaj Date dictated 1/17/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted], GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

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b7C

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

b6
b7C

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[REDACTED] (Continued)	BMW	\$55.00	September
	BMW	\$40.00	August
	Maraven	\$1.00	September
[REDACTED]	BMW	\$4.00	September
	BMW	\$1.00	August
[REDACTED]	Raytheon	\$19.00	September
[REDACTED]	Scannet	\$2.00	September
		\$621.00	
.....			
[REDACTED]	Maraven	\$0.17	August
	Telenet	\$144.00	July
	Telenet	\$59.00	August
[REDACTED]	BMW	\$11.00	September
[REDACTED]	UAW	\$5.00	September
[REDACTED]	Scannet	\$6.00	September
		\$225.17	
.....			
[REDACTED]	BMW	\$3.00	September
	BMW	\$0.17	August
	Maraven	\$1.00	September
	Maraven	\$8.00	August
[REDACTED]	Maraven	\$132.00	July
	Maraven	\$37.00	August
[REDACTED]	AHSC	\$15.00	August
		\$196.17	
.....			

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS	
	AHSC	\$0.55	September	b6 b7C
	Telenet	\$92.00	July	
	Telenet	\$21.00	August	
	AHSC	<u>\$6.00</u>	August	
		\$119.55		
.....				
	AHSC	\$64.00	August	b6 b7C
	AHSC	\$10.00	September	
	Raytheon	\$5.00	August	
	Raytheon	\$7.00	September	
	RADA	<u>\$1.00</u>	September	
		\$87.00		
.....				
	AHSC	\$88.00	August	b6 b7C
.....				
	CBOT	\$6.57	September	
	RADA	\$115.00	August, September	
	AHSC	\$35.00	August, September	b6 b7C
	BMW	\$20.00	September	
	MMM	<u>\$3.00</u>	September	
		\$179.57		
.....				
	CBOT	\$86.00	September	
	RADA	\$8.00	September	b6 b7C
	MMM	<u>\$3.00</u>	September	
		\$97.00		
.....				

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS	
[REDACTED]	CBOT	\$103.00	September	
	RADA	\$4.00	September	b6
[REDACTED]	MMM	\$7.00	September	b7C
		<u>\$114.00</u>		
.....				
[REDACTED]	CBOT	\$87.00	September	
	RADA	\$18.52	August, September	b6
[REDACTED]	RADA	\$0.76	September	b7C
[REDACTED]	CBOT	\$287.00	September	
		<u>\$393.28</u>		
.....				
[REDACTED]	CBOT	\$2.00	September	
	RADA	\$3.00	September	
[REDACTED]	CBOT	\$0.90	September	b6
	RADA	\$0.12	September	b7C
		<u>\$6.02</u>		
.....				
[REDACTED]	AHSC	\$27.00	August, September	b6
	MMM	\$5.00	September	b7C
	RADA	\$2.00	September	
		<u>\$34.00</u>		
.....				
[REDACTED]	RADA	\$8.00	August, September	
	CBOT	\$0.17	September	b6
[REDACTED]	MMM	\$0.42	September	b7C
		<u>\$8.59</u>		
.....				

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS	
[REDACTED]	Raytheon	\$5.00	September	b6 b7C
	AHSC	\$4.00	August, September	
		\$9.00		
.....				
[REDACTED]	AHSC	\$4.50	August, September	
	RADA	\$0.12	September	b6 b7C
[REDACTED]	Raytheon	\$1.00	September	
		\$5.68		
.....				
[REDACTED]	Raytheon	\$109.00	September	b6 b7C
.....				
[REDACTED]	Raytheon	\$41.00	September	b6 b7C
.....				
[REDACTED]	Raytheon	\$107.00	September	b6 b7C
.....				
[REDACTED]	Raytheon	\$76.00	September	b6 b7C
.....				
[REDACTED]	CBOT	\$0.29	September	b6 b7C
	RADA	\$85.00	August, September	
		\$85.29		

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted], GTE Telemail, forwarded copies of the attached Telemail messages.

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Review of the messages indicates that contact with GTE Telemail was made by a group using the name "Phalse". The "Members of Phalse" soon stated they could be called [redacted], or [redacted]. This person then began using an intermediary to deliver the messages. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
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b7D

[redacted], as well as another confidential source, have confirmed [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In the series of messages attached, [redacted] admits to frequent and pervasive intrusion into the Telemail system, and also admits to reading the internal messages of legitimate users of Telemail. (Specifically, AT & T Long Lines.)

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b7C

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

Sub E

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633 - ATTACHMENT

Posted: Mon, Nov 7, 1993 9:00 AM EST
 From: [REDACTED]
 To: [REDACTED]
 CC: [REDACTED]
 Subject: HACTLER MEG

File # 100-1505-0000

b6
b7c

APPARENTLY, THERE IS AN ORGANIZATION COORDINATING SOME OF THE RECENT ACTIVITY BY UNAUTHORIZED USERS ON TELEMAIL. I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ONE OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1001-1005.

$$= \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{-t^2} dt = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \cdot \sqrt{\pi} = 1$$
[illegible]

1. ☐ **Yes**
 2. ☐ **No**
 3. ☐ **Not sure**

b6
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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

As a result, the model is able to capture the nonlinear relationship between the variables, which is a common feature in many real-world datasets. The model is also able to handle missing data, which is a common problem in many datasets. The model is able to handle missing data by using a technique called "multiple imputation by chained equations" (MICE). This technique involves imputing the missing values for each variable in the dataset, one at a time, using the values of the other variables in the dataset. The imputed values are then used to fit the model, and the process is repeated until the model is able to handle the missing data.

1. ANOTHER, BUT RELATED, ON "NORMALIZATION" THAT WE SHOULD REMEMBER IS THAT THE
"NORMALIZATION" OF THE EAST IS NOT THE SAME AS THE "NORMALIZATION" OF THE WEST.
THE "NORMALIZATION" OF THE WEST IS THE "NORMALIZATION" OF THE WEST.

THEY ARE IN A POSITION THAT ENTAILS, IN THE ALL-STATE, TO FIND THE POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF ASSORTED TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS (XERO, THAT BEING, SAYING, WE CAN DO, NO MORE, NECESSARILY, THAT WILL BE FOR US, BUT IN ONLY A MORE MODERATE, FROM ANY OF OUR MEMBERS, WE DID NOT DESTROY ANY INFORMATION, AND DID WE THEREBY SUBMITTING REPORTS FROM GRANTS, WEIRD, TO THE SYSTEM, WE DID NOT HAVE ANY OTHER, UNDER ANY LEGITIMATE NOTION.

THEY WILL BE GIVE AN ADVANTAGE TO SOME RATHER WELL-KNOWN, SOME OF THEM HAVE NOT BEEN, PERSONNEL-THERE ARE PROBABLY SCORES OF OTHER FACETS, NOTED AWAY ALL THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM. WE FEEL YOU HAVE GONE ABOUT THIS PROBLEM IN THE WRONG WAY. CONFISCATING LEGITIMATELY BOUGHT EQUIPMENT ONLY SERVES TO VICTIMIZE INNOCENT PEOPLE-MANY OF WHOM HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE TELEMAIL SYSTEM. THIS TACTIC CERTAINLY DOESN'T DISCOURAGE HACKERS; IT'S DOUBTFUL THAT ANYTHING WILL. AND IT DEFINITELY DOES NOT LOOK GOOD INT THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC.

NATURALLY WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR OTHER GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS. AS REPRESENTATIVES OF PHALSB, WE FEEL THAT SOME OF OUR MEMBERS AREN'T BEING TREATED WITH FAIRNESS. WE'D LIKE A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THIS.

PLEASE DO NOT BLOCK ACCESS TO THIS ACCOUNT AS WE SINCERELY WANT TO ESTABLISH MEANINGFUL COMMUNICATION.

FINAL 3E

b6
b7C

Action? ☐ B115

ਸ਼੍ਰੀ ਗੁਰੂ ਗ੍ਰੰਥ ਸਾਹਿਬ ਜੀ

F-20

Action?

2E0D 0A0D 0A43 4C41 5544 4941 2048 4F55
5354 4F4E 0D0A

* * * * *
* * * * *

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b7c

Enter SMN or <CR> to stop: xcid-1588-8719.detail

SMN: XGID-1588-8719

Posted date: November 7, 1988 1:32 PM

Delivery Options: 0000000000000000

Field	Type	Offset	Length
From	1	0	8
To	1	8	8
CC	1	16	10
Subject	1	54	8
MIDL	1	26	22
Body	1	62	678

From
5454 5437 2230 3020

* TTT7160

To
4540 6560 6500 7A00

* Fd11...

CC
5010 7060 6560 7A00

* ...

Subject
4865 6060 6F20 2020

* Hello

MIDL
000E 0100 8000 5642 4450 3100 5420 000E
0100 4000 5454 5437 9030 3010

*V80100 ...
* ...

Body
5468 6973 2060 6574 7465 7220 6973 1010
6E20 7265 706F 6E73 6520 746F 2070 6F75
7220 6D65 6D6F 2074 6520 4940 6F75 7372
6F6E 1E20 2054 6865 206D 6169 6062 6F73
2070 6F75 2061 7265 2075 706F 6512 6010
6973 2071 7569 7465 2069 6060 6567 6160
2028 6173 2070 6F75 2069 6E1F 7720 2020
686F 7765 7665 7220 4920 7265 6160 6072
2077 6F75 6064 2060 6969 6520 746F 2060
6176 6520 6100 0A64 6961 606F 6775 6520
7769 7468 2079 6F75 2E20 2054 6F20 7468
6174 2065 6E64 2020 4920 6861 7665 2061
2060 6567 6160 206D 6169 6062 6F73 2073
6574 2075 7020 666F 7220 796F 750D 0A75
6E64 6572 2074 6865 206E 616D 6520 2250
6872 6965 6E64 3222 2E20 2054 6865 2070
6173 7377 6F72 6420 666F 7220 7468 6520
626F 7820 6973 2074 6865 2073 6967 6E2D
6F66 6620 796F 750D 0A75 7365 6420 7768
656E 2079 6F75 2063 6F6E 7461 6374 6564
204D 732E 2048 6F75 7374 6F6E 2E20 2042
6173 6564 2075 706F 6E20 796F 7572 2060
6574 7465 7220 2069 7420 7365 656D 7320
796F 750D 0A72 6570 7265 7365 6E74 2061
2067 726F 7570 2E20 2049 2064 6F6E 2774
206D 696E 6420 7461 606B 696E 6720 746F

* This letter is a
* a response to ...
* a name to ...
* ... The ...
* ... you are ...
* ... is quite ...
* ... as you ...
* ... however ...
* ... would like to ...
* ... ave a ... dialogue ...
* ... with you. To th ...
* ... at end, I have a ...
* ... legal mailbox ...
* ... et up for you ...
* ... nden the name "P ...
* ... hfriend". The ...
* ... assword for the ...
* ... box is the sign- ...
* ... off you..used wh ...
* ... en you contacted ...
* ... B ...
* ... ased upon your l ...
* ... etter, it seems ...
* ... you..represent a ...
* ... group. I don't ...
* ... mind talking to ...

b6
b7c

6B65	2063	6172	6520	6F66	2064	6973	7365	* will let you..ta *
6D69	6E61	7469	6E61	2074	6865	2070	6173	* care of disse *
7377	6F72	6420	746F	2079	6F75	7220	6772	* inating the pas *
6F75	7020	6D65	6D62	6572	732E	0D0A	0D0A	* sword to your an *
5261	7468	6572	2074	6861	6E20	6765	7420	* our members..... *
696E	746F	2074	6865	2064	6574	6169	6C73	* Rather than get *
206F	6620	796F	7572	206C	6574	7465	7220	* into the details *
746F	2043	6C61	7564	6961	2020	4920	776F	* of your letter *
756C	6420	7261	7468	6572	0D0A	7761	6974	* to [] I wo *
2075	6E74	696C	2077	6520	6361	6E20	6465	* old rather..wait *
7665	6C6F	7020	6120	6469	616C	6F67	7565	* until we can de *
2E0D	0A0D	0A4C	6F6F	6969	6E67	2066	6F7C	* velop a dialogue *
7761	7264	2074	6F20	6965	6172	696E	6720	*Looking for *
6672	6F6D	2079	6F75	2E0D	0A0D	0A50	687C	* ward to hearing *
6965	6E64	0D0A						* From you....Eho *
								* tend.. *

b6
b7c

Enter SMN or CCRD to stop:
 Logout
 :07 NOV 1983, 16:44

909 162.86 DISCONNECTED 00 20 00:00:06:44 250 39

@ 909162

909 162 REJECTING 00 17

@ 909173

909 173 CONNECTED

User name? []
 Password? []

Name or Password invalid.

User name? []
 Password? []

Welcome to TELEMAIL!
 Your last access was Monday, Nov 7, 1983 4:15 Pm

CHECK these bulletin boards:
 TELENET

No.	Delivered	From	Subject	Lines
1	Nov 7 15:02	[]	Equipment Pickup	4

Command? []

User's catalog.

Command? s all

Nothing found in bulletin board.

Command? s purged

Posted: Tue Nov 8, 1983 1:03 PM EST
From:
To:

Mse: AGID-1589-2038

b6
b7c

WE CAN NOT GET INTO THE ACCOUNT, PLEASE
ADVISE.

PHALFE

Command?

Posted: Fri Nov 25, 1983 4:28 PM EST
From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To:
Subj: communications

Mse: RGIN-1591-3845

b6
b7c

(Please excuse the delay in responding to you, however things have been rather hectic lately. We do hope you understand.)

Thank you for responding and for setting up a special account for us. Admittedly, it seems a bit strange to actually have a "legal" account in this system. We hope that all parties involved will make the most of this setup.

We would like you to be completely honest with us concerning this investigation. (We don't actually expect you to be, but we're taking chances.) We will attempt to be as open and as honest as we possibly can regarding our activities on the system. But please don't expect us to reveal the identities of our every last member to you, the press, or the F.B.I. There has been entirely too much publicity concerning this incident, and we aren't especially eager to see more. The other reports have been rather disappointing -- to say the least. Many of our friends and associates are afraid to talk freely on their telephones, in their homes, or their friends, etc. This kind of paranoia is very difficult to have to live with. While this may or may not ever disappear from our party, we felt it was important for you to know how we were feeling about affecting our lives. We need to know just what the case is as of now. It's been over a month now since events took their course and nobody has been able to say just what's going to happen or not. We find this to be very disconcerting. Believe it or not, the equipment that was seized was not being used primarily for the purpose of breaking into TELFMAIL or any other system. Such "extra-curricular" activities, for the most part, comprised at most five percent of a given individual's time at his or her keyboard. The other ninety-five percent was devoted to legitimate computer use.

Our members do not steal equipment, nor do they even use any of their "illegitimate" knowledge for profit. No true hacker does. That would make them nothing more than a common criminal.

Our appeal is for the unfinished computer programs that are needed for students classes and jobs. We've heard reports of one person who was writing a novel through a word processor -- a person who had nothing at all to do with any of this matter -- and is now living in virtual suspended animation. There are many other such cases, but the point has been made.

TELFMAIL was not an end in itself to us. We simply used it because it was fast, efficient, and convenient (in fact, we feel it's a potential goldmine for individual computer owners as well as corporations). Again, we don't know what other people were actually doing. Whatever it was, though, it could certainly have been curtailed via a few small precautions on your part. We would be more than happy to advise you on these and on the workings of your system in general, however, we really must know if there is any chance of equipment being returned in the future.

Please advise and forward this to all interested parties.

Yours,
The members of PHALSE

F-25

Posted: Sun Nov 27, 1983 12:58 PM EST Urgent

Mse: PGID-1591-3973

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

(member of F44 SF)

Meq: 107,10-1501-2072

b6
b7C

I don't know if TELEMAIL is a goldmine, as you suggest in your letter; but it is a business. As such, we expect the users of the system will only be those individuals authorized by Telenet. You mention that a few small precautions on our part could curtail unauthorized intrusions. Please comment further on this, as I suspect you are quite expert on the topic. You also point out the usefulness of the system to business and personal computer users. The current uses of the system by our customers are already

site varied, but I would so appreciate your comment on this topic.

You call for the return of equipment, citing it is only used five percent of the time for unauthorized breaking and entering. First, how often do burglars' tools, guns and bombs have to be used before they are considered dangerous? Is there any difference between burglars' tools and computer equipment, when the equipment is used to break and enter into a private system? Second, I wonder how many individuals use their equipment primarily for hacking activities? The challenges of hacking are often found elsewhere when using a computer for more useful expressions of creativity, as I'm sure you are aware. Imagine what might have been accomplished if all of the time and ability spent on hacking had been channelled into something more constructive.

As far as innocent people suffering harm as a result of losing their equipment, I suggest that those individuals consult their attorneys to see what can be arranged with the authorities. I am especially sympathetic where the material is needed by students for their coursework. I assure you that the people at Telenet wish harm to no one. We are proud of our TELEMAIL service, and of the people behind the service. We owe it to our customers to have no tolerance for unauthorized and illegal prying into the system.

The account you are now communicating to is surely closed and you are encouraged to use it. I suggest you change the password frequently and limit the password distribution. It really will be more difficult to communicate if the account is used by too many people. Help me by advising me you are. I don't necessarily need names and addresses, but assistance could be helpful if more than one person will be responding. I'll leave the form of the definition to you.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

Command?

Mem: YGID-1591-7340

Dear (we would like a name too),

One thing we need to ascertain is whether or not an individual is working with you under our name. One federal trial is talking that an individual is talking to you and saying that very same thing. It is not a fact. Let's hope not. (You should have received 3 releases in the past week including this one and the two that were sent last Friday.)

We are becoming ever backwards having to see our users in a new way. And we will help our figures put one as before, and not as the new one adds to users. But, as we've already started, we'll do it as best we can in our view. We found a way to do it, and it to build a friend. All we wanted to do was to help our users, and ourselves.

1961 now, we are doing some important work. We are
any collaboration in an activity like this. We are
of freedom. However, the results of this work will be
to things and we can all benefit.

We understand TELEMAIL is a business, however, it has been a circus (no personal affairs intended). You have made the mistake of so many others have made when they turned into space. The thing of things. You folks lost control. Fortunately, things got out of hand. And you have partners in space. I don't know of this. We don't particularly care about Telecom's operations, but on your plans with Southern Bell and Manhattan Radio Telecom on the various scenarios in NASA's space station. There is no way of that and more, but it doesn't really matter. It's not a matter also had seen it, results could have been disastrous. It could not have been that way, certainly not that. But you don't leave their front doors wide open at night. We don't know if we did was done in out of the rain.

Attorneys are great for people who can afford them. We are not rich enough to even use your system, much less protect ourselves from it. But one thing we have been told is that there is such a thing as due process, and it has not yet surfaced here. The media is starting to ask questions about that and we're really at a loss as to what to tell them, except that perhaps an exceptional error has occurred.

3 = Executive office of the President

P.S. Tell those guys over on EXOP not to use first names as passwords. // Ambassadors should know better, after all.

Men: AGFD-1581-7364

b6
b7C

This is [redacted] Suggestion, try asking [redacted] (name taken from the novel 1994) who [redacted] was....

Sounds like the PHALSENS want to help! HA HA

Somehow, I get the feeling that [] really doesn't think that they did anything wrong.... (the old hacker rationale...) I wish there was some way to get across to him that he was completely wrong in his (and his friends) behavior.... Oh well....

Looks like there were several sasses loose on here. I can defend most of them.

1. The Cracker and his friends from Irvine, Ca.
2. [] and company.
3. The lovers from Ventana New York.
4. The Inner Circle

b6
b7C

[]
and others

5. PHALSEN

[]
and others

6. [] and []

b6
b7C

It is not an overlap with #1 and #2 and that #4 and #5 are not where [] fits in I don't know. Like those "Mason" say.

[] tells me that someone's letter reports that there is someone else talking to the FBI and/or TELEMAIL. Someone makes reference to that in his letter. I hope we are not dealing with an internal leak here....

I would sure like some direction from you guys to assist me in solving further. I do a fair job just in case I don't want to foul up anything by accident. Hopefully, my efforts and efforts are helping rather than hindering. I must say there are times when I have to pinch myself to be sure I am not doing up all this stuff!! he he

It is interesting hearing all sorts of tidbits from [] about what went on inside TELEMAIL. Looks like you had some real nice info! Whew! My concern is that the investigation will drag, and drag, and drag, etc. and any momentum that will help discourage future system hackers will be lost. My own belief is that punishment should be as swift and sure as possible while still being fair. The longer you make these poor hackers wait for some sort of indictment, the more p.o.ed they will get. Now the teenagers on the other hand will lose their fear and want to begin hacking all over again.... There needs to be some sort of national cleaning house for dealing with computer fraud and telecommunications abuse that is funded by a consortium of all telephone companies and data communications carriers. The kind of abuse that I am daily in contact with is mind boggling. If it is any consolation, the trials and tribulations of TELEMAIL are nothing compared to what is still happening on other systems every day!

b6
b7C

(Well I will get down off my soapbox and get back to work.... Sorry about the outburst, but I have to get some of load off my mind to keep my sanity in this incredible mess.)

F29

Yours,

Command?

Posted: Sun Dec 18, 1988 10:01 AM EST

Mss: WGID-1594-1922

From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES

To: [REDACTED]

CC: [REDACTED]

Subj: External Communication

b6
b7C

The following memo from Phaise underscores the reason for our deployment of the recent security software in Telemail. Phaise was quite comfortable in their use of Telemail, including their use of Admin capabilities to set up their own accounts. They even noticed the abuses of others to some extent unilaterally to avoid the inevitable discovery and limitation of abuse.

We are still left with abuses where:

- Admins have not discovered accounts that were created by the hackers.
- Hackers have taken over accounts no longer used by the legitimate user, changing the default "A" to their own password.
- The legitimate user has a simple password (such as his/her first name) and doesn't change the password.

The user information we have is quite complete, but not activated, that requires all users to change their passwords on a regular basis (i.e., monthly). This also means that all accounts are activated for security. The user must be able to log in with their own password. If all users are activated, the user must be able to log in with their own password.

MESSAGE FROM PHASE 17

=====

Posted: Sat Dec 17, 1988 10:01 AM EST

Mss: WGID-1594-1921

From: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

Subj: Part 1

b6
b7C

For many hackers, the initial discovery of TELEMAL's infamous "A" default password came by word of mouth. For others, it was discovered by accident. On some occasions, was actually revealed by TELEMAL administrators who unwittingly sent messages to each other, not knowing they were being overheard.

In whatever way it was discovered, the fact remained: TELEMAL had made a very serious blunder by establishing a standard default for so many customers. It simply was not realistic to expect each and every company to take the responsibility of changing them. One of these subscribers (NASA) sent urgent messages to its members imploring them to change their passwords. But it was too late. While NASA, by inevitably changing their passwords structure, had prevented *further* breakins, there was very little that could be done regarding intruders that had already settled down in seldom or never used accounts. What's more, such people actually followed NASA's advice and changed their passwords, thus closing off the account to the original owner, who they hoped,

would try once, fail to get in, mutter something unprintable about computers and their creators, and then go back to his typewriter.

Most of the TELEMAIL hackers did not do anything malicious. However, we did hear reports of some people who sent silly messages or tried to start fights among legitimate users. PHALGE people were especially concerned about this, since everyone's "safety" on the system was being compromised. When the crackdown came as it undoubtedly would, all of the hackers would be deemed as bad as the very worst. And so it went.


Administrator accounts proved to be rather easy to obtain as well, either the same "A" default or some mathematical equation involving the user ID number (a special code beginning with a "*") would spell out the password. Naturally, we were very concerned when the above people began brassing about getting into these accounts. We knew they wouldn't take the proper precautions and would wind up (however unwittingly) causing damage. They were warned repeatedly not to play around where they might be noticed, and not to create names that would attract attention (P.PHREAK, H.ACKER, etc.). It was naive to think this advice would be followed to the letter, but at the moment, we didn't know what else we could do.

We are not trying to throw the blame to somebody else -- we made many mistakes ourselves which we will outline in later messages. What we are doing is showing where PHALGE stood in relation to everyone else, as we have perceived it. If you have any specific questions regarding what we have already talked about, please address them here. The next message (hopefully Sunday) will be a continuation of this one.



b6
b7C

MESSAGE FROM AN INTERMEDIARY
=====




b6
b7C
b7D

...



b6
b7C
b7D



b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

No questions yet. Please continue.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Action? 406

[Redacted]

Action?

Posted: Mon Dec 19, 1983 12:39 AM EST
From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: [REDACTED]
CC: [REDACTED]
Subj: External Communications

Msg: FGID-1594-4019

b6
b7C

Following are the letters received, and my responses to, Phalse and [REDACTED]

PHALIE MESSAGE
=====

Posted: Mon Dec 19, 1983 9:13 PM EST
From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Part 2

Msg: LGID-1594-1019

b6
b7C

Once a TELEMAIL account had been successfully penetrated, further access was made easy through the generosity of TELEMAIL itself in dispensing information.

The DIRECTORY command was the most useful. By typing DIR, followed by a user name, one would get information about the users associated with that user name existed. Of course, it was a bit tedious having to type in all user names ourselves. We couldn't do it till we had the user names were. After a little experimentation, we found that DIR could give us every user name that had an A in it connected. That had certainly been made. But it still wasn't enough. We wanted to see everything. It didn't take long to discover that DIR gave us just that percent for the private data, which we will see too. This huge list made it possible to do several things. Since each DIR readout gave a little hierarchy structure, we were able to see what companies or organizations were on the system. From there, it was easy to use the USERS OF or MEMBERS OF commands to sort out users by company.

We were curious as to how many of these companies we could penetrate. So we went down the list, typing "A", or a firm name listed (and we did in most cases by the DIR command), or even the user name itself. Some companies were not penetrated by us (EARTHNET, EARTHNET, and others). Others were absurdly easy (NASA, US Dept. of Agriculture, Code-00, and we are sorry to say, TELENET).

Every time a new account was entered, more information was obtained. For example, let's say we just got into an account used by NASA. We could now do a USERS OF NASA and get more names than if we did it from another non-NASA account. The entire structure of TELEMAIL was, thus, becoming unraveled right before our eyes.

No matter where we ended up, though, there was always private data which we could not see. And it was easy to figure out how to get this, although not very practical. A special user ID code had been assigned to each user ID. It began with a "*" and was shown with every DIR readout. If, instead of the user ID, you entered the user ID code the same information would be displayed. All that would have to be done to set a list of *everybody* would be to keep feeding out different user ID codes (either sequentially or randomly) after the DIR command. This was much easier than trying to guess names. A computer could do it willingly. But it still would have taken a very long time, if we had ever decided to really pursue this. We were never able to find out whether a wildcard format might work here (DIR *A* or DIR *1*).

In a future message, we will talk about what we were actually doing on the system. For now, though, we would like to point out that we look on this whole mission of discovery as an Adventure. We were more interested in seeing how many accounts *could* be obtained through various companies than we were in actually obtaining them. For one thing, there was no need for us to attain new accounts, since we had enough to communicate with already. //

Our next subject will be our suggestions towards improving security in the TELEMAIL system. First, however, we would like to open it up to the floor for questions or comments on what we have gone over so far.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

// (X)

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

([Redacted])

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

MY RESPONSE

=====

[REDACTED]

Response to Part III

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

Thanks again for your input. The "Filter", as you suggest, has no relations at this time. Naturally, we are very familiar with the functionality of the various commands of Telemail (i.e. `UNUSER/PSWDEP` etc.).

However, I am interested in what your thoughts are as to prevention of abuse. Clearly, this is where we can most benefit our user community. Detection is, at best, reactionary. How do you think we can identify our hackers in the beginning of their "adventures"? You also indicated that we will depend upon what you have already listed in Telemail. Please advise.

Please bear in mind that Telemail is the most user friendly system in the future, especially in our situation. We are concerned with making it as easy as possible for all. I certainly do not want to see a system that is too complex or too restrictive. Actually, I think that we can improve the user interface and make it more user friendly. We can also improve the user interface and make it more user friendly. We can also improve the user interface and make it more user friendly.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Response to [REDACTED]

I certainly hope you change your password frequently. Who are you so paranoid about dealing with someone named "Skorpion"? I recall, eh.

As far as contacting me to find out my name, if you want, you can call me at anyone. I will set up an account for you this week.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Action? PUR

Purged.

Action?

Sent: Wed Dec 21, 1983 11:53 AM EST

Msg: 0010-1004-0007

From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRAISE/ASSOCIATES

To: [REDACTED]

CC: [REDACTED]

Subject: External Communications

b6
b7C

Re:

Forwarded message:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

Action? FUB

Purged.

Action?

11/11/90
Posted: Sat Dec 24, 1989 2:57 PM EST

Msg: SRJH-1595-2490

From: [REDACTED] /PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES

To:

Subject: Sorry for delay.

b6
b7C

We are rather busy here and will try to continue our narrative next week when we can find the time. The Holidays are a busy time. We are sure you will understand. Later...

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Command:

[REDACTED] SINCE 12/20/98 BURNED

1/14/00

b6
b7C

Heaps's catalog.

*** Next cmd: S SINCE 12/22

Bulletin Board contains:

No.	Delivered	From	Subject	Lines
-----	-----------	------	---------	-------

1	Dec 26 11:08	[REDACTED]	RE: Sorry for delay.	
---	--------------	------------	----------------------	--

b6
b7C

*** Next cmd: S BURNED

Nothing found in bulletin board

Command: B1

Received: Mon, Dec 26, 1999 10:14 AM PST

Msg: 00110-15095-0001

From: [REDACTED] RE: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Subject: RE: Sorry for delay.

I understand you understand. Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!

--

--

--

--

DocId: 34878971, 1000 10:44 AM EST Hroeger Seat: 101 (1-1595-4) 101

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) = 1$	$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) = 1$
--	--

Author: [REDACTED]
 Subject: Supervision of Correctional Institutions

• *USDA's New Website*

[illegible]

Th. 2. 1. 1. 1. 1.

4. 2. 2. 2. 2.

Declassify on: Dec 31, 1992 AUTHORITY: E.O. 11652

[illegible]

• **•**


1

[illegible]

Following are listings of messages received/retransmitted for the Phoenix marriage. If you would like, I can download the entire message text. Please advise.

INBOUND MESSAGES

=====


No.	Delivered	From	Subject	Lines
1	Nov 7 16:04		Initial phase message	40
2	Nov 08 16:08		communications	54
3	Nov 09 02:00		message #4	40
4	Nov 09 00:00		more communications	70
5	Nov 17 02:11		Part 1	40
6	Nov 19 01:10		Part 2	40
7	Nov 24 05:47		Survey for details	5
8	Nov 31 00:45		Further communications	10

b6
b7C

=====

Unreadable, No - 12000

=====

No.	Delivered	From	Subject	Lines
1	Nov 7 10:1	
2	Nov 09 12:17	
3	Nov 09 10:04	
4	Nov 19 00:26	

b6
b7C



b6
b7C

Forwarded

Posted: Fri Jan 13, 1984 3:19 AM EST
From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: [REDACTED]
Subj: AN EXPLANATION

Mse: AGIE-1597-3738

b6
b7C

Hello,

As you've probably noticed, communications have deteriorated. This has not been intentional. Events have transpired to drastically cut back access to this system. Here is a brief explanation.

This is only the second time that I [REDACTED] have communicated with you directly. Before this, I would dictate my messages over the phone to someone with a terminal who would then send them to you. b6 b7C

Recently I discovered that this person was really an FBI informant. So, for a time, I wasn't sure whether or not the messages had been sent or even if the account existed. So for the past two weeks, I've been scrimping and saving to get ahold of a terminal. That accomplished, I can now resume communications.

There have been a lot of nasty side-effects caused by this latest revelation, however. For one thing, my REAL name and unlisted phone number are being thrown all over the country, which is a bit of a bother. It wouldn't surprise me at all if you already had them. It also wouldn't surprise me if you were actually part of the FBI (ourselves for selves). These possibilities don't upset me, although I do appreciate honesty when discussing such things.

What does upset me, though, is the way in which this entire thing is going. Apart from the threatening calls I get on an almost daily basis, friends of mine are being harassed because they know me. I don't know if this is the usual FBI routine, but it seems a bit much for what we're talking about.

For some reason, PHALSE is considered by them to be some huge and dangerous organization. I don't know how they interpreted the messages they read, but from what I know, nothing could be further from the truth. PHALSE is actually more of a state of mind than an actual group, but I certainly don't want to bore you with my interpretation.

I would appreciate any suggestions or revealing statements you might have at this point. Also, from now on, I will be speaking primarily from my own point of view instead of claiming to represent the "group". To continue to do that might spread the wrong idea even further.

Again, thanks for sending the copies of the messages so readily. They were a great help. If I'm not mistaken, though, you're missing one after your outbound #3. I seem to recall a message that said something to the effect of "this has been the most constructive message so far." As long as you remember it, that's fine.

There are two more topics [at least] that I had planned to address (preventative measures for you & an explanation of what we were doing on the system). I'm hoping for later on today for at least one of those. Purpose of this message was to let you know EXACTLY what's happening on this end and to try and explain the spottiness of our communications. Hopefully, I'll be able to finish these messages before I get an invitation to Alexandria, which I'm told could come at any moment. //

Looking forward to your reply.

P.S. I'm using 800-424-9494. Is that OK?

P.P.S. Did you get "2600" yet?

Posted: Fri Jan 13, 1984 1:41 PM EST
From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: [REDACTED]
CC:
Subj: My viewPoint

Mss: JGIE-1597-4709

b6
b7c

First, a couple points related to your message. I really am not quite sure of who you are (all that matters is your experience - which is evident by your previous messages - not your name). I don't have your phone number, and would never call you (let alone harass you). I can assure you no one from Telenet would call you. As far as your allegations about the FBI, I personally have a good deal of respect for all law enforcement agencies; it is my opinion that they have a tough job in today's society, but I've never been on your current side of the fence. I am not with the FBI, I have worked for GTE for a number of years, and am very involved with the Telemail product - of which I am very proud and probably even a little protective or defensive.

I wanted to have a dialogue with you primarily for the benefit of Telemail and the industry in general. You have been involved with the current technologies and I am quite interested in your perspective. How vulnerable are today's systems (naturally I am not without an opinion), how would unauthorized access be best prevented, etc. I am not trying to play tricks with you - honest! Actually, I am very appreciative of your time and effort and feel you have a good deal of valuable input - if you are so motivated. The way I have approached our relationship is that if you are playing tricks on me, so be it, I tried. If you are helping me, I am only too happy to pass this along to the FBI, and maybe it might help me (naturally, I am not in a position to even suggest that it might help -- but I would like to think it does).

I am glad that you are not using an intermediary. That was your call, and I'm sorry you think it didn't work out for you. Also, I have not received a copy of "2600", but would really like to (of course you can't compare the mail to Telemail in terms of speed).

Thanks for your help. I hope we can really get into it.

Posted: Fri Jan 13, 1984 2:31 PM EST
From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: [REDACTED]
Subj: RE: My viewPoint

Mss: LGIE-1597-4841

b6
b7c

I believe in your integrity and sincerity. I wasn't implying that I didn't trust you -- I was simply trying to point out how difficult it's become to trust ANYBODY. That's one thing I've learned from this whole thing. Any time you say or do something, it's always possible that there's somebody taking note of it. Until recently, I would have thought such a statement indicative of a paranoid, but now I'm not so sure.

I don't know if you realize or desire this -- but since my intermediary turned out to be an informant, that means every word that's passed between us has been looked at by many others. Now I don't have any problem with

this, but I thought you should know, in case you didn't already. Like I've said before, I'm very distressed by that revelation, most of all because that person was trying to get me to do all kinds of things on all kinds of systems. Fortunately, I didn't take him up on that offer.

Anyway, enough of this: I'll start working on the next real message now.

[REDACTED]

Posted: Sun Jan 15, 1984 4:59 PM EST
From: [REDACTED] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: [REDACTED]
CC: [REDACTED]
Subject: GETTING RID OF HACKERS

Msg: AGIE-1597-5766

b6
b7c

What can be done to eliminate hackers on the Telemail system? Realistically, very little. Telemail is a huge system and not all of the certified users can be expected to follow the same strict guidelines for protection, or even to understand them. Hackers thrive on this sort of attitude, an attitude that won't change until the average user is injected with a little "hacker mentality" himself. Once somebody sees what their weak points are and how these can be used against them, their protection will become more effective. Example: penetrating a hacker's account would be much more difficult than penetrating an average account. Most hackers know how and where to protect themselves because they know how their own minds work. System operators are expected to possess this same foresight, and many times they obtain it through actual experience.

Even the vastness of Telemail will never totally disallow hackers, the primary interest should be to limit the damage they can do (accidentally or intentionally) once they are inside. Right now, if I were to gain access to an account, I could not only see all of the names that I can send to, but thousands that I cannot send to. If I cannot send to these people, why should I even know they exist? With this kind of a system, I can get a hardcopy printout and spend days going down the list finding defaults (or, now, finding inactive accounts that never changed their defaults) or first-name or even user-name passwords. With each account penetrated, more names could be found. As I've mentioned in previous messages, there are other ways to get names using identity codes, a process that shouldn't be allowed.

Administrator accounts will be penetrated in the future. Not as often as in the past, perhaps, but it will happen. Major commands -- deleting or adding users -- should be subject to verification before they're acted upon, perhaps by generating a message to the administrator's real-name account, advising him/her of what is about to be done. (On this subject, I've heard reports concerning how all of those NASA users got deleted. Supposedly, a hacker was playing with one of the administrator commands and thought he would eliminate the termination dates. So, when he was asked for the termination date, he hit a return, thinking that that would leave it open. Instead, it made the termination date NOW and promptly eliminated all of the users in question. I can't confirm this -- administrator functions aren't my specialty -- but if it is true, it indicates a significant problem with this command, i.e. the same command can be made accidentally by a legitimate administrator.)

I'm not sure what the criteria is for allowing use of the SET command, but it can be used to cover up one of the best protective devices currently on Telemail, namely the last access date. This tells a person if someone else has been using his account. However, it can be suppressed using the SET command. A naive or inexperienced user might not notice or think that something is wrong with the system when he doesn't see the last access displayed. I don't see any positive application of this suppression; it's only one line in the first place.

Users should know if someone is trying to get into their account. If someone tries, say, nine times to enter a password for a particular user id, a message should be sent to the user, informing him of this, perhaps even letting him know what passwords were tried, in case the hacker is getting close. At the same time, the account should lock itself for a period of time, so that the hacker can't eventually guess right and it should re-lock itself if future attempts are made. But the hacker shouldn't be told that he's locked out, most importantly because such a message would confirm that he had a correct user id.

I'm sure there is more on this subject that I wanted to address, but I have to be somewhere else now. I'll devote some thought to anything else I want to add, and hopefully I'll get to that late tonight. Please let me know if you have any questions on the above or topics you'd like me to go over.

By the way, I'm now using my semi-local access number, as requested.

[redacted]
Posted: Mon Jan 16, 1984 3:17 AM EST
From: [redacted] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: [redacted]
CC: [redacted]
Subject: SOMETHING ELSE

Mss: EGIE-1597-5872

b6
b7C

Thanks for the comment.

The additional item that I mentioned... a function on the Telemail system that is nothing short of a hacker's dream is the Unread command. I had trouble believing that one when I first came across it. It was actually possible to read someone's mail and then reseal the envelope, without leaving ANY traces! I really have to think hard to find an over-the-counter use for that command. I'm sure there must be some purpose to it, but the misuse of the Unread function, in my opinion, negates that considerably.

I don't want you to get the wrong idea. Neither I nor the people I communicated with spent a great deal of time reading other people's mail. Yes, we did it a couple of times, when we suspected that it might have been really interesting (like with AT&T Long Lines (ATT.LL) and their clever password of BELL - can you blame us?) but for the most part we stayed out of other people's affairs. More on that later.

What I'm trying to say is that if anyone really nasty and malicious got onto the system who KNEW what he was doing, the Unread command would be one of his closest friends. That, combined with the SET function I described earlier could very effectively cover his tracks.

One more thing: a notice of some sort when there is more than one user in an account should be seriously considered. There could be fifty people in my account right now and I'd never find out about them.

If I think of anything else, I'll pass it along.

[redacted]
Posted: Mon Jan 16, 1984 3:54 AM EST
From: [redacted] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: [redacted]
CC: [redacted]

Mss: EGIE-1597-5874

b6
b7C

On the lighter side, there are all kinds of interesting commands and features on this system. Some of which you may or may not be aware of. Odds are most people don't know about this one.

*** Exception: This error should not occur.

909 173 DISCONNECTED 00 20 00:00:20:18 43 96

@C 909173

909 173 CONNECTED

User name?

Password?

b6
b7C

Welcome to TELEMAL!

Your last access was Monday, Jan 16, 1984 9:34 AM

No new mail.

Command? RESUME

OK!!

It's a pretty interesting feature overall: I learned it from somebody on the system (a hacker, of course). I don't really see a purpose to it, except to create practical jokes and scare people to death. If I recall correctly, we did use it to successfully "scare" away some rather inexperienced hackers. It was very effective, I believe.

ATTENTION HACKER. I
MIS
IS THE FBI AND WE HAV
E
TRADED YOUR CALL.

They haven't stepped on any sidewalk cracks since then, I hear.

I'll send some more serious stuff either late tonight or tomorrow.

Posted: Wed Jan 18, 1984 11:46 PM EST
From: PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES
To: (RECEIPT)
CC:
Subj: A PROBLEM WITH OUR COMMUNICATION

Msg: 001E-1598-1476

b6
b7C

Hello,

As you know, I sent you a message a few days ago explaining why our communications had been temporarily cut off. In that message I told you that I was using a go-between who later turned out to be an FBI informant. I also made reference to the fact that I was being harassed and that I believed this informant was at least partly responsible.

Recently a message from this person was forwarded to me. In it, he vehemently denied those possibilities. Now then, since I have been careful not to talk with anyone else concerning this, I can only assume that he somehow read my message.

There are a few possibilities here. One is that the FBI is monitoring your system without your knowledge, in which case I feel an obligation to

tell you about it. Another possibility is that they're monitoring my which doesn't involve you at all. Or perhaps you're showing these communications to them yourself.

As I've said (or certainly implied) before, the latter possibility doesn't upset me at all. It's completely within your rights to share our conversations with anyone you desire; it's your system and it's your case. But think of this: somewhere along the line, no matter which of these three scenarios is true, the FBI is letting one of their informants read what's going between us!

Maybe I'm over-sensitive; I think, though, that you should be as indignant as I am concerning this. That person is not an FBI agent, and as far as I'm concerned has no business reading our mail - he is not the one conducting the investigation.

I'm really rather surprised at the FBI. I thought for sure they'd have policies against this kind of thing. By doing this, they're compromising their own security as well as ours - this person is not to be trusted with anyone! Having talked personally with him on a number of occasions, I've heard a few rather interesting remarks he's made which lead me to believe that he's no more on the side of the FBI than he is on mine. I think he's taking everybody for a drive. Of course, I could never prove this.

Please take whatever action you can to see that this unauthorized eavesdropping is stopped. I have nothing against authorized eavesdropping, but we should let it stop there. Please let me know your feelings on this.

P.S. Did you get my last message o.k.? I hope it didn't mess up your terminal or anything.

Posted: Thu Jan 19, 1984 8:04 AM EST

Mss: FDIE-1598-2545

From: [redacted] PH.PHRASES/ASSOCIATES

To: [redacted]

CC: [redacted]

Subj: THE OTHER GUY

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b7c

I think the situation is less insidious than you might have assumed. The intermediary you used is also an experienced hacker (or so I believe). When he sent me a short message saying that he would not be an intermediary, I offered him a place out of the rain, so to speak, and gave him an account on Telemail. I need all the help I can get, and while I don't have the time or the inclination to play you two against each other, I can always use more information about my system and hackers. When you told me you thought he was an informant, I told him (electronically) that he was indeed viewed in this light, and he might want to clear the air if this was not based in truth. (I would think you would want this opportunity if you were in his shoes). Sorry, if this caused you undue concern, but I must admit all the possibilities you outlined could have been the case. As far as I know, the FBI is not monitoring my lines. It would be quite difficult technically for this to be the case.

I told you in a previous message that if the information you gave me was helpful, I would be happy to pass this along to the FBI (I think this cannot hurt you at all). Unless I hear differently, I will continue on this course.

Please discuss this further if you still have concerns about our communications.

marks:

b6

b7C

Command?

CAHN WISHOD & WISHOD

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

534 BROADHOLLOW ROAD - CB 179

MELVILLE, NEW YORK 11747

RICHARD C. CAHN
EUGENE L. WISHOD
JOSEPH H. WISHOD
EUGENE R. BARNOSKY
DAVID R. JAMPOL

(516) 694-2300

November 7, 1983

[redacted] Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Hauppauge, New York 11788

Dear [redacted]:

Pursuant to our conversation of Friday, November 4th, I deliver to you on behalf of State University of New York at Stony Brook, various material relating to the computer investigation and [redacted] which I briefly outlined to you by telephone.

I would be obliged if, pursuant to our understanding, you would identify yourself to my secretary as Special Agent of the FBI and acknowledge receipt of these materials on the attached xeroxed copy of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

RCC:bp
Enc.
HAND DELIVERED

THE ABOVE MATERIAL WAS RECEIVED
THIS 7th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1983

F-50

198A-003 Sub E-7
He He

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Stony Brook

Office of Vice President for Administration
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, NY 11794
telephone: (516) 246-0000

MEMORANDUM

To: [redacted]
From: [redacted]
Subject: FBI Search of WUSB Offices
Date: October 14, 1983

b6
b7C

Pursuant to your request, I shall attempt to provide you with a summary of the events of October 13, 1983.

At approximately 1 P.M., I received a phone call from [redacted] informing me that there were several FBI agents on campus and presently were in the process of searching room 242 of the Student Union Building which was the studio of Station WUSB. He said they had arrived on the campus a couple of hours prior to this time armed with a Federal search warrant. He had assigned [redacted] a Public Safety officer, to accompany the agents. [redacted] advised me that he had called the President's Office as well as [redacted].

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I then met with [redacted] in his office and requested a copy of the search warrant. I noted that the search warrant limited the search to room 242 of the Student Union Building and asked [redacted] if that was in fact the room they were limiting their search to. He attempted to contact Stafford by radio while I was there to no avail.

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Upon return to my office, I called WUSB with the intention of speaking with [redacted] who I was told was at a meeting. Instead, I spoke with [redacted] who advised me he was a former student and volunteer working with the station. [redacted] told me that he had a receipt for the items which the FBI took and brought it to my office accompanied by two other gentlemen who work at the station.

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I am informed that there are only four members of the station's staff who use the computer, namely [redacted] and [redacted] of the station. [redacted] said that the room is always kept locked and that only the aforementioned people have access to it.

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He told me they use a Heathkit H39 computer for the purpose of doing programming, listing of addresses, etc. I asked if they had done any programming on the computer or hooking into outside computers, since the warrant indicated that the evidence the FBI was seeking was with regard to wire fraud. [redacted] told me that at times they had made connections with "computer bulletin boards". I understand these bulletin boards are operated by computer hobbyist and are used for leaving messages for private people or retrieving technical information, etc. He said the bulletin board phone

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[redacted]
FBI Search of WUSB Offices
October 14, 1983
Page 2

b6
b7C

numbers are available in computer literature.

[redacted] told me that the agents advised him that the equipment was to be taken to New York City.

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Upon return to my office, I called University Counsel's Office immediately and advised them of the situation. I have forwarded to them a copy of the search warrants as well as the receipt for equipment.

On the morning of October 14th, I met with [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] described the incident as follows:

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At about 11:15 or 11:30, he was called by [redacted] and informed that the FBI was at the studio to search room 240. [redacted] asked to see identification since the agents did not offer credentials themselves.

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The agents then searched room 240, finding nothing that was computer related. [redacted] offered the information that we in fact did have computer equipment, but it was housed in room 227. The agents then made several phone calls and eventually requested permission to gain access to room 227 from [redacted]. He gave them the authority to enter and search that room. [redacted] accompanied the agents as did [redacted] of Public Safety. [redacted] then taught a class and had a meeting returning to the studio at about 3:30.

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[redacted] advised me that all of the computer hardware belongs to an individual named [redacted] and the software, discs, stationery, etc. are the property of Polity. Accordingly, it appears that nothing that was taken by the FBI is actually owned by the University.

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[redacted] spoke with the owner of the equipment, [redacted] and advised him that he would do well to seek legal advice. [redacted] was informed that at the same time this search was occurring on campus, there was also a search of [redacted] home in [redacted] [redacted] was not there at the time but was advised by his roommate, [redacted] that all computer related equipment and software were removed from the premises at that time. [redacted] did not inquire of [redacted] of his involvement, but merely told him to seek legal advice. Subsequent to my meeting with [redacted] and [redacted] I spoke with [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] I advised both of the new turn the situation had taken in that property was not that of the University. [redacted] felt that although that was the case, we were still peripherally involved since it was WUSB offices which they searched.

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[redacted]
FBI Search of WUSB Offices
October 14, 1983
Page 3

b6
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[redacted] had suggested, prior to learning that the equipment was privately owned, that [redacted] telephone the FBI and request that the equipment be returned to the campus and/or we get copies of everything they took. I forwarded this suggestion to [redacted] who said he would act on it.

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[redacted] expressed concern, as did [redacted], that neither my office nor University Counsel's Office was contacted by Public Safety when the agents first came on campus but only told several hours later.

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[redacted] also expressed the concern that he had no prior knowledge of the agents arrival. He felt that a phone call from Public Safety prior to the agents coming into the Student Union would have eased his situation greatly.

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[redacted] expressed some concern over the role of Public Safety in that he felt they should be more concerned with protecting the University rather than assisting the law enforcement giants of the FBI.

b6
b7c

RNI:jkw

att. (2)

1. Search warrant
2. Receipt of items taken

blcc: [redacted]

b6
b7c

United States District Court

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNLESS KNOWN AS ROOM 240 OF THE
STUDENT UNION BUILDING (BUILDING 37)
LOCATED AT THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW YORK, STONY BROOK, LONG ISLAND,
NEW YORK

Sealed by _____ of New York
Docket No. _____

TO ANY SPECIAL AGENT OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OR ANY OTHER
AUTHORIZED UNITED STATES MARSHAL OR
ANY DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL:

Affidavits having been made before me by the below-named affiant(s) believed to believe that (on the
premises known as) ROOM 240 OF THE STUDENT UNION BUILDING
located at the STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, STONY BROOK, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK

in the _____ District of _____

contains certain property, namely computer and computer peripheral equipment, such as hard disk drives, tape drives, printers, disk drives, tape drives and other input/output devices, magnetic media including but not limited to magnetic tapes, disks (hard or floppy), all output produced by or caused to be produced by a computer including printed output, teletype output or paper tape output; all notes, papers, notebooks, or any other type of record associated with or related to computer usage, including software books, disk catalogs, diaries, directories or any other device used to record information, addresses and business dealings of unauthorized usage or users of computer networks; and other notes, papers, diaries and records which are the fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of crimes against the United States, that is, wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

and as I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the property so described is being concealed on the premises above-described and the grounds for application for issuance of the search warrant exist or stated in the supporting affidavit(s).

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to search on or before _____

(not to exceed 10 days) the person or place named above for the property specified, serving the warrant, and making the search on the day(s) — 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. (if any time is specified) and if the property is found there to seize it, leaving a copy of this warrant and receipt for the property taken, and prepare a return in return of the property seized and promptly return this warrant to _____

J. Murray _____

[Signature]

[Redacted Box]

b6
b7C

If a search is to be conducted at any time of the day or night, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, 15b1, the warrant must be served on the person or place named above.

Return this warrant to the Court of Record.

RETURN

DATE RECEIVED DATE AND TIME WARRANT EXECUTED

3-83

10-13-83 10:35 AM

PROPERTY OF WARRANT AND RETURNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

b6
b7c

PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN PURSUANT TO THE WARRANT

2 1/2" 5 1/4" DISKETTES
 2 1/4" 5 1/4" DISKETTES
 ZENITH ^{WINCHESTER} DISK DRIVE (C:SY2) (Serial # 2-67)
 J037 M018
 LOT 44515)
 HEATHKIT FLOPPY DISK SYSTEMS (SY3, SY4, SY5) (MODEL 4-77)
 CHRONOGRAPH (#041104743)
 SMART MODEM (#082094002)
 HEATHKIT COMPUTER (SY3/D)
 MODEL H19-2, SERIES 100-02-42399)
 DIABLO 630 (SERIAL # 1044) LARGE PRINTER
 ORION 824 MICROLINE (MODEL 503, Serial # 215770) SMALL PRINTER
 FILE SACKET CONTAINING MAILING LISTS
 FILE SACKET CONTAINING COMPUTER NUMBERS
 FILE SACKET CONTAINING DIGITAL RESEARCH
 FILE SACKET CONTAINING BASIC LISTINGS
 1 SHEETS CONTAINING NAMES & ADDRESSES
 BOX OF MISC PAPERS & PRINTOUTS
 ADDRESS WHEEL
 ENVELOPE CONTAINING 3 5 1/4 DISKS

CERTIFICATION

I swear that this inventory is a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the warrant.


Subscribed, sworn to, and returned before me this date

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Date: October 17, 1983

Re: Computer search by the F.B.I.



WUSB
99.1 fm stereo

b6
b7C

At approximately 11:30 a.m. on Thursday October 13, 1983, while in my office (Stony Brook Union 271), I received an intercom message from [redacted] that he was in the studio (Union 240) and there were agents from the FBI with him and I should come right down.

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I walked into the studio and immediately identified myself to one of the agents (it wasn't until about 20 minutes later that I realized the agents had not identified themselves to me so I asked one to do which he did). They were accompanied by a member of the SUSB Office of Public Safety who you later identified to me as [redacted] (sp?).

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Upon my arrival, they showed me a search warrant for computer related equipment and miscellaneous documents which they believed were located at the radio station (Union 240). I immediately became concerned over the fact that I was certainly aware of computer equipment located on "radio station" premises but not in room 240. After a few minutes of the agents searching the first of several rooms in our studio complex, I decided that in order to prevent possible disruption, interference or tampering with present or future broadcast studio operations I would advise the chief agent, [redacted] that the station did have access to computer equipment which was located in another room of the Stony Brook Union. This equipment is personally owned by [redacted] at WUSB, and is used by the radio station to create and generate program logs, mailing lists and word processing documents.

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At this time, [redacted] began placing a series of phone calls in order to get permission to search room 227. At the same time he asked me if I had authorization to enter room 227 and would I sign a statement stating such, which I did. At approximately 12:40p.m., the agents moved to room 227 (I

WUSB-FM, State University of New York, Stony Brook, New York 11794

Phone: Office (516) 246-7900, Studios 246-7901

don't know if telephone authorization to do so had been reached). At this time, the agents entered room 227 which I had now opened for them and one of them immediately began photographing the contents of the room. Since I had to go teach my THR 270 class in the Fine Arts Building from 12:45-2p.m., I left the agents in the presence of [redacted] a station staff member and former [redacted] [redacted] and now an alumnus of Stony Brook. Eric is authorized to have key access to room 227 as well as having knowledge of what computer equipment was in the room and could verify the "checklist" of equipment removed.

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At the conclusion of my class, I went directly to the office of [redacted] [redacted] and advised him briefly of the situation.

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At our 9:30a.m. meeting on Monday October 17th, I advised you that [redacted] had come to me with information possibly pertinent to the situation. In a later telephone conversation you suggested that you would schedule a meeting with him and other campus officials.

b6
b7C

October 19, 1983

[redacted]
Office of University Counsel
State University of New York
State University Plaza
Albany, NY 12246

b6
b7C

Re: FBI Computer Search

Dear [redacted]:

Enclosed please find a copy of [redacted] account of the events of October 13, 1983, as well as a mention of his conversation with [redacted] [redacted], which occurred in Port Jefferson on October 15, 1983.

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On October 18, 1983, at approximately 2 P.M., [redacted] Officer, and I met with [redacted] concerning additional information, which he had conveyed to [redacted].

b6
b7C

[redacted] is a full-time student at Empire State College and is taking one course on our campus. He is [redacted] at WUSD. [redacted] stated to us that when the FBI agents arrived, he thought it necessary to advise [redacted] of their presence, in that he knew they were interested in the computer equipment and thought [redacted] was the owner. He said he telephoned [redacted] at home shortly after the agents arrived on the scene, and [redacted] responded, "Thanks a lot for letting me know, there are things we have to get rid of." (Or words to that effect.) In addition, [redacted] told us that [redacted] is a telephone buff, as it were, and is very knowledgeable about technical aspects of the telephone and all of its various ramifications. He also stated that at one time, he, [redacted], was present when [redacted] and a couple of other young men were apparently making a telephone call to the Defense Department in Washington. He stated that although he has no technical knowledge of the computer, he was present when he thought that [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] were apparently gaining access to some computer outside the University, though he did not know what or where at the time.

b6
b7C

[redacted] also noted that several times during the summer, he heard [redacted] and [redacted] comment about fear of the "phone police" arriving, and that he inferred from these comments that they were doing something illegal with the telephones.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is an alumnus of Stony Brook and was involved in a similar incident concerning the computer at Catholic University of America in Washington. I am enclosing the records, which we have on that case for your information and files.

b6
b7C

Page 2
October 19, 1983

b6
b7C

At the present time, we are attempting to find out if the telephone lines on campus were used illegally or for the purpose of accessing our own Univac. If that investigation yields any fruit, I will keep you advised.

Very truly yours,

b6
b7C

RCH:lm

Enclosure

cc:

b6
b7C

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
AT STONY BROOK, NEW YORK
Memorandum

To: [redacted] Date: 7/29/81
From: [redacted]


b6
b7C

-Appropriate action
.....Comment and criticism
✓.....Your information and files
.....Please note and return
.....At your request

[redacted]

*Re: [redacted]
I suggest comparing this with
the printed file to see if it
meets [redacted]*

b6
b7C



STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
AT STONY BROOK, NEW YORK

Memorandum

To:



Date: 7/29/81

From:

[Handwritten signature]

b6
b7C

-Appropriate action
-Comment and criticism
-Your information and files
-Please note and return
-At your request

Re.



You can file this.
I think the case is closed.

b6
b7C

July 21, 1981

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The following is a concise account of my dealings with the computer at the Catholic University of America and the events which led up to it.

In early March of this year, a video computer terminal was obtained by a friend of mine. It was purchased with the original intention of helping him with homework in a course he was taking. However, we both anticipated eventually using it for record catalogues on WUSB-FM, the campus radio station which we both work on. For this reason the terminal was kept for a time in our technical office.

We wanted to find out as much as we could about the different types of systems available so that when the time finally came to start entering our data (which would be record titles and companies), we wouldn't, in effect, be stumbling in the dark. We found out about a local computer bulletin board, located in Centereach, called Connection-80. What a computer bulletin board does is list the access numbers of computers all around the country where one can either leave messages for other callers or obtain information about various computers.

The access number for the computer at Catholic University was listed on this bulletin board and probably on many others. I must stress that there is nothing underhanded about this particular point, since the number was given to this bulletin board by the computer club at Catholic University. It was meant to be called. This is what we did, with absolutely no evil intentions whatsoever. We dialed into their system to obtain information, which we were invited to obtain by their having the number available.

When we made the initial connection to this computer, I recognized it as the same type of computer which was used in my high school. I remembered a few commands and one of them was the SEND command, which would allow the user to instantly send messages to other users. However, I soon realized that there was a major difference between the two systems. The one which I had used in the past was unable to send messages unless the user was logged on. What this means is that the user had to enter his account number and password before he was able to do any sort of work, which included sending messages. Even then, he was only able to send messages to those who wanted messages sent to them. Catholic University proved to be quite different. Anyone who dialed into the system could send messages to anyone else without being logged on at all.

Out of curiosity, we tried to make contact with other users, to see if this really worked. Several responded, saying that they didn't want to be bothered. We complied with their requests. A couple of others wanted to talk to us, including one person whose first name was [redacted] (or so he claimed). His last I couldn't remember except that it had one syllable. The reason why he stands out in my mind is because he asked so many questions. I gave him my name, my major, the school I went to, the telephone number for the radio station, and all sorts of other information which I didn't see any harm in giving him. At one point he asked for my home phone number and address, which is where I drew the line. I did, however, give him the access number for the computer at Stony Brook, perhaps foolishly, although I honestly didn't see what harm he could do with a password or account number. At another point, he suggested (since he knew that I was [redacted] of a radio station) that I trade him records for account numbers and passwords into his system. At the time I took this as a joke and I don't believe I

en responded.

I talked to this same person the next evening (I don't remember the exact date except that it was sometime in March) and possibly the evening after that as well, which would have been the last time I called up their system. On each occasion he asked me questions about myself and what I did. I asked him a few questions as well, however, in all honesty I forgot his answers in a matter of hours, since I had slightly more important things on my mind. Unfortunately, we don't have a printer, so the communications I had with this individual were lost as soon as they left the screen on the terminal.

That is the extent of my dealings with the Catholic University computer. At no time did I log on to their system and I certainly never offered to make any deals with anyone for such an opportunity. Frankly, I wouldn't know what to do even if I was able to log on. I know very little about computers and I don't have a great desire to expand that knowledge, except to know what kind of a system would be good for our record catalogues. My experience in high school was minimal, to say the ~~least~~ most.

I really don't understand what has been going on since I communicated with this individual. In early May I heard from the office of our Vice-President for Student Affairs. They told me that they had a complaint from Catholic University ~~which~~ which concerned me. When I first heard this, I was extremely annoyed. I felt that anyone who saw harm in my few communications with random users was extremely paranoid.

Since then, though, I have become more aware of the facts involved. I have spoken with both the afore mentioned vice president as well as the campus judicial officer and, from what they have told me, Catholic University has a very legitimate gripe. Someone has been communicating with users attempting to obtain passwords and other secret information. Perhaps this is not so unusual; I'm not familiar with the espionage dramas that I've been told exist behind the doors of the computer room. What is unusual (at least, in this particular case) is that my name has surfaced as the one trying to obtain all of this valuable information. As I mentioned before, I have no interest in these things, and even if I did, I don't have ~~time~~ the time to devote to it.

What appears to me to be happening is that some inconsiderate person is attempting to rob the Catholic University of its computer services and is using my name in the process. (It's obvious he/she wouldn't use their own name!) In this case the person had previously found out all sorts of things about me so that they could be more convincing. Well, they were. I haven't seen the copies of the conversations that occurred, but I'm sure I would be shocked to see someone use my name and personal information while attempting to rip someone else off. Shocked and a little scared. Not to mention angry.

I want to see this stopped and if we can prosecute the person responsible, great, but I really doubt we can do this unless we start tapping phone lines or something. In any event, what I would suggest to the Catholic University is to tighten up their security a little, so that it's not so easy for non-users to communicate with users. And if anyone in the future is found to be using my name, in any form, I want to be notified directly. Thank you.

Sincerely,



b6
b7c

Stony Brook

State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, NY 11794
telephone: (516) 246-7000

June 24, 1981

[redacted]
Computer Center
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C. 20064

b6
b7C

Dear [redacted]:

Following receipt of your May 1st letter and the attached records on [redacted] interaction with Catholic University's computer, we have consulted with legal counsel and with our campus Computer Center. We have concluded that [redacted] actions at this end do deserve limited action under our campus judiciary code, but do not deserve criminal proceedings instituted by Stony Brook. b6 b7C

The University's legal counsel suggests that there may indeed have been a criminal offense directed toward Catholic University through theft of time on your computer. However, our counsel further states that Catholic University should be the party making a determination on whether criminal proceedings should be instituted in this case.

[redacted] reviewed the material you forwarded with members of his staff. He noted that there was interaction initiated by [redacted], but he also noted that that interaction was available through straight telephone access and that none of the reported conversations included any requests to [redacted] to get off the line; none of the reported conversations indicated that [redacted] was bothering the users with whom he was conversing or was hampering their operations. b6 b7C

We will be charging [redacted] with unauthorized use of University services. We will certainly make it clear that from our standpoint his behavior was inappropriate and violated our Student Conduct Code in more than one way. b6 b7C

You may also wish to know that the terminal from which [redacted] was operating has been removed from the radio station. It was a personal machine belonging to another student. It was to have been used for developing record files. Any such development in future will be strictly monitored by the general manager of the radio station.

I appreciate very much your willingness to share with us the full report of information that you had about [redacted] inappropriate interaction with your computer. Please let me know if we can help you in any other way. b6 b7C

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

ELW:ajt

x.c.: [redacted]

Stony Brook

MEMORANDUM

To [redacted]
From [redacted]
Subject Investigation of [redacted] Case
Date June 18, 1981

b6
b7C

At your request I have pursued the matter of [redacted] use of a computer terminal in WDC to access the computer at Catholic University in Washington, D. C. I have consulted with [redacted], University Computing Center, and [redacted] has graciously reviewed the case and consulted with several members of his staff. [redacted] has reported to me that the log of the transactions sent to us by Catholic University does not show that [redacted] used criminal means to gain access to their computer. In fact, the way in which the system is set up, they permit access without a password. [redacted] also added that there is no evidence that anyone at Catholic University ordered [redacted] to get off the computer or in any way indicated he was bothering them or hampering their operations. From [redacted] perspective, we should focus on [redacted] unauthorized use of University telephone lines; his questionable offer to trade property, which perhaps did not belong to him, to gain access to another system; and his foolish interference with computer operations at another university.

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b7C

Based upon this review, I feel that [redacted] should be charged under the University Student Conduct Code and receive a letter of warning and disciplinary probation from the University Hearing Officer. I believe that this matter does not warrant further action.

b6
b7C

If you require additional information, please see me.

SRT/lp

x.c.: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Office of the Vice President for Student Affairs
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, NY 11794
telephone: (516) 246-7000

Stony Brook

MEMORANDUM

To [redacted] Computing Center
From [redacted]
Subject [redacted] Case
Date June 18, 1981

b6
b7C

I wish to thank you very much for your help in the investigation related to the [redacted] case. Your review of [redacted] transactions has been very helpful and has enabled the University to determine how to proceed in this matter.

b6
b7C

Thank you again for your cooperation.

SRT/lp

x.c.: [redacted]

b6
b7C



State University of New York
State University Plaza
Albany, New York 12246

Office of the University Counsel
and Vice Chancellor for Legal Affairs
(518) 473-7591

JUN 10 1981

June 3, 1981

[Redacted]

Administration 355
State University of New York
Stony Brook, New York 11794

Re: [Redacted]

b6
b7c

Dear [Redacted]:

I have reviewed the materials which you submitted in relation to Catholic University of America's complaints about attempts at unauthorized computer access made by an individual identifying himself as [Redacted] at WUSB.

b6
b7c

Although the facts present a rather unique case, I concur with [Redacted] analysis that the Rules of Student Conduct may be implemented in student disciplinary proceedings on campus. Since there is no specific category in the prohibited conduct section of the Code covering misuse of University telephone lines for the purpose of securing illegal computer access, I suggest that the alleged misconduct falls within the general sections relating to "Respect and Protection for Persons and Property" (Section A-1) and the "Integrity of Transactions and Records" (Section A-3).

More specifically, these sections provide that:

"A(1)(b) No student shall take, possess or damage any property not his/her own on the University campus or on any University property."

and

"A(3)(d) No student shall knowingly take or use any services without authorization."

There may be other sections which you feel are more appropriately utilized than these cited. In any event, I see no jurisdictional difficulty.

[Redacted]

Page Two

June 3, 1981 b6
b7c

If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to
contact me.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

GJD:set

cc: [Redacted]

b6
b7c

CAHN WISHOD & WISHOD


ATTORNEYS AT LAW

534 BROADHOLLOW ROAD

MELVILLE, NEW YORK 11747

(516) 664-2300

RICHARD C. CAHN
EUGENE L. WISHOD
JOSEPH M. WISHOD
DOUGLAS A. McNALLY



II A1b

3d

May 29, 1981

[Redacted]

Administration 355 - SUNY
SUNY at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, NY 11794

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re: [Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]:

b6
b7C

I have reviewed the file on [Redacted] and I believe that there was a criminal offense which probably in the last analysis will be determined to have occurred in both the State of New York and the District of Columbia. However, the victim of the theft, Catholic University of America, should really be the party making a determination where criminal proceedings should be instituted, if at all.

With respect to any student disciplinary proceedings on campus, I would assume something in the Rules of Student Conduct would cover a Stony Brook student utilizing the University telephone lines for the purpose of making long distance calls and securing illegal access to another university's computer. You should, therefore, consider whether as a matter of policy you desire to institute such Student Conduct Code proceedings against the student.

b6
b7C

[Redacted] at Counsel's office has expressed a strong interest in this matter and I am, therefore, this date forwarding to her all of the materials which were just received from you together with the copy of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

RCC:bp
cc: [Redacted]

b6
b7C

THE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON D.C. 20064

COMPUTER CENTER
202 635-5373

May 1, 1981

[redacted]
Administration 355 - SUNY
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, NY 11794

Dear [redacted]:

As I promised in our phone conversation Thursday, April 30, 1981, enclosed are copies of the pertinent dialog between three different CUA computer users and someone who has been accessing our DECSYSTEM-10 claiming to be [redacted] an [redacted] at SUNY/Stony Brook and an employee of Radio Station WUSB. In the printouts, dialog beginning with ";;TTY56" is from the "phantom" caller, and dialog beginning with "SEND TTY56 ..." is from our user. (The number of the terminal, TTY56 above, may vary--this is because he was dialing into the system and getting a different line each time.) In most cases, his messages appear in lower case characters and our user's appear in upper case only.

The problem was first brought to my attention Thursday, April 23, 1981, when one of our part-time programmers gave me a printout (see Item 1) of a dialog between himself and someone who claimed to be named Eric who was offering to trade record albums for an access code to our system. The caller claimed to be working for WUSB and using a terminal located in the station. He told of exchanging five record albums with one of our students named [redacted] in exchange for [redacted] access code to our system. When we checked the code he had been using, we found that it had not been issued to anyone named [redacted]. We did talk to the person to whom the account was issued and are fairly certain that he was a victim of someone on our campus using his access code.

Friday, April 24, 1981, a graduate student brought me a printout (see Item 2), again of a dialog with [redacted] this time offering to trade access to long-distance telephone lines in exchange for a system access code. The caller gave our user a local phone number to call, two access codes for the communications system and instructions on how to use them.

5.06.81

[redacted] called [redacted] - she will get back later after consultation
" " [redacted] - to return call

At this time, I talked with a representative of C & P Telephone Company. After a check, he told me that the lines being used were not Bell Telephone lines, and therefore, they were not interested in the problem. I next talked to a [redacted], an investigator for MCI Communications. He was most interested and most concerned about this activity. He subsequently checked, however, and found out that the access scheme was not MCI, but was one belonging to Southern Pacific Communications. I talked with [redacted] of SPC. He told me that the long-distance access codes belonged to two California firms, and that they would begin to monitor the usage of the two codes. I sent him copies of some of the pertinent printouts.

b6
b7c

[redacted] called me Thursday, after I spoke with you, to tell me that he had somehow examined the account activity for March for the two access codes and learned that [redacted] had made several calls using these codes. He also told me that he had talked with [redacted] of SUNY/Stony Brook and had confirmed that [redacted] was a student there. He indicated that no action had been taken. I gave him your name and phone number. I assume he has since contacted you.

b6
b7c

Both firms expressed that while they are concerned about illicit usage of their phone lines by a person claiming to be a student, they are most concerned about the damage that could be done if the numbers were given to a "professional" who fully understood their usefulness.

Meanwhile, our Systems Programmer began taking steps to temporarily limit what a user could do on our system without having an access code. This patch was in use over the weekend, so we do not know what, if any, access this person tried to obtain. However, the patch had to be removed Monday morning and a more permanent fix applied. This was not accomplished until Thursday morning.

This person was again on the system Tuesday night. Both the user who "talked" to him last Thursday and our Night Operations Shift Supervisor engaged him in dialog over the system. Printouts from both dialogs are included. Our user this time managed to extract the last name of [redacted] (see Item 3) and also that he had used a DECsystem-10 while he was a student at [redacted]. Our Operator did not learn anything which we did not already know.

b6
b7c

In addition to the events we can document with printouts, I have had numerous students, faculty and even staff members of the Computer Center tell me that they had at one point received unsolicited messages from this person. Unsolicited messages serve only to interrupt someones work and to distract them from what they are doing. In the case of one user, he had to reprint several pages of a document because a "garbage" message was in the middle of it.

The person calling himself [redacted] has twice given our people the phone number of WUSB. I know of one occasion when our user actually called the number, asked for and actually spoke with someone claiming to be [redacted]

b6
b7C

Of more serious import, Tuesday night during the dialog with our Operator, the caller gave him the phone number (see Item 4) to access your Univac computer system. I am sure that my counterparts in your Computer Center would be most interested in this.

We would like to see this activity stopped. As I have indicated, we have taken steps to tighten our own system security.

Clearly, this may be a situation in which the caller does not realize the seriousness of his actions. However, we estimate that we have spent over \$1,000 in staff time alone dealing with this problem. We view this as harassment of our employees and our users. This activity, from our understanding, is a Federal offense if the calls are coming across state lines from New York to Washington, D. C. In addition, this person has admitted using SPC lines without authorization which is probably also a violation of statutes.

We appreciate your taking action on this problem. Please feel free to contact me if I may be of further assistance. I would appreciate your letting me know the outcome of this situation.

- Sincerely,

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

AAH:mct

Enclosures

Stony Brook

MEMORANDUM

To
From *[Signature]*
Subject WUSB Telephone Inventory
Date October 26, 1983

b6
b7C

Attached is a listing of all telephone lines leased to WUSB Radio Station. The list is broken down into two categories, the first part consists of 6 telephone lines, only one of which is capable of reaching long distance (7122). Also attached is the billing for this phone from May, 1983 through September, 1983. The remainder of the phones cannot reach long distance, however, the two phones with A2N service can reach all of New York State and Washington, D. C. and vicinity. Unfortunately, our antiquated Centrex phone system is not able to identify calls made on these tie lines.

The second part of the list labelled radio circuits are used throughout the campus to interconnect various locations such as the Gym back to the studios to broadcast sporting events.

The potential for a bright technical oriented person such as the involved parties is to connect anyone of these radio circuits to any phone circuit on campus in the many Telco closets scattered throughout the campus. In effect this would mean they would be able to make calls from the studio via these circuits on anyone's phone line which in most cases goes undetected because very few department heads question their telephone bills on a thorough basis.

The Message Unit Detail (MUD) reports which I promised are still being processed by the phone company and should be available in about 1 week. This will give you all local calls made on these phones in the 516 calling area for approximately 6 months.

If there are any questions that may surface regarding the attached, please call me.

Attachments

DM: pvo

cc:

b6
b7C



Federal Bureau of Investigation
ATTN: [REDACTED]
300 Lee Street Room 500
Alexandria, VA 22314

b6
b7C

F-74



Roger Olson

NOT A MEMBER OF
THE A. G. C. C.
CHICAGO, ILL. COIN

1. The first group of people who are affected by the disease are those who are in the first group of people who are affected by the disease.

January 14, 1984


[redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation
300 North Lee Street #500
Alexandria, VA 22314

b6
b7C

You called the other day to ask about a person named [redacted] As I told you then, I have received phone calls over and over and over again asking for this person.

Now today, the enclosed arrived in the office mail because the mailman couldn't find a box for it otherwise. I have to say of all the phone calls looking for him, its the first time a letter was addressed to him here. The address is not even correct, we don't have a number such as B-16.

If its of any help you are welcome to it. There is no return address shown to send it back to and I refuse to get involved any further by reading it or learning more about Roger. The less I know the better I feel. If anything further comes to my attention I will advise you.



b6
b7C

2600

January, 1984!

Published monthly by 2600 ENTERPRISES, an electrolytic organization. Subscription rates are \$10 annually. Write to 2600, Box 752, Middle Island, NY 11953.

*0#D

VOLUME ONE, NUMBER ONE

AHOY!

(That's how Alexander Graham Bell used to answer his phone. For some reason, it never caught on...)

This is the very first issue of 2600. We will, on this page, explain our motives and what the goals are which we hope to achieve with this publication.

The idea for 2600 was born early in 1983. We saw a tremendous need for some form of communication between those who truly appreciate the concept of communication: technological enthusiasts. Of course, others have different ways of describing such people—these range from words like hacker or phreaker to stronger terms such as criminal or anarchist. Our purpose is not to pass judgement. 2600 exists to provide information and ideas to individuals who live for both. All of the items contained on these pages are provided for informational purposes only. 2600 assumes no responsibility for any uses which this information may be put to.

Of course, a lot has changed since our first days. *War Games* came out. And then the 414 gang got caught. Suddenly everyone was talking about phreakers and hackers. And while there were some that sort of jumped into the limelight, others were a bit more cautious, in fact, some were quite upset. Sure, the publicity was fun. But what would be the cost?

Well, time has passed and the cost has been high. Phreakers and hackers have been forced into virtual isolation. Raids by the FBI have become almost commonplace. The one magazine that was geared towards phone phreaks (*TAP*) mysteriously disappeared at the height of the crisis, sparking rumours that they, too, had been raided. However, in November, the magazine resurfaced, with an explanation that a fire had destroyed part of their mailing list. (Incidentally, if your name was one of the ones that was lost, you can claim the issues you are entitled to by sending *TAP* a copy of their mailing label or a cancelled check.)

And then there was the legendary computer bulletin board known as *OSUNY*. Enthusiasts from all across the country called up this board and left messages ranging from the latest in Sprint codes to how to crash an RSTS system to what to do once you've finally gained access to Autovon. Within a week after being mentioned in *Newsweek*, *OSUNY* was disconnected. Word has it that they are still in existence somewhere, but by invitation only. A truly smart move, if that is the case.

Many hackers were keeping a low profile even before the October raids. When the FBI confiscated

equipment from 15 sites across the country on the twelfth and thirteenth of the month (sponsored by a grant from the folks at CTE), many of our contacts were lost because they feared the consequences of continuing. Two organizations, the Inner Circle and PHALSE, were deeply affected by the raids. The latter group (whose initials signify Phreakers, Hackers, and Laundromat Service Employees) is still in contact with us on occasion and has promised to contribute many articles devoted to just what was really going on.

So it seems that the events of 1983 have conspired to actually *strengthen* the resolve of hackers and phreakers across the country to put out this monthly newsletter. We hope you will help us continue by subscribing, spreading the word among your friends, and of course contributing articles and information. Since we are non-profit, it really doesn't matter to us if you xerox your copy and send it to someone else—all we ask is that you let us know so that we can have a rough idea of how many people we're reaching.

2600 has several sections, some of which will appear every month, others on an irregular basis. On this, the front page, and on page two, you will always find informative full-length features on relevant subjects. Future topics include: "A Guide to Long Distance Telephone Services and Their Vulnerabilities", "DEC and Their Many Mistakes", "Phreaking in the Sixties", and "Tracing Methods Used by the Law", as well as any late-breaking items. "FLASH" appears on page 3 and provides a roundup of timely news items written from a technological enthusiast's perspective. Page 4 is used for a variety of things—interesting stories from the past, schemes and plots that just might work, and feedback from subscribers. The last two pages of 2600 are comprised of data. Just what sort of data, we cannot say. However, if it is something that you are looking for, then you will probably recognize it.

The three holes on each page serve a purpose. We suggest that you obtain a loose-leaf book so that you can neatly file every issue of 2600 you receive.

Many thanks to those of you who subscribed without even seeing an issue. A word of advice, though: don't do it again or you'll probably get ripped off! We'd also like to thank those who took advantage of our free issue offer. If interested in subscribing, the rates and address can be found at the top of this page.

Welcome to 2600. Turn the page and become a part of our unique world.

FBI GOES AFTER ADS HACKERS

IBM must press charges before action can be taken — Feds reveal their tactics, blow source

On this page we had originally planned to run an article entitled: ESS — Orwell's Prophecy. At the last minute, however, we received this bombshell from an anonymous contributor. It seems that a group of hackers was making use of one of IBM's ADS systems. (Audio Distribution Systems enable users with touch-tone phones to send voice messages back and forth to each other. Look for an in-depth article on them in a future issue.) Unfortunately, as is all too often the case, one of these hackers was really an FBI informant who was taking note of all of the illegitimate users (around 40 or so). Luckily for this particular group, the informant was sloppy and left many telltale clues which gave them literally months of warning. So, when the informant decided to send a message to the system operator, advising IBM to take action against the hackers and to call the FBI for more information, the hackers were ready. The system operator's account had also been penetrated by them and hence, the message was received by the hackers first! One of them actually followed the instructions in the message and called the FBI! And for some reason, the investigator there thought he was talking to an IBM executive. This is some of what he said.

One of the individuals that supplies me with information from time to time has uncovered a lot of abuse within the ADS systems, not only here in the United States, but in England and Italy. I talk to this individual on a private bulletin board. . .

We have no ability to come in as an outside investigative or law enforcement agency and do anything about it because, first off, we don't have a complainant. We don't want to step on anybody's toes, but it's been our policy to monitor bulletin boards and the phone phreaking activity across the country and advise commercial computer systems and corporations if we do discover certain computers along with the passwords and account numbers being published on the board. We do this on a one on one basis.

The GTE Telemail Connection

That was my baby, too! As a matter of fact, that's how we came across the ADS system — through the GTE investigation. [These] people are not just interested in data communications through terminals — they will leave voice messages on an ADS. We have been slowly uncovering more and more on the ADS in the last two months.

The major phase of [the Telemail investigation] was about 20 individuals that we had located and identified and we're looking for indictments on most of them coming down in the next month or two. We're talking about a group of highly organized people that do communicate on a daily basis all the way across the country — from San Francisco and

L.A. to Denver to upstate New York. So we have a core of individuals that we are still looking at that are using your system and then we have this peripheral that we are not as concerned about because they are not part of an out & out conspiracy or an organized network, per se. I know of at least 8 or 10 that are the central figures in this, the carryover from Telemail. And we keep hearing information of other people who are calling in with junk messages — there's no real substance to their messages. Now the reason I know that is that they have included one of my sources of information onto their system and so he gets messages from the other parties.

The Communist Connection



In a way we're somewhat fortunate that it's 16-year-olds or 26-year-olds as opposed to people from behind the Iron Curtain. It gives us the opportunity to see how these systems work and see if we can plug any loopholes before somebody from a not-friendly nation would try the same thing. I personally fully expect it — I'm surprised it hasn't happened in the past. It may have. We just haven't caught it. But the kids are a little bit sloppier and they're getting caught. . . I hate to sound paranoid, but we're supposed to be considering the big picture as far as is there anything sensitive in nature. For us within the bureau, sensitive in nature first off means national security and you've got corporate trade secrets and the like that you don't need being distributed.

How the FBI Wins Trust and Gets Info

The subjects have an ego problem and they love to talk to other individuals about what they are capable of doing and bragging about it. They have a tendency to trade information. Everything is negotiable with them. We have never had to barter away access to systems — we do it more on the technical information of phone networks, computer systems, and the like to where it's more of a technical information tradeoff as opposed to an access tradeoff. [An example would be the] login procedure for a PDP-11. You integrate yourself within their confidence and their circle of friends. You feed them a little bit of bait and a lot of times they'll go for it. You enter into a dialogue with them and they end up taking you for a ride.

These people are very hungry for technical avenues through which they can communicate. It used to be the personal computer bulletin boards — public messages that anybody can read. You start finding out that they leave a phone number or an address — and you start finding out who the parties are. There's thousands of these bulletin boards across the country and you narrow in on maybe twenty or so that are the more hardcore bulletin boards that are being used for exchange of illicit information. Then they move from there to an electronic mail service, namely GTE

(Continued on back page)



GTE raids still have many unanswered questions—computer owners concerned

Combined News Sources

On Wednesday, October 12, at 6:00 AM, the FBI started to raid the homes of over fifteen individuals for allegedly breaking into Telemail, GTE Telenet's massive electronic mail service. While much of the publicity has now died down, questions remain concerning the legality and the overall implications of such computer seizures.

At a December 16 meeting of the Long Island Computer Association, this topic was addressed. Some members could not understand the rationale for taking away the computers in the first place. "It sounds like scare tactics to me... to keep these kids off of computers," one commented. "To hold the equipment seems like something that should be unlawful and it's something that the public should look at. If it's not justified, we should say that we won't put up with it anymore and to return the equipment." He did not elaborate on precisely what kind of action a computer group such as LICA could take.

Legally, the computers can be kept for as long as they are needed in the investigation. Ultimately, a judge will decide how long that can be.

"The allegation," said an attorney familiar with the case, "is that the services of the Telemail bulletin boards were used and the theory that the government is proceeding under is that it was a violation of Section 1343, wire fraud (a scheme with intention to defraud someone else using either television, telephone, or some other communications means). They're saying that if there was use of the bulletin board service, then that was a 'theft of service' and there was intention to defraud GTE."

One member took GTE's side. "These are all nice games these people are playing, but they are a theft of service. Somebody is in the business of providing that service and they're deliberately interfering with their providing that service. They're trying to get something for nothing."

Another disagreed. "You may be on their computer, but it's not costing them anything, if you're not taking up time. Unless the whole system is fully used and you were the last user on, are you really using any of their time? Really and truly?"

Many hackers felt they were unjustly accused. One even said he'd never used the Telemail system. Others said they had looked around once or twice but had never hurt anything. Others, though, admitted to deleting mail and playing tricks, like sending obscene messages back and forth between two innocent executives.

Whether or not the Telemail system was used fraudulently did not seem to be the overriding issue at the LICA meeting. What had members there worried was the way in which the investigation was being carried out. When dealing with computers as evidence, different rules apply, rules that for the most part have not been written yet. "Data can be manufactured just as easily as it can be erased from a personal computer," one member commented. "And the longer that they have the computer in their custody, the less likely that the information that they claim is on it was actually there. Because, as we know, you could enter any date, any time into the computer and have it date- and time-stamp the files."

Meanwhile, a GTE Telenet spokesperson said that the corporation still intends to prosecute and denied that the whole thing was being put on for the deterrent effect that it might have on other people. The spokesperson also said that abuse on the system was discovered in the past, but they didn't prosecute at that time. This time, though, they're serious.

AT&T Credit Cards Make Debut

2600 News Service

There's now another way to place telephone calls without dimes. This month, the "true" AT&T credit card phones are making their debut in various airports around the country. This new phone actually takes an AT&T credit card (not those wimpy "calling cards" or "PIN cards." We're talking about a *real* hunk of plastic, with a magnetic strip and everything.) — and there's even a little video screen that gives you directions.

Unless some sort of a bug can be found within the system itself, phone phreaks won't accomplish very much here, unless they can actually get their hands on other people's cards. This, in itself, wouldn't be too difficult, since large numbers of the cards would be sent out on the same day in a particular area. Stealing out of personal mailboxes, though, is an act most phone phreaks would never stoop to. And the folks at AT&T are well aware of this.

Wireless phones spell trouble

2600 News Service

With cordless phones popping up all over the place, problems were bound to arise. It's not at all uncommon to hear another cordless conversation on your phone or to hear the electronic pulse-beeping when you're not even dialing. Then there are cordless phone phreaks to deal with, who drive into heavily populated zones holding one of the common cordless models. It's called "cruising for dialtones." And some phones are nice enough to broadcast your conversation on an AM frequency. This feature isn't very good for private conversations. It helped shape a recent drug bust in the state of New York.

Recently, a lady in the Midwest called up her local electric company to tell them that she was going to be away for two months. A member of the 2600 Club heard this on his radio and, being in a good mood, called her and told her that important, personal business should *never* be discussed on cordless phones. After thanking him, she exclaimed, "That thing's going right back to the Phonecenter Store!"

1984 arrives in Hong Kong

The Los Angeles Times

In an effort to "discourage people from driving their cars in heavily congested areas" all 350,000 of Hong Kong's motor vehicles will be fitted with tracking devices that will let government computers know exactly where each car has traveled so that the owner can be billed for road use. This system could be in full implementation by 1987, if the government has its way. Such a system would also allow the police to quickly pinpoint the whereabouts of any vehicle. Tampering with the \$45 tracking devices will be illegal and any attempt to do so will trigger street cameras to photograph the license plate of the car.

THE TRUTH BEHIND THOSE 9999 NUMBERS

by Mark Bluebox

Once upon a time, I was talking to one of my favorite friends, one of the nation's oldest and most experienced telephone enthusiasts—some might refer to him as a phone phreak. In this particular conversation, he mentioned to me that I might want to experiment with a series of 800 numbers: exchanges starting with 9, followed by the suffix 9999 (800-9xx-9999). And so I did, and a whole new world began to open up in front of me.

They were mostly weather and time numbers in various locations throughout the country. And, since these were 800 numbers, there was NO CHARGE! One number in particular was of a great deal of interest to me and to many others. This was 800-957-9999, which hooked up to WWV, the radio station operated by the National Bureau of Standards that does nothing but tell the time and give shortwave reports. This is the most accurate clock in the entire world! You either have to tune WWV in on a shortwave receiver or dial 303-499-7111 in Fort Collins, Colorado. Yet, here I was with an 800 access! Being a bit of a shortwave enthusiast, I don't have to tell you how convenient this was for me. Unfortunately, it got too convenient for too many people.

I guess I made the mistake of giving it to a former president of a large amateur radio club in the Dallas area. He, in turn, printed it in the Amateur Radio Newsbulletin where thousands of people probably saw it. Another statewide newsbulletin picked it up and printed it. Through an amateur radio news network which this bulletin was a part of, the news got as far as California.

One day, I called up the West Link Amateur Radio News Service at 213-768-7333. (This is a service located in West Link, California that broadcasts news over amateur radio, VHF, UHF, etc.) Their latest report had this little item: "Speaking of interesting things, the National Bureau of Standards has got a very convenient time number for those of you that are not constantly at a shortwave receiver. You can dial 1-800-957-9999 for WWV. It's just another good toll-free service for us to use." The avalanche had really begun now.

The West Link report was heard on bulletin stations all around the world and, apparently, one station in Nashville, Tennessee broadcast it. From there it fell into the hands of one of the writers for the DX program on Radio South Africa! I happened to be listening to a program where they were talking about pulling in distant time stations, weather stations, etc. He then mentioned, "For those of you that live in the United States, a convenient toll-free 800 number has

been provided by the National Bureau of Standards for WWV and that number is 1-800-957-9999." Imagine my surprise! Once again, the number had been broadcast all around the world. People in many, many nations now had that number. Of course, the number only worked inside the United States, but the word was being spread by shortwave listeners and QSL people everywhere.

The number was getting swamped. Needless to say, it was busy much of the time. A government official, who *also* had this number, thinking that it was legitimate, called up WWV and complained. He told them that they needed to add some more lines to their new 800 number. The general manager of the station said, "I don't know *what* you're talking about. I don't know of any 800 number that gets you WWV."

The government official told him what the telephone number was. The general manager called it and heard his own station. Astounded, he contacted the Mountain Bell Telephone Company in Denver, Colorado. They said, "You're not paying for any 800 in-WATS number. We show 303-499-7111 for WWV, but we don't have any 800-957-9999."

Mountain Bell checked it out and sure enough, the number existed but not on *their* records. No one was getting charged for this! Now, of course, you know a monopoly as well as I do—they're *sure* not going to let anyone have a free ride. So they told the WATS coordinator to find out what happened. He finally made the discovery that some technicians had hooked that number up for transmission testing. [These switching technicians are toll technicians, AT&T Long Lines switching technicians, and carrier systems technicians. In other words, they're the group of people who link switching centers together, from New York to Los Angeles, for example. In this case, the whole escapade was a kind of group effort. The switchmen and the carrier people got together and set up this number for testing, finding noisy carriers, carriers with cross-talk on them, etc.]

The WATS coordinator told them they'd better get this number off—too many people knew about it. He told them to erase *every* 800 test line number that was on the system. Not surprisingly, someone also got chewed out very severely.

So, consequently, 800-957-9999 is no longer in existence. But since then, less than two weeks later, several of the 800 test numbers have begun to defiantly reappear. Check around, you'll probably find a few interesting ones. But I doubt if WWV's brief stint as a toll-free service will ever be repeated.

Ahoy, folks! If any of you have ever used an extender that goes by the name of 8006213129, you'd better give it a call now! The people running it have a message for you.

Position	Name	Extension	Position	Name	Extension
Office of the President			Director of advance		
The President	Ronald Reagan	2858	Deputy director of advance	Stephen M. Studdert	7565
Special assistant	David C. Fischer	2168	Administrative assistant	Hugh L. O'Neill	7565
Personal secretary to the President	Kathleen Osborne	2858	Trip desk officers	CeCe B. Kremer	7565
Office of the Counselor to the President			Advance staff	Mari J. Frucci	7565
Counselor to the President	Edwin Meese III	2235		Karen Jones Roberts	7565
Deputy counselor	James E. Jenkins	7600		Lynn Smallpage	7565
Assistant counselor	Edwin W. Thomas Jr.	2235		Robert K. Gubitosi	7565
Special assistant	Mitchell F. Stanley	2235		James F. Kuhn	7565
Assistant to the President for Cabinet affairs	Craig L. Fuller	2823		Dan Morris	7565
Secretary	Adela Gonzalez-Nardi	2823		Lanny F. Wiles	7565
Assistant director	T. Kenneth Gribb Jr.	2800		Rocky D. Kuonen	7565
Administrative assistants	Karen Hart	2823	Director of scheduling	Gregory Newell	7560
	Nancy A. (Missy) Hodapp	2800	Deputy director of scheduling	Tricia Rodgers	7560
Director of planning and evaluation	Richard S. Beal	6690	Administrative assistant	Cristy Valentine	7560
Office of Chief of Staff			Staff assistants	Michael Castine	7560
Chief of staff	James A. Baker III	6797		Frances (Fan) Snodgrass	7560
Executive assistant to the chief of staff	Margaret D. Tutwiler	6797		Netta A. Dickey	7560
Staff assistant	Kathy Camalier	6797	Confidential assistant	Mary H. Rawlins	7560
Confidential secretary	Margaret Glasscock	6797	President's diarist	Ellen Jones	7560
Deputy to the chief of staff	Richard G. Darman	2702	Appointments secretary	Helen C. Donaldson	7560
Administrative assistant	Sara Currence Emery	2702	Staff directory for the First Lady	Peter McCoy	6702
Secretary	Janet F. McMinn	2702	Administrative assistant	Christine J. Hathaway	6702
Special assistant to the chief of staff	James W. Cicconi	2174	Press secretary	Sheila P. Tate	7136
Presidential correspondence	Anne Higgins	7610	Assistant press secretary	Barbara Cook	7136
Special presidential messages	Dodie Livingston	2941	Personal secretary	Elaine Crispen	6633
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff			Social secretary	Muffie Brandon	7064
Deputy chief of staff	Michael K. Deaver	6475	Assistant social secretary	Linda Faulkner	7064
Assistant to the deputy chief of staff	Joseph W. Canzeri	2861	Scheduling director	Nina Wormser	7910
Staff assistant	Shirley Moore	6475	Special projects	Ann Wroblewski	7905
Special assistant to the President for private initiatives	James S. Rosebush	2957	Office of the Vice President		
Executive assistant	Bernyce Fletcher	2957	The Vice President	George Bush	7123
Director of special support services	Edward V. Hickey Jr.	2150	Executive assistant	Charles G. (Chase) Untermeyer	2587
Deputy director of special support services	Dennis E. LeBlanc	2150	Chief of staff	Daniel J. Murphy	6606
Deputy director of military office	Col. Frank E. Millner	2150	Deputy chief of staff	Richard N. Bond	7056
Army aide to the President	Lt. Col. Jose A. Muratti Jr.	2150	Military assistants	Lt. Col. Michael D. Fry	4213*
Air Force aide to the President	Maj. William M. Brennan	2150		Lt. Col. William Eckert	4223*
Navy aide to the President	Cdr. William R. Schmidt	2150	Counsel	C. Boyden Gray	7034
Marine Corps aide to the President	Maj. John P. Kline Jr.	2150	Deputy counsel	Rafael V. Capo	7034
Physician to the President	Dr. Daniel Ruge	2672	Press secretary	Peter Teeley	6772
			Deputy press secretary	Shirley M. Green	6772
			Speechwriter	Christopher Buckley	7453
			Domestic policy adviser	Thaddeus A. Garrett Jr.	2173
			Assistant domestic policy adviser	Mary S. Gall	7935
			National security affairs adviser	Nancy Bearg Dyke	4213
			Congressional relations assistant	Robert V. Thompson	224-2424
			Legislative assistant	Susan Alvarado	224-8391
			Assistant for appointments and scheduling	Jennifer Fitzgerald	7870

All telephone numbers are on the 456- exchange except those marked with an asterisk, which are on the 395- exchange, and those listed in full.

Proper tabbing is extremely important when typing a list. Above is an example of tabs used successfully.

This here page is usually a continuation of page 5. However, when we get a blockbuster story like the one below, we have to reallocate our space. We know you'll understand. By the way, as long as we've got you looking up at this part of the page, why not take the time to send us some mail? Letters, articles, information, old telephones, paintings, anything, really. You know the address (it's on the front page). Let's hear from YOU.

FBI VS. HACKERS

(Continued from second page)

Telemail. They caused fits within Telemail when they decided to get a little bit cocky and see if they could shut down accounts and change passwords of the administrators and things like that. From there they have moved one step further to where they are now the same individuals communicating through the ADS systems and they also set up conference calls through the Bell System, so they're not just attacking one particular system or one individual avenue of communication — they try to hit them all. It's an ego trip for all of them.

Pen Registers

We would put a pen register on the phone line of the individual (suspect) and it would record only the digits dialed on his telephone — we would not use a full blown wiretap to record his voice. We can only put a pen register on an individual's phone for like, thirty days before we have to go back to a judge and try to get an extension and we try to minimize the use of our electronic surveillance equipment so the public does not think we're the Big Brother of 1984. (laughter) It's coming. Actually, we're already there! (hearty laughter)

We have not utilized any pen registers for the specific purposes of going after abusers of the ADS systems. First off, we have to have an actual case presented to us or a complaint. It's a roundabout way of doing it, but it's the way that we, in the bureau, have to have somebody outside come to us. Otherwise we can carry on the whole investigation without IBM even being aware that we are monitoring activity within their system and we don't want to become that secret police, or anything like that. We want to be above board and work with the corporations in the community.

Just How Much Trouble Are These Hackers In?

On the federal level we can prosecute them for telephone fraud (fraud by wire) if we can determine that the ADS is an ongoing business operation and that you are being denied your just revenues by them sneaking onto your system and abusing your system. The strictest penalty is a \$1000 fine and 5 years in jail for an actual conviction of fraud by wire violation. Those are always lax — a more common sentence may be for an adult maybe a year in jail, 18 months, or a fine, sometimes they get probation, or agree to pay back any fraudulent money obtained

or for services rendered or whatever to the client company — it stays on his record for a year, he's on probation for a year and at the end of that, his record is wiped clean. Rarely do they get the maximum penalty. It just doesn't happen.

Do Me a Favor

Please do not disclose any geographic location because we are kind of unique in that we do not have any other source available in any other part of the country that could supply us with information like this. He may be one of 200 people, but if you identify Michigan you identify between 2 or 3 individuals and it may burn the source.

We'd like to make it clear that we don't intend to do this kind of thing very often, since rumours about certain people being informants are very common in this business. But this is no rumour. This, friends, is solid fact — we would not have printed this story if we weren't able to substantiate the claims it makes, and we had no trouble at all doing that. Our intent in making this information known was not to screw up the FBI's fun (they're really not doing all that much out of the ordinary anyway), but rather to expose a very dangerous individual who goes by the name of Cable Pair (some say his real name is John Maxfield). This person has been posing as an extremely friendly hacker who lives in Detroit and is just bubbling over with technical information in exchange for your secrets. He claims to have been one of the nation's first phreaks, which may or may not be true. He gives out his telephone numbers freely, will do anything to communicate with somebody (like place conference calls from his own private PBX system, provided you give him YOUR phone number), and generally will use anything you say to him against you in the future. Our advise is simple: stay the hell away from this person. Even if you haven't done anything wrong yourself, your life can still be made miserable by him if you're even suspected of having contact with wrongdoers.

This latest turn of events has saddened us — we thought Cable Pair would be a promising contributor to this publication and instead we learned a valuable lesson: don't trust anybody. Have fun, Cable Pair. Enjoy yourself. Just don't expect to see any of us over at the Chestnut Tree Cafe with you. You're on your own now.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/14/84

The following is a summary of trap and trace information received verbally from [redacted]
[redacted]

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b7E

Investigation on 2/6/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
Sub E
by SA [redacted] DF:mb Date dictated 2/6/84

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Review of

b6
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AX 196A-633

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/10/84

[] This is a summary of the activities of []
[] on GTE Telemail.

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[] used the names [] and
[] on Telemail. [] also routinely used the
legitimate account registered as [].

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[] was a member of a group of illegal users
called the "PHALSER". [] was registered as an illegal
user in following companies: BMW, MARAVEN, TELENET, UAW
and SCANNET.

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[] under one of his user names accessed
the Telemail system on at least 247 different occasions
between July 9, 1983, and October 12, 1983. Of those
occasions, GTE Telemail captured 57 of his messages.

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A fellow "PHALSER" has met [] and can definitely
identify [] as [] and [].
[] is described by this fellow PHALSER as the leader
of the group and as a part-time volunteer at WUSB Radio
Station, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
Stony Brook, New York.

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Information received from []

[]

b7E

[] stated to this fellow PHALSER that he
found out that the FBI was about to search for computer
equipment at WUSB. [] further told this person that
he [] was able to contact someone and get some material
out of the room to be searched before the FBI searched
it. A fellow radio station employee, [],
told the FBI that, at the time of the search, [] gave
instructions over the phone to [] concerning

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Investigation on 2/6/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [] :gaj Date dictated 2/6/84

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the room to be searched. After the search, [] thanked [] for calling him and letting him know the room was going to be searched. The fellow PHALSER also said that [] told him that he had given a statement to the attorney representing [] admitting to his [] use of Telemail. [] also told the fellow PHALSER that "our story will be that I'm the only one who used Telemail."

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On November 6, 1983, [] using the legitimate account known as [], left a message to the Public Relations Officer of GTE, stating that "we" represent PHALSE which is "an organization that has been rather active on the Telemail system over the past few months." In subsequent messages, [] described the methods by which he and other PHALERS penetrated the Telemail system and admits to reading the messages of legitimate companies (e.g. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH messages).

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Finally, []

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b7D

During the search of the WUSB Radio Station, two computer print-outs labelled "Telemail System Command Manual" dated September 20, 1983, were found. These are "bootleg" copies of system information that only a legitimate Telemail customer administrator should have access to. These print-outs were found in the same room from which [] at [] request, removed other material immediately before the search.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/13/83

[redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] advised he lives at
this residence with [redacted] and [redacted]

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[redacted] said that he only used the Data System
Terminal located in the bedroom of [redacted] in order to
prepare a program which would [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] advised he would rather not discuss the
activities of [redacted] regarding his use of the com-
puter equipment located in [redacted] bedroom.

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b7C

[redacted] said he was born on [redacted] in
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] telephone [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/13/83 at [redacted] File # BQ196B-2942

SAS [redacted]
by and [redacted] VJKE/mtm Date dictated 10/13/83

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/28/83

[redacted] telephone
[redacted] was telephonically contacted on December 20, 1983.

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[redacted] said he had spoken to various "friends" and based on their advice he had decided he did not want to talk to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at this time.

Investigation on 12/20/83 at Hauppauge, New York File # Alexandria 196A-633
(Telephonic) Sub E
by SA [redacted] btd Date dictated 12/21/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/28/83

telephone [redacted] was contacted by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] telephonically from the Hauppauge, New York, Resident Agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [redacted] was told that the FBI would like to interview him concerning statements made to him by [redacted] on the telephone on October 13, 1983, at the time of an FBI search of the WUSB Radio Station on the State University of New York at Stony Brook.

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[redacted] first stated he knew nothing about the incident. He was then told that the FBI had information that [redacted] had asked [redacted] to go to the room where the computers were stored and remove certain materials before the agents could get to them. [redacted] was further told that this removal of items by him might constitute obstruction of justice.

b6
b7C

[redacted] said that he wanted to talk to an attorney and [redacted] agreed to have his attorney call SA [redacted] at the Hauppauge, New York, Resident Agency.

b6
b7C

(Telephonic)

Investigation on 12/20/83 at Hauppauge, New York File # Alexandria 196A-633
Sub E

by SA [redacted] /btd Date dictated 12/21/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

11/18/83

Date of transcription

[redacted] called the Alexandria Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on this date and requested to speak to Special Agent (SA) [redacted]. [redacted] was advised of his rights orally and he thereafter indicated that he still wanted to talk with this agent concerning his involvement in the illegal accessing of the GTE Telemail system.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 10/19/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-63

by SA [redacted]:gaJ Date dictated 10/21/83

b6
b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

11/18/83

Date of transcription

[redacted] called the Alexandria Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on this date and requested to speak with Special Agent (SA) [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

This agent advised [redacted] of his right to remain silent and [redacted] indicated that he was aware of his rights, but still wished to talk with this agent concerning illegal accessing of GTE Telemail system.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 10/27/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 10/28/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/14/83

[redacted] (protect identity), telephonically contacted the Alexandria Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and thereafter provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] provided the following information:

1) [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

2) [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 12/6/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] /DF:mb Date dictated 12/6/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/16/84

[redacted] telephonically contacted this agent and thereafter provided the following information:

His date of birth is [REDACTED] and his Social Security Account Number is [REDACTED]. His home address is [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also provided this information:

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b6
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b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 1/11/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

b6
b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/25/84

[redacted] home phone [redacted] or [redacted]
telephonically contacted this agent on this date.
thereafter provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 1/23/84 at Alexandria, VA File # Alexandria
196A-633

by Sa [redacted] mbe Date dictated 1/23/84

b6
b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

12/28/83

Date of transcription

telephone [redacted] was advised of the official identities of the interviewing agents and thereafter provided the following information:

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b7C

He is [redacted]

[redacted] is well known at the WUSB Radio Station and is considered to be a "phone expert." During the summer of 1983, [redacted] saw a handwritten note on a bulletin board at the radio station that said something to the effect of "the phone police are coming." At one point, [redacted] and [redacted] were standing next to the bulletin board and [redacted] asked [redacted] what that sign meant. [redacted] replied something to the effect of, "I don't want to talk about it." [redacted] felt that [redacted] was continuously doing something with the phones that he did not want other people to know about.

b6
b7C

[redacted] also has personal knowledge that [redacted] uses the telephone "constantly" to make various types of telephone calls to 800 numbers and is much more knowledgeable about unusual features of the telephones than other people.

b6
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In approximately May or June, 1983, [redacted] saw [redacted] call some sort of answering service or message service on the telephone. [redacted] was using the telephone in the radio station and the phone was on a speaker at the time. [redacted] saw [redacted] punch various buttons on a touch-tone telephone and then a voice would say something to the effect, "Press one to leave a message, two to hear a message, etc." When [redacted] saw that [redacted] and others had heard this, he seemed to be very concerned. At this same time, [redacted] also heard a message from [redacted] to [redacted] being delivered over this message system. [redacted] clearly recognized [redacted] voice and [redacted] knows that [redacted] and [redacted] are good friends. It is clear to [redacted] that the message being delivered on the telephone system was from [redacted] to [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] said that [redacted] specifically called the "message service" to check for his messages. [redacted] was also present when this happened.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/20/83 at [redacted] File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SAs [redacted] & [redacted] Date dictated 12/21/83
DF/btd

Sub E

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b7C

AX 196A-633 Sub E

According to [redacted] has moved somewhere to upstate New York. He moved in August, 1983. [redacted] has visited [redacted] within the past week.

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In approximately May, 1983, [redacted] saw [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] (Last Name Unknown) at a pay telephone in the Student Union at the State University of New York Campus at Stony Brook. [redacted] watched as [redacted] dialed a number and [redacted] said, "I'm calling the Defense Department." [redacted] then said that the number rang a couple of times and then he would receive a dial tone.

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On October 13, 1983, the day the premises of WUSB Radio Station were searched by agents of the FBI, [redacted] was present when agents first came to the station and he indicated they had a search warrant. At this point, [redacted] called [redacted] to report that the agents were there because he thought the computer in the station belonged to [redacted] called [redacted] and said something to the effect of, "The phone police are here." [redacted] appeared very disturbed and asked [redacted] what he meant. [redacted] said, "The FBI is here and they have a search warrant for computers." [redacted] replied something to the effect of, "Thanks for letting me know. There is something we have to get rid of or there is something we have to do." [redacted] also asked [redacted] to find out if anyone was down in the room where the computer was. [redacted] reported that [redacted] was, in fact, in that room and [redacted] asked [redacted] to call [redacted] to the telephone. [redacted] did call [redacted] to the telephone and [redacted] listened as [redacted] seemed to be getting some sort of instructions from [redacted] then left and apparently went back to the room where the computer was. [redacted] says he clearly got the impression that [redacted] was asking [redacted] to remove something from the room where the computer was.

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After the search, [redacted] came back to [redacted] and said, "Thank you for calling me, it was important that you did that." [redacted] again felt that [redacted] had succeeded in having [redacted] get material out of the room to be searched before the FBI agents found it.

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

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AX 196A-633

NAMES OF DEFENDANTS:

1. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Weight
Eyes
Iowa Motor
Vehicle Number
Address

☐ yrs old

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

2. [redacted], described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Weight
Social Security
Account Number
Address

[redacted]

☐ yrs old

b6
b7C

[redacted]

~~e2~~

AX 196A-633

3. ^①, described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Social Security
Account Number
Address

 yrs old

b6
b7C

~~23~~

AX 196A-633

4. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Social Security
Account Number
Address

☐ yfs old

Present Address

b6
b7C

7

26

AX 196A-633

5. [redacted] described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Social Security
Account Number
Height
Weight
Eyes
Hair
Address

[redacted]

☐ yrs old

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

6. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Social Security
Account Number

☐ yrs old

(provided by subject)

(from NCIC)

Height
Weight
Eyes
Hair
Place of Birth
Address

b6
b7C

~~28~~

AX 196A-633

PROSECUTIVE STATUS:

1. On August 30, 1983, the available facts in this matter were presented to Elsie Munsell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, who advised she would consider prosecution in the matter.

2. On October 12, 1983, the premises located at

(1) [REDACTED];

(2) [REDACTED]; and (3) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] were searched pursuant to a duly authorized federal search warrant and various computer paraphernalia were seized.

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3. On October 13, 1983, the premises located at [REDACTED] was searched pursuant to a duly authorized federal search warrant and various computer paraphernalia were seized.

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b7C

AX 196A-633

WITNESSES:

1.

[Redacted]

GTE Telemail
8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia
Telephone [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Can provide details of GTE Telemail operations,
methods of detecting unauthorized users and
procedures for obtaining print-outs of customer
messages.

2.

[Redacted]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6
b7C

Can supply details of investigation.

3.

[Redacted]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Omaha

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

4.

[Redacted]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Tucson

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

5.

[Redacted]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
San Diego

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

AX 196A-633

6. [redacted]
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Albany

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

AX 196A-633

EVIDENCE:

RE: [REDACTED]

1. Summary of seven messages left on GTE Telemail by [REDACTED] (original in possession of [REDACTED] GTE Telemail [REDACTED]).

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2. Summary of 53 items of relevance seized during search (in possession of FBI Alexandria).

3. Summary of information retrieved from floppy discs (discs in possession of FBI Alexandria).

4. Summary of trap and trace information received from [REDACTED] (original in possession of FBI Alexandria).

b7E

5. List of charges attributable to [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED] (original in possession of [REDACTED]).

b6
b7C

6. FD-302 with attached list of items seized in search.

7. Two index cards, seized in search of [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED]. One contains the name [REDACTED], followed by the phone number [REDACTED] (w) and [REDACTED] (H). The other card contains the number [REDACTED] followed by the name [REDACTED] (originals in possession of FBI Alexandria).

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RE: [REDACTED]

1. Summary of 12 messages left on GTE Telemail by [REDACTED] (originals in possession of [REDACTED]).

b6
b7C

2. Summary of 11 items of evidence of relevance seized during search (in possession of FBI Alexandria).

3. Summary of information retrieved from floppy discs (discs in possession of FBI Alexandria).

4. List of charges attributable to [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~PT~~

AX 196A-633

RE: [REDACTED]

1. Summary of 62 messages left on GTE Telemail by [REDACTED] (originals in possession of [REDACTED]).
2. Summary of ten items of relevance seized during search (in possession of FBI Alexandria).
3. List of charges attributable to [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED] (in possession of [REDACTED]).

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

RE: [REDACTED]

1. Summary of 40 messages left on GTE Telemail by [REDACTED] (originals in possession of [REDACTED]).
2. Summary of ten items of relevance seized during search (in possession of FBI Alexandria).
3. Copy of trap and trace information provided by [REDACTED] (original in possession of FBI Alexandria).

b6
b7C

b7E

4. List of charges attributable to [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (original in possession of [REDACTED]).

b6
b7C

RE: [REDACTED]

1. Summary of four messages left on GTE Telemail by [REDACTED] (originals with [REDACTED]).
2. Copy of first sheet of a list of names seized from [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED] bearing the listing [REDACTED] (original with FBI Alexandria).

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

3. List of charges attributable to [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED] (original with [REDACTED]).

b6
b7C

RE: [REDACTED]

1. Summary of six messages left on GTE Telemail by [REDACTED] (originals with [REDACTED]).

b6
b7C

2. Copy of first sheet of a list of names seized from [REDACTED] bearing the listing [REDACTED] (original with FBI).

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

3. Letter with enclosure sent to FBI Alexandria,
dated January 14, 1984, by [redacted]

b6
b7C

4. Letter sent to FBI Alexandria by [redacted] dated
January 26, 1984.

b6
b7C

5. List of charges attributable to [redacted], aka
[redacted] (original with [redacted]).

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/15/83

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user using the name [] on GTE Telemail.

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The date and time of each message is provided with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

- 1) August 30, 1983, 1:06 p.m. (All times Eastern Daylight Time)
- 2) September 1, 1983, 8:44 p.m.
- 3) September 6, 1983, 12:58 a.m. This message is to [] and the text is as follows: "Hi [], if you get the chance would you please send the programs we discussed?"
- 4) September 23, 1983, 9:09 p.m. Message reads, "Hi []..welcome to Telemail. Let me know how you like it."
- 5) September 23, 1983, 9:26 p.m. Message reads, "Welcome to Telemail. Hope that you enjoy the system. If you want to send any info, type A at action. Type exit and you will get the command prompt. There are extensive help commands. Later, []"
- 6) September 25, 1983, 11:01 a.m. Message reads, "Welcome to the company. See you at the security seminar in September."
- 7) October 11, 1983, 12:18 a.m. Message reads, "Welcome to the services. If I may be of further services please let me know."

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 12/9/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [] :btl Date dictated 12/9/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/21/83

The following is a summary of a review of evidence seized in the search of the residence of [redacted]. The following articles with relevance to this investigation were found:

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1.) A photocopy of a page from the publication "80 Micro-Computing", dated March, 1981, with the telephone number 1-402-741-7733 followed by the words Telenet local access number. This is followed by the words @ mail, password = phones, user = phones.

2.) Hand-written note in a red notebook as follows: [redacted]

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b7C

3.) An envelope with the hand-written words: Silver Box followed by the letter A-697-1633, B-770-1633, C-852-1633, D-941-1633. This is followed by the words Blue Box and the number 2600.

4.) A brown scrap paper with the words "Admin Hack" followed by the words "Admin/Prime Computer".

5.) A blue sheet of paper with numerous 800 Modem numbers on it and approximately 20 "Wats extenders". This sheet of paper also has the words "source online lists users". This is followed by the number [redacted] and the words Delta Comm. This is followed by the number [redacted] and the word Kremlin.

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6.) Computer print-out with a message from [redacted] on how to hack Telenet. The hand-written words "try Telenet-212 99 are found on this print-out.

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b7C

7.) Print-out with hand-written words "AHSC". AHSC is American Hospital Supply Corporation and this was one of the companies that was most often penetrated by hackers in telemail.

8.) Print-out of a computer program to search for computer numbers.

Investigation on 11/7/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 11/8/83

b6
b7C

9.) Print-out with messages from TDK (on hacking Sprint codes), and others including [redacted] on illegally accessing Autovon; using blue boxes, and various Telenet accounts and passwords.

b6
b7C

10.) Print-out of a program to search for MCI telephone access codes.

11.) A program to automatically dial various phone numbers, including those for Metrophone access codes and MCI access codes.

12.) A print-out with a message from [redacted] listing "dialups" for the National Institute of Health Computers. This print-out also contains a message from [redacted] wherein he offers a Sprint code hacking program and "valid Sprint codes".

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13.) A print-out of Edunet file names.

14.) A print-out of a message from [redacted] listing various computers and connect addresses. There is also a message from [redacted] about a blue box.

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b7C

15.) A print-out from the Osuny bulletin board with information about how to rig your phone for a long distance dialing without being charged. This print-out also contains Metrophone access numbers. It also contains a message from [redacted] wherein he claims to have 70 source accounts. There is also a message from Mandrake concerning the phone company's detection of hackers.

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b7C

16.) A print-out about phone phreaking.

17.) A print-out with messages from [redacted] with connect addresses of Arpanet hosts. This print-out also contains messages from [redacted] and [redacted] listing Telenet accounts.

b6
b7C

18.) A computer print-out of a program to search for computer numbers.

19.) A print-out with a message from [redacted] listing Metrophone access numbers.

b6
b7C

20.) A print-out of a program for an automatic telephone dialer to get MCI or Sprint access codes.

21.) A print-out from the Security Land bulletin board with a message from [redacted] giving "Mainframe" numbers and passwords. This message also contains information on Arpanet.

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22.) This is a print-out containing Metrophone access codes left by [redacted] is [redacted] [redacted], whose residence at [redacted] was searched on October 12, 1983.

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b7C

23.) A print-out containing a program designed to search for computer access numbers.

24.) A print-out of a program designed to search for computer access numbers.

25.) A print-out containing information on how to access Telenet, with a message from a hacker known as [redacted] [redacted]. This print-out also contains a message from [redacted] containing Sprint codes, MCI codes and Metrophone codes.

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b7C

26.) A print-out of a type-written paper titled "Cheating power companies, vending machines, etc."

27.) A print-out with information on how to alter your phone to manufacture blue boxes and other devices to cheat the phone company.

28.) A print-out with Telenet access numbers and connect addresses, including "Citibank Cash Manager" and "Nasa Recon".

29.) A print-out with a message from [redacted] (aka [redacted]) and [redacted], both of which offer 800 numbers that can be extended to call anywhere in the United States and MCI access codes. The message from [redacted] gives the number [redacted] as a contact number for his Modem.

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b7C

30.) A photocopy of an MCI credit card issued to [redacted]. It lists customer service number 612-544-8171 and bears account number [redacted].

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b7C

31.) A print-out with numerous Satelco access codes.

32.) A print-out with numerous Telenet connect addresses.

33.) A paper with various 800 numbers written on it.

34.) A print-out with a message in reference to the password to the Boystown PDP-11 Computer.

35.) A print-out with Compuserve and Source accounts listed. This print-out also lists access code numbers for overseas long distance lines.

36.) A print-out from the "Pirates Palace Bulletin Board" and it lists numerous Sprint codes, Telenet hosts and connect addresses, many of which bear hand-written notations such as "O.K.", "No good", etc.

37.) A print-out concerning "Autonet access lists".

38.) A print-out listing "ADP Autonet Extended United States Access Locations".

39.) A print-out with a list of various bulletin boards and phone numbers.

40.) A print-out with a list of numerous Sprint access numbers.

41.) A print-out of a list of "Pirate Bulletin Boards".

42.) A print-out with 800 numbers and extender codes, Sprint codes, MCI codes, and Metrophone codes. This print-out also contains password for a source account. This print-out also contains a message describing "phreaking" as a felony and stating that sharing information on these bulletin boards is "aiding and abetting".

43.) A print-out referring to the arrest of a hacker known as [redacted] by the Los Angeles Police Department.

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44.) A print-out with ITT access codes. It also contains numerous MCI and Sprint codes.

45.) A print-out of numerous Telenet hosts and connect addresses.

46.) A print-out of a computer program designed to search for other computer numbers.

47.) A print-out of bulletin boards and access numbers.

48.) A piece of blue paper with a Compuserve account number, ID number and password. This blue paper also contains a source connect address, user name and password.

49.) Another sheet of blue paper with a source identification name and password.

50.) A copy of an MCI bill to

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51.) A print-out with numerous Sprint codes and access numbers.

52.) A print-out with numerous Sprint codes and access numbers, many with hand-written notations such as "N. G." and "Check".

53.) A print-out with numerous Metrophone access codes.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/30/84

On October 12, 1983, a search pursuant to a Federal Search Warrant was executed at the home of [REDACTED]

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The "floppy discs" that were seized in this search were examined by [REDACTED] a computer programmer. The following is a summary of [REDACTED] findings concerning information on these floppy discs:

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On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub T, 1B1, Item Number 9, Number One, a program called, "Code Breaker for the Hayes Smartmodem" by [REDACTED] was found. This is a program designed to find access codes for MCI or some similar long distance communication service. A program called "MCI Hacker" is designed specifically for finding MCI authorization codes. A program called "MCI FIND" is a list of access codes actually found by a computer. This was probably produced by the program called "MCI Hacker."

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On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub T, 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Two, a program called "C-SCAN" was found. This is a program which searches for other computers via the telephone. A program called "CODE/CHK" is designed to search for authorization codes for long distance communication services. This program contains this "you are now running one of the most powerful computer programs to search for a correct authorization code on many of the different companies that provide long distance communication services. Use of this program may be against many different laws."

On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub T, 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Three, had a program called "MNET/OMT" was found. In this program appears to be a compuserve account number. A program called "SOURCE/OMT" appears to contain a source account number.

Investigation on 1/13/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633
SubT
by SA [REDACTED] mbe Date dictated 1/13/84

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On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub T, 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Four, was found a program labelled "MCI." This program is designed to obtain MCI authorization codes. A program entitled "COMFAST" by [redacted] subroutines, by [redacted] is designed to search for other computers via the phone. A program called "SMFIND" is designed to obtain MCI authorization codes and was designed by [redacted].

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On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub T, 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Five, appears a message from a hacker promising information on how to break in to a computer called RSTS.

On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub T, 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Six, is the program called "PAMS." This is a listing of other phone numbers connected to computers.

On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub T, 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Seven, appears the program called "TELENET." This is a list of numerous "connect addresses" for Telenet computers. A program called "DIAL" is designed to dial a telephone number entered into the keyboard and then searched for numbers.

On the disc labelled 196-633 (T), 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Eight, also labelled "Auto Dial Hack" is found a basic program that checks for authorization codes.

On the disc labelled 196-633 (T), 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Nine, is found a program called "DIAL" in which there is an automatic phone dialing program that mentions telenet.

On the disc labelled 196-633 (T), 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Ten, is a program labelled "TELECOM." This program contains assorted modem control programs.

On the disc labelled 196-633 (T), 1B1, Item Number 9, Number Eleven, is found a program labelled "TERM MASTER." This disc contains sorted programs to control modem dialing.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/30/84

This report reflects a review of trap and trace information and [redacted] pursuant to a Federal Grand Jury subpoena for [redacted]

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b7E

Review of [redacted]

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Review of [redacted]

b3

[redacted] revealed the following:

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b7Eb3
b7Eb3
b7E

Investigation on 1/26/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/26/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7c

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		\$127.58	
.....			
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		\$3.00	
.....			
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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b7cb6
b7cb6
b7c

SUBT [redacted]

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84b6
b7c

NY-CC per

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/19/83

At approximately 8:10 a.m. on October 12, 1983, a search warrant was executed on the premises known as [redacted]. The following Special Agents (SAs) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were present during the search which concluded at 10:30 a.m. this date:

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The attached schedule lists all items of an evidentiary value which were seized. All items seized with the exception of Item #18 were located in the southwest bedroom/office of the residence by SA [redacted] (VLB). Item #18 was found by SA [redacted] (DLH) in the master bedroom. The inventory itself was prepared by SA [redacted] (RGC).

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Investigation on 10/12/83 at [redacted] File # Omaha 196A-922

by SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted]

Date dictated 10/18/83

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This is to certify that on *October 12, 1983*
at *8:15 AM*, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, at the time of
~~conducting a search of my person and/or~~ the premises at

[Redacted]

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obtained the attached listed items. I further certify that
the listed items represent all that was obtained by Special
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department
of Justice.

Signed

[Redacted]

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b7C

Witnessed

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice

Witnessed

[Redacted]
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice

b6
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SEARCH INVENTORY/Receipt

DATE: 10/12/83

TIME: 8:21AM

LOCATION:

b6
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ITEM #	ITEM DESCRIPTION	WHERE FOUND	FOUND BY
1.	Radio Shack TRS-80 C1190 Vultex associated wiring	dent - S.W. Bedroom Office	VLB
2.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Keyboard S.W. 1014408	S.W. Bedroom	VLB
3.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Fax Printer Model 1737-1 SN 5727	S.W. Bedroom	VLB
4.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Video Display SN 200331	S.W. Bedroom	VLB
5.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Expansion Interface SN 25300 Prop of Baltimore Public Schools Baltimore West High #81246	S.W. Bedroom	VLB
6.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Mini Disk SN 235423-1 Prop of Baltimore Public Schools Baltimore West High #81248	S.W. Bedroom	VLB
6. A	Term Master Label on black disk in item #6	S.W. Bedroom	VLB
7.	Silver box similar to item 6. Labeled Drive 1	S.W. Bedroom	VLB
7A	black disk - labeled base (PH)	E-30 61	

SEARCH INVENTORY/Receipt

DATE: 10/12/83

TIME: 9:15 AM

LOCATION:

b6
b7C

ITEM #	ITEM DESCRIPTION	WHERE FOUND	FOUND BY
8.	6 outlet Power strip	S.W. Bedroom Office	VLB
9.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Discrete File Box w/57 disks	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
10.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Lowalt Interface 11004953	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
11	2 Radio Shack TRS-80 disc ops system 114444-2 to be given to myl 2/24/84 w/ S.W. B.	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
12.	Black 7.5 Book "Multides" w/2 discs	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
13.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Manual 25-Memory Program	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
14.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Manual Tape Writing Unit 26-1503 w/7 discs	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
15.	Radio Shack TRS-80 Book Computer 3' x 2"	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
16	Radio Shack Book - Misc note 1-33-736	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
17	Seal for mostly contain misc paper.	S.W. Bedroom "	VLB
18.	Misc Paper - Computer Sheet	Closet Master Bedroom	DLH
19.	Black Misc. Receipt w/misc cards	Desk - S.W. Bedroom	VLB

SEARCH INVENTORY/Receipt

DATE: 10/12/83

TIME: 9:56 AM

LOCATION:

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ITEM #	ITEM DESCRIPTION	WHERE FOUND	FOUND BY
20.	Pack of 15 Diskettes	SW Bedroom Office	VLB
21.	Address "Petite" address Tel #	SW " "	VLB
22.	Mass computer prints	SW " "	VLB
23.	Smartmodem for Expy 687 or 10000 94-194 map/slate	SW " "	VLB
25 &	Manual for item 23	SW " "	VLB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


1

Date of transcription 10/18/83

At approximately 6:15 p.m. on October 11, 1983, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), presented an affidavit in support of a search warrant to United States (U.S.) Magistrate Richard W. Peterson, Council Bluffs, Iowa. This affidavit had previously been authorized by Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted], Southern District of Iowa (SDI), Des Moines, Iowa. U.S. Magistrate Peterson approved the search warrant for search of the premises known as [redacted]

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The warrant was executed at 8:10 a.m. on October 12, 1983, by the following Special Agents of the FBI, Omaha, Nebraska:

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The search was completed at 10:30 a.m. A copy of the search warrant and items seized was left at the premises since no occupants were present. It should be noted the side door to the residence was left open and access to the house was made through this entrance. Efforts to locate the owner of the residence were negative. Pottawattamie Sheriff was notified of the search warrant. General condition of the house was that it was in complete disarray.

Three telephones were located in the residence with numbers as follows:

Location	Number
Southwest Bedroom	[redacted]
Master Bedroom	[redacted]

196A-633-46
RAC
EA
[initials]

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b7C

Investigation on 10/11-14/83 at [redacted] File # Omaha 196A-922

by SA [redacted] :emb Date dictated 10/17/83

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OM 196A-922

2

Kitchen

b6
b7C

The search warrant was returned to U.S. Magistrate Peterson at 10:15 a.m., October 14, 1983, at Suite 406, First Federal Savings and Loan Building, Council Bluffs, Iowa.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

1/4/84

Date of transcription

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user using the name [] on GTE Telemail.

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The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included:

1. July 26, 1983, 6:04 a.m. (All times are Eastern Daylight Time)
2. July 26, 1983, 1:55 p.m. (Mountain Day Light Time)
This message is from [] to Phalse and the subject is "The first atomic bomb explosion). This message is an extremely long message that purports to be a true story told to [] by Laura Fermi, widow of the nuclear physicist, Enrico Fermi. This message mentioned "We lived in Hyde Park which is a suburb of Chicago."
3. August 3, 1983, 4:28 p.m. This message inquires about an ADS System in Chicago.
4. August 5, 1983, 2:48 p.m. This message is in reference to publication of the 2600 Magazine.
5. August 8, 1983, 12:26 p.m. This message states in part "I got a phone call here at home Sunday morning from the Sysop of Osuny. This message also indicates that the Sysop of Osuny spoke with [] on the phone." It appears that The Sysop of Osuny may have the home phone numbers for both [] aka [] and [].
6. August 9, 1983, 12:22 a.m. This is another message concerning a phone call from the Sysop of Osuny.

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Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [] :gkh Date dictated 12/83/83

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[redacted]

Phone [redacted]

b6
b7C

January 26, 1983

[redacted]

Federal Bureau of Investigation
300 North Lee Street - Room 500
Alexandria, VA 22314

b6
b7C

Dear [redacted]:

This letter is in reference to your various phone calls to me regarding the investigation you are conducting. I was happy to speak with you, and I gave you all the information I have available, which was very little. When you have called, you have kept insisting that there was something I knew further about the case.

You have alluded to various coincidences which seem to convince you that I am the [redacted] you seek. Today you suggested I was also [redacted]. I would simply like to point out that you had no comparisons to draw at all until you called me the first time and I voluntarily told you much about myself.

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Because I do volunteer work for the library at the radio station called CRIS (Chicago Radio Information Service) you found a connection to [redacted]. Because some freak picked up on my BBS phone line several months ago, and then disseminated my number to his friends to hassle me, you found a connection to [redacted].

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When you first called me, you did not even have my correct name, and you asked for "R. Benedict" which was my deceased godmother's name, a fine older lady who lived here for many years. I told you my name, and I gave you what information I could. I told you that if there was one call for [redacted] there were fifty of them over the course of the summer. In each and every case I told the caller, "SORRY, WRONG NUMBER." I told you of one such caller who called 2-3-4 times from Texas (he said) who asked for [redacted] new number, etc. I told you this person had some terrible sound in his nose all the time he talked. I think I also told you that when I first started my [redacted] BBS, it got trashed something awful by the same person(s) unknown.

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b7C

You pointed out a coincidence along the way that on one of the IBM systems in your investigation some person used the password [redacted]. I do not know what to make of this, and while I might agree that there are various things you mentioned which have similarities to my own life, I simply cannot and will not assume responsibility for anything someone does that happens to look like something about me.

b6
b7C

Now, just by coincidence of course, two days after you spoke to me the first time, I got a piece of mail for your [redacted]. It did not even have the correct address/apartment number (we have no such number as whatever it said). I forwarded this to you without hesitation - unopened - if it would help you. I added a note saying that of all the times there had been attempts to contact this person, it was the first time someone had bothered to write. I have attempted to be cordial in our phone conversations, but I do not like your repeated insinuations that I will be in a lot of trouble, be forced to come all the way to Virginia, etc. I have never hesitated to talk to you, even though on both occasions that you called me I had just gone to bed from an overnight work shift.

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b7C

You are free to tap my phone and don't need my permission. You are free to compile all my phone records. If you think you can uncover some big secret out here you are welcome to have someone come and visit. Don't even tell me - just surprise me at 6 AM or something. I don't really care any longer as long as you will please conclude your investigation where I am concerned. My mistake, I believe, was in not getting my phone number changed back in the summer some time after I took down the BBS from my line. If these freaks or whatnot have passed my number around there is not one thing I can do about it.

You also noted that I had a post office box. Yes I do and have had for many years. It is actually registered for this building I think and not just for my use. You kept talking about Hyde Park New York, or Chicago. I was born in [redacted] raised in [redacted]

b6
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[redacted] This was supposed to be some other coincidence of yours. Believe me, no one who values their life lives in Hyde Park, a south side ghetto here. No I guess you don't believe anything I say.

You keep asking where I was teaching school. I am not a school teacher, I am not competent to teach much of anything, and I was not teaching anything last summer or any other time. You made a big thing of me having some kind of trouble with the phone company. I tried to explain to you that in November (two months ago!) I got billed for some extra units that was supposed to be on my call pack. I don't know how you keep relating this to some sort of phone trouble from last summer.

Believe me, sir, I intend absolutely no disrespect for your office or your investigation, but there is nothing further I can tell you except to continue repeating myself as I have done.

If you persist that I must come to Virginia it will work a very bad hardship for me. I have little money, and none to spare for travel, etc. I will lose time (and money) from work. I am already indebted at work and just keeping afloat, due to a theft here in June for which I was held accountable because of careless handling of the office money. (Sneak thief while my back was turned). I am just now finally getting that money, almost two thousand dollars paid off to the owner. I live from one two hundred dollar paycheck to the next. If I had to come over there, there is no way I could even buy the ticket right now.

May I offer what I hope will be satisfactory to you? I will submit to a lie detector test by anyone you choose. It could be your Chicago office. I will also answer any questions a grand jury might want to ask, and possibly this can be notarized or something in your Chicago office.

I am not trying to avoid you in anyway, but there is nothing further I can tell you about [redacted] or [redacted]. I am not these people and I do not know these people. I am tired of being harassed by people looking for them, and I do not want more mail coming to [redacted]. Also I do not like the repeated insinuations about trouble for myself. I cannot even afford an attorney for advice regarding this letter but I am trying to write you in a frank and honest way. I want to clear myself immediately and with no further delay. I do not know any of the other names you mentioned, except that the name [redacted] stood out, I remembered the fellow in Texas using that name. This whole matter has me very upset and frankly because of my financial situation at present I am thinking maybe I will sell the computer and forget about the BBS since its only a hobby for me anyway. I would not even have the money to buy a computer these days -- I did a couple years ago when I first got it.

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If there is ANYTHING further I can do, please let me know, but I sure want to clear myself if possible right here through your Chicago office for the reasons mentioned. I am sending this to you by registered mail to insure that you personally get it, and hope to have a reply from you shortly. I do appreciate your efforts but I have nothing to do with your problem. Permit me to clear myself if you are so suspicious of me. Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C

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PS --

I talked just a few minutes ago to [REDACTED].

He says he told you about [REDACTED] being on the BBS run by [REDACTED] at the Library. (NOT EVER SEEN BY ME)

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He says he also told of how those freaks almost wrecked my other BBS when I was running it with [REDACTED] (Think BBS). (Was on other phone line) He mentioned several names to you of those people..

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[REDACTED]
all of whom are a bunch of young kids who like to destroy anything someone else starts.

Also he said you asked ~~xx~~ about "all my phone lines.."

I have 3 lines




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The first is for our office in the apartment building. The second is more for outgoing calls (it has a call pack) we use it both in the office and for me. Also used by ~~xxxx~~ janitor, etc.

The third used to be for me privately, now its the BBS I operate after the fools trashed my other thing.

If there is anything further at all let me know. Can I take a lie detector test?



b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7C

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[REDACTED]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[REDACTED]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$100.00	July, August
[REDACTED]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
[REDACTED]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[REDACTED]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
[REDACTED]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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b7C

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [REDACTED]:sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/15/83

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user known as [] and [] on GTE Telemail.

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The date and time of each message is provided with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

- 1) August 30, 1983, 12:57 a.m.
- 2) August 30, 1983, 1:07 a.m.
- 3) August 30, 1983, 1:12 a.m.
- 4) August 30, 1983, 1:18 a.m. This message is from "Keybis" to []. The message reads, "Through the airport?? You think a kilo would be a bit obvious. I know John Delorean, ya know." b6
b7C
- 5) August 30, 1983, 1:30 a.m. This message reads, "What happens when the dogs eat my leg??"
- 6) September 1, 1983, 5:12 p.m. This message reads, "Hello [] and anyone else reading this text. [] that hoochie is 100%! I've already gone through half what I bought. I'm gonna save the rest and buy another. Anyone interested in trading MCI nodes and codes?" b6
b7C
- 7) September 8, 1983, 10:27 p.m. This message reads in part, [] as of 7:30 this evening, I have not heard anything on our 'shipment'." b6
b7C
- 8) September 8, 1983, 10:30 p.m. This message reads, [] I let our computer phone number search program run for about three hours tonight. All I got was a shit load of Telenet accesses. Ah well call me huh?"
- 9) September 10, 1983, 11:21 p.m.
- 10) September 10, 1983, 11:24 p.m.
- 11) September 13, 1983, 12:53 a.m.
- 12) September 21, 1983, 12:07 a.m.

Investigation on 12/9/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [] :btl Date dictated 12/9/83

b6
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/1/83

The following is a review of evidence seized pursuant to a Federally approved search warrant conducted at [redacted] on October 12, 1983.

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The following is a summary of the evidence that is relevant to this investigation:

- (1) A brown heavy paper envelope that was addressed to [redacted] (No last name written), and the return address is [redacted]. [redacted] is also known as [redacted].
- (2) A packet of white sheets of paper stapled together. On the first sheet is the term [redacted] followed by the number [redacted]. On the second page of this item is the name [redacted] and the address [redacted]. From this same sheet of paper is a number [redacted] and the numbers 1, 123, and the password [redacted]. This phone number is the modem phone number for [redacted] and the numbers and password are the account number and password for [redacted] on that bulletin board.
- (3) This item is a scrap of greenish paper containing numerous telephone numbers. On that sheet of paper is the word "Mail" followed by a dash and the word "Phones" followed by another dash and the word "Phones" again. That sequence of words allows a person to get every Telenet dial up number from the Telemail System.
- (4) A scrap of white paper with four telephone numbers on it. Also appearing on the sheet of paper is the name [redacted].

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 11/15/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633

by SA [redacted] :plw Date dictated 11/15/83

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b7C

- (5) A sheet of white paper with the number [redacted] written on it. b6 b7C
- (6) A computer print-out that came from [redacted] bulletin board. This message is from [redacted] and it is about the ITT Dialcom Network. In this message, [redacted] leaves an ITT Dialcom account and password. [redacted] also says he has about seven other accounts on ITT Dialcom. b6 b7C
- (8) A computer print-out from [redacted] bulletin board from [redacted]. In this message he gives the telephone number for the University of Kentucky computer and gives you a log-in code. [redacted] also leaves five source accounts with the instructions to dial up Telenet and stating that you can access the source system by hitting "C" then a space then "30128" on your keyboard. This message is followed by another message from [redacted] in which he lists at least 75 main frame computers and their telephone numbers. Examples of the computers are Michigan National Bank, University of Hartford, Charge Card Association, Michigan Bell. b6 b7C
- (9) A print-out of a "telephone modem search" by [redacted] with sub-routines by [redacted]. b6 b7C
- (10) A photocopy entitled, "Local Telephone Numbers for Access to the SPRINT Network."
- (11) A computer print-out entitled, "How to Cause Car Trouble." This lists numerous things a person can do to damage an automobile such as "Pour Draino in the radiator. Pour sand in the crank case," and numerous other methods for damaging someone's car.

Extra copy
do keep

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/16/84

[redacted] a computer programmer, examined various "floppy disks" that were seized pursuant to a Federally approved search warrant at the residence known as [redacted]. This is the residence of [redacted], and his parents.

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[redacted] found the following information of interest:

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On a floppy disk labelled 196-633-Sub I 1B1, Item Number 3 (one of eight), Number 1, the following information was found: Under a heading "OMNICOD/BAS" appears a program that searches for access codes to computers or long distance networks. Under a heading known as "SPCODE/BAS" appears a program that will break MCI "access codes" or other similar services. A program labelled "SPTRVCD/BAS" appears to also attempt to break long distance access codes. A program known as "COMFIND" searches for other computers via the phone.

On the floppy disk labelled 196-633-Sub I, 1B1, Item Number 3 (two of eight), Number 4, [redacted] found the following programs: "Code Breaker for the Hayes Smartmodem". This program tries different access codes for a given phone nubmer, probably to get access codes for a long distance service like MCI.

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A program known as "Breaker/BAS" is a program similar to the one above, but slightly more sophisticated.

A program known as "Break/BAS" appears to be an earlier version of "Breaker/BAS".

On the disk labelled 196-633-Sub I, 1B1, Item Number 3 (one of eight), Number 3, [redacted] found the following: A program labelled "Message/TXT". This is a listing of various messages left on a home bulletin board set up by [redacted]. The program known as "Member/DAT" is a listing of various people authorized to use [redacted] "bulletin board".

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Investigation on 1/10/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

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b7C

PSZ 88

On the disk known as 196-633-Sub I, 1B1, Item Number 3 (one of eight), Number 2, [] found a program labelled "PHONE/TXT". This is a listing of messages from the Osuny bulletin board.

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b7C

On the disk labelled 196-633-Sub I, 1B1, Item Number 1, Number 4, [] found a program labelled "COMPROG/BAS". This is the beginning of a program to search for other computers over the phone. On the program labelled "CODE" appears a program to find codes for services like MCI. [] also found three programs labelled "COMV3/BAS", "COMFIND/BAS", and "COMMFID/BAS", all of which are programs to search for other computers by the phone. The program labelled "TRAVCOD" is the same program as the previous one labelled "CODE".

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On the floppy disk labelled 196-633-Sub I, 1B1, Item Number 1, Number 6, [] found the following programs: A program labelled "COMV41" which is a program for searching for computers by phone. A program labelled "FINDINGS" lists the results of the program produced by "COMV41". A program labelled "MCIV41" searches for MCI access codes. A program labelled "MCIFIND" lists the results of the above program.

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b7C

On the floppy disk labelled 196-633-Sub I, 1B1, Item Number 1, Number 8, [] found the program "RUSERS/LOG". This program lists various users from a home bulletin board.

b6
b7C

On the disk labelled 196-633-Sub I, 1B1, Item Number 1, Number 13, [] found a program labelled "FINDINGS". This program lists the results of a computer search program, apparently from the previous program labelled "COMV41".

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers. This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7c

Many of the hackers had two or more user names, therefore the following will be a summary of the above document, indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names (this summary covers the months of July, August and September for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		\$127.58	
.....			
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		\$3.00	
.....			
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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Sub I

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/5/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user known as [] on the GTE Telemail system. The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

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b7C

1.) July 7, 1983, 8:49 PM (all times eastern daylight time).

2.) August 17, 1983, 12:26 AM.

3.) August 17, 1983, 2:50 PM. This message reads, "Are you serious []? What's this younger generation coming to."

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b7C

4.) August 17, 1983, 5:20 PM.

5.) August 18, 1983, 5:48 PM.

6.) August 15, 1983, 7:16 PM.

7.) August 17, 1983, 7:35 PM.

8.) August 18, 1983, 7:54 PM.

9.) August 20, 1983, 8:31 PM. This message reads, "Did you know that 202141 is the same as Telemail? I didn't."

10.) August 24, 1983, 6:52 AM.

11.) August 27, 1983, 12:44 AM. This message is to [] and is signed []

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b7C

12.) August 27, 1983, 4:45 AM. The content of this message indicates that [] first name is [] and that he knows the home phone number to the hacker known as []. This message also indicates that this person talked to the manager of a computer system and threatened to damage their computer system.

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Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA []:gaj Date dictated 12/8/83

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b7C

13.) August 27, 1983, 6:13 AM.

14.) August 27, 1983, 2:46 PM.

15.) August 29, 1983, 4:03 PM. This message is from Admin/Raytheon to [redacted]. The message reads as follows: "This is [redacted]. You may want to change the PWD until [redacted] cools off. I didn't REG my user name, but I'd like one. Signed [redacted]."

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16.) August 29, 1983, 8:04 PM.

17.) August 29, 1983, 10:03 PM.

18.) August 31, 1983, 1:51 PM.

19.) September 1, 1983, 4:13 AM.

20.) September 3, 1983, 2:34 AM.

21.) September 4, 1983, 4:46 PM.

22.) September 4, 1983, 4:59 PM.

23.) September 6, 1983, 3:51 PM.

24.) September 7, 1983, 2:45 AM.

25.) September 6, 1983, 7:31 PM.

26.) September 6, 1983, 3:54 PM.

27.) September 10, 1983, 1:30 AM.

28.) September 10, 1983, 2:31 PM.

29.) September 11, 1983, 4:00 AM. This message reads, "[redacted] is [redacted] (not the original) who runs [redacted] is a phreak. Nothing special." [redacted] is the home bulletin board run by [redacted] (aka [redacted]) who was a subject in this matter.

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30.) September 13, 1983, 2:51 PM. This message reads in part, "There's no telling how long this will be up, but I have been on here for about a year with no problems."

31.) September 13, 1983, 11:21 PM. This message reads as follows: "The people at Telenet will know we're here sooner or later and they may or may not get angry; so don't post things that give your name or number and you may want to use a node other than your own. Some phreaks loop their calls all over the U.S."

32.) September 14, 1983, 3:25 AM. This message reads in part, "We are not the only phreak people on the system, and [redacted] got the FBI after him by deleting Nasa's major node." The message also contains the sentence, "I was also a member of both PHA and Innercircle and am now a member of Securityland." This message also contains the PS: "All this talk about who I am (sic) because I can see how great this would be if I worked for the FBI."

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33.) September 14, 1983, 10:37 PM. This message is from [redacted] to [redacted] and reads, "Hi [redacted]. Well I also have been hacking on Telenet for quite a while (not as long as you) and this is not my only T-mail admin. This group is not really mine but I adopted them because I plan on dumping Telemail soon anyway (very strong rumors that Nasa had some major trouble and had the FBI on Telemail). For this reason I won't give away anything else, except that if you can get on [redacted] board you can contact me there. Quite a project if you're government. I'd also like to say that I left everything open here on purpose figuring that if Telenet was looking for me they would find me otherwise I don't care who sees this. We do have more private groups though. Signed [redacted]."

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34.) September 14, 1983, 10:42 PM. This message is from Admin/SCPP/Bang/Promo/Raytheon to SCPP. Subject is: [redacted]. Text of the message is "I am [redacted] and my address is [redacted]."

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35.) September 15, 1983, 1:29 AM. This is from Admin/Promo/Raytheon to SCPP, subject "Also [redacted]. Text of the message is "I am also The [redacted]. Only in a more powerful state."

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b7C

36.) September 15, 1983, 1:27 AM.

37.) September 15, 1983, 1:15 AM. This message reads as follows: "The Telenet people can easily find out which node you call from; in fact, it will be on the bill to be sent out about now. But many Admins don't look for the user name or anything like that. Oh yes, I do not work for the FBI."

38.) September 15, 1983, 1:59 AM.

39.) September 15, 1983, 2:00 AM.

40.) September 15, 1983, 1:19 AM.

41.) September 15, 1983, 1:32 AM.

42.) September 15, 1983, 4:18 PM. The text of this message is as follows: "Oh it was just a thought...I had heard that the FBI was looking into Telmail (SIC) because someone deleted Nasa and Unix...True? I know someone who told me they deleted Unix a while back and he could well have deleted Nassa. Signed [redacted]."

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43.) September 15, 1983, 7:49 PM.

44.) September 16, 1983, 4:30 AM.

45.) September 16, 1983, 5:42 PM.

46.) September 17, 1983, 3:24 AM.

47.) September 18, 1983, 4:01 AM.

48.) September 19, 1983, 6:21 AM.

49.) September 21, 1983, 5:55 AM.

50.) September 23, 1983, 4:24 AM.

51.) September 24, 1983, 6:35 AM. This message reads in part, "Ah you shouldn't have mentioned the Oak Industries Vax, now you'll have to hear how I broke in on their Vax and had them beg for mercy."

The message continues, "Well it's been almost two years and I just got a breakthrough that will give me an account before too long. I don't know whether to use it for years quietly or destroy the Vax."

52.) September 24, 1983, 6:20 PM.

53.) September 26, 1983, 2:31 AM.

54.) September 27, 1983, 2:32 AM.

55.) September 27, 1983, 5:55 AM.

56.) September 27, 1983, 5:56 AM.

57.) September 27, 1983, 6:10 AM. This message reads in part, "When I was a member of PHA (Phreakers of America) and two generations of TIC (The Innercircle) we did all kinds of things that did nothing but waste time, to show that we were a group. We set up and took down boards, argued over different logos, voted members we didn't like out, etc."

58.) September 29, 1983, 7:12 PM.

59.) October 1, 1983, 9:17 PM.

60.) October 2, 1983, 4:30 PM.

61.) October 2, 1983, 4:33 PM.

62.) October 3, 1983, 7:55 PM.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 12/28/83

The following is a review of items seized in a court authorized search of the premises known as [redacted] on October 13, 1983. The following items of relevance to this investigation were found:

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1) A spiral bound notebook containing the name [redacted] and the telephone number [redacted].

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2) A letter from [redacted] This letter discusses some sort of a computer war game that both [redacted] and [redacted] are involved in.

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3) A post card from [redacted] This post card appears to discuss a computer war game that [redacted] and [redacted] are involved in.

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4) A white 3-inch by 5-inch card bearing the name [redacted], telephone number [redacted] address [redacted]

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5) A white 3-inch by 5-inch card bearing the name [redacted], telephone number [redacted], address [redacted]

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6) A white 3-inch by 5-inch card bearing the name [redacted], telephone number [redacted] address [redacted]

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b7C

7) A 9-inch by 12-inch water color pad with the first page bearing the following information: [redacted] This sheet of paper also bears the telephone number [redacted] followed by the word [redacted]. It also has the telephone number [redacted] followed by the name [redacted]. It also contains the telephone number [redacted]. The note pad also bears the name [redacted] followed by the telephone number [redacted]. This pad also has the name [redacted] followed by the telephone number [redacted].

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Investigation on 12/22/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] btd Date dictated 12/22/83 Sub F

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8) A white sheet of paper bearing the telephone number



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9) A white card bearing numerous telephone numbers and a dial up number and access code for Ditt DialCom Computer System.

10) Approximately 30 sheets of computer paper stapled together and labeled RDF Start Up Routines.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7C

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		\$127.58	
.....			
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		\$3.00	
.....			
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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SUB F

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633by SA [redacted]:sfk Date dictated 1/25/84b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 1/4/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user using the names [] and [] on GTE Telemail.

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The day and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages indicated.

1. July 10, 1983, 5:33 p.m.
2. July 16, 1983, 12:32 a.m.
3. August 2, 1983, 7:06 p.m.
4. August 5, 1983, 2:46 a.m.
5. August 8, 1983, 10:08 p.m.
6. August 10, 1983, 10:01 a.m.
7. August 10, 1983, 11:00 a.m.
8. August 10, 1983, 10:46 p.m.
9. August 12, 1983, 6:39 p.m.
10. August 26, 1983, 12:40 a.m.
11. August 26, 1983, 12:46 a.m.
12. August 28, 1983, 12:54 a.m.
13. August 28, 1983, 1:02 a.m.
14. August 31, 1983, 9:32 p.m.
15. September 3, 1983, 10:49 p.m.
16. September 4, 1983, 7:02 p.m.
17. September 10, 1983, 7:18 p.m.
18. September 10, 1983, 7:31 p.m.
19. September 12, 1983, 11:16 p.m.
20. September 12, 1983, 11:08 p.m.
21. September 12, 1983, 11:17 p.m.
22. September 12, 1983, 11:37 p.m.
23. September 15, 1983, 11:05 p.m.
24. September 15, 1983, 11:09 p.m.
25. September 15, 1983, 11:12 p.m.

This message reads "Does anyone think we will be better off if we made a separate phone call for each connection to telemail? Would that make us look more like the real thing?"

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [] :gkh Date dictated 12/8/83

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September 16, 1983, 8:17 p.m.
September 18, 1983, 2:09 a.m.
September 19, 1983, 12:24 a.m.
September 19, 1983, 11:44 p.m.
September 22, 1983, 10:45 p.m.
September 26, 1983, 9:12 p.m.
September 28, 1983, 7:44 p.m.
September 28, 1983, 7:45 p.m.
September 28, 1983, 8:39 p.m.
September 29, 1983, 11:28 p.m.
September 29, 1983, 11:48 p.m.
October 1, 1983, 7:35 p.m.
October 2, 1983, 9:51 a.m.
October 2, 1983, 11:35 p.m.
October 9, 1983, 12:21 a.m.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/5/83

The following is a summary of the review of seized evidence obtained pursuant to a duly-authorized Federal search warrant executed on October 12, 1983, at the residence of [redacted]

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The following is a summary of the evidence that is relevant to this investigation:

1. A computer card bearing the number 800-424-9494, with the word "telenet" written underneath it;
2. A computer card with the words [redacted] and [redacted] written on it; also written on this card are the words "cbot", "scannet", "dialcom", and "tymnet"; this card also contains the word [redacted];
3. This item is a yellow sheet of paper with numerous phone numbers associated with bulletin boards; also found on this sheet of paper is the number [redacted] followed by the word "Voice" and the name [redacted]; this sheet of paper also bears the address [redacted] it also contains the name [redacted] followed by the telephone number [redacted];
4. A white sheet of paper bearing numerous phone numbers, some of them identified as follows: [redacted] This paper also contains the name [redacted] and the number [redacted] and the name [redacted] and the number [redacted];
5. A message addressed to [redacted] dated 6:00 PM, September 15, 1983. It is addressed to [redacted] and in the remarks section it says, "[redacted] called. Be on campus 9:00 [redacted] Number [redacted]" On the back of this message are the words [redacted] and [redacted];

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b7CInvestigation on 11/15/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 11/15/83b6
b7C

6. White sheet of paper with the name [redacted] -
[redacted]. It also contains the name [redacted]
and next to that the word [redacted]. This sheet
of paper also contains the name [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted].
7. A white sheet of computer paper with the word "Black"
and the number "800-523-0684". This sheet of paper
also bears the word "NASA", "ARC", "JPL". These
are all host companies on telemail that were penetrated
by hackers;
8. A white sheet of paper bearing [redacted] = [redacted]
[redacted] = [redacted] = [redacted] = [redacted]
[redacted]. This sheet of paper also has the words telemail
check;
9. A white sheet of computer print-out paper that has
numbers listed for ITT, Metrofone, Telenet, Sourcenet,
Sprint, followed by what appeared to Sprint access
codes; Allnet and two 800 numbers;
10. A sheet of computer print-out paper that has the
word Maraven, followed by the words [redacted]
[redacted], and [redacted]; followed by the word
phalse. This sheet of paper also has the words [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted].

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted], GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7C

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
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.....			
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[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		\$3.00	
.....			
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/4/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user using the name [redacted] on GTE Telemail. The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

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- 1.) August 15, 1983, 12:17 AM.
- 2.) August 15, 1983, 12:24 AM.
- 3.) August 18, 1983, 1:18 AM.
- 4.) August 19, 1983, 12:18 AM.

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted]:gaj Date dictated 12/8/83 b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
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b6
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	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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AX 196A-633

IDENTIFICATION RECORDS, PRIOR ARRESTS,
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REPORTS:

AX 196A-633

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/15/84

The following is a summary of the activities of [redacted], aka [redacted], on GTE Telemail.

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[redacted] using the alias [redacted] was an illegal user in three different telemail companies as follows:

AMERICAN HOSPITAL SUPPLY COMPANY (AHSC)
RADA COMPANY
MMM COMPANY

[redacted] is known to have left at least ten messages on the GTE Telemail System from August 31, 1983, to October 11, 1983.

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In late September, 1983, [redacted] began "welcoming" new illegal users to the telemail system.

On September 20, 1983, September 21, 1983, September 22, 1983, September 23, 1983, and again on September 24, 1983, the GTE Telemail security log detected a hacker attempting to break into forty different legitimate telemail administrator accounts. All of these calls came from the 402 area code and into telenet dial-in number [redacted]. Trap and trace records received from [redacted]

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Investigation on 2/2/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

Sub T

by SA [redacted] -tre Date dictated 2/2/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 10/18/83

On October 13, 1983, a male identifying himself as [redacted] telephonically contacted the Omaha office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and stated that he was at that time in San Diego, California. [redacted] continued that he had been informed that his [redacted] residence had been "ransacked," and that "some piece of paper" had been left at his house.

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[redacted] was informed that his home had been searched on October 12, 1983, by Special Agents (SAs) of the FBI, pursuant to a warrant issued by a U. S. Magistrate for the Southern District of Iowa (SDI), and that since no one could be found at the residence, a copy of the warrant and inventory of all items seized by authority of the warrant was prominently attached to the front of the refrigerator in the kitchen of his residence.

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[redacted] was further informed that his use of the word "ransacked" was inaccurate in that upon entry to the residence, SAs noted that every room in the residence was in a state of total disarray.

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[redacted] stated he was concerned that his professional papers had been seized and he could not conduct his business without them.


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b7C

He was informed that items taken were selectively seized as being related to or evidence of the criminal conduct specified in the search warrant, Fraud By Wire (FBW).

[redacted] stated he had been at his home on only four occasions during the last two months, and wondered whether some "kids" may have been using his computer.

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[redacted] added that his house is always open, and anyone can enter the house at any time.

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Investigation on 10/13/83 at Omaha, Nebraska File # Omaha 196A-922

by SSA [redacted] :cac Date dictated 10/13/83

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/2/84

The following is a summary of the activities of [redacted] on telemail.

[redacted] used the names [redacted] and [redacted] in the companies known as RADA and MMM. [redacted] has accessed telemail approximately 12 times from August 30, 1983, to September 21, 1983.

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His messages include references to drug usage and plans for interstate transportation of drugs and to "trading" MCI long distance access codes.

On October 12, 1983, [redacted] admitted to accessing GTE telemail to communicate with [redacted] and [redacted].

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Investigation on 1/30/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] mbe Date dictated 1/30/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 10/17/83

At 6 A.M., on October 12, 1983, [redacted] were awakened at their residence at [redacted] at which time they were advised as to the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose for the Agents being at their residence.

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At 6 A.M., a search warrant was served on [redacted] for the search of his residence, [redacted]. [redacted] advised his son did have a computer and it was located in his son's room. At this time [redacted] was awakened and advised as to the identities of the Agents and the purpose for their presence. At this time [redacted] appeared to be hyperventilating. [redacted] explained to the Agents where his records were concerning his computer. [redacted] pointed out the one diskett that contained all the computer records of his use of General Telephone and Electronics' (GTE) Telemail. SA [redacted] wrote "Telemail" on the corner of this disk. [redacted] was then taken to the kitchen and interviewed in the presence of his father.

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Both [redacted] and [redacted] were advised that [redacted] was a subject in the investigation, however, there was no arrest warrant for his arrest and further that he was not going to be arrested on this date. [redacted] was advised that he did not have to talk to the FBI, however, he was asked if he did wish to be interviewed to which he stated he was willing to talk to the FBI. At this time [redacted] provided the following information:

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Approximately two to three months past he was using his computer through Compuserve, a service he was paying for out of Columbus, Ohio. His access number in Tucson, Arizona, for Compuserve is [redacted]. This is an open line that can be used like a CB radio. Anyone can talk to anyone that subscribes to this service. Through Compuserve he talked to an individual who used the name [redacted]. He does not know if [redacted] was a true name or not. [redacted] told him he could use GTE's Telenet system to send messages. [redacted] told him to dial Telenet, 747-0107 and then type in Telemail. First account [redacted] gave him was [redacted]. Later he told him his [redacted] account was [redacted].

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He did send messages and talk to people using the GTE Telenet System. He talked with [redacted] (true name not recalled) (S-81)

b6
b7CInvestigation on 10/12/83

at [redacted]

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ERH:/jar

Date dictated 10/14/83

Phoenix 196A-1325

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who is a male who said he lived close to Los Angeles, California. He located a note from his records that reflected [redacted] telephone number as [redacted]. He also located a brown envelope from his records that he had received from [redacted] which reflected a return address of [redacted]

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[redacted] true name is [redacted] whose residence telephone number is [redacted] and bulletin board number is [redacted].

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[redacted] true name is [redacted]. He located a note from his record reflecting the name [redacted] and address [redacted]. He advised that [redacted] telephone number is [redacted].

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He talked to [redacted] and [redacted] over the Telemail accounts.

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He remembers seeing the name [redacted] on Telemail and believes [redacted] lives in [redacted] used the codename [redacted]. He saw one message in which the name [redacted] was used instead of codename [redacted] in which [redacted] said he was going to Detroit for a CB conference. [redacted] was always bragging about changing the pass words in the computer of Miter Corporation, Arpanet System, which is designed for research corporations. He changed the pass words because the systems administrative caught him in the system and told him to get off. In talking with [redacted] on Compuserve he asked [redacted] what happened to his account. [redacted] in that he tried to use it and it was not there. [redacted] told him some of the accounts had been erased and that [redacted] was trying to set up new accounts.

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[redacted] true name unknown, told [redacted] how to access Telemail. In a conference call between [redacted] and himself, [redacted] was bragging about his use of the Arpanet System. [redacted] also bragged and said that he had erased 200 NASA Accounts. [redacted] had more knowledge about the Telemail system than anyone else.

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[redacted] was a Hacker who used both Compuserve and Telemail who he believes lives in Oklahoma City. He does not know the true name for [redacted]. He sent and received messages from [redacted] and through these messages [redacted] said he lived in [redacted] and [redacted] did not live far away. In conversations with [redacted] said he lived within an hour of [redacted].

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He talked with [redacted] on Compuserve and saw [redacted] name on Telemail. He did not use Telemail to talk with [redacted]. He believes [redacted] is a friend of [redacted] and [redacted] and that [redacted] said he [redacted] had gone to a party with [redacted] and [redacted]. He believes several people used the codename of [redacted].

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He recalls seeing the name [redacted] (codename) on Telemail and believes he may live in New York.

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[redacted] told him he [redacted] had gotten his new account for Telemail from [redacted] over Compuserve.

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[redacted] gave him his new account, name of [redacted]. He does not know where [redacted] got the new account. However in later conversations with [redacted] and [redacted] he was told by them that [redacted] had set up the new account.

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He believes [redacted] was the one who started illegally using Telemail.

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[redacted] gave him an account number 405,206 and the password "Bad Boy" to enter the University of Kentucky Dec Systems 10. [redacted] of Dec Systems 10 is [redacted] telephone number [redacted]. He was on the system when [redacted] gave him [redacted] the account number and password. [redacted] said it was okay to use the system as long as they did not erase any files.

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[redacted] also used SOURCE which is a GTE Telenet System and is similar to Compuserve. [redacted] erased a lot of one section of the computer in SOURCE. They were aware that [redacted] erased the system but they did not know who [redacted] was. They closed all the accounts under the name [redacted].

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The codename [redacted] was also used in conjunction with the codename [redacted] and that he believes [redacted] true name is [redacted] (Last Name Unknown) who either lives in [redacted]

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[redacted] (codename) true name unknown, lives in [redacted] and also uses [redacted] bulletin board, telephone number [redacted]. [redacted] was telling everybody how to access Sprint and other telephone systems.

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[REDACTED] also told people how to make boxes that produced tones to access telephone systems without paying. [REDACTED] offered these boxes for sale for \$30 each. [REDACTED] said he was [REDACTED] years old and his telephone number is [REDACTED]

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He also advised that [REDACTED] also sent him information on how to access Sprint.

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He did not know any of these individuals prior to the use of Telemail nor has he ever personally met them. He did not know any of these systems were being illegally used and he did not profit in any way from the use of Telemail.

[REDACTED] is described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Height:
Weight:
Hair:
Eyes:
Social Security
Account Number:
Residence:

Arizona Driver's
License Number:
Father:

Employed:

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/2/84

[] This is a summary of the activity of []
[] on GTE telemail:

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[] used the names, []
[] and [] on telemail.

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[] using the name [] was a member of the "Inner Circle," and illegal group in the company AHSC, and was also an illegal user in a company called Raytheon, as ADMIN/SCPP/BANG/PROMO/RAYTHEON.

[] is known to have accessed the telemail system, using one of the above aliases, approximately 62 times, from July 7, 1983 to October 3, 1983.

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GTE logs show that [] would access the telemail system through the dial-up and the 619 area code.

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On October 12, 1983, [] aka, []
[] stated to FBI agents that []
was []
telephone number []. A search of [] residence
also produced an envelope with the above return address.

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On October 14, 1983, [] stated to the FBI that he was [] on telemail and provided additional details of his telemail intrusions.

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Investigation on 1/30/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633
by SA [] mbe Date dictated 1/30/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/1/83

On October 13, 1983, [] was interviewed at her place of residence, [] while that residence was being searched by Special Agents (SAs) of the San Diego Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Office pursuant to a search warrant signed by U.S. Magistrate J. Edward Harris.

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[] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent, the nature of the search and the interview, and she voluntarily furnished the following information:

[] advised that she has been employed at the residence since March 21, 1983. She further advised that she lives at the residence and that her job is to clean the home and take care of the seven infants. [] stated that she has seen a computer in one of the downstairs rooms, however, she has no knowledge as to who operates the computer or what is done with it. She further stated that she has never seen anyone operating the computer and that, "I only take care of the kids and keep the house clean."

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The interview with [] was conducted in Spanish.

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Investigation on 10/13/83 at [] File # SD 196B-1018-23
by SA [] /jaf Date dictated 10/14/83

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/1/83

On October 13, 1983, a search was conducted at [redacted] in response to a search warrant signed by U.S. Magistrate J. Edward Harris. A report regarding that search has been made.

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Shortly after the searching agents arrived at the location, a [redacted]-year old white male named [redacted], who identified himself as the brother of [redacted], was interviewed. [redacted] was at the residence at the time the search warrant was executed. [redacted] assisted in identifying other individuals in the residence at the time. They included:

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[redacted], age [redacted]

[redacted], age [redacted]

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[redacted], age [redacted]

[redacted] years old, and a neighbor

[redacted] stated that other children in the family were [redacted] all in school at the present time.

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[redacted] said that his parents were [redacted]. They were both at work at their company, [redacted] phone [redacted] which is located in the Mira Mesa area of North San Diego. [redacted] stated that his father's name was formerly [redacted] but had changed it to [redacted] for reasons not known to the boy. He said that his brother, [redacted] did not like the new name and maintained the old one. He said that all of his brother's computer equipment was located in his bedroom so far as he knew. He indicated that so far as he knew, his brother had his computer hooked up to telephone number [redacted]. In addition, two other numbers came into his home, [redacted] and [redacted].

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[redacted] was asked to identify his brother's computer friends, and the only person whom he could identify was a boy named [redacted] who currently works part-time at Poway High School. He was aware that his brother "talks" to other friends around the country about computer games and specifically mentioned the State of Alabama.

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Investigation on 10/13/83 at [redacted] by SA [redacted]/laf

AX 196A-633
SD 196B-1018-30
SD 87B-10472

10/13/83

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SD 196B-1018

Continuation of interview of

10/13/83

Page 2

[redacted] essentially stayed with SA [redacted] throughout the search of the residence except for [redacted] room in the basement and other basement area rooms.

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A sketch was made of the house and that sketch is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/3/83

At [redacted], Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] and [redacted] identified themselves to [redacted] and SA [redacted] explained to [redacted] that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents were going to search that residence, and he was exhibited a copy of the search warrant. SA [redacted] explained to him that the items to be searched for included a computer and related equipment. He explained that those items were in his bedroom and he directed agents to that location.

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Following that, SAs [redacted] and [redacted] arrived at the residence and commenced searching.

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[redacted] was advised that he was free to remain in the bedroom if he wished, but his movements were not restricted and he could leave if he so desired.

SA [redacted] advised him that he was suspected of participating in the unauthorized computer services of the Telemail Company through "hacking". [redacted] stated he was willing to be interviewed and he furnished the following information:

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His true given name is [redacted] and he was born on [redacted]. While [redacted] was still a juvenile, his father changed his (the father's) name to [redacted]. [redacted] did not know whether that meant his name was officially changed or not, but the name he uses is still [redacted].

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His parents own a business known as [redacted] which sells [redacted].

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He stated he does know of people who gain access to computer systems without authorization, but he does not do so and does not even have the equipment to do so. He stated he has no modem, but he stated that he has had access to one which belongs to [redacted] who lives in [redacted] telephone [redacted] and attends computer classes at UCSD. [redacted] last used his modem about two and one-half weeks ago. [redacted] has used his modem and has used

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Investigation on	10/13/83	at	[redacted]	SD 87D-10472
				SD 196B-1018-29
by	SA [redacted]	SA [redacted]	NIW/jaf	Date dictated 10/13/83
				10/14/1983
				FBI - ALEXANDRIA

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Continuation of interview of

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his computer. He does not think that [] would be involved in any illegal computer activities such as "hacking".

SA [] asked him if he has ever heard of a person who uses the name []. He stated he has heard of this person but not lately. He does not think this person is from this area.

[] was asked about the name [] and again he stated he has heard of this person but has never seen anything "posted" by him. He has heard that [] and [] "pirate" discs, meaning they copy discs.

He has not heard of search warrants in connection with hackers being served throughout the country within the last few days. He did hear there was an article in Time Magazine that there was some sort of legal action being taken against Our Planet, which is a network of computers, which he stated he has used in the past.

SA [] asked him if he heard of Telemail, and he stated he has but is not sure where. He denied ever having to access that computer system.

SA [] asked him again where he had heard of [] and he stated he heard that name on the "Bulletin Boards", which is a computer system that is used to post messages. He denied ever having used that name.

SA [] joined the interview and asked [] who is high school math teacher was, and he stated it was [] and he had one by the name of [] and another one by the name of []. He stated he has no black friends who are interested in computers.

SA [] asked him if he is interested in contests or if he has any family in Texas, and he stated he does not enter contests and has no family in Texas.

At this point SA [] departed from the bedroom where the interview was being conducted and returned a few minutes later and the interview continued.

[] was asked several questions regarding his relationship to an individual by the name []. [] stated that the name [] was recalled by him as someone with whom he had attended [], but his

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Continuation of interview of [REDACTED]

10/13/83

Page 3

recollection of [REDACTED] was not clear. Other questions were posed of [REDACTED] regarding his relationship to [REDACTED] but those questions did not specifically pertain to the search nor the unauthorized use of Telemail Services. The results of the questioning regarding [REDACTED] have been set forth in another report and are available at the FBI in San Diego if necessary.

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During the search of the residence at [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] observed a phone located in a small office-type space located off of the kitchen area in the residence. The telephone had five buttons and two lines were active, numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. These numbers appeared at the buttons on the phone. In addition, two other numbers appeared as buttons on the telephone but appeared to be inactive. The numbers were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

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Located in that office-type room was a game printout dated January 17, 1983, showing an account number 3761. [REDACTED] advised that that printout involved a game sponsored by Flying Buffalo, Inc., Box 1467, Scottsdale, Arizona. The game printout pamphlet was seized.

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In addition, SA [REDACTED] assisted in the search of [REDACTED] room as well as in the search of the remaining part of the house.

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A copy of the search warrant and an inventory of the items seized was provided to [REDACTED] by SA [REDACTED]. The inventory of items seized is available at the FBI in San Diego, where the seized items were taken.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/18/83

[redacted] was interviewed at his residence, [redacted]. He was advised as to the identity of the interviewing agent and that the interview would concern his knowledge and participation in activities, now commonly known as "hacking," into General Telephone Electronics (GTE) Telemail System. He was advised of his rights and executed a waiver. He furnished the following information.

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He has been "hacking" for approximately nine to ten months. He has always been interested in electronics and has built many electronic kits. Since he was very young, he has had interest in seeing how things were constructed. It is only of recent that he has developed a deep interest in the computer world.

His present knowledge of computer technology has been acquired actually through trial and error. He did attend a Regional Occupation Program (ROP) which taught computer programing. Due to his background, he ended up as a teacher's assistant in that program and was instructing other students. His grade average in high school would not be indicative of his overall ability. His grade average was low. He explained this was caused by him being taken out of school several times and traveling in the United States. He has lived in California off and on for many years. He has also lived in Alaska with his parents.

His father is self-employed and owns [redacted]. [redacted] He cannot remember the exact address, but it is located in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. The father has five to six employees. The mother also works with the father. [redacted] advised that his father's name is [redacted]. His father changed his name to [redacted] after seeing it mentioned in a science fiction novel.

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[redacted] was reminded of a phone call that occurred on October 14, 1983, wherein he had a conversation with the interviewing agent. In that conversation, he had told the interviewing agent that he was in fact [redacted] stated that he was indeed [redacted]. He had been reluctant to reveal this fact to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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b7CInvestigation on 10/14/83 at [redacted] File # SD 196B-1018by SA [redacted] :rm Date dictated 11/16/83b6
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Continuation of interview of [REDACTED]

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agents who searched his residence on October 13, 1983, pursuant to a search warrant. He thought the purpose of the search concerned another matter involving the family. He briefly described the homicide of an aunt, which had occurred earlier in the year. He advised that he now understood the purpose of the FBI's presence on the preceding day as well as today. He decided to use the name or handle [REDACTED] after calling in on a "Bulletin Board." One of the other party's using the "Bulletin Board" at the time asked him what his "handle" was. Since he could not or would not use his own true name, he thought of [REDACTED] He had heard it used before.

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He has contacted hundreds of individuals on the telephone lines by using the computer as the father purchased a computer for him approximately nine months ago. The first computer terminal that he had was an Ace 1000. The brand name was Apple. He had another computer before that. That unit was given to [REDACTED] who resides in [REDACTED]

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His purpose in gaining access to various top communications networks in the United States was to learn more about computers. He simply would access a system, learn as much as he could about it, and then contact the programmers. He frequently talked with programmers regarding the system. Many of the discussions he had with programmers regarding the systems concerned the lack of security.

One of the frequent networks that he accessed was GTE's Telemail System. He recalled one account that utilized the GTE system as that of Raytheon. He also recalled being furnished an administrative password called PROMO. He obtained this from another "hacker" named [REDACTED] This individual was living in Colorado and frequently used the "Bulletin Board." [REDACTED] had no idea whether [REDACTED] was a male or a female. Their communication was conducted on a test loop. Conversations could occur without using any telephone numbers. All that had to happen was to have individuals call in on the access telephone number to the Telemail System.

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Access to these telephone lines usually involved dialing the local telephone number for the Telemail System. Once into the system, a series of numbers would be dialed and the systems' "Bulletin Board" would be brought up on a viewing screen. As he mentioned earlier, most of his involvement was with the Raytheon account. He did access a few others. Most of the accounts he accessed were what he called powerless. All an

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Continuation of interview of [REDACTED]

10/14/83

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individual could do in that type of account was to send and receive mail. There was no ability to create or eliminate an account. A message could be added or deleted as wished. On occasions, he did access an administrative account. Once identifying the parameters of that account, he was able to set up accounts of a lower status. With that type of account, one could simply make a private account and furnish it its own access code.

He stated that he thought the "Bulletin Board" with Raytheon was for public use. Anyone could access the system with the proper equipment and read it.

The identities of other "hackers" were discussed with [REDACTED]. He advised that he does not know [REDACTED]. He advised that [REDACTED]

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The name [REDACTED] is also known to him as a young lady. He does not know her last name and, as far as he knows, she does not have a home computer.

He denied any deliberate effort to interfere or delete information involved in the computer nets. He had seen comments posted on the "Bulletin Board" indicating that various "hackers" had become bored and had deleted units from whatever communications system they had accessed. He did not admit to doing any of the deletions. He advised that he had not cracked the bank computers, yet. As far as any other computer networks, he has simply been on the network to see what it was all about and then had simply signed off.

He wrote a letter to GTE and discussed the lack of security with the Telemail System. As he had mentioned earlier, Telemail had serious security flaws. This letter was written circa May of 1983. GTE never responded to his letter.

As far as the security of Telemail or any other computer networks, most of the low level accounts within the system have little or no security. Selling of passwords to such accounts is common. By experimentation, many of the accounts can be accessed simply by using one letter passwords. He has heard of a "hacker" or group of "hackers" who make money by selling the passwords to the accounts. In fact, some of these "hackers" have offered to create an account for a fee. They were making money from the Telemail System by creating accounts. [REDACTED] recalled the group's name as the "time core," or "pirates cave," or "pirates cove."

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Continuation of interview of

10/14/83

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[redacted] advised he sold an RCA terminal modem to a pawn shop for \$170.00. The pawn shop is located in the downtown area of San Diego. He could not recall the name of the pawn shop. He advised that since he does not have a driver's license, he was transported by a friend to the pawn shop so as to make the deal. He would not identify his friend during this interview. He advised that he would contact him and obtain the location of the pawn shop so as to confirm the sale of the unit.

[redacted] The inner circle was a group of "hackers" that attempted to form a club. The group never became involved in anything and as far as he knows, they have all broken up. [redacted]

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[redacted] Address information as to this individual's whereabouts would be in the materials seized by the FBI. He once acquired an account from [redacted]

[redacted] was also familiar with ARPANET. He knew this to be a government's system involved in research matters. he was not involved in this system. He knew that several universities were using it. He did not know the access code to get into that system.

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The following description was obtained from interview and observation:

Name:
Sex:
Race:
Date of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Address:

Education:

Occupation:
Hair:
Eyes:
Father's name:

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- 1 -

Date of transcription November 2, 1983

[redacted] was telephonically contacted at his residence, [redacted]. He was reminded of a conversation which had occurred between him and the writer on October 14, 1983, at his residence. That discussion had been preceded by an admonishment of his rights. During that discussion, he was questioned as to the location of an RCA Data Terminal, also known as a "modem".

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He advised that he had pawned the "modem" at a pawnshop located in the downtown area of San Diego. He had received approximately \$170.00 for it. He could not recall the exact location of the pawnshop, and he did not have a receipt showing the transaction. He added that a friend of his had transported him to the downtown area because he did not have a drivers license. He would not furnish the identity of this friend. He would contact his friend and obtain the address of the pawnshop so that the sale of the Data Terminal could be confirmed.

He was now queried as to the results of his inquiry with his friend. He stated he had a correction to make regarding his previous interview. He initially said he had sold the "modem" to a pawnshop when, in fact, he had sold it to his friend. His friend had returned the terminal to him and was quite concerned over the recent publicity concerning the searches that occurred throughout the United States. The friend no longer wished to be involved with him. [redacted] said that he would voluntarily turn the "modem" over to the investigating agent, and that it could be picked up at his residence during the afternoon of October 17, 1983.

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At approximately 1:15 P.M., the RCA "modem", Serial Number 001034, Model Number UP3501, along with a small power supply and assorted connecting cables, was picked up at the residence of [redacted] in [redacted].

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He commented at this time that he had been told by friends to seek the assistance of an attorney and discuss the facts regarding his involvement in the illegal entry into the Telenet Computer System. As of yet, he had not retained counsel and queried the writer as to what he should do. He was reminded

Investigation on	October 17, 1983	File #	SD 196B-1018-25
by	SA [redacted] jmb	Serialized	FILED
		DEC 1 1983	October 18, 1983
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Continuation of interview of

- 10/17/83

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of his previous interview with the writer wherein he had been advised of his rights, including the right to counsel. He was told the decision was his to make. He then asked what he should do in the event the news media contacted him regarding his participation in the computer fraud. He was advised by the writer that any contact or discussion with the media would be left as his prerogative.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/31/83b6
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[redacted] tele-
phone [redacted], was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and that the interview concerned an investigation involving the penetration of the GTE-Telenet/Telemail Computer Network. [redacted] advised he had information concerning this matter and requested that his identity be protected and that the information furnished be kept confidential. [redacted] furnished the following information:

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b7DInvestigation on 10/13/83

at

SD 196B-1018 -19

by

SA

[redacted] jaf

Serialized 10/14/83
Date dictated 10/14/83

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Continuation of interview of

[REDACTED]

10/13/83

Page

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[REDACTED]

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b7D

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7D

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/24/83

telephone [REDACTED] who was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, provided the following information:

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Investigation on 10/11/83 at [redacted] File # SD 196B-1018

by SA [redacted] /cm Date dictated 10/20/83

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SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____
DEC 1 1999
FBI - ALEXANDRIA
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 9/20/83

[redacted] hereinafter referred to as [redacted] and [redacted] hereinafter referred to as [redacted] were interviewed at the offices of Home Federal Savings and Loan, 12411 Poway Road, Poway, California. They were being interviewed at the request of [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] reside at [redacted] telephone [redacted]

[redacted] The following information was furnished by [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 9/8/83 at [redacted] File # SD 87D-10472

b6
b7C

by SA [redacted] /mg

DEC 1 1983

Date dictated

9/16/83

FBI - ALEXANDRIA

1-17C-B-1018-Info

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/10/84

This is a summary of the activities of []
[] on GTE Telemail.

[] used the names []
and [] on Telemail.

b6
b7C

[] was an illegal user in the following companies:
BMW, MARAVEN and UAW.

b6
b7C

[] accessed Telemail at least 40 times between
July 10, 1983, and October 9, 1983.

Records of []
[]
[]b7E
b6
b7C

[] has admitted to the FBI that he did access
the Telemail system without authorization and was using
the above-mentioned names.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 2/6/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 206A-633

by SA [] :gaj Date dictated 2/6/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/10/84

[] This is a summary of the activities of []
[] on GTE Telemail.

b6
b7C

[] used the name [] on GTE Telemail.
He was a member of a group known as the INNERCIRCLE and
was an illegal user in the legitimate customer AMERICAN
HOSPITAL SUPPLY COMPANY (AHSC). [] left four messages
on GTE Telemail between the dates of August 15, 1983,
and August 19, 1983.

b6
b7C

[] has admitted to the FBI that he used
the Telemail services four or five times, but did not
think that someone else was being charged for the computer
time. [] stated he thought that when someone contacted
COMPUSERV or the source, then charges would begin to accumulate.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 2/6/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 286A-633
196A
by SA []:gaj Date dictated 2/6/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/30/84

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was advised of the official identity of the interviewing agent and thereafter provided the following information:

b6
b7C

He used the name [redacted] on the Osuny bulletin board during the summer of 1983. While looking at messages on this bulletin board, [redacted] was able to see a private message left for another party on that board. This message was from someone using the name [redacted] and the message stated something to the effect that "you can call me at [redacted] [redacted] said he called the number once to see if it was a working number and a male answered. [redacted] said he did not say anything, but simply hung up.

b6
b7C

[redacted] also said that at an electronics show in New Jersey he met a computer enthusiast whose first name was [redacted] [redacted] said he uses the name [redacted] on the Telemail system and that he [redacted] would leave a welcome message on Telemail for [redacted].

b6
b7C

[redacted] said he used the Telemail service approximately four or five times and in doing so communicated with [redacted] (who he knew to have a real first name of [redacted] and [redacted].

b6
b7C

[redacted] further stated that he did not know that the messages he was leaving on Telemail were being billed to another company. He thought that somehow this was an electronic connection to a Source account or a Compuserve account and that a person would be billed through Source or Compuserve once you have connected with those computers.

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b7C

[redacted] also provided the following identifying information:

Date of Birth: [redacted]
Age: [redacted]
Social Security
Account Number: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633


by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/26/84

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

2

Height:
Weight:
Eyes:
Hair:



b6
b7C

~~52~~

173

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/10/84

This is a summary of the activity of []
[] on GTE Telemail.

b6
b7C

[] used the names [] and []
[] on Telemail.

[] was a member of the group known as the PHALERS and was registered illegally as a user in the following companies: BMW, UAW, MARAVEN, TELENET and AHFS.

b6
b7C

[] left six messages on Telemail between July 26, 1983, and August 9, 1983.

A fellow "PHALSER" told the FBI that [] is the same person who uses the name [] on various computer bulletin boards. A list of hackers seized from the residence of [], aka [], contains the listing: []

b6
b7C

This phone number is the unlisted phone number for [] [] also known as [], also said he saw a message on a computer bulletin board stating that [] could be reached at the number []. The customer name and address for that unlisted phone number is []

[] was contacted at that number and he stated that he is the actual subscriber to that number. []

b6
b7C

[] admits to getting numerous calls for [] at this number, but denies being [] OR [] or using the Telemail system. The personal ID of [] on Telemail was []

A fellow PHALSER states that [] works in "some sort of informational job, reading stuff over the radio". [] stated he does volunteer work for the []

b6
b7C

NCIC check on [] revealed three past arrests and one conviction as follows:

b6
b7C

Investigation on 2/6/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

196A
206A-633
SUB P

by SA [] gaj Date dictated 2/6/84

b6
b7C

AX 206A-633

2



b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/27/84

[redacted] was telephonically contacted and advised of the official identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview. [redacted] thereafter provided the following information. His date of birth is [redacted] and he is employed as [redacted] [redacted] has two telephone numbers, [redacted] and [redacted]. Both of these numbers have a customer name and address of [redacted]. [redacted] indicated Ruth Benedict was his mother who is now deceased.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated he has a home computer and a modem and a printer. He runs a home bulletin board known as the [redacted]. The number to call to contact the computer was [redacted] until approximately July 1, 1983, when he switched the modem number to [redacted].

b6
b7C

[redacted] also has a post office box number that he gives out to computer enthusiasts because he does not want to give out his home address. That is, [redacted].

b6
b7C

During July and August, 1983, [redacted] was setting up his bulletin board to accept incoming calls and requested assistance from a friend of his named [redacted]. According to [redacted] [redacted] is also employed as [redacted] in a [redacted] home telephone number is [redacted] and according to [redacted] has a computer system, a modem, and a printer.

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b7C

[redacted] said he does not know who [redacted] or [redacted] are. [redacted] denied any involvement in any illegal intrusions into GTE telemail or any other illegal

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/12/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted]:mbe Date dictated 1/13/84

b6
b7C

activities with his computer system. [] also denied any involvement with the illegal use of the IBM ADS Voice Message System.

b6
b7C

[] did, however, state that he has received numerous phone calls at the telephone number [] asking for []. He said these phone calls began during the summer of 1983, and the most recent was approximately one month ago.

b6
b7C

During the summer of 1983, [] remembers getting a phone call from someone who identified himself as []. This person talked with an apparent nasal condition, doing much coughing and blowing his nose and snorting during the conversation. [] called long distance to [] and asked him for a password for his bulletin board.

b6
b7C

[] stated he had had some difficulty with the telephone company during the past few months and that he received an additional number from the Chicago Phone Company and due to an oversight by the phone company, had not been billed for this number for approximately six months. This number, [], is the number he presently uses for his computer, and [] further stated that he eventually had to pay the phone company an additional sum of money for phone calls made over the past six months or so.

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b7C

[] does some work at the Chicago Library Radio Station reading newspaper articles over the air for the blind. This station is known as "CHRIS," which stands for Chicago Radio Information Systems. The similarity between this acronym "CHRIS" and the first name of [] was commented on by [].

b6
b7C

[] said he did not know and had never heard of the names [] and others. [] said he did have a book of user names and true names concerning his home bulletin board and he may have a list of nationwide home bulletin boards on which he wrote the true names of some computer enthusiasts. [] said that he would be willing to make this information available to the FBI.

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b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PROSECUTIVE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING

also known as

also known as

also known as

also known as

FRAUD BY WIFE; CONSPIRACY

b6
b7C

Copy to: 1 - USA, Alexandria, Va.

(Attn: AUSA

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

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AX 196A-633

NAME OF DEFENDANTS:

1. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Weight
Social Security
Account Number
Address

☐ yrs old

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b7C

~~01~~

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2. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Weight
Address

☐ yrs old

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b7C

~~0-2~~

188

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3. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Weight
Home Address

☐ yrs old

b6
b7C

~~C-3~~

189

AX 196A-633

4. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Weight
Home Address

☐ yrs old

b6
b7C

~~0-4~~

AX 196A-633

PROSECUTIVE STATUS:

1. On August 30, 1983, the available facts in this matter were presented to Elsie Munsell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, who advised she would consider prosecution in this matter.

2. On October 12, 1983, the premises located at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were searched pursuant to a duly authorized court order and various computer paraphenalia were seized.

b6
b7C

~~D-1~~

191

AX 196A-633

WITNESSES:

1. [REDACTED]

GTE Telemail
8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia
Telephone [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Can provide details of GTE Telemail operations,
methods of detecting unauthorized users and
procedures for obtaining print-outs of customer
messages.

2. [REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6
b7C

Can supply details of investigation.

3. [REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Albany

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Buffalo, New York

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AX 196A-633

EVIDENCE:

RE: [] and []

1. Summary of messages left on Telemail by []
[] (originals in possession of []
[] GTE Telemail).

b6
b7C

2. Summary of messages left on Telemail by []
[] (originals in possession of []).

b6
b7C

3. List of items seized in search of []
[]

4. Summary of relevant evidence maintained by FBI
Alexandria.

5. Summary of trap and trace records received from
[] (originals at FBI Alexandria).

b7E

6. List of charges attributed to []
and [] (originals with []).

b6
b7C

RE: [] and []

1. Summary of messages left on Telemail by []
(originals with []).

b6
b7C

2. Summary of evidence retained by FBI Alexandria.

3. Copy of incident report from Nazareth College
which implicates [].

4. Summary of nine messages left on Telemail by
[] (originals with []).

b6
b7C

5. Copy of trap and trace documents provided by
[] (original with FBI Alexandria).

b7E

6. List of charges attributed to [], aka
[] and [], aka [] (original with []).

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/9/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user known as [] and [] on GTE Telemail. The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

b6
b7C

1.) August 30, 1983, 6:14 PM (all times Eastern Daylight Time).

2.) August 30, 1983, 9:07 PM.

3.) August 31, 1983, 11:02 AM.

4.) August 31, 1983, 9:02 AM.

5.) August 31, 1983, 3:54 PM.

6.) September 1, 1983, 7:48 AM.

7.) September 1, 1983, 8:04 AM.

8.) August 31, 1983, 7:54 PM.

Note, on September 1, 1983, at 11:03 AM, the illegal user [] received a message from the illegal user [] (aka []). This message states in part, "He wrote me and told me that if I don't set up accounts a certain way then the company will notice when the bill comes and they will drop the accounts." In this message [] is clearly telling [] (aka []) that these messages are being placed in the account of a company without that company knowing about it and approving of it and further the company will be billed for the message.

b6
b7C

9.) September 2, 1983, 12:10 PM.

10.) September 5, 1983, 7:07 PM.

11.) September 6, 1983, 11:38 AM. In this message [] refers to [] is the true name of [] wife.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [] :gaj Date dictated 12/8/83

b6
b7C

- 12.) September 6, 1983, 3:58 PM.
- 13.) September 7, 1983, 11:10 AM.
- 14.) September 7, 1983, 1:59 PM.
- 15.) September 7, 1983, 2:32 PM.
- 16.) September 8, 1983, 7:49 AM.
- 17.) September 8, 1983, 6:12 PM.
- 18.) September 11, 1983, 6:34 PM.
- 19.) September 11, 1983, 6:35 PM.
- 20.) September 12, 1983, 11:27 AM.

21.) September 12, 1983, 1:56 PM. Message refers in part to the purchase of oxygen. This message is in response to a message left on the system by [redacted] stating that the oxygen was ready for pick-up at Rochester Fire and Safety. Investigation by the FBI at Rochester Fire and Safety reveals that [redacted] did, in fact, pick up a respirator on September 12, 1983.

b6
b7C

- 22.) September 13, 1983, 7:33 AM.

23.) September 15, 1983, 9:04 PM. Message states in part "I was unable to log into Telenet, til now. The lines were busy all day. I don't know what all the action was for on Telenet, but it looks like everyone was doing there last minute business reports today."

24.) September 16, 1983, 8:00 AM. Message reads in part "I check the Lincom board this morning, and much to my surprise I found nothing of: use and/or value. I think that you should pass along (SIC) to the Admin, that we need support here in the field, and the board should contain important information dealing with the everyday usage of this system."

25.) September 18, 1983, 10:01 AM. Message states in part [redacted] from the Okla, sales office has made national news. He was in one of the mag's this month." This statement refers to the fact that [redacted] aka [redacted] was quoted in a national computer magazine in an article concerning computer hacking.

b6
b7C

26.) September 18, 1983, 10:21 AM.

27.) September 18, 1983, 4:07 PM. Message
refers to [redacted], aka [redacted] is
the roommate of [redacted] at Cornell University.

b6
b7C

28.) September 19, 1983, 9:32 AM.

29.) September 21, 1983, 7:45 PM.

30.) September 21, 1983, 7:44 PM.

31.) September 23, 1983, 9:03 AM.

32.) September 23, 1983, 5:12 PM.

33.) September 22, 1983, 2:31 PM.

34.) September 23, 1983, 5:18 PM.

35.) September 24, 1983, 5:29 PM.

36.) September 25, 1983, 9:19 AM. This message
refers to [redacted], meaning [redacted] wife.

b6
b7C

37.) September 26, 1983, 3:55 PM.

38.) September 26, 1983, 1:52 PM.

39.) September 27, 1983, 3:00 PM.

40.) September 27, 1983, 6:27 PM.

41.) September 28, 1983, 11:44 AM.

42.) September 28, 1983, 11:33 AM.

43.) September 28, 1983, 4:39 PM.

44.) September 30, 1983, 8:35 AM.

45.) October 2, 1983, 12:27 PM.

46.) October 2, 1983, 12:23 PM.

47.) October 2, 1983, 3:47 PM. This message
again refers to [redacted], meaning [redacted]
roommate at Cornell.

b6
b7C

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48.) October 2, 1983, 3:55 PM. This message states "The A/C you know the number is [redacted]" (Subscriber to number is unknown.) b6 b7C

49.) October 3, 1983, 6:22 PM.

50.) October 3, 1983, 1:13 PM.

51.) October 3, 1983, 4:34 PM.

52.) October 4, 1983, 1:50 PM.

53.) October 5, 1983, 10:24 AM.

54.) October 5, 1983, 10:26 AM.

55.) October 5, 1983, 3:41 PM.

56.) October 6, 1983, 12:39 PM. This message states in part "How about that for balls, giving a story like I did to [redacted]? Well, it would have been nice if it had worked though." This statement refers to the message left by [redacted] on October 5, 1983, at 3:41 PM, wherein he states he talked to [redacted] at American Community and told [redacted] the false story that he [redacted] was doing a story on companies like American Community. [redacted] was attempting to get information about decoders or descramblers for cable t.v. systems. b6 b7C

57.) October 6, 1983, 12:41 PM.

58.) October 6, 1983, 6:12 PM.

59.) October 7, 1983, 8:16 AM.

60.) October 6, 1983, 6:51 PM.

61.) October 6, 1983, 7:40 PM. This message states in part "The cable company there is semi-smart. I will have to work on [redacted] to find out what type of decoder system they are using. I think that I could get the info, but if I don't you can't go wrong with sine wave." b6 b7C

62.) October 7, 1983, 4:22 PM.

63.) October 10, 1983, 4:49 PM.

64.) October 10, 1983, 4:47 PM.

AX 196A-633

5

- 65.) October 11, 1983, 11:01 AM.
- 66.) October 11, 1983, 1:11 PM.
- 67.) October 11, 1983, 1:05 PM.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/9/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user known as [redacted] and [redacted] on GTE Telemail. The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

b6
b7C

1.) August 30, 1983, 7:19 PM (all times Eastern Daylight Time). This message contains the name [redacted] and is signed "Love [redacted] is the true name of [redacted]. She is the wife of [redacted] aka [redacted] and [redacted].

b6
b7C

2.) August 31, 1983, 10:23 AM. This message also contains the true name [redacted].

b6
b7C

3.) August 31, 1983, 10:24 AM.

4.) August 31, 1983, 2:23 PM.

5.) August 31, 1983, 3:38 PM.

6.) September 1, 1983, 10:57 AM. This message is from [redacted]. She has now changed her user name from [redacted].

b6
b7C

7.) September 2, 1983, 11:54 AM.

8.) September 5, 1983, 12:05 PM. This message again has the true name [redacted].

b6
b7C

9.) September 6, 1983, 9:16 AM.

10.) September 6, 1983, 9:22 AM.

11.) September 6, 1983, 11:14 AM.

12.) September 6, 1983, 12:43 PM.

13.) September 6, 1983, 1:31 PM.

14.) September 7, 1983, 2:17 PM.

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 12/8/83

b6
b7C

15.) September 8, 1983, 9:16 AM.

16.) September 8, 1983, 1:44 PM.

17.) September 8, 1983, 1:52 PM.

18.) September 9, 1983, 9:03 AM.

19.) September 12, 1983, 12:32 PM. This message is from [] to [] and is as follows "I do believe that I told you to expect quite a bit higher than you were but I must admit that that is even higher than I thought. Also Roch Fire and Safethy (SIC) called and said that the O2 is ready and the balance due is \$164." Investigation by the FBI at a firm called Rochester Fire and Safety indicated that [] did, in fact, have an order for a respirator and that the balance due was \$164. [] picked up that respirator on September 12, 1983.

b6
b7C

20.) September 12, 1983, 3:24 PM.

21.) September 12, 1983, 3:08 PM.

22.) September 16, 1983, 12:48 PM.

23.) September 17, 1983, 9:55 PM. This message contains the true name [] and is signed Love, [].

b6
b7C

24.) September 18, 1983, 1:21 PM.

25.) September 19, 1983, 10:21 AM. This message asks "How does [] feel about your little discovery (rebooting his system)? If he's anything like [], it is probably a little unsettling." These names refer to [], [] roommate at Cornell, and [] husband.

b6
b7C

26.) September 19, 1983, 10:23 AM.

27.) September 19, 1983, 2:31 PM.

28.) September 20, 1983, 10:02 AM.

29.) September 20, 1983, 10:09 AM.

- 30.) September 20, 1983, 11:38 AM.
31.) September 20, 1983, 3:46 PM.
32.) September 21, 1983, 2:59 PM.
33.) September 22, 1983, 11:13 AM.
34.) September 22, 1983, 2:53 PM.
35.) September 23, 1983, 10:23 AM.
36.) September 23, 1983, 11:33 AM.
37.) September 23, 1983, 2:41 PM.
38.) September 26, 1983, 9:17 AM.
39.) September 26, 1983, 9:17 AM.
40.) September 26, 1983, 9:25 AM.
41.) September 26, 1983, 9:41 AM.
42.) September 26, 1983, 10:51 AM.
43.) September 26, 1983, 12:06 PM.
44.) September 26, 1983, 3:32 PM.
45.) September 26, 1983, 5:48 PM.
46.) September 27, 1983, 4:19 PM.
47.) September 27, 1983, 7:23 PM.
48.) September 27, 1983, 4:11 PM.
49.) September 28, 1983, 10:06 AM. This message
is to [] and uses the name [] referring to [] b6
b7C
50.) September 28, 1983, 11:55 AM.
51.) September 29, 1983, 6:27 PM.
52.) September 30, 1983, 8:58 AM.

53.) October 1, 1983, 3:59 PM. This message is from [redacted] to [redacted] to her husband [redacted]. The message reads in part "Well, I finally got through. I didn't know your name. I had forgotten what you had said it was. You really ought to investigate on that [redacted] user on here. Who knows, with your hacking ability you may come up with something interesting."

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b7c

- 54.) October 2, 1983, 1:37 PM.
- 55.) October 2, 1983, 6:38 PM.
- 56.) October 3, 1983, 9:44 AM.
- 57.) September 30, 1983, 8:58 AM.
- 58.) October 2, 1983, 1:29 PM.
- 59.) October 2, 1983, 1:42 PM.
- 60.) October 2, 1983, 6:34 PM.
- 61.) October 3, 1983, 9:37 AM.
- 62.) October 3, 1983, 3:26 PM.
- 63.) October 3, 1983, 3:29 PM.
- 64.) October 4, 1983, 11:12 AM.
- 65.) October 4, 1983, 2:42 PM.
- 66.) October 4, 1983, 11:23 AM.
- 67.) October 5, 1983, 3:47 PM.
- 68.) October 6, 1983, 1:16 PM.
- 69.) October 6, 1983, 1:07 PM.
- 70.) October 10, 1983, 2:41 PM.
- 71.) October 10, 1983, 5:54 PM.
- 72.) October 7, 1983, 3:25 PM.

AX 196A-633

5

73.) October 11, 1983, 1:46 PM.

74.) October 11, 1983, 3:08 PM.

~~File~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/19/83

Pursuant to a search warrant, a search was conducted at [redacted] The premises were entered at 9:00 a.m. and exited at 10:52 a.m.

b6
b7C

The following items were taken from the residence and receipted for:

1. Manilla folder with tapes, computer printouts and miscellaneous items from cabinet in garage - all computer related.
2. Hayes Smart Modern 300, 552094725
3. Radio Shack TRS 80, Model 3, SSAN (Social Security Account Number) [redacted] on it.
4. Power source Hayes, lead
5. Two disc drives
 - a) Tandon 100-1
 - b) Sugart SA-400
6. Printer Gemini 10X 3013024363
7. Flip-N-File Programs
8. Digital timer - Sony 023702
9. Columbia Stereo amplifier
10. SPR-4 - Drake Manuals (two)
- 10a. Miscellaneous documents from [redacted]
11. Printout paper

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

[redacted]
Ax 196A-639

Investigation on 10/12/83 at [redacted] Bureau 196A-529
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JK; kah Date dictated 10/13/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 12/7/83

The following is a review of evidence seized pursuant to a duly authorized Federal Search Warrant, executed at the premises known as [REDACTED] the residence of [REDACTED].

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b7C

The following is a summary of evidence relevant to this investigation:

- 1) Two yellow cards with the printing, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 2) A printout with the words, "Computer located at," and six phone numbers listed.
- 3) A printout with numerous bulletin boards and phone numbers associated with those bulletin boards.
- 4) A white piece of paper with numerous numbers of unknown meaning on it.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 11/15/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [REDACTED] /DF:mb Date dictated 11/16/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/20/84

The floppy discs seized in the search of the residence of [redacted] were examined by [redacted] a computer programmer, and [redacted] stated no information pertaining to GTE Telemail was found.

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b7C

Investigation on 1/17/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/17/84 b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/27/84

The following is a review of [redacted]
and trap and trace information received from [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
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b7E

A review of [redacted]
[redacted]

b7E

A review of the trap and trace computer print-outs
indicated the following [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 1/19/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted]gaj Date dictated 1/19/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

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Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
.....			
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
.....			
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Sub H [redacted] Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/9/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user [redacted] and [redacted] on GTE Telemail.

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The date and time of each message is provided with the synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

1.) August 30, 1983, 12:56 AM (all times Eastern Daylight Time). This message discusses how to set up illegal user accounts.

2.) August 30, 1983, 4:19 PM. This message states "Hi [redacted]. I got our new accounts up. [redacted] will never find these. (I hope) Tell [redacted] that her account is ready [redacted]. See ya. Signed [redacted]."

[redacted] refers to [redacted], aka [redacted] is the illegal user name for [redacted] is her password on the Telemail System.

b6
b7C

3.) August 30, 1983, 8:20 PM. This message tells [redacted] how to use the Telemail System.

4.) August 30, 1983, 10:54 PM.

5.) August 30, 1983, 8:18 PM.

6.) August 30, 1983, 4:18 PM.

7.) August 31, 1983, 12:56 PM. This message refers to [redacted]

b6
b7C

8.) September 1, 1983, 3:18 PM. This message reads as follows [redacted]. I got a list of RADA accounts and yours were there too. So that does not seem to hide them. Also, [redacted] is set up strangely in that you can only use certain configs. Please explain. My accounts are under RADA, even though there are only a few. I frankly think [redacted] is dangerous, since [redacted] does not have a particularly good reputation, and saying [redacted] is run by [redacted] will be sure to get it looked at if anything is looked at. As of now, accounts ([redacted] etc.) are

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b7C

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 12/8/83

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b7C

under RADA. If you get a list of RADA accounts, you also get some that maybe you created ([redacted], etc.). I have not looked into it but if those are under [redacted] they are also showing up under RADA since [redacted] is a subset of source. Will call you. [redacted]."

b6
b7C

9.) September 1, 1983, 4:44 PM. Message reads as follows [redacted], I don't know what you are trying to find out (i.e. your findings) but the other accounts are: [redacted] [redacted]. There is nothing wrong with the accounts, but if you find anything, let me know. [redacted] is under [redacted], and [redacted] is under RADA, all others of mine are under RADA. [redacted] P.S. call me when you get in, if busy try again in five. See ya [redacted]."

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b7C

10.) September 1, 1983, 4:48 PM.

11.) September 1, 1983, 10:14 AM. This message reads in part "Send me mail with the options for the "Admin not noticing." This message refers to continuing attempts to keep the legitimate administrator of an account from knowing there are hackers in his company's account.

12.) September 1, 1983, 8:47 AM. This message refers to the fact that [redacted] as the administrator is going to change the user name of [redacted] to [redacted].

b6
b7C

13.) September 1, 1983, 11:21 AM.

14.) September 1, 1983, 11:03 AM. This message reads as follows [redacted], as you can see, your name has been changed to its proper name (also, please send mail to me to [redacted]). I finally got it I think. And hopefully [redacted] won't screw us up again. He wrote me and told me that if I don't set up accounts a certain way then the company will notice when the bill comes and they will drop the accounts. I think he is bullshitting me because he wants to have full control of the system. Oh well I told him to tell me what the correct set-up params are so I can do it. Talk to you later [redacted]."

b6
b7C

15.) September 1, 1983, 5:19 PM.

16.) September 6, 1983, 8:37 AM.

17.) September 5, 1983, 3:29 PM.

18.) September 5, 1983, 8:24 PM. This message contains the name [redacted]

b6
b7C

19.) September 4, 1983, 11:02 PM.

20.) September 6, 1983, 10:54 AM.

21.) September 5, 1983, 3:27 PM. This message contains the sentence "I just got back (3:19) and [redacted] (my roommate) just walked in." This sentence indicates that [redacted] is the illegal user name for his roommate, [redacted].

b6
b7C

22.) September 6, 1983, 3:41 PM.

23.) September 6, 1983, 6:02 PM.

24.) September 6, 1983, 6:03 PM.

25.) September 6, 1983, 6:04 PM.

26.) September 6, 1983, 6:09 PM.

27.) September 7, 1983, 12:41 PM.

28.) September 7, 1983, 12:50 PM.

29.) September 7, 1983, 4:36 PM.

Note, on September 7, 1983, at 2:14 PM, [redacted] received a message from [redacted]. This message begins Gee, [redacted] I guess there is always a first time. In this message [redacted] uses the true first name for [redacted]. This message also refers to [redacted] meaning [redacted].

b6
b7C

30.) September 8, 1983, 8:44 AM.

31.) September 7, 1983, 11:42 PM.

32.) September 7, 1983, 11:37 PM.

33.) September 8, 1983, 10:52 AM.

34.) September 8, 1983, 10:44 AM. In this message [redacted] uses the name [redacted] referring to [redacted] aka [redacted].

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1325219-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 65

Page 17 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 18 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 19 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 20 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 21 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 22 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 23 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 24 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 25 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 26 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 28 ~ Duplicate;
Page 29 ~ Duplicate;
Page 30 ~ Duplicate;
Page 31 ~ Duplicate;
Page 45 ~ Duplicate;
Page 46 ~ Duplicate;
Page 74 ~ Duplicate;
Page 75 ~ Duplicate;
Page 76 ~ Duplicate;
Page 77 ~ Duplicate;
Page 79 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 80 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 83 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 192 ~ Duplicate;
Page 193 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 202 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 204 ~ Duplicate;
Page 205 ~ Duplicate;
Page 206 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 207 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 213 ~ Duplicate;
Page 214 ~ Duplicate;
Page 215 ~ Duplicate;
Page 216 ~ Duplicate;
Page 217 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 218 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office ALEXANDRIA	Office of Origin ALEXANDRIA	Date 2/17/84	Investigation Period 8/29/83 - 2/10/84
Title of Case MAINFRAME		Report made by SA [redacted]	Typed By ga
		Character of Case FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY	

PROSECUTIVE

REFERENCE: Alexandria teletype to the Bureau dated 8/27/83.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This summary is organized into seven separate summaries to more clearly reflect the groups of subjects involved. Also, those summaries concerning juveniles were prepared separately in order to facilitate transmittal to local prosecutors.

Approved <i>[Signature]</i>	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces
Copies made: 2-Bureau 1-USA, Alexandria, Va. (Attn: AUSA [redacted]) 2-Alexandria (196A-633)		196-4713-32 15 FEB 23 1984

Notations:

"Copy of 196-4713-32"

57 FEB 28 1984

A*
COVER PAGE

35.) September 8, 1983, 3:21 PM. This message again uses the true name [] in referring to []

b6
b7C

36.) September 9, 1983, 8:32 AM.

37.) September 12, 1983, 12:40 PM.

38.) September 12, 1983, 4:34 PM.

39.) September 12, 1983, 9:28 PM.

40.) September 13, 1983, 10:13 AM.

41.) September 15, 1983, 1:45 PM. This message states "Well I figured out what [] did, and I found his new board. It is on this (a different company). We (not him) are now under Lincom, a division I created, so we are isolated (a little) from both the main co. and [] [] Talk to you later, []" This message indicates that [] has set up his own illegal node in a new company, [] and [] were previously illegal users in the legitimate user known as RADA.

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b7C

42.) September 15, 1983, 1:43 PM.

43.) September 16, 1983, 1:56 PM. This message refers to Pat (indicating his roommate []) and [] (indicating []).

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b7C

44.) September 16, 1983, 1:05 AM.

45.) September 16, 1983, 2:03 PM.

46.) September 18, 1983, 1:28 AM. This message again uses the true name [] and the true name []

b6
b7C

47.) September 18, 1983, 1:36 PM.

48.) September 18, 1983, 11:17 AM.

49.) September 19, 1983, 1:39 PM.

50.) September 20, 1983, 8:46 AM.

51.) September 20, 1983, 10:23 AM.

52.) September 20, 1983, 10:38 AM.

53.) September 20, 1983, 11:18 AM.

54.) September 20, 1983, 3:46 PM.

55.) September 20, 1983, 2:29 PM.

56.) September 21, 1983, 7:33 PM.

57.) September 22, 1983, 10:20 AM. This message states in part "Who knows, anyway we have been terrorizing the parking lot with the laser. [redacted] window has a good view of the parking lot, so we just aim it at peoples feet and they can't figure out what the hell is going on. The beam does diverge a little, for example, at 200 yards or so, it is about five inches wide. But it still gives a good effect."

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58.) September 22, 1983, 10:35 AM.

59.) September 22, 1983, 9:03 PM.

60.) September 23, 1983, 3:56 PM.

61.) September 24, 1983, 6:06 PM.

62.) September 26, 1983, 12:30 PM.

63.) September 27, 1983, 12:29 AM.

64.) September 27, 1983, 12:32 AM.

65.) September 28, 1983, 12:31 PM.

66.) September 29, 1983, 12:56 PM. This message states "[redacted] it looks like we had to move. [redacted] is [redacted] and can be sent mail. [redacted] is [redacted] password: Bright. Talk to you later. [redacted]" This indicates that these illegal users have now moved to yet a third company, 3M Corporation.

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b7C

67.) September 29, 1983, 2:58 PM.

68.) September 29, 1983, 3:11 PM.

- 69.) October 1, 1983, 10:29 PM.
- 70.) October 2, 1983, 3:04 PM.
- 71.) October 3, 1983, 12:33 AM. This message
uses the true name
- 72.) October 2, 1983, 3:11 PM.
- 73.) October 3, 1983, 1:20 PM.
- 74.) October 3, 1983, 4:47 PM.
- 75.) October 3, 1983, 7:28 PM.
- 76.) October 4, 1983, 2:21 PM.
- 77.) October 5, 1983, 12:27 PM.
- 78.) October 5, 1983, 4:52 PM.
- 79.) October 5, 1983, 12:32 PM.
- 80.) October 5, 1983, 5:06 PM.
- 81.) October 7, 1983, 1:04 AM.
- 82.) October 7, 1983, 8:40 AM.
- 83.) October 10, 1983, 1:30 PM.
- 84.) October 11, 1983, 2:14 PM.
- 85.) October 10, 1983, 1:54 PM.
- 86.) October 9, 1983, 1:55 PM.
- 87.) October 11, 1983, 2:02 PM.
- 88.) October 11, 1983, 1:58 PM.

b6
b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/18/84

The following is a summary of evidence obtained following a search of [redacted]. The following evidence is that which is related to [redacted].

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- (1) A green note paper with handwritten instructions on how to change passwords on a Telemail account.
- (2) A sheet of paper bearing the Telenet dial-up number [redacted] and a Telenet 800 number, 800424-9494.
- (3) A New York telephone bill for number [redacted], dated September 13, 1983. This bill contains numerous phone calls to area code [redacted] which is the home phone of [redacted] aka, [redacted].
- (4) This is a computer printout of all the administrators of Telemail customers.
- (5) This is a computer printout of numerous names and addresses beginning with [redacted].
- (6) This is a multi-page computer printout. On the back of the computer printout is found numerous handwritten user names associated with the illegal use of Telemail.
- (7) This is a Panasonic video cassette on which is taped the events at a picnic sponsored by [redacted] in [redacted] [redacted] aka, [redacted] attended this picnic. On this tape beginning at approximately counter number 42, the video tape camera is pointed toward [redacted] and the person taking the picture says, "There's [redacted] say yes." At that point, [redacted] replied, "Yes," and the camera pans away from him.

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b7Cb6
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Investigation on 12/23/83 at Alexandria, VA File # Alexandria
196A-633 Sub J
 by SA [redacted] plw Date dictated 12/23/83

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You can then hear [] say, "You misspelled
my name, it's [] then says,
[] is wanted by the FBI. No kidding!"

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b7C

nazareth

INCIDENT REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY AND SAFETY

COMPLAINT No. _____

PAGE _____ OF _____

NATURE OF INCIDENT Telephone Fraud Investigation			
DATE / TIME OCCURED 9-7-83(See Below)		DATE / TIME REPORTED 10-6-83 1100hrs	
NAME OF COMPLAINANT OR VICTIM Nazareth College of Rochester			
ADDRESS / STREET No. 4245 East Avenue			
CITY Rochester	STATE N.Y.	ZIP 14610	
HOME PHONE [REDACTED]	BUSINESS PHONE 586-2525	EXT. No. [REDACTED]	
SEX n/a	DATE OF BIRTH n/a	MONTH DAY YEAR	
PENAL LAW SECTION OR COLLEGE CODE			

TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN n/a	
EXACT LOCATION OF INCIDENT Smyth Hall, Rm#322, Math Labs.	
WITNESS(ES) NAME	
ADDRESS / STREET No.	PHONE
CITY	STATE ZIP
NAME OF PERSON ARRESTED OR SUSPECT	
ADDRESS / STREET No.	PHONE
CITY	STATE ZIP
DESCRIPTION	
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH MONTH DAY YEAR

NARRATIVE

(1) Summarize details of incident. (2) Describe physical evidence or property found and disposition. (3) Describe injuries, give Doctor's name, Hospital name, etc. (4) Description of suspects. (5) Names of additional witnesses.

[REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] had returned his monthly telephone bill for September, with questionable calls to six long distance locations, in and out of the country, not authorized by he or anyone in his department. The telephone number that the calls originated from are computer phones in the Math Lab. One private number is [REDACTED] and the other is [REDACTED]. The calls were made from the latter number. They are as follows:

- #1 - [REDACTED]
- #2 - [REDACTED]
- #3 - Prince George, British Columbia
- #4 - Prince George, British Columbia
- #5 - [REDACTED]
- #6 - Renner Texas

(See attached telephone bill)

The telephone calls were all made on Wednesday, September 7, 1983 between the hours of 2:44PM and 4:27PM while the math labs were open for use by students.

----- INVESTIGATION TO CONTINUE -----

P-29

REFERRED TO	<input type="checkbox"/> CIVIL AUTHORITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INTERNAL <input type="checkbox"/> NOT REQUIRED	221-
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT		

STATUS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED
DISTRIBUTION	[REDACTED]
REPORTING OFFICER	[REDACTED]
DATE	SEP 11 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY AND SAFETY
 COPIES NOT TO BE MADE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

INCIDENT REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY AND SAFETY

nazareth

Nazareth

SUPPLEMENTAL INCIDENT REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY AND SAFETY

COMPLAINT No. _____

PAGE _____ OF _____

NATURE OF INCIDENT

Telephone Fraud Investigation

DATE/TIME OCCURRED

9-7-83

DATE/TIME REPORTED

10-6-83 1100 hrs

NARRATIVE

(1) Summarize details of incident (2) Describe physical evidence or property found and disposition (3) Describe injuries, give Doctor's name, Hospital name, etc. (4) Description of suspects (5) Names of additional witnesses

10-7-83 It was learned that the call to _____ was listed to _____ residence and that a return call from that telephone number to a telephone number in _____ had been made. That number in _____ was _____ the residence of _____ of _____ who is listed as being employed by _____. Our records showed no prior enrollment with Nazareth, but _____

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It was thought that this subject was _____

----- INVESTIGATION TO CONTINUE -----

10-20-83/ Television station WOKR first broke the news that _____ of _____ in _____ had been questioned by FBI agents in Ithaca and computer equipment taken and confiscated from his room. This, according to the media coverage occurred on October 12, 1983 at _____. The students involved in this raid were thought to be a part of a nationwide ring who allegedly got into the Telemail computers in Alexandria, Va. (See Attached articles) I contacted Special Agent _____ of the Rochester Office of the FBI for further information as to the apprehension of _____ and also _____ at Cornell, who referred me to Special Agent _____ of the Ithaca Office of the FBI. Agent _____ (1-607-272-6424) described _____ as a nice kid, very cooperative, understanding, and stated that he had also spoken via telephone to the parents in _____ who were wonderful people. He stated the youth was not charged but the equipment was confiscated and that charges may be pressed in the future.

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Agent _____ suggested I talk to the parents and _____ and felt that he _____ would be cooperative should his attorney allow him to talk to me. _____ of our computer center in Smyth Hall basement and _____ along with _____ were both notified of the investigation.

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On this date, I telephoned _____ residence and spoke to _____ and later to _____. Both were cordial, though suspicious at first due to the calls from the media. They described their only son as a straight honest boy who didn't know he was committing any offense but was given the number by _____ in _____ who is a _____ computer whiz of sorts. _____ they stated has been _____

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b7C

_____ He was allegedly here over the summer to meet several friends. It would be impossible, according to _____ for _____ to have made the calls from our telephone in the Math Lab because _____

They agreed to have me talk to him later this month after the publicity

STATUS

☒ OPEN

☐ CLOSED

REPORTING OFFICER

BADGE No.

b6
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SUPPLEMENTAL INCIDENT REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY AND SAFETY

COMPLAINT No. [REDACTED]

PAGE [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED]

NATURE OF INCIDENT Telephone Fraud Investigation	
DATE / TIME OCCURED 9-7-83	DATE / TIME REPORTED 10-6-83 1100 hrs

NARRATIVE

(1) Summarize details of incident (2) Describe physical evidence or property found and disposition (3) Describe injuries, give Doctor's name, Hospital name, etc. (4) Description of suspects (5) Names of additional witnesses

subsidies. Both stated that he has cooperated fully with the FBI and according to Agt. [REDACTED] felt that he would cooperate with us.

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----- Investigation to Continue -----

The incomplete roster of those using the room on the date in question, showed the names of only four persons that afternoon, and they are:

[REDACTED] residing in [REDACTED] home address: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] home phone: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Residing in [REDACTED] home address - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Home phone [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] home address - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] home telephone - [REDACTED] DOB: [REDACTED] local list-
ings of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of the Admissions office is also taking a course but was not able to use the computer room that day, nor during business hours.

----- Investigation to Continue -----

Copies to:

[REDACTED]

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Special Agent [REDACTED] - Rochester FBI Office
Special Agent [REDACTED] - Ithaca FBI Office
with extra copy for Special Agent [REDACTED]
originating case agent in Alexandria, Virginia

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STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED	REPORTING OFFICER [REDACTED]	BADGE No. [REDACTED]
--	---------------------------------	-------------------------

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PAST DUE AMOUNT	TOTAL NEW CHARGES	PAY THIS AMOUNT	PLEASE PAY BY (SEE BACK OF BILL)
.00	53.00	53.00	OCT 14 1983

NAZARETH COLLEGE
4245 EAST AVE
ROCHESTER NY 14618

Dept.	Acct. #
APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT	
Dept. Head	Date
Comptroller	Date
Treasurer	Date
Paid	
Check #	
Date	

BALANCE FROM PREVIOUS BILL 08-19-83
MONTHLY SERVICE 09-19 THROUGH 10-18
62 METERED CALLS
GROSS REVENUE SURCHARGE

LONG DISTANCE CALLS

#	DATE	PLACE CALLED	NUMBER CALLED	TIME	MIN	R	CHARGE
1	0907			244P	9	0	4.16
2	0907			301P	23	0	14.43
3	0907	PRINCEGRGEB	604-562-9515	410P	1	0	.89
4	0907	PRINCEGRGEB	604-562-9515	411P	1	0	.89
5	0907			412P	3	0	1.14
6	0907	RENNER TX	214-931-3437	427P	1	0	.64

TOTAL LONG DISTANCE CHARGES
TOTAL TAXES FED .00 ST/LOCAL .00
PLEASE PAY THIS AMOUNT BY 10-14.

SEE REVERSE FOR INFORMATION ABOUT LONG DISTANCE CALLS,
PAYMENTS AND LATE PAYMENT CHARGES

 nazareth

#	Date	Place Called	Number Called & Party	Time	Min.	Charge	
1	9/7/83	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> (Non-Pub)	2:44P	9	\$4.16	b6 b7C
2.	9/7/83	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> Auxilliary line for <input type="text"/>	3:01P	23	\$14.43	b6 b7C
3.	9/7/83	Prince George, British Columbia	604-562-9515 Auxilliary Line for(562-9513) Native Court Records	4:10P	1	\$.89	
4.	9-7-83	Prince George, British Columbia	Same as above	4:11P	1	\$.89	
5.	9-7-83	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	4:12P	3	\$1.14	b6 b7C
6.	9-7-83	Renner, Texas (Auxilliary Number 931-3252)	214-931-3437 Helco Commodity Research Division of Clayton Brokerage Company of St. Louis	4:27P	1	\$.64	


TOTAL \$22.15

All calls placed on Wednesday, September 7, 1983 between 2:44PM and 4:27PM
from 586-4773 to the above numbers and listings.

~~F-33~~

225

STUDENT NO.



~~234~~

226

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT BEARS
SIGNATURE OF REGISTRAR

OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR
233 E. 4TH AVENUE

[Handwritten signature]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/9/84

The following is a summary of messages left on the GTE Telemail System by the illegal user [redacted]. The format of this summary will be as follows: The time and date of each message will be stated, with a synopsis of the message if it is deemed particularly significant or contains incriminating statements.

b6
b7C

1.) September 3, 1983, 1:34 PM (all times Eastern Daylight Time).

2.) September 5, 1983, 11:35 PM. Message reads: Harry, what do you think happened to [redacted]? Signed [redacted].

b6
b7C

3.) September 9, 1983, 9:37 AM.

4.) September 10, 1983, 12:31 PM.

5.) September 10, 1983, 12:33 PM.

6.) September 10, 1983, 7:08 PM.

7.) September 10, 1983, 9:23 PM.

8.) September 11, 1983, 1:19 AM. This message reads in part: "Also if you want to test out 2600 Hz, call [redacted]. There's a 'number changed' recording that you can cer-chunk off of if you want. Signed [redacted]."

b6
b7C

9.) September 26, 1983, 8:24 PM.

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 12/8/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/20/84

[redacted] a computer programmer, examined the floppy discs that were seized in the search of the room of [redacted] and [redacted] at [redacted]. [redacted] stated that all discs were examined and no information relating to GTE Telemail or other telecommunication services were found.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/17/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/17/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7C

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

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REPORT FORMS (FD-302's)

	<u>PAGE</u>
Summary of Activity - [REDACTED]	2
[REDACTED]	4
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[REDACTED]	9
Summary of Activity - [REDACTED]	10
[REDACTED]	11

b6
b7C

~~1~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/15/83

The following report is a summary of the activity of [redacted] on the GTE Telemail System. This same information also applies to the activities of [redacted] wife, [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] used the following user names on Telemail: [redacted]. The names [redacted] and [redacted] were illegal user names in the node called [redacted] RADA. The user names [redacted] and [redacted] were illegal user names in the illegal node [redacted] CBOT. [redacted] under these various user names left messages on the Telemail System from approximately August 30, 1983 - October 11, 1983.

b6
b7C

[redacted] used the names [redacted] and [redacted] while a user in the illegal node [redacted] RADA. She used the names [redacted] and [redacted] while a user in the illegal node called [redacted] CBOT.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is known to have access to Telemail System, using one of the above-mentioned user names, at least 91 times from August 30 - October 11, 1983.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is known to have access to Telemail System, using one of the above-mentioned user names, at least 133 times from August 30 - October 11, 1983.

b6
b7C

A review of the actual messages themselves shows that the names [redacted] and [redacted] occur with some frequency in messages left on the Telemail System by [redacted] [redacted], or one of the other user names identifiable with [redacted] and [redacted]

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On September 12, 1983, at 12:32 PM, [redacted] leaves a message for [redacted] on the Telemail System. This message states that Rochester Fire and Safety called and said that the oxygen was ready and the balance due was \$164. [redacted] Rochester Fire and Safety, was interviewed by agents of the FBI and he indicated that his records showed that on September 12, 1983, the home

b6
b7C

Investigation on 11/21/83 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 11/21/83

b6
b7C

number for [] was contacted to notify them that a respirator for [] mother was ready to be picked up. [] said that the telephone number [] was on the bill.

b6
b7C

[]
[]
[]

b6
b7C
b7E

On October 12, 1983, at the time of the search of his residence, [] furnished a signed statement admitting to accessing a "computer program" by calling the local Telenet dial-up number, typing the word "mail" and then entering a code word. [] however, declined to discuss the user names [] and [] or how he got access to the Telemail System. An FD-302 reflecting interview of [] dated October 12, 1983, indicates [] says he got the password for the Telemail account from []

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/19/83

[redacted] was interviewed at his residence [redacted]. He freely and voluntarily furnished the following signed statement:

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b7C

[redacted]
10/12/83
[redacted]

b6
b7C

"I [redacted] freely and voluntarily furnish the following information to SA [redacted] and [redacted].

"I was born [redacted] and have finished college in New England.

b6
b7C

"I have a personal computer that I use personally and professionally in my business. I have had a personal computer for about a year.

[redacted] is the number I use to access GTE Tele-net 716-454-1020 which I do often. I then access compuservice, dow jones, etc. Radio Shack, computer stores, will tell you how to use GTE Tele-net. In addition I had accessibility to a computer program that handled home messages by using tele-net 716-454-1020. Furthermore, this program was not created by myself or my wife. A message indicating "Mail" would allow entrance and code word would be entered.

b6
b7C

"We (my wife and I) would leave messages for each toher on the GTE Tele-Net both being at home, it was fun. On the advice of my attorney I, at this time do not wish to discuss [redacted] and [redacted] or how I got access to these accounts.

b6
b7C

"I had no idea what I did was a crime and will, with my attorney, discuss this with the government in the future.

"/s/ [redacted]
dated October 12, 1983 (CORR)


Investigation on 10/12/83 at [redacted]

File # 196A-633-63
196A-529

by SA [redacted]; SAA [redacted] and
SA [redacted] /JK; kah

Date dictated 10/13/83

b6
b7C



Witnesses:

[redacted] SA, FBI, 10/12/83, Rochester, NY
[redacted] Special Agent, FBI, 10/12/83, Rochester, NY
[redacted] SAA, FBI, 10/12/83, Rochester, NY

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b7C

In addition to the signed statement, he
furnished the following information:

He is employed at [redacted]

[Large redacted area]

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He did not know it was a crime to access GTE
Tele-Net. The telephone number in Rochester for Tele-Net
is 454-1020. He calls this number from his computer
system number which is a line in his telephone. He then
accesses the computer by using the name [redacted]
(phonetic) and thereafter uses a password that he gets
from a friend named [redacted] who got it from an
individual that [redacted] was hesitant to discuss. [redacted]
did mention [redacted] (phonetic) [redacted]

b6
b7C

During the conversation with [redacted] he often telephonically contacted his attorney, [redacted] and [redacted] associate [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] indicated that he would be glad to cooperate in the future with any investigation and that all he wanted was his computer back since he did not know he was committing any crime.

He stated that telephone [redacted] in [redacted] is a telephone number for an individual [redacted] This is some type of college campus and information is available from something called a freak board and through this number information can be given on how to build "black boxes" to access all kinds of sophisticated computer systems.

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b7C

[redacted] gave this as an example of the type of information he has available and is willing to provide the government, through his attorney.

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/2/84

The following is a summary of the activity of [redacted] on GTE telemail.

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b7C

[redacted] used the names [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] were illegal nicknames in the company called RADA. [redacted] was his user name in the company, CBOT, and [redacted] was his user name in MMM Company. [redacted] was also [redacted].

b6
b7C

[redacted] is known to have accessed the telemail system, using one of the above-mentioned aliases, approximately 170 times, from approximately August 30, 1983, through October 10, 1983.

b6
b7C

[redacted] was initially a member of the group known as [redacted] (Short for [redacted]), which was run by [redacted] aka, [redacted]. He later became [redacted] of a group known as LINCOM in CBOT.

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b7C

A review of the actual messages shows that the true names [redacted] and [redacted] occur with some frequency in the messages. A review of trap and trace records provided by [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] Of these, 57 can be matched with telemail logs showing [redacted] using one of his aliases, actually entering the telemail computer.

b7E
b6
b7C

On October 12, 1983, at the time of the search of his room, [redacted] stated that he guessed the search was due to his telemail computer contacts he made from his room.

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b7C

Investigation on 1/30/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633

by SA [redacted] smbe Date dictated 1/30/84

b6
b7C

A review of the paper evidence seized during the search revealed among other things, hand written instructions on how to change passwords on a telemail account, and "user names" identical to those used to illegally access telemail.

On October 12, 1983, [redacted], another subject in this matter, said he got the password for his telemail account from [redacted]

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription October 21, 1983

[redacted]
[redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent as Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ithaca, New York. [redacted] was shown a copy of the search warrant for [redacted] which he read and stated he had no questions. [redacted] was asked if he had any idea what the basis of the search warrant was and he stated that he guessed that it would be concerning Telenet and Tele-mail Computer contacts that he had made from [redacted] was asked how he had heard of these computer services and he stated he learned of them from [redacted] by the name of [redacted] who is also known to him as [redacted] who resides in [redacted] [redacted] stated that he first became familiar with [redacted] by way of computer approximately one year ago. [redacted] further advised that [redacted]

b6
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[redacted] is described as follows:

Height:
Weight:
Race:
Complexion:
Date-of-birth:
Education:

Home address:
Home telephone number:
College number:

b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/12/83 at [redacted] File # AL 196A-677 -22
by SA [redacted] ed *Pat* Date dictated 10/14/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/2/84

The following is a summary of the activity of [redacted] on GTE telemail:

[redacted] used the name [redacted] in a company called RADA and [redacted] in a company called CBOT.

b6
b7C

[redacted] accessed the telemail system using one of these two names, approximately 19 times, from approximately September 3, 1983, to September 29, 1983.

b6
b7C

[redacted] initially was a member of [redacted] RADA, then was a member of [redacted] CBOT.

A review of trap and trace records provided that

[redacted]
[redacted] Of these, 11 can be matched with telemail logs showing [redacted] accessing the telemail system.

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b7C
b7E

On October 12, 1983, during the search of [redacted] [redacted] told FBI agents that [redacted] [redacted] had been using telemail to communicate with friends in Rochester, New York.

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b7C

Investigation on 1/30/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] mbe Date dictated 1/30/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription October 21, 1983

[redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent as Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ithaca, New York, at 9:10AM. [redacted] was furnished a copy of the search warrant for [redacted], which he read and stated that he understood and had no questions. [redacted] was advised that he could observe the search if he cared to but because of the small size of the room was advised to stay in the doorway so as to not interfere with the search. [redacted] stated he understood, was going to make a telephone call, and then except that invitation to remain in the doorway to observe the search. [redacted] stated he did not know the basis for the search. He did advise that [redacted] had been using a computer service called Telemail to communicate with friends in Rochester, New York.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is described as follows:

Height:
Weight:
Race:
Complexion:
Date-of-birth:
Education:

Home address:

Home telephone number:
College number:

b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/12/83 at [redacted] File # AL 196A-677

by SA [redacted] ed Date dictated 10/14/83

b6
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PROSECUTIVE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING

[REDACTED] also known as
[REDACTED]
FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY

b6
b7C

Copy to: 1 - USA, Alexandria, Va.
(Attn: AUSA [REDACTED])

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

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AX 196A-633

NAME OF DEFENDANT:

described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Height
Weight
Social Security
Account Number
Address

☐

Yes old

b6
b7c

AX 196A-633

PROSECUTIVE STATUS:

1. On August 30, 1983, the available facts in this matter were presented to Elsie Munsell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, who advised she would consider prosecution in the matter.

2. On October 12, 1983, the premises located at [REDACTED] was searched pursuant to a duly authorized federal search warrant and various computer paraphenalia were seized.

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~~D-1~~

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AX 196A-633

WITNESSES:

1.

[REDACTED]

GTE Telemail
8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia
Telephone [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Can provide details of GTE Telemail operations, methods of detecting unauthorized users and procedures for obtaining print-outs of customer messages.

2.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6
b7C

Can supply details of investigation.

3.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Oklahoma City

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4.

[REDACTED]

Can provide testimony that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are the same, as well as information about [REDACTED] use of the Telemail System.

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b7C

Full text of interview pages 3 - 6, attached.

~~21~~

AX 196A-633

5.

[Redacted]

Can identify [Redacted] as [Redacted] and provide
information about [Redacted] use of the Telemail.

Full text of interview page 7, attached.

b6
b7C

6.

[Redacted]

Can identify [Redacted] as [Redacted] and provide
information about [Redacted] use of Telemail.

Full text of interview pages 8 - 10, attached.

b6
b7C

~~E-2~~

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AX 196A-633

EVIDENCE:

1. Summary of 65 messages left on Telemail by [redacted]
(originals in possession of [redacted]
[redacted], GTE Telemail).

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b7C

2. Report with attached inventory of items seized
in search.

3. Two reports summarizing relevant items found
in search (originals in possession of FBI Alexandria).

4. List of charges attributable to [redacted] aka
[redacted] (original in possession of [redacted]).

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b7C

5. A Panasonic Video Cassette on which [redacted] identifies
himself, then says "You misspelled my name, it's [redacted].
[redacted] is wanted by the FBI. No kidding!" (original
in possession of FBI Alexandria).

6. Summary of trap and trace information received
from [redacted]

b7E

~~PI~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 12/15/83

The following is a summary of message left by the illegal user using the name [redacted] and [redacted] on GTE Telemail.

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The date and time of each message is provided with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

- 1) August 28, 1983, 9:36 p.m. (All times are Eastern Daylight Time) This message reads as follows:
[redacted] ..I have found a few administrator accounts. Please fill me in on how to do the dialogue with the reg user, etc. etc. commands...and any advice, any advice you may have for going as undetected as possible. Thanks, [redacted]
- 2) August 28, 1983, 11:31 p.m.
- 3) August 29, 1983, 11:06 p.m. This message reads, "Hello welcome to [redacted] on Telemail! This bulletin board service is to be used to communicate with other [redacted] network users. Current members are: [redacted]
[redacted]
If you would like to have new users added, contact the Administrator, [redacted], by sending a message to Admin, [redacted]. Later, [redacted]"
- 4) August 29, 1983, 11:16 p.m. This message reads in part, "Please refrain from the use of real names or obvious tip-offs while using [redacted] private mail, or any other communications on Telemail. Please use general information only. Use obvious information at your own risk. Thank you, [redacted] Administrator."
- 5) August 29, 1983, 11:23 p.m.
- 6) August 29, 1983, 11:24 p.m.
- 7) August 30, 1983, 12:59 a.m.
- 8) August 30, 1983, 8:33 a.m.
- 9) August 30, 1983, 3:30 a.m.
- 10) August 30, 1983, 4:04 a.m.
- 11) August 30, 1983, 8:24 a.m.
- 12) August 30, 1983, 8:32 a.m.
- 13) August 30, 1983, 5:40 p.m.

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 12/9/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :btl

Date dictated 12/9/83

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b7C

AX 196A-633

Continuation of interview of

or

Page 2

b6
b7c

- 14) August 30, 1983, 5:54 p.m.
- 15) August 30, 1983, 10:57 p.m.
- 16) August 31, 1983, 5:33 a.m.
- 17) August 31, 1983, 5:35 a.m.
- 18) August 31, 1983, 11:14 a.m.
- 19) August 31, 1983, 1:47 a.m.
- 20) August 31, 1983, 5:04 a.m.
- 21) August 31, 1983, 5:14 a.m.
- 22) August 31, 1983, 5:37 a.m.
- 23) August 31, 1983, 5:40 a.m.
- 24) August 31, 1983, 6:08 a.m.
- 25) August 31, 1983, 6:26 a.m.
- 26) August 31, 1983, 6:26 a.m.
- 27) September 1, 1983, 8:31 a.m. This message reads in part, "Oh, by the way, a reporter for a newspaper is coming here today to interview me on computer theft. I'm afraid I'm going to have to disappoint him when I tell him that I really know nothing about it. (Ha!) Later, [redacted]"
- 28) September 1, 1983, 7:25 a.m.
- 29) September 1, 1983, 1:01 p.m. This message reads in part, "I'm real sorry about screwing you up with those accounts under RADA. It's just that according to [redacted], Telemail will make drastic changes to the entire system if they realize an infiltration of any size of unauth. users...especially after the god damn media blitz about the 414's." b6
b7c
- 30) September 1, 1983, 1:50 p.m.
- 31) September 1, 1983, 12:56 p.m. In this message, [redacted] states that he has obtained the dial up access number for Long Distance Savers, Inc. and has hacked out a customers code. He also indicates that he has used this code to make illegal long distance phone calls.
- 32) September 1, 1983, 1:25 p.m.
- 33) September 1, 1983, 1:27 p.m.
- 34) September 1, 1983, 6:08 p.m.
- 35) September 1, 1983, 6:12 p.m.
- 36) September 1, 1983, 1:28 p.m.
- 37) September 2, 1983, 9:26 a.m.
- 38) September 1, 1983, 9:03 p.m. This message is to [redacted] and reads as follows, [redacted] thanks for the info. Will try it out next time I get on a DEC-10. I'll dump those hacking programs to you here in Telemail if you have a terminal program b6
b7c

AX 196A-633

Continuation of interview of

or

Page 3

b6
b7C

capable of data capturing and saving to disc. Then you just unload it in and save it back out again, this time it will be saved in the non-ASCII compressed format which loads faster. Later [] "

- 39) September 3, 1983, 8:13 p.m. This message reads as follows, "Dial, the following Sprint Code is a business Sprint account. As such it will go anywhere in the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii. It also may go to Canada, although I haven't tested it. The Code is 54830522. Use this code only for calls that you can't make with ordinary Sprint. I'd also suggest that you first dial a city such as Saint Louis or Chicago, then use this Sprint Code from there to place your call. Please don't use Oklahoma City. Please consult the Sprint Directory I sent you to randomly select a large city to route through. Thanks []"
- 40) September 4, 1983, 11:31 p.m.
 41) September 4, 1983, 11:34 p.m.
 42) September 6, 1983, 7:07 p.m.
 42) September 7, 1983, 3:42 p.m.
 43) September 8, 1983, 1:14 a.m.
 44) September 8, 1983, 4:40 a.m.
 45) September 9, 1983, 11:06 a.m.
 46) September 8, 1983, 2:16 p.m.
 47) September 9, 1983, 2:15 a.m.
 48) September 10, 1983, 10:55 p.m.
 49) September 12, 1983, 1:19 a.m.
 50) September 12, 1983, 1:20 a.m.
 51) September 12, 1983, 7:11 a.m.
 52) September 12, 1983, 12:44 p.m.
 53) September 13, 1983, 12:49 a.m.
 54) September 13, 1983, 12:01 p.m. This message is from [] to all [] Members. The subject of the message is "Be careful." The message is as follows:

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"The following forwarded notice is an example of the ways that one can easily be detected if hacking Telemail...and he does not know what he's doing! So please take heed of the fact illustrated by this letter that it is important that you don't do anything strange like changing your name and your directory file to read something like Adam and the Ants or something like that which would be rather obvious. So please unless you know what you are doing don't phuck around with Telemail, other than the use of

-End-

AX 196A-633

Continuation of interview of _____

or _____

Page 4

your account to check and send mail to _____
and the users of _____ Thank you, _____
_____ Admin." This is followed by a forwarded
message from _____ (aka _____) con-
cerning how Telemail bills their customers.

b6
b7C

- 55) September 13, 1983, 12:09 p.m.
- 56) September 13, 1983, 1:04 p.m.
- 57) September 13, 1983, 12:49 a.m.
- 58) September 13, 1983, 2:57 a.m.
- 59) September 13, 1983, 2:40 p.m.
- 60) September 13, 1983, 3:59 p.m.
- 61) September 13, 1983, 8:14 p.m.
- 62) September 14, 1983, 9:51 a.m.
- 63) September 14, 1983, 1:39 p.m.
- 64) September 14, 1983, 5:53 p.m.
- 65) September 20, 1983, 6:15 p.m.

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription December 7, 1983

The authority of a search warrant issued in the Western District of Oklahoma by United States Magistrate Ronald L. Howland, a search of a residence known as [REDACTED] was conducted. Attached is a copy of the receipt and inventory of the items seized pursuant to the search warrant. A copy of the receipt and inventory was furnished to [REDACTED] who was present during part of the search and was present at the conclusion of the search. This inventory was made in the presence of [REDACTED] and his son, [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

196-633

Investigation on 10/12/83 at [REDACTED] File # Oklahoma City 196A-1270
by SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED] JRD:krl Date dictated 10/12/83

b6
b7C

The following items have been received: From living Room & Kitchen:

Box containing:

1. mailing machine
2. sack containing address labels
3. Radio Shack Modem IITM 000067
4. ⁴⁸four manila envelopes containing miscellaneous papers
5. USER'S Manual for computer

From [redacted] bedroom:

6. box containing magnetic (floppy) discs
7. envelope bearing label [redacted]

b6
b7c

containing papers

8. TRSDOS & DISK Basic Reference Manual
9. ^{9a-c}three manila envelopes containing miscellaneous papers from Bedroom
10. large roll of blueprints
11. Box containing miscellaneous papers
12. "Blue Box"
13. TRS 80 Micro Computer System
SN 047526
14. Video Display - TRS 80 (TV Monitor)
SN torn off Model 26-1201
15. Radio Shack TRS 80 Expansion Interface
SN 070671
16. Smart Modem SN 152094024
17. Radio Shack TRS-80 Line Printer III
SN 020497
18. ^{18aB}Two disk drive (units)
19. Radio Shack TR 80 Plug N Power
Controller SN PP-0019146
20. ^{20aB}Two Radio Shack power supplies
21. cable for disk drive
22. X papers from luncheon table under kitchen table
23. ^{23aB}Two telephones, ^{24.}two 400D KTY units, 400H KTY,
one Sandbar 4000F, ^{25.}one sheet of paper,
26. Bag containing misc papers & printed circuit board
27. envelope ~~attached~~ containing two disks
in disk drive at time of search.

This is continued from page one, and final page
Items listed on page one
were the items seized by
Special Agents of the FBI pursuant
to a search warrant issued
in the Western Dist of Okla. for
address known as [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] on 10/12/83.
Items as listed on previous
page were the only items
seized by Agents at time of
search.

The above list and inventory was read
by [redacted] who declined to
sign. ~~the~~ receipt. The inventory was kept
in the [redacted] in the [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] Special Agent Gm
11. 10/12/83
[redacted] SA, FBI, OK
10/12/83

Added in Agent of the receipt and inventory
was kept with [redacted]

b6
b7C

JKN 10/12/83
CHB 10/12/83 SA FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/7/83

The following is a review of evidence seized pursuant to a duly authorized Federal Search Warrant, executed at the premises known as [REDACTED]
This is the residence of [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

The following is a summary of evidence relevant to this investigation:

- 1) A white 3 x 5 card with numerous user names and passwords. The computer system is unknown.
- 2) An 8 x 10 printed pamphlet with the title, "Free Long Distance" with numerous references to MCI codes and Sprint codes.
- 3) A mailing envelope addressed to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 4) A printout with the name [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 5) Envelope with numerous addresses on mailing labels, including the name, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 6) A printout on silver paper with numerous listings including, "Introduction to Telenet," Blue Box Operation, and containing numerous Sprint access numbers.
- 7) Paper with instructions on computer systems known as, "DEC 10, and DEC 20, containing instructions about access in the system and passwords.
- 8) A long printout containing numerous first names, followed by, "Interests."
- 9) A printout that refers to a prime computer.

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 11/10/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [REDACTED] /DE:mb Date dictated 11/10/83

b6
b7C

- 10) A scrap of paper with numerous names and phone numbers, not identical to any known subjects.
- 11) A printout of "Bulletin Boards in North America" including, Telenet numbers and Telenet System Commands.
- 12) A green envelope addressed to [redacted]
[redacted]
This envelope contains a handwritten note, [redacted]
[redacted] called. He says its better to send the tapes by USPS rather than UPS." b6 b7C
- 13) Two copies of a "Revised Telenet Phone Number Guide."
- 14) A two page photo copy of "Revised Tymnet Phone Numbers."
- 15) Four copies of "Uninet Network Access Phone Numbers."
- 16) Two copies of a letter to [redacted], from the office of Legal Counsel, University of Oklahoma, dated September 30, 1982. This letter is in reference to the termination of the lease at [redacted]. The letter mentions in part, "You have willingly and knowingly allowed your son, [redacted], to operate a computer business from this premise." b6 b7C
- 17) A printout entitled, "All About User-Publishing."
- 18) Two copies of a printout entitled, [redacted] [redacted] Mailing List." b6 b7C
- 19) One copy of "Sprint Access Numbers."
- 20) A printout with various names and user identification numbers, none of which are identical to known subjects in this matter.
- 21) A typewritten paper titled, "Macrohost Commands-[redacted] is [redacted]." b6 b7C
- 22) Mailing envelope addressed to [redacted], containing a floppy disk labeled, "All ST80 Modules, plus Non Com/ctl."
- 23) Printout titled, "Connected to the Source" with a message on that printout from [redacted]. b6 b7C

- 24) A computer printout with a message from [redacted] on it. b6 b7C
- 25) A printout indicating a connection to the source, with a message from "[redacted]". b6 b7C
- 26) A printout again showing a connection to the source.
- 27) A forty-seven page copy of a pamphlet, indicating various ways to cheat the phone company.
- 28) A typewritten paper called, "Scanning for Codes on the Northern Telecom Switching System" by [redacted] [redacted]. This paper describes how to obtain Sprint codes. b6 b7C
- 29) A typewritten brochure on, "Picking Ward Locks."
- 30) A typewritten brochure on, "Picking Other Types of Locks."
- 31) A typewritten brochure on, "Phone Operations."
- 32) A printout that is a letter from [redacted] soliciting a computer bulletin board ad. On this printout, he gives his home phone number and address. b6 b7C
- 33) A printout with a message from, [redacted] containing codes for extending 800 numbers. b6 b7C
- 34) An 8 x 10 sheet of paper with various 800 numbers written on it.
- 35) A printout with source accounts and passwords. This printout also contains a message from [redacted] and [redacted]. In this message, [redacted] refers to his "real identity" and to the fact that he believes "law enforcement" is watching him. b6 b7C
- 36) A handwritten questionnaire about bulletin boards, including the question, "Would you participate in a secure, private, freak bulletin board on the source?"
- 37) A piece of cardboard containing a mailing label indicating the object was mailed from [redacted] to [redacted] was a subject of a search in [redacted] in this matter. b6 b7C

- 38) A Sprint bill addressed to [redacted], and dated December, 1982, in the amount of \$572.00. b6 b7C
- 39) A printout with numerous names and identification numbers on them, none identical with subjects in this case.
- 40) A typewritten paper mentioning "USEMC-BBS."
- 41) A printout of a message from [redacted], asking for information on how to hack a prime terminal. b6 b7C
- 42) A "Temporary Users Guide to the United States Electronic Mail Center" dated August, 1983.
- 43) A printout with a message from [redacted] about accessing the computer at the University of Kentucky. b6 b7C
- 44) A printout with a message from [redacted] - [redacted] and [redacted] in reference to accessing a computer at Boystown. b6 b7C
- 45) A printout from [redacted] referencing a Telemail Account.
- 46) A white piece of paper with the words, [redacted] and the name [redacted]. This white paper also contains the address, [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 47) A paper with the name, [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 48) A printout with various MCI access codes listed.
- 49) A handwritten letter from [redacted], aka [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 50) Newspaper article with picture of [redacted]. Included in the text is the quote, as follows "Modem users are required by Federal law to register their modems."
- 51) Envelope addressed to [redacted] from [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 52) Letter from [redacted] to the Office of Legal Counsel, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.

- 53) A letter from [redacted] to [redacted] in reference to legal action against the phone company in reference to Modem charges. b6 b7C
- 54) Printout of message on "CompuServe" from [redacted] listing a return address of [redacted] b6 b7C
- 55) Printout of program to a bulletin board established by [redacted], called "USEMC of Norman, Oklahoma." b6 b7C
- 56) A printout of messages from the Osuny Bulletin Board. In this message, [redacted] talks about Chicago. b6 b7C
- 57) A printout with messages about MCI access codes, source accounts, etc.
- 58) Is a printout containing a message from [redacted]. Within the message is the statement, "A remailing service is now available exclusively for members. If you need to leave your address for illicit purposes, you may leave a Post Office Box in [redacted] [redacted] and your mail will be forwarded to you first class for the cost of postage, plus fifty percent." It continues "If you are interested, write [redacted] [redacted]" b6 b7C
- 59) A printout with a list of names, each name preceded with the words, User ID: and then the numbers 1,1. These numbers continue down to user ID: 1,93. The names [redacted] and [redacted] appear on that list. b6 b7C
- 60) A computer printout beginning, "Dear Fellow Modem User, and continuing with the statement that if a person wants additional information on how to avoid paying the extra charge for a modem, they can write to the address, [redacted] and the number is [redacted] (which appears to be a compuserve account.) The return address also has the telephone number [redacted]-Voice; [redacted]-300Boud. These telephone numbers are followed by the address, [redacted] [redacted] b6 b7C
- 61) A copy of a page out of a book titled, "Revised Telenet Phone Numbers."

- 62) A printout containing a message from the Telemail Account of [redacted] to [redacted]. The text of this message says "I can only get the quick reference booklets at this point. They are about ten pages each. I can xerox important admin functions also." The message continues "telephone [redacted] Name: 53552, Password: 426," and then the message continues, "and leave address there. OK? Take it easy, signed [redacted]" This sheet of paper also has handwritten notes containing the name, [redacted], and the number [redacted]. It also has the name, [redacted] number [redacted] and the number [redacted]
- 63) Four pages of typewritten material, beginning with the words, "The Electronic Mail System." The fourth page of this document is titled, "Calling Through Sprint" and suggests that if you have called the Osuny Bulletin Board, that "Your number is probably being traced." This article also states that this bulletin board is in fact, [redacted] which was the illegal account that [redacted] had created on Telemail.
- 64) A typewritten page with one paragraph entitled, "To Get A Free Telset From Bell." This paragraph gives you details about how to obtain a person's actual number of extensions in his home and then call the local phone store pretending to be that person, and arranging to get an extension that the innocent person will be charged for.
- 65) A printed sheet of paper titled, "Maxhost/Cmd by [redacted]"
- 66) A computer printout beginning with the words, The USEMC V. 6.0, copyright 1983, [redacted]
- 67) A copy of two pages labeled, "Local Telephone Numbers for Access to the Sprint Network."
- 68) A sheet of paper with numerous telephone numbers in Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, St. Louis, North Carolina, Hawaii, and Texas, written on it.
- 69) A computer printout with numerous messages referring to obtaining Sprint codes.

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

- 70) A computer printout containing the message number 8: titled, "To Find Telenet, Dial your local Access Number, then at the @ sign, type in MAIL.
- 71) A computer printout with the handwritten word, [redacted], followed by the address, [redacted]
[redacted] b6
b7C
- 72) A series of pages titled, "The United States Electronic Mail Center - Version 6.0 Users Manual, Summer of 1983." This typewritten page contains the words, "The USEMC-DBS-300Boud-[redacted]
[redacted] Copyright 1983, by [redacted] b6
b7C
- 73) A computer printout containing the names of numerous administrators for Telemail Accounts. Handwritten above these names are the words, "Checked September 12-13, 1983.
- 74) A computer printout with numerous user names followed by the words, "User ID: and a number, followed by a second number. The names [redacted] and [redacted], as well as [redacted] appear in these names. b6
b7C
- 75) A computer printout from the Telemail System. The message is from [redacted] to [redacted]. The message states to go undetected in the system, use a regular user name, such as [redacted] or other names that are common. The message continues and lists commands that administrators of accounts can use. b6
b7C
- 76) A computer printout with two messages. The first message says, "Here are the dial up to the NIH computers!" It then lists the dial up numbers for three National Institutes of Health computers. A second message is from Jupiter FBN. The message says, "Here is an Arpanet access number, 800/638-4870. It is a TAC computer (Military Network). Don't abuse it because I desperately need that Watts line for communication."
- 77) A computer printout listing a number of host systems on Telenet. Following the listing of about twenty companies, is the statement, "I thought I would post these because they might be interesting because they are located in Canada. Signed [redacted]
[redacted]. Followed by the words, "The inner circle." b6
b7C

- 78) Two typewritten pages titled, "The Telephone Connection Premiere Issue, February, 1983." The article discusses among other things, [redacted] Security on CompuServe, and Telephone Tracing, and Sprint. b6 b7C
- 79) A computer printout with the words, "Dial up - (202)695-0441, followed by the word, password - DARCOM. Followed by the words, "For an outside line, simply say, outside line, you must first specify "Routine Traffic." These are instructions for someone to illegally access the military's autovon system.
- 80) Two pictures of a computer setup, taken in December of 1982. This appears to be the computer setup of [redacted] b6 b7C
- 81) A computer printout with numerous listings as follows: "MCI found at: and access code and the local MCI dial up." Also found on this computer printout, is the telephone [redacted] and the word, [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 82) A copy of a sheet of paper, titled "Uninet Network Access Phone Numbers by States." This sheet of paper bears the initials, [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 83) A letter addressed to [redacted] from [redacted] [redacted] Counsel for the source. The letter states, "As we discussed, enclosed is a STC subscriber agreement." The letter then continues, "I look forward to hearing from you on the source regarding the Oklahoma modem charge." b6 b7C
- 84) A three page typewritten letter beginning, "Thank you for your interest in the USEMC-BBS [redacted]" and signed by [redacted] b6 b7C
- 85) A typewritten pamphlet entitled, "The United States Electronic Mail Center, Revision 6.0, Temporary Users Guide, September, 1983."
- 86) A computer printout containing what appear to be the names of the administrators of various Telenet/Telemail Account holders.
- 87) A long computer printout referring to requests by [redacted] to other bulletin board users to give him stolen Sprint account codes, because he is on his last one. b6 b7C

- 88) Audio cassette with the words phone and the number [redacted]. On this tape, [redacted] is talking to another person on the phone. They make up a fictitious name and [redacted] makes a collect phone call to that name to see if the call can actually be made. The call is to a place called Death Valley Junction, and the phone number is 2. b6 b7C
- 89) A copy of a Sprint Travel Card bearing the name [redacted], and numerous Sprint access codes and Metro phone access codes written on it. b6 b7C
- 90) A white card bearing numerous Sprint codes and the "date found" and the initials of people that he gave the Sprint codes to.
- 91) A white sheet of paper bearing numerous Sprint codes.
- 92) A sheet of paper bearing the words, [redacted] b6 b7C
- 93) Part of a Southwestern Bell phone bill, dated August 21, 1983, for phone number [redacted]. It contains a bill for a call to number (914)725-4060, which is the Osuny Bulletin Board. b6 b7C
- 94) A subscriber form for long distance savers, with the salesperson's name listed as, [redacted]. The subscriber's name is [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 95) A sheet of paper bearing the name, [redacted]. Two telephone numbers are next to the name, as follows: [redacted] and [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 95) A typed sheet of paper, "Prepared by [redacted]," which lists instructions for creating a red box, which appears to allow you to fake the sound of coins dropping into a coin phone. b6 b7C
- 96) A computer printout with a list of the following names: [redacted] and [redacted]. This sheet of paper also has in handwritten form, the name, [redacted] and the number [redacted]. Next to this, is written the name [redacted]. The number [redacted] is also written on the paper. b6 b7C

- 97) A computer printout with the names, [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted] b6
b7C
- 98) A computer printout of one hundred and ninety-three names, beginning with the name [redacted] and the password, Video. b6
b7C
- 99) A computer printout bearing the handwritten words, [redacted] and [redacted] b6
b7C
- 100) A white piece of heavy paper, bearing approximately twenty names and passwords. The third name down is [redacted] with a password Arpanet. b6
b7C
- 101) A telephone bill for telephone number [redacted] dated July 21, 1983. The following numbers are frequently called: [redacted]
[redacted] b6
b7C
- 102) A computer printout from [redacted] says he would be a "willing student," referring to the use of MCI, Sprint, Compuserve, and the Source. [redacted] gives his address as [redacted]
[redacted] b6
b7C
- 103) A computer printout with a message from a Telemail account, from [redacted] to [redacted]. This message discusses an 800 number used to access Arpanet. b6
b7C
- 104) A computer printout listing the users of GTE. This list also has handwritten next to the user's name, what appear to be passwords.
- 105) A telemail message, dated Thursday, September 1, 1983, from [redacted] to [redacted]. The message concerns how to use a computer system known as DEC-10. b6
b7C
- 106) A white sheet of paper with handwritten notes on it. The notes show the name [redacted] and the word Neal, next to the word [redacted]. Neal was [redacted]
[redacted] password on Telemail. These notes also include the name [redacted] and the term BIZCOMP. These are both user names and an account name that were used on Telemail. This sheet of paper also bears the name [redacted] and the address [redacted]
[redacted] was one of the frequent illegal users of Telemail. b6
b7C

- 7 — 107) A computer printout bearing one hundred and forty-three names and home phone numbers of various computer hackers.
- 108) A pink sheet of paper with the term, Ohio Scientific Users Group, and the number [redacted] on it. This sheet of paper also contains words, "Death Valley Junction, California." It also contains the phone numbers [redacted] and [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 109) A white sheet of paper bearing the name [redacted] Underneath that is the word, [redacted], and the number [redacted] and [redacted]. This sheet of paper also bears the address, [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 110) A sheet of note paper bearing the name [redacted] [redacted], and telephone number [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 111) A sheet of paper bearing the term, "The United States Electronic Mail Center, August, 1983. It also bears the name [redacted] and the name [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 112) A typewritten booklet starting with the words, "This is the book on cheating the phone company."
- 113) A typewritten booklet that begins with the words, "This is the paper on picking lever locks."
- 114) A typewritten booklet that begins with the words, "This is the book on padlocks."
- 115) A computer printout with one of the messages being to [redacted] from [redacted]. Content of the message is, "Last night I logged into Telemail and logged out to log in as another user. P.S. I was using the 800 number." b6 b7C
- 116) A computer printout beginning with the words, "Codebreaker for the Hayes Smartmodem. The second line bears the name [redacted]. b6 b7C
- 117) A computer printout with a message from [redacted] to [redacted]. The message states that the main reason [redacted] is writing [redacted] is so that [redacted] can look at this Telenet address: 301162. b6 b7C

AX 196A-633

12

- 118) A blue homemade box containing a touchtone keyboard with wires exiting from the box.

~~4E-20~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/16/84

A review of the evidence seized pursuant to a Federal search warrant executed at [redacted], the residence of [redacted], revealed the following items of interest:

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b7C

- 1.) A san/bar 400 F "relay circuit" that is labelled "property of the Bell System".
- 2.) Two 400D KTU "relay board" also labelled "property of the Bell System".
- 3.) A circuit board labelled 400 H KTU, also labelled "property of the Bell System".

Investigation on 1/10/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/16/84

[redacted], a computer programmer, examined the computer equipment seized in the search of [redacted] [redacted], the residence of [redacted]

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[redacted] found that the "disk interface" had arrived in a "non-operative" condition. [redacted] stated that the disk interface had been modified and that without that particular interface or one that had been similarly modified, none of the disks could be interpreted.

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Investigation on 1/10/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

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Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	CAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
.....			
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
.....			
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/15/84

Review of [redacted]
[redacted] pursuant to a federal grand jury
subpoena showed that [redacted]

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Further, GTE Telemail records show [redacted]
accessing the telemail system at 12:31 a.m. Eastern
Daylight Time through telenet dial-in number 405-232-4546.

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Copies of [redacted]
trap and trace computer printouts and a hand-written
explanation provided by [redacted] are attached
to and incorporated within this report.

b7E

Investigation on 2/2/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
Sub D
by SA [redacted] :trc Date dictated 2/2/84

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

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FOR REPORT FORMS (FD-302's)

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[REDACTED]	3
[REDACTED]	7
[REDACTED]	8
[REDACTED]	11

b6
b7c

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/15/84

The following is a summary of the activities of [redacted] aka [redacted] on GTE Telemail.

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b7C

[redacted] used the alias [redacted] AND [redacted] on GTE Telemail.

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[redacted] was the person responsible for creating an illegal "node" called [redacted] (short for [redacted]) in RADA COMPANY. This illegal group has 26 different user names registered. Each of these users was therefore able to illegally access the telemail system.

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[redacted] later created an illegal "node" call [redacted]/CBOT in the company CBOT. This node had five illegal users registered in it. Finally, [redacted] created an illegal "node" called [redacted] MMM in the MMM COMPANY. This illegal "node" had five illegal users registered in it.

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[redacted] is known to have accessed the telemail system in excess of 65 times between August 28, 1983, and September 20, 1983.

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Trap and trace records of [redacted] [redacted] show that [redacted]
[redacted]
Further, GTE records show [redacted] entering the telemail system during that same time frame.

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b7C

Investigation on 2/2/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
Sub D

by SA [redacted] :trc Date dictated 2/2/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7C

1*

Date of transcription December 7, 1983

At 8:15 a.m., agents of the FBI knocked on the front door of a residence known as [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In their possession at the time was a search warrant issued in the Western District of Oklahoma by the United States Magistrate, Ronald L. Howland for this address.

Agents knocked on the door, which was opened by an individual who identified himself as [REDACTED] was advised of the identity of the agents and the fact that they had a search warrant for the premises.

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Upon entering the apartment, the agents determined that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and that he lived in the apartment with his father, [REDACTED] requested permission to contact his father by telephone which was granted and Special Agent [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] over the telephone of the circumstances of their presence in his apartment. [REDACTED] indicated that he would return to the residence upon the completion of the class he was due to teach.

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[REDACTED] was given a form titled "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" which he read. [REDACTED] stated that he would decline to sign this form or anything else upon the advice of an attorney. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] who was an attorney in [REDACTED] and contacted this person by telephone. [REDACTED] then told the agents that [REDACTED] had advised him not to talk to the agents present.

b6
b7CInvestigation on 10/12/83

at [REDACTED]

File #

Oklahoma City
196A-1270b6
b7C

SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

by SA [REDACTED]

JRD:krl

Date dictated 10/12/83



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PROSECUTIVE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING

[redacted] also known as
[redacted]
FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY

b6
b7C

Copy to: 1 - USA, Alexandria, Va.
(Attn: AUSA [redacted])

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

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AX 196A-633

NAME OF DEFENDANT:

described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Social Security
Account Number
Height
Weight
Hair
Address

yrs old

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b7C

~~e-1~~

AX 196A-633

PROSECUTIVE STATUS:

1. On August 30, 1983, the available facts of this matter were presented to Elsie Munsell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, who advised she would consider prosecution in this matter.

2. On October 12, 1983, the premises located at [REDACTED], was searched pursuant to a duly authorized federal search warrant and various computer paraphenalia were seized.

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AX 196A-633

WITNESSES:

1.

[REDACTED]

GTE Telemail
8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia
Telephone [REDACTED]

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Can provide details of GTE Telemail operations, methods of detecting unauthorized users and procedures for obtaining print-outs of customer messages.

2.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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b7C

Can supply details of investigation.

3.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detroit

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b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and details concerning use of a pen register on the home phone of Stajda.

4.

[REDACTED]

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Can supply details confirming that [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] and also provide testimony concerning admissions made by [REDACTED] to him.

AX 196A-633

EVIDENCE:

Note - Originals of pen register information, as well as court order authorizing same are in possession of SA [REDACTED], FBI Detroit.

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1. Copy of search warrant and attached affidavit.

2. List of 20 messages left on Telemail by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (originals are in possession of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], GTE Telemail).

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3. List of relevant items obtained in search (in possession of FBI Alexandria).

4. List of charges attributed to [REDACTED] (original in possession of [REDACTED]).

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5. Report with information on authorization of pen register.

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">United States District Court</p>	<p>DISTRICT Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division</p>	
<p>United States of America vs. The premises known as [REDACTED]</p>	<p>DOCKET NO.</p>	<p>MAGISTRATE'S CASE NO.</p>
<p>NAME AND ADDRESS OF JUDGE¹ OR FEDERAL MAGISTRATE Barbara K. Hackett 1019 Federal Building Detroit, Michigan 48226</p>		
<p>The undersigned being duly sworn deposes and says: That he/she has reason to believe that</p>		
<p><input type="checkbox"/> on the person of <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> on the premises known as</p>		
<p>DISTRICT Eastern District of Michigan</p>		
<p>[REDACTED] more specifically described as a two story frame house, white in color, located [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p>		
<p>The following property is concealed:</p>		
<p>computers and computer associated devices such as modem, CRT terminals and keyboards, printers, disc drives, tape drives and other input/output medium; magnetic media including but not limited to magnetic tapes, discs (hard or floppy); all output produced by or caused to be produced by a computer including printer output, teletype output or paper tape output; all notes</p>		
<p>Affiant alleges the following grounds for search and seizure² (SEE ATTACHED)</p>		
<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> See attached affidavit which is incorporated as part of this affidavit for search warrant</p>		
<p>Affiant states the following facts establishing the foregoing grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant</p>		
<p>SEE ATTACHED</p> <div style="position: absolute; top: 60%; right: 10%; border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> <p>28E-847-39</p> <p>SEARCHED.....INDEXED..... SERIALIZED.....FILED..... OCT 18 1983 FBI-DETROIT</p> </div>		
<p>SIGNATURE OF AFFIANT</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	<p>OFFICIAL TITLE, IF ANY Special Agent, F.B.I.</p>	
<p>Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence;</p>		
<p>DATE October 11, 1983</p>	<p>JUDGE¹ OR FEDERAL MAGISTRATE Barbara K. Hackett</p>	

¹United States Judge or Judge of a State Court of Record.

²If a search is to be authorized "at any time in the day or night" pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(c), show reasonable cause therefor.

Continuation of property which is concealed:

papers, notebooks, or any other type of records associated with or related to computer usage, including address books, desk diaries, diaries, directories or any other device used to record information, addresses, and business dealings of unauthorized usage or users of computer networks; and other books, papers, ledgers, and records which are the fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of crime against the United States, that is, wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and or mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT

The undersigned being duly sworn deposes and says:

I

Affiant, [REDACTED], is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and has been so employed for four years. Affiant is assigned to investigate allegations of violations of federal criminal laws including 18 U.S.C. §1341 (mail fraud), §1343 (wire fraud), §1362 (wilful interference with means of communications controlled by the United States, and §371 (conspiracy to commit fraud by wire). Affiant has received a certificate after completion of a month long course in computer related fraud at the FBI Training Academy. For approximately one year affiant has been assigned to monitor computer bulletin boards. A computer bulletin board as referred to in this affidavit is nothing more than a small capacity computing device (including CRT terminals and keyboards), such that are commonly available on the retail market, a modem, or a device that allows data communication to be sent over a telephone line, and some kind of data storage device connected to the computer (including magnetic tapes and/or hard or floppy discs). Frequently, the operator of a "bulletin board" will have a small CRT screen and a printer as well.

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A bulletin board program as referred to in this affidavit, is merely a set of data instructions to a computer, either pre-purchased or devised by the user, which allow the collection of devices described to function as a "computer bulletin board."

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The "computer bulletin board" functions as a medium of information exchange for other persons who likewise own computers. To use a "computer bulletin board", a person dials the associated telephone number of the board to be contacted and waits until a data tone is heard. Then the call is electronically or acoustically coupled to the caller's computer. Now, the caller may peruse information files, leave messages, or even "converse" by keyboard with the person at the opposite station.

The vast majority of dial-up computer bulletin boards are legitimate in nature, and serve the needs of the avid computer hobbyist or conversant. Some serve as forums or meeting places for various sexual activity or esoteric thought or inclination. Others, referred to as "hostile" bulletin boards, offer a medium of exchange for illicit, criminal and fraudulent activity directed at Telecommunications Common Carriers and operators of large nationwide computing services.

While one may set up a computer bulletin board with inexpensive equipment and a modicum of computing knowledge, many have reached the sophistication of more advanced systems by requiring passwords in order to access data and leave messages.

Through his training and experience, your affiant is aware that computer bulleting boards have varying degrees of security, which is to say, some subject matter may be accessible to the casual caller while the operator of the computer may allow only certain callers with "passwords" or "codes" to peruse and leave more sensitive and illicit data and information. The operator of a hostile computer bulletin board may demand some illegal or

illicit information from the caller as a sign of good faith before access is granted to the more sensitive data files.

II

Affiant has learned from officers and employees of GTE Telenet Communications Corp. (GTE) at operations headquarters in Vienna, Virginia, through conversations with special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that GTE owns and operates a computer network known as Telenet which links various subscriber companies and government agencies, through a tie-in system, in numerous cities. GTE is a Telephonic Common Carrier, regulated by the U.S. Government, which operates as follows: First the user dials a local and usually toll-free access number. A tone, analogous to dial tone, is returned to the caller. Next, the caller dials in an access code provided by the common carrier. Finally, the caller dials in the telephone number to be called. Computerized billing equipment owned by the common carrier automatically times the call and bills it to the person whose access code was used. The use of a Common Carrier Access Code is similar to the use of a telephone company credit card. Common carriers cannot at this time determine the origination point of calls placed through their facilities, only the destination points. Common carriers, therefore, are only aware of fraudulent and illegal use of access codes after the legitimate customer informs them after the legitimate customer receives a bill by mail.

Recently (since mid-August of 1983) it has come to the attention of GTE that computers of certain Telemail subscribers have been accessed by a group of intruders. The intruders, some of

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whom appear to have banded together in groups known as "Inner Circle", "Operation Circle" and "Phalsers" have gained access to certain subscriber administrators and established pirate "bulletin boards" within the subscriber system, as well as browsed through subscriber files. These "bulletin boards" have been established without the subscriber's knowledge or consent.

Once it was determined that certain Telemail customer files were being infiltrated, GTE was able to retrieve messages posted on the pirate bulletin boards and determine that traffic between "Inner Circle" members discussed on August 15, 1983, an operation known as "Ultimate Rip-Off". In one of the messages on the bulletin board on August 15, 1983, a subject calling himself [] noted to a subject calling himself [] that he [] picked the wrong system because code 21256 is a demo system and "you can't really do anything with it". [] advised [] he was supposed to get into system C-21267. FBI investigation has revealed that both account number 21256 and 21267 are Telemail accounts assigned to Citibank, New York, N.Y. Another message on August 15, 1983, asks the question "Who is going into the banks and pick up the money."

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On late afternoon August 25, 1983, GTE advised the FBI at Alexandria, Virginia, that a further review of their system has uncovered other intruders not previously discernible to GTE which indicates that this intrusion problem is far more widespread than previously thought. GTE has been able to

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retrieve a number of pirate messages which reflect the intruders sharing information giving directions for access to other systems as well as the GTE system.

Recently, it has come to the attention of GTE that the accounts of approximately eighteen Telemail subscribers have been accessed by unauthorized intruders from different areas of the country. The intruders have gained access to certain customers' Telemail subscribers accounts by determining passwords assigned to Telemail subscribers through a process called "hacking". In this process, a "hacker" chooses a subscriber account such as Raytheon, NASA, USDA, RADA Corporation, Coca Cola USA, 3M Corporation. The "hacker" then begins to try numerous successive passwords (e.g., each letter of the alphabet, or the administrator's first name, etc.) until the correct password is discovered. Many hackers program their home computer to systematically try passwords for hours at a time. Once a hacker has broken a terminal's password, he can now enter the Telemail system as if he or she were the legitimate subscriber. The hacker would do this by calling any published Telenet dial in number and then placing his or her telephone on a modem hookup. This modem hookup now allows the hacker to type on his or her home computer keyboard and have the impulses sent through the telephone system into the Telenet computer system. The hacker then types in the command "Mail" and enters the Telemail mailing system. At this point the computer prompts the hacker with "User Name?". He or she then types in the words (for example) ADMIN/ NASA. The computer then prompts with "Password?" and the hacker

then types in the password that he or she has discovered through hacking. At this point the hacker is accepted by the system as a legitimate subscriber, and may perform many of the functions that the subscriber can perform, all of which would be charged to the legitimate subscriber. At this point the hackers create a pirate subdivision in the legitimate subscriber organization, such as ADMIN/inner circle/NASA and then set up user names in that new "pirate" account. User names may be any compilation of letters and numbers but are usually a first initial, period, then last name (i.e., [REDACTED]). The hacker, as administrator of his or her own subdivision, now sets up passwords for all his or her users, notifies them of their user name and password and they can now enter Telemail with their names and passwords. These users may then leave messages on the system to an individual in the group, to the pirate administrator or (because the computer believes they are legitimate) to any other user (legitimate or illegitimate) in the entire Telemail system.

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III

Affiant has learned from FBI S/A [REDACTED] that on approximately August 23, 1983 GTE Telemail discovered the unauthorized usage of customer accounts of American Hospital Services Corporation (AHSC) and Raytheon Company by a person(s) using the fictitious name [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. This person(s) was (were) using Telenet Dial in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. This person has entered the accounts of Telemail customers without authorization in excess of sixty (60) times from August 23, 1983 to September 24, 1983.

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IV

Affiant has learned from Michigan Bell Telephone Company records that the phone numbers [redacted] and [redacted] are listed to [redacted] at [redacted], [redacted] which affiant has discovered is a two story, white frame house located on [redacted]
[redacted]

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V

On September 24, 1983 a confidential source, who has provided reliable information in the past, which information has been confirmed by Special Agent [redacted] FBI, and who on one occasion gave information which lead to an arrest, told Special Agent [redacted] that [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] The source identified [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Subsequently, the source was
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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VI

[redacted] confirmed that Raytheon Company's account on Telemail was in fact terminated by an unauthorized user on August 29, 1983. This information was not released to anyone outside the Raytheon Company or GTE Telemail.

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VII

On the basis of a court order signed by United States District Judge Avern Cohn, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, a pen register, a device which records the number dialed from a particular telephone was placed on

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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VIII

On October 11, 1983 your affiant confirmed that from August 23, 1983 to October 6, 1983, Telenet account numbers 313/964-2813 or 313/964-5538 were called at least sixty (60) times from [REDACTED] home phone, [REDACTED]

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IX

Due to the continuing nature of the offense, that is the devising of a scheme or artifice to defraud GTE, AHSC and Raytheon Corporation through the use of computers and computer related equipment over a telephone at a given location your affiant believes that the fruits and instrumentalities of said crime will be found at [REDACTED]

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XI

Based on all of the above facts, your affiant submits that there is evidence of an ongoing offense located at the premises known as [REDACTED] which is located in the Eastern District of Michigan. At that location are

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computers and computer related paraphernalia records, documents, papers, and notes which are the fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of an offense against the United States, that is wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, mail fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341 and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and/or mail fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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SWORN TO before me and
SUBSCRIBED in my presence
this 11th day of October, 1983.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

United States District Court		DISTRICT Eastern District of Michigan	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. The premises known as <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 200px; margin: 10px auto;"></div>		DOCKET NO.	MAGISTRATE'S CASE NO. 831055
		TO: Any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any duly authorized law enforcement officer	

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Affidavit(s) having been made before me by the below-named affiant that he/she has reason to believe that (as the person of) (on the premises known as) [REDACTED] more specifically described as a two story frame house, white in color, located on [REDACTED]

in the Eastern District of Michigan there is now being concealed certain property, namely computers and computer associated devices such as modem, CRT terminals and keyboards, printers, disc drives, tape drives and other input/output medium; magnetic media including but not limited to magnetic tapes, discs (hard or floppy); all output produced by or caused to be produced by a computer including printer output, teletype output or paper tape output; all notes, papers, notebooks, or any other type of records associated with or related to computer usage, including address books, desk diaries, diaries, directories or any other device used to record information, addresses, and business dealings of unauthorized usage or users of computer networks; and other books, papers, ledgers and records which are the fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of crime against the United States, that is, wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and or mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

and as I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the property so described is being concealed on the person or premises above-described and the grounds for application for issuance of the search warrant exist as stated in the supporting affidavit(s).

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to search on or before of ten (10) days
(not to exceed 10 days) the person or place named above for the property specified, serving this warrant and making
the search (in the daytime — 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M.) (~~at any time in the day or night~~)^{*} and if the property be found
there to seize it, leaving a copy of this warrant and receipt for the property taken, and prepare a written inventory of
the property seized and promptly return this warrant to Magistrate Barbara Hackett
as required by law. Federal Judge or U.S. Magistrate

NAME OF AFFILIANT	SIGNATURE OF JUDGE OR US MAGISTRATE	DATE/TIME ISSUED
	Barbara K. Idaratti	October 11, 1983 3:15 P.M.

RETURN

DATE WARRANT RECEIVED 10/11/83	DATE AND TIME WARRANT EXECUTED 10/12/83 @ 9:00 am	COPY OF WARRANT AND RECEIPT FOR ITEMS LEFT WITH [redacted]
INVENTORY MADE IN THE PRESENCE OF [redacted]		b6 b7C

INVENTORY OF PROPERTY TAKEN PURSUANT TO THE WARRANT

One Atari 400 home computer serial # 020388
One Atari 410 datarecorder serial # T 48534
One Atari 850 serial interface serial # AN 146902
One Bizcomp versamodem serial # B 003948
One KMC color television set serial # 20505492
One tan princess telephone
Ten data cassette tapes
Two boxes of misc. papers

CERTIFICATION

I swear that this inventory is a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the warrant.

/s/ [redacted]

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Subscribed, sworn to, and returned before me this date.

/s/ Barbara K. Hackett

10/13/83

Federal Judge or U.S. Magistrate

Date

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/5/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user [] on GTE Telemail. The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

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1.) August 15, 1983, 3:19 PM. This message reads as follows: [] you picked the wrong system we are supposed to get into C 21267...because 21256 is a demo system of some sort you can't really do anything with it. Here is the user name and password. User name = Bank; Password = Bank. That password is to C 21256. Have phun! Was I supposed to post that up here? Signed [] " For information C 21267 is the Telemail connect address for Citibank in New York City.

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2.) August 16, 1983, 10:43 AM.

3.) August 18, 1983, 11:17 AM. This message concerns how to illegally access Wats lines.

4.) August 17, 1983, 11:04 AM.

5.) August 18, 1983, 11:26 AM.

6.) August 14, 1983, 10:24 AM.

7.) August 14, 1983, 4:45 PM.

8.) August 15, 1983, 3:17 PM. The subject of this message is "Ultimate Rip-off". Text of the message is as follows: "It may work or it may not, depends on what happens. Q-Who is going to go into the banks and pick up the money? Q-If we don't do it the way where you have to pick up the money in the bank where...Signed []"

9.) August 16, 1983, 10:50 AM.

10.) August 18, 1983, 11:07 PM.

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [] :gaj Date dictated 12/8/83

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11.) August 16, 1983, 3:08 PM. This message is from [] to []. Subject is "Admin listing". The text of the message is "Here is a Admin listing--Admin/IBMLEX, P = IBMLEX; Admin/Michigan, P = A; Admin/Unix, P = Angela; Admin/Amnet, P = Bill; Admin/CCUSA, P = Mary; Admin/CWP, P = CWP; Admin/Raytheon, P = Lou. Purge this message. Signed []."

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12.) August 18, 1983, 9:10 PM. Subject is "Telemail Accounts". Text of the message is "Here is some accounts that I created from the other Admins accounts...Company user name password..IBMLEX, P. Phreind, Phred. CCUSA, M. Mikey, Phred. Unix, J. Crack, Phred. Michigan, Dr. Zaphod, Phred. Amnet, A. Phreedmon, Phred. Raytheon, J. Jackson, Phred. Telemail, H. Frem, Phred. JPL, J. Cargo, Phred. LERC, J. Darda, Phred. NSTL, S. Shuttle, Phred.... These are accounts that I created using the Admin's passwords to the companies. Signed []."

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13.) August 19, 1983, 8:29 PM. This message concerns instructions about how to illegally access the computer system known as Dialcom.

14.) August 20, 1983, 11:14 AM. This message also contains instructions on how to access Dialcom.

15.) August 21, 1983, 1:46 PM. This message contains ITT Dialcom passwords.

16.) August 23, 1983, 12:12 PM.

17.) August 27, 1983, 2:23 PM. This message is titled "Welcome to Bizcomp". The text of the message is as follows: "Welcome to the new age of bulletin boards. I am the Sysop of the phantsy BBS so if you have any remarks about the board or need help on how to use it just sent mail to [] that is me otherwise... Signed []."

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18.) August 30, 1983, 4:37 PM. This message reads in part "To go undetected in the system I use regular user names such as E. Smith or other names that are common."

19.) August 30, 1983, 4:40 PM. This message is from the node [] Triplex to [] The text of the message is as follows: "I set these accounts up with little power of sending so it may work, but whatever.. []"

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20.) September 3, 1983, 3:07 PM. The text of the message is "Is Telemail going unused? Please lets see if we can get the system going a bit..O.K. Signed [] Telemail--Sysop."

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/5/83

This 302 reflects a review of evidence seized pursuant to a duly authorized Federal Search Warrant at the location known as [REDACTED]. This residence is the residence of [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED].

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The following is a summary of paper materials and print-outs that are relevant to this investigation:

1.) Three hand-written pages of names and phone numbers beginning with [REDACTED]. This list also contains, among others, the names and numbers for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

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2.) A long computer print-out containing the connect addresses, official name, computer type and system type of numerous computer networks, including Arpanet and Milnet.

3.) Thirteen sheets of hand-written notes containing Arpanet connect addresses, Milnet connect addresses, Telenet connect addresses. Hand-written notes concerning Mitre Corporation with a listing of nine user names followed by the passwords for each user name. These notes also contain numerous other host computer systems and their telephone numbers, including Michigan National Bank, Hartford College, Arizona State, National Institutes of Health, First National Bank of America, J. C. Pennys, Credit Link, Sears Credit Line, Union Oil, and F. A. A.

4.) A sheet of paper with hand-written notes concerning Mitre Corporation. This page lists 13 user names and passwords associated with Mitre Corporation. Mitre Corporation is a host on Arpanet and Mitre Corporation is engaged in sensitive Department of Defense research.

Investigation on 11/17/83 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633 SubC
by SA [REDACTED] :gaj Date dictated 11/17/83

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5.) A sheet of paper with hand-written notes on it. These notes refer to McClellan and contain four user names with their passwords. McClellan is a United States Air Force Base that is a host on the Milnet network.

6.) A packet (stapled together) of seven pages containing hand-written notes. These notes cover a variety of topics, including listing calling card numbers. These pages also list numerous Telemail user names and passwords, including "[redacted]--Skylab", and the following listing:

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IBMLEX = P. Phreind Password = Joke
CCUSA = M. Mikey Password = Joke
UNIX = J. Crack Password = Phred
Michigan = Dr. Zaphod Password = Phred
Amnet = A. Phreedmon Password = Phred
Raytheon = J. Jackson Password = Phred
Telemail = H. Frem Password = Phred
JPL = J. Cargo Password = Phred
LERC = J. Darda Password = Phred
NSTL = S. Shuttle Password = Phred

Other hand-written notes on this series of sheets of papers include the words [redacted], Innercircle, [redacted] and [redacted]. Another note lists the word Admin/CCUSA, followed by Password = Mary. There is also a listing of Admin/CWP, Password = CWP, and the words Admin/Raytheon, Password = Lou. Hand-written notes also include the name [redacted] = 42739. This is followed by the note * = T 223 N = Transmit. This is followed by the name [redacted] = 9242. The above names and numbers are associated with the number 1-800-426-2222.

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7.) A sheet of paper with hand-written notes containing various Telemail hosts, user names and passwords as follows: Jobs/AHSC, User = [redacted], Password = COBE; OSF/NASA, User = [redacted], Password = Skylab; UNACRX/Telemail, User = [redacted], Password = Apple; CCUSA, User = [redacted], Password = A; Admin/Finance, User = [redacted], Password = A.

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8.) A sheet of paper with hand-written notes, including the name [redacted], followed by the address [redacted]. This sheet also contains the name [redacted], followed by the phone number [redacted].

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9.) A sheet of paper with hand-written notes labelled Telemail Notes, followed by the listing of numerous host companies on Telemail, such as NASSA, CCUSA, Raytheon, IBMLEX and approximately 30 others.

10.) Two sheets of paper with hand-written notes labelled Arpanet-Notes. These notes consist of connect addresses and host names.

11.) Two pages of hand-written notes listing approximately 50 Telemail users and passwords. The companies involved are Coca Cola, USA, NASA, Ford, and a company listed as GSFC.

12.) A sheet of paper with the hand-written words Innercircle.

13.) A sheet of paper with hand-written notes, including the following Telemail host systems: Jobs/AHSC, User = [redacted], Password = Code; OSF/NASA, User = [redacted], Password = Skylab; UNACRX/Telemail, User = [redacted], Password = Apple; GSFC, User = [redacted], Password = A; CCUSA, User = [redacted], Password = A; Admin/Finance, User = [redacted], Password = A.

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14.) A sheet of paper with a hand-written list of names as follows: [redacted]
[redacted] This is a listing of the users of the illegal node in Telemail known as the Innercircle. This sheet of paper also bears the name [redacted]

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15.) A sheet of paper with the hand-written notes, including the word [redacted], followed by the number [redacted]. This sheet of paper also contains the name [redacted] and the name [redacted] is an employee of GTE Telemail.

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16.) A sheet of paper with hand-written notes on it as follows: Admin/Trinex [redacted]; Admin/GTE [redacted]. This is followed by the word Triplex and then the word [redacted], followed by the word Fone. This is followed by the word Admin/Triplex, followed by the letters FGFGE. The preceding two sets of names were user names and passwords in an illegal file in GTE Telemail. This sheet of paper also contains the words [redacted] and [redacted]

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17.) A sheet of paper concerning a listing of user names and passwords as follows: Admin/Bizcomp, Password Dead; [redacted] Password Fone; [redacted] Password DOD; [redacted] Password Rum; [redacted] Password [redacted] [redacted] Password [redacted] Password Red.

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18.) A re-print of the Global Autovon Telephone Directory.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

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Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted]:sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/19/83

[redacted]
[redacted] was served with a Federal Court Order on 8/19/83, requesting her organization to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the installation of pen registers or dialed number recorder equipment on [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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The court order will expire in [redacted] unless an extension is obtained.

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10/11/83 [unclear] 3-
for [unclear]

Investigation on 8/19/83 at [redacted] File # 28E-847 - 151
by SA [redacted] *AKA* Date dictated 8/19/83

b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

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Summary of Activities on Telemail (<div data-bbox="900 678 1037 720" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 80px; height: 20px;"></div>)	3

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- 1 -

Date of transcription 9/13/83b7D
b6
b7COn [redacted]
the following:

advised SA [redacted]

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b7C
b7Db6
b7C
b7D

Source stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Source stated that it is his opinion that [redacted]

Source stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7DInvestigation on 9/3/83

at [redacted]

File #

Alexandria 196A-633
Detroit 28E-847-23

by

SA [redacted]

/ SW

Date dictated

9/9/83

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/10/84

[] This is a summary of the activities of []
[] on GTE Telemail.

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[] used the names [] and []
on GTE Telemail.

[] was an illegal user as part of the group
called "INNERCIRCLE" in AMERICAN HOSPITAL SUPPLY COMPANY
(AHSC), and in RAYTHEON COMPANY. [] created an illegal
"node" called "BIZCOMP" in RAYTHEON COMPANY.

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[] stated to a confidential source that
[]
[]

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[] routinely provided the user names and
passwords of legitimate Telemail administrators to other
hackers, giving out as many as seven at one time. He
also created many illegal accounts and provided these
user names and passwords to other hackers, giving out
as many as ten at one time.

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[] also routinely accessed another Telenet
host system known as ARPANET (ADVANCED RESEARCH AND PLANNING
AGENCY NETWORK). This is a system designed and set up
by the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE to provide a system for transfer
of information by companies doing defense related research,
some of it classified.

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[] is known to have accessed the Telemail
system at least 25 times between August 15, 1983, and
September 5, 1983.

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Investigation on 2/6/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 206A-633
by SA [] :gaj Date dictated 2/6/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PROSECUTIVE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING

~~345~~
[redacted] also known as [redacted]
FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY

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Copy to: 1 - USA, Alexandria, Va.
(Attn: AUSA [redacted])

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AX 196A-633

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X

AX 196A-633

NAME OF DEFENDANT:

[redacted] described as:

Race

Sex

Date of Birth

Height

New York

Driver's License

Address

[redacted]

☐

Yrs

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~~e-1~~

345

AX 196A-633

PROSECUTIVE STATUS:

1. On August 30, 1983, the available facts in this matter were presented to Elsie Munsell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, who advised she would consider prosecution in the matter.

2. On October 12, 1983, the premises located at [REDACTED], was searched pursuant to a duly authorized federal search warrant and various computer paraphenalia were seized.

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AX 196A-633

WITNESSES:

1.

[REDACTED]

GTE Telemail
8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia
Telephone [REDACTED]

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Can provide details of GTE Telemail operations,
methods of detecting unauthorized users and
procedures for obtaining print-outs of customer
messages.

2.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Can supply details of investigation.

3.

[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Can supply details concerning search of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4.

[REDACTED]

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Can supply details concerning [REDACTED] true
identity as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] use
of Telemail.

Full text of interview pages 3 - 4, attached.

5.

[REDACTED]

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Can supply details of phone conversations with
[REDACTED] aka [REDACTED] at home phone of [REDACTED]

AX 196A-633

EVIDENCE:

1. A seven-page typed paper with the name [redacted] appearing throughout (original in possession of FBI Alexandria).

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2. Thirty-six messages left by [redacted] on the Telemail System (original in possession of [redacted] [redacted] GTE Telemail).

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3. Copy of charges accumulated by [redacted] on GTE Telemail (original in possession of [redacted]).

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4. Copy of search warrant and affidavit for [redacted]
[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/5/84

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user using the name [redacted] on GTE Telemail. The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

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1.) August 14, 1983, 11:57 AM.

2.) August 14, 1983, 12:11 PM. The subject of this message is "Trace, Security". The text of the message reads in part "We might have a problem. There's a good chance that my phone is tapped. Regardless we might have to be more careful. Call it paranoia, but I think someone is out to get all of us."

3.) August 14, 1983, 1:47 PM.

4.) August 14, 1983, 2:12 PM.

5.) August 14, 1983, 4:31 PM.

6.) August 15, 1983, 4:02 PM. This message reads in part "At the conference tonight we will discuss: Cosmos, Ult Rip-off, Blu-Stuff."

7.) August 15, 1983, 4:08 PM. This message reads in part "Over the telephone voice calls: Don't say anything phreak-related after today! Reasons: 1.) There is no reason to because we will have our hands full with cosmos and banks for the ult rip-off; 2.) We can go "data" instead of voice; 3.) We don't want to spread around a lot of info for security reasons. The more people that know the less chance of safe success."

8.) August 15, 1983, 11:59 PM.

9.) August 17, 1983, 8:47 PM.

10.) August 14, 1983, 1:59 PM.

Investigation on 12/8/83 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 12/8/83

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b7C

11.) August 17, 1983, 2:54 PM.
12.) August 17, 1983, 8:39 PM.
13.) August 14, 1983, 11:47 AM.
14.) August 14, 1983, 11:49 AM.
15.) August 14, 1983, 2:04 PM.
16.) August 15, 1983, 6:33 PM.
17.) August 15, 1983, 8:09 PM.
18.) August 17, 1983, 8:43 PM.
19.) August 17, 1983, 8:53 PM.
20.) August 18, 1983, 8:33 PM.
21.) August 19, 1983, 12:28 AM.
22.) August 20, 1983, 10:48 PM. The text
of this message refers to the user name [redacted] followed
by [redacted]. Other information indicates [redacted]
is [redacted] of the Osuny bulletin board.

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b7C

23.) August 20, 1983, 11:07 PM.
24.) August 21, 1983, 1:01 PM.
25.) August 21, 1983, 1:03 PM.
26.) August 21, 1983, 6:13 PM. This message
is titled "Teleconferencing Numbers". The text of
the message is as follows: "Here are the girls' numbers
who have passed the test: [redacted]
- [redacted]
[redacted]
- [redacted]. That's all."

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b7C

27.) August 21, 1983, 8:25 PM.

28.) August 21, 1983, 8:27 PM.

29.) August 22, 1983, 9:03 PM.

30.) August 23, 1983, 5:39 PM. This message is addressed to [] and []. The text of the message begins "To [] and []". The message is signed [] has been identified as [].
[] A phone number obtained for the user name [] was subscribed to by a person named [] in [].

b6
b7C

31.) August 23, 1983, 5:45 PM. This message is again signed [].

32.) August 24, 1983, 3:29 PM.

33.) August 24, 1983, 3:31 PM.

34.) August 24, 1983, 3:36 PM.

35.) August 24, 1983, 3:37 PM.

36.) August 24, 1983, 4:03 PM.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

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Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		\$127.58	
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		\$3.00	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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b7Cb6
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Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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b7C

United States District Court

FOR THE

Southern District of New York

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

THE PREMISES KNOWN AS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Docket No.

Case No.

SEARCH WARRANT

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To Any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation or any duly authorized law enforcement officer
Affidavit(s) having been made before me by Special Agent

that he has reason to believe that { ~~not the person of~~ [REDACTED]
on the premises known as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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in the Southern District of New York

there is now being concealed certain property, namely computers and computer associated devices such as modem, CRT terminals and keyboards, ^{here enclosed (front)} printers, disc drives, tape drives and other input/output medium; magnetic media including but not limited to magnetic tapes, discs (hard or floppy); all output produced by or caused to be produced by a computer including printer output, teletype output or paper tape output; all notes, papers, notebooks, or any other type of records associated with or related to computer usage, including address books, desk diaries, diaries, directories or any other device used to record information, addresses and business dealings of unauthorized usage or users of computer networks; and other books, papers, ledgers and records which are the fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of crime against the United States, that is, wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

and as I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the property so described is being concealed on the person or premises above described and that grounds for application for issuance of the search warrant exist as stated in the supporting affidavit (X).

You are hereby commanded to search within a period of ten (10) days
(not to exceed 10 days) the person or place named for the property specified, serving this warrant and making the search { in the daytime (6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.) } and if the property be found there to seize it, leaving a copy of this warrant and receipt for the property taken, and prepare a written inventory of the property seized and promptly return this warrant and bring the property before
----- as required by law.

Federal judge or magistrate

Dated this day of October , 19 83

Judge (Federal or State Court of Record) or Federal Magistrate

*The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: "The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime." (Rule 41(c)). A statement of grounds for probable cause should be made in the affidavit(s) if a search is to be authorized "at any time day or night" pursuant to Rule 41(c).

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT

Your affiant, _____, is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and has been so employed for _____ years. Your affiant brings this affidavit on information he has received from his personal investigation, from information received from Special Agent _____ and from persons your affiant knows to be reliable and trustworthy.

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INTRODUCTION

General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) owns and operates a computer network known as Telenet which links various subscriber companies and Government agencies through a tie-in system in numerous cities throughout the United States. Access is obtained by calling a published telephone number in various cities.

Within the Telenet System is a service called Telemail which offers a computerized message capability between Telemail customers and any Telemail subscriber company. Each Telemail subscriber is responsible for designating an "in house" administrator to oversee all administrative functions of the customer's Telemail service, including the assignment of passwords to gain access to the system and the subscriber company. The administrator for a new user company may set up various subdivisions and individual users in his own company as he sees fit.

Recently, it has come to the attention of GTE that the accounts of approximately eighteen Telemail subscribers have been accessed by unauthorized intruders from different areas of the country. The intruders have gained access to certain customers' Telemail subscribers accounts by determining passwords assigned to Telemail subscribers through a process called "hacking". In this process, a "hacker" chooses a subscriber account such as Raytheon, NASA, USDA, RADA Corporation, Coca Cola USA, 3M Corporation. The "hacker" then begins to try numerous successive passwords (e.g., each letter of the alphabet, or the administrator's first name, etc.) until the correct password is discovered. Many hackers program their home computer to systematically try passwords for hours at a time. Once a hacker has broken a terminal's password, he can now enter the Telemail system as if he were the legitimate subscriber. He would do this by calling any published Telenet dial in number and then placing his telephone on his modem hookup. This modem hookup now allows him to type on his home computer keyboard and have the impulses sent through the telephone system into the Telenet computer system. He then types in the command "Mail" and enters the Telemail mailing system. At this point the computer prompts him with "User Name?". He then types in the words (for example) ADMIN/NASA. The computer then prompts with "Password?" and he then types in the password that he has discovered through hacking. At this point he is accepted by the system

as a legitimate subscriber, and may perform many of the functions that the subscriber can perform, all of which would be charged to the legitimate subscriber. At this point the hackers create a pirate subdivision in the legitimate subscriber organization, such as ADMIN/inner circle/NASA and then set up user names in that new "pirate" account. User names may be any compilation of letters and numbers but are usually a first initial, period, then last name (i.e.,

). The hacker, as administrator of his own subdivision, now sets up passwords for all his users, notifies them of their user name and password and they can now enter Telemail with their names and passwords. These users may now leave messages on the system to an individual in the group, to the pirate administrator or (because the computer believes they are legitimate) to any other user (legitimate or illegitimate) in the entire Telemail system.

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PROBABLE CAUSE

1. On approximately August 23, 1983 GTE Telemail discovered an unauthorized user in the account of their customers, Raytheon Company and American Hospital Supply Company (AHSC). This person has been using the fictitious name [redacted] and was accessing Telemail through dialin number 914/328-9199, which is in the Scarsdale, New York area.

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2. [redacted] GTE Telemail, told Special Agent [redacted], FBI, that a review of messages in AHSC shows that [redacted] has been using the account of AHSC since at least August 16, 1983 and has entered the Telemail system at least 55 times, the latest being detected on September 22, 1983 and September 23, 1983 in the accounts of NASA and RADA Corporation, respectively.

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3. Special Agent [redacted] has received information from a confidential source, who has provided reliable information in the past, said information being confirmed by Special Agent [redacted] and which information has led to an arrest on one occasion. This source stated to Special Agent

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[redacted] that [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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4. Investigation by the FBI indicates that the telephone number [] is subscribed to by []

[] Further, a person by the name [] date of birth [] resides at that address.

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5. It is common for the "hacker" to have an additional phone line in the residence to be used for the computer modem. There is, in fact, an additional phone line (number []) at this address.

6. [] in a message left on the Telemail signed the message with the name []

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b7C

7. On October 4, 1983 Special Agent [] called the number [] and asked if [] was there. The woman who answered the phone said that [] was not in at that time.

8. Due to the continuing nature of the offense, that is, the devising of a scheme or artifice to defraud GTE, Raytheon and AHSC through the use of computers and computer related equipment over a telephone at a given location, your affiant believes that the fruits and instrumentalities of said crime will be found at []

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9. Based on all of the above facts, your affiant submits that there is sufficient probable cause to believe that this on going offense is located at the premises known as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] which is located in the Southern District of New York. At that location are computers and computer related paraphernalia, records, documents, papers, and notes which are the fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of an offense against the United States, that is, wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

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Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me and subscribed in my
presence this ____ day of October, 1983.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

AX 196A-633

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/10/84

This is a summary of the activities of []
[] on GTE Telemail.

[] used the name [] on Telemail.

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He was registered as an illegal user in AMERICAN
HOSPITAL SUPPLY COMPANY (AHSC) and RAYTHEON COMPANY.

In his messages, [] discussed among other
things such projects as "the Ultimate Rip-off" in reference
to the Telemail computer account of CITIBANK OF NEW YORK.

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[] is known to have accessed the Telemail
system at least 36 times between August 14, 1983, and
August 24, 1983.

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Investigation on 2/6/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [] :gaj Date dictated 2/6/84

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/30/84

[redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was advised of the official identity of the interviewing agent and thereafter provided the following information:

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He used the name [redacted] on the Osuny bulletin board during the summer of 1983. While looking at messages on this bulletin board, [redacted] was able to see a private message left for another party on that board. This message was from someone using the name [redacted] and the message stated something to the effect that "you can call me at [redacted] [redacted] said he called the number once to see if it was a working number and a male answered. [redacted] said he did not say anything, but simply hung up.

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[redacted] also said that at an electronics show in New Jersey he met a computer enthusiast whose first name was [redacted] [redacted] said he uses the name [redacted] on the Telemail system and that he [redacted] would leave a welcome message on Telemail for [redacted]

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[redacted] said he used the Telemail service approximately four or five times and in doing so communicated with [redacted] (who he knew to have a real first name of [redacted] and [redacted]

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[redacted] further stated that he did not know that the messages he was leaving on Telemail were being billed to another company. He thought that somehow this was an electronic connection to a Source account or a CompuServe account and that a person would be billed through Source or CompuServe once you have connected with those computers.

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[redacted] also provided the following identifying information:

Date of Birth: [redacted]

Age: [redacted]

Social Security [redacted]

Account Number: [redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633by SA [redacted] gaj Date dictated 1/26/84b6
b7C

AX 196A-633

2

Height:
Weight:
Eyes:
Hair:



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4
368



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PROSECUTIVE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING

373
[redacted] also known as
[redacted] also known as
[redacted] also known as
[redacted] also known as
[redacted] also known as
[redacted] also known as
[redacted]
FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY

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Copy to: 1 - USA, Alexandria, Va.
(Attn: AUSA [redacted])

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~~A~~

AX 196A-633

NAME OF DEFENDANTS:

1. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Address

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> yrs old
<input type="text"/>	

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AX 196A-633

2. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Address

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AX 196A-633

3. described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Social Security
Account Number
Address

☐ yrs old

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~~63~~

375

AX 196A-633

4. described as:

~~Race~~
~~Sex~~
Date of Birth
Address

yes

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5. [redacted] described as:

Race
Sex
Date of Birth
Address

[redacted]

yes old

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~~CS~~

AX 196A-633

PROSECUTIVE STATUS:

1. On August 30, 1983, the available facts in this matter were presented to Elsie Munsell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, who advised she would consider prosecution in the matter.

2. On October 12, 1983, the premises located at:
(1) [redacted]; (2) [redacted]
[redacted]; (3) [redacted]
[redacted]; (4) [redacted], were searched pursuant to a duly authorized federal search warrant and various computer paraphenalia were seized.

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AX 196A-633

WITNESSES:

1. [REDACTED]

GTE Telemail
8229 Boone Boulevard
Vienna, Virginia
Telephone [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Can provide details of GTE Telemail operations,
methods of detecting unauthorized users and
procedures for obtaining print-outs of customer
messages.

2. [REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Can supply details of investigation.

3. [REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Los Angeles

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b7C

Can supply details concerning search of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Los Angeles

b6
b7C

Can supply details concerning searches in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

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b7C

Can identify [REDACTED] as [REDACTED]
through personal knowledge.

AX 196A-633

EVIDENCE:

RE: [redacted]

1. List of four messages left by [redacted] on Telemail (original in possession of [redacted] [redacted] GTE Telemail).

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2. Summary of relevant evidence seized in search at [redacted] (In possession of FBI Alexandria).

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3. Summary of information found on "floppy discs" seized in search (discs in possession of FBI Alexandria).

4. List of charges attributable to [redacted] aka [redacted] [redacted] (original in possession of [redacted] GTE Telemail).

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RE: [redacted]

1. List of 39 messages left on GTE Telemail by [redacted] (originals in possession of [redacted]).

b6
b7C

2. Summary of relevant evidence seized in search at [redacted] (in possession of FBI Alexandria).

b6
b7C

3. List of charges attributable to [redacted] aka [redacted] (original in possession of [redacted] GTE Telemail).

b6
b7C

4. Summary of trap and trace information received from [redacted]

b7E

RE: [redacted]

1. List of 67 messages left by [redacted] on GTE Telemail (originals in possession of [redacted] GTE Telemail).

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b7C

2. Summary of relevant evidence seized in search at [redacted] (in possession of FBI Alexandria).

b6
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3. Summary of information found on "floppy discs" seized in search (discs in possession of FBI Alexandria).

4. List of charges attributable to [redacted] aka [redacted] [redacted] (original in possession of [redacted]).

b6
b7C

5. Summary of trap and trace information received from [redacted]

b7E

AX 196A-633

RE: [REDACTED]

1. List of eight messages left on Telemail by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (originals in possession of [REDACTED]).

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b7C

2. Summary of relevant evidence seized in search
of [REDACTED] (in possession of
FBI Alexandria).

b6
b7C

3. Summary of information found on "floppy discs"
seized in search (discs in possession of FBI Alexandria).

4. List of charges attributable to [REDACTED]
(original in possession of [REDACTED]).

b6
b7C

5. Summary of trap and trace information received
from [REDACTED]

b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/15/83

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user using the name [redacted] and [redacted] on GTE Telemail. The date and time of each message is provided with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

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- 1) August 27, 1983, 11:47 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time)
- 2) August 30, 1983, 4:04 a.m. (Eastern Daylight Time)
- 3) September 3, 1983, 4:01 a.m. This message is from [redacted]/Promo/Raytheon to Admin. Message reads, "I forgot my other PW [redacted] I'll have to check it out with [redacted]."
- 4) September 10, 1983, 9:08 p.m.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/9/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :btl Date dictated 12/9/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/20/84

The following is a listing of evidence pertaining to the illegal intrusion into GTE Telemail found at the premises known as [REDACTED]. This is the residence of [REDACTED].

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1.) A computer print-out listing 38 system users beginning with account number one belonging to [REDACTED] and including [REDACTED] and others.

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2.) Numerous copies of a magazine newsletter called "Tap". These newsletters contain information on defeating alarm systems and numerous articles on how to avoid paying legitimate charges to the phone company.

3.) A computer listing which lists the contents of a floppy disc. A sample of the contents listed are as follows: T 001 B. Telemail less than 9, T 005 B. Telemail less than 13, T 005 B. Telemail plus 4.1 less than 9, T 003 B. Telemail less than 13.

4.) A 3" X 5" card with the following words hand-written on it: [REDACTED] and others.

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5.) A 3" X 5" card with the word Autonet, followed by C 21311. This card also contains the phone number 800-424-9096, followed by the words "[REDACTED] Please".

6.) A 3" X 5" card which, on one side contains the name [REDACTED], followed by the phone number [REDACTED] (W) and [REDACTED] (H). On the reverse of this card are the following words: Telemail (T@Mail): Username: DCLNBB, password: Bill, followed by the words "use help". Also found on this side of the 3" X 5" card are the words [REDACTED], followed by break system.

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7.) A 3" X 5" card which contains the number [REDACTED], followed by the name [REDACTED]. On the reverse of this card the word [REDACTED] is found and the number [REDACTED].

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Investigation on 1/17/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [REDACTED] :gaj Date dictated 1/17/84

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8.) A computer print-out which is signed by the user [redacted]

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9.) A sheet of yellow paper that bears the name [redacted]

[redacted] This is followed by the numbers [redacted], then the word Soc Sec and then this number [redacted]. This is followed by the words drivers lic. CDL number [redacted] and also the number [redacted]. Also found on this sheet of paper are the numbers [redacted] and [redacted].

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10.) A sheet of 8" X 10" white paper which bears the name [redacted] and the phone number [redacted]

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11.) A computer print-out titled MCI Credit Card Access Numbers and signed [redacted] "alias" [redacted]

12.) A copy of the Uninet network access phone by state.

13.) A sheet of yellow paper that bears the name [redacted] and the word [redacted]. This paper also has the name [redacted] and the phone number [redacted]. On the reverse of this sheet of paper is found the name [redacted] followed by the phone number [redacted]. (This is the home phone of [redacted], aka [redacted].

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14.) A copy of "revised tymnet phone numbers".

15.) A green sheet of paper from a spiral note book with handwritten words as follows: TRW, Arpanet, Milnet, TVETLINK-Telnet.

16.) A computer print-out with three messages to [redacted]. One message is from [redacted] and the other two are from [redacted].

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17.) A computer print-out with a number of messages on it, one of which is from [redacted]. This message refers to [redacted]. The other two users on this computer print-out are [redacted] and [redacted].

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18.) A computer print-out with one message starting "Hi [redacted]" and ending [redacted].

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19.) A copy of the Oklahoma Modem Users Group Newsletter, dated September 1, 1983, and signed by [redacted]
[redacted]

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20.) A 3" X 5" card which bears the handwritten name [redacted].

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21.) A white 3" X 5" card which contains the name [redacted] but it is spelled [redacted] followed by the phone number [redacted]. (This number was given to a confidential source by [redacted] and the confidential source was told that [redacted] [redacted]. The customer name and address for this number belongs to [redacted].)

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22.) A 3" X 5" card that has the name [redacted] followed by the number [redacted].

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23.) A 3" X 5" card that contains the initials [redacted] and the phone number [redacted]. (This is the home phone number for [redacted] aka [redacted].) This 3" X 5" card also contains the name [redacted] followed by the following numbers: [redacted] (V), [redacted] (I), [redacted] (D).

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24.) A yellow manilla envelope with a mailing label from [redacted] addressed to [redacted] [redacted] It is dated September 7, 1983.

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25.) The remnants of a 3" X 5" card that had been torn into numerous pieces. When placed back together the writing on the 3" X 5" card reads as follows: The check is good. I swear it! Don't try checking for fingerprints, I'm careful. Signed, [redacted]

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Also seized in the search were items labelled paraphenalia, which appear to be homemade pipes and tubes for smoking marijuana.

Also seized was a switchblade knife.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/30/84

On October 12, 1983, a duly authorized search warrant was executed at the address [REDACTED] [REDACTED], the home of [REDACTED]. The "floppy discs" that were seized pursuant to the search warrant were examined by [REDACTED], a computer programmer. Following is a summary of the information that Lebowitz found on these discs.

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On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub G, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Number One, is found a program called "TELENET." This is a listing of various telenet host connect addresses. A program called "Numbers" contains a message from [REDACTED] about phone numbers. [REDACTED] is a nickname for [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and alias of [REDACTED]. The program called "Pay Phone" contains a message on how to misuse or abuse pay phones.

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On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub G, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Number 2 is a program called "Hack. Sprint." This is a program to find Sprint access codes. Three programs titled "Hack. MCI.", "Hack. ITT.", and "Hack. METRO.", were designed to hack out MCI, ITT, and Metrophone authorization codes respectively. A program called "Hacker II" is designed to find access codes for many different long distance systems. A program called "Codes MCI" is a listing of MCI access codes actually found. A program called "CODES SPRINT" is a list of Sprint codes actually found.

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On the disc labelled 196-633 Sub G, 1B1, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is found a program called "JOLOY I" This contains numerous messages from a bulletin board. These messages include numerous passwords as well as numbers given to "Phreak on Telenet." A program called "JOLOY II" is a listing of connect addresses on different systems on telenet. One of the systems is listed as "Allied Corp Confidential." A program called "OSUNY" contains information

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Investigation on 1/13/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633
Sub E
 by SA [REDACTED] :mbe Date dictated 1/13/84

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from [] on MCI credit card access methods. It also contains information on a magazine called "Tap" devoted to phreaking on phones.

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The disc labelled 196-633 Sub G, 1B1, [] Number 4, contains a program called "TITLES." This program is a listing of various messages from a bulletin board. The program called "B. INT CALLS W/BUE BOX - 29" contains a message from the phantom concerning how to use a blue box device for free overseas phone calls. A program called "B. Telemail - 5" contains a message from [] concerning a new bulletin board that he has set up within the telenet system. The program called "B. MITRE - 5" contains a message from [] giving passwords for the MITRE Corporation Computer on Arpanet. The program called "[] 00004.MAIL" contains a message to [] from Jupiter - FBN. This program provides an identification name and password for a computer. A program called "D. DANGER! - 3" contains a message from [] to all users warning of people being searched by authorities. The program called "B. TELENET?? - 9" contains a message from [] to everybody concerning Telenet. The program called "B. TELNET (NOT GTE - TELENET) - 18" contains a message from [] telling everyone to make sure to purge their messages. The program called "B. AUTONET - 26" contains a message from [] to all concerning a new network called "AUTONET." This message also asks for an Arpanet Access Code.

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The disc labelled 196-633 Sub G, 1B1, [] Number 5, contains a program labelled "B. MASS. GEN. HOSPITAL - 14." This program contains a message from [] on how to use telemail. The program called "B. ARPANET - 5" contains a message from [] on how to get into Arpanet from Telenet. The program called "AUTOVAN'ERS - 31" contains a message from [] about how to dial into the Autovan Network. The program called "B. SCC'S - 5" contains a message from [] about phone numbers for a customer service of the "Lesser Known FCC's." The program called "B. ITT DIALCOM NETWORK - 5" contains information from [] on the ITT Dialcom Network at how to enter the network. The program called "B. WHO CARES"

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contains a listing of telenet connect addresses from [redacted]
[redacted]. The program called "B. TRW - 19" contains
a message from [redacted] about a TRW Computer
System he found. The program called "B. TRAVEL-NET - 29"
contains a note from [redacted] on how to find access
codes to Travelnet. The program called "B. WRONG!!!!!!
- 29" contains a message from [redacted] about how to
use a "phone trunk." A program called "B. NOTES ON SKYLINE
- 5" contains a message from [redacted] about
finding codes for Skyline. The program called "B. CODACAS
- 1" contains a message from [redacted] about how
to play a "On-line" computer game.

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The disc labelled 196-633 Sub G, 1B1, [redacted]
[redacted], Number 6, contains a message labelled
"PHREAK 932" which contains numerous messages from a home
bulletin board.

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The disc labelled 196-633 Sub G, 1B1, [redacted]
[redacted], Number 8, contains a program called
"OLD DATAPAC." This program contains a message from [redacted]
[redacted] about a Canadian electronic system called
DATAPAC.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
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Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
.....			
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
.....			
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

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The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user using the name [redacted] on GTE Telemail.

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The date and time of each message is provided, with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

- 1) September 14, 1983, 9:50 p.m. (all times Eastern Daylight Time)
- 2) September 14, 1983, 9:07 p.m.
- 3) September 14, 1983, 9:57 p.m.
- 4) September 15, 1983, 12:39 a.m. This message reads in part, "I have been poking around and I've got some neat info."
- 5) September 16, 1983, 1:41 a.m.
- 6) September 18, 1983, 1:20 a.m.
- 7) September 18, 1983, 9:32 p.m.
- 8) September 18, 1983, 9:35 a.m. This message reads, "Why do you need some Vax addrs? Do you have a new method of hacking on them that will work?" Signed [redacted]
- 9) September 18, 1983, 11:31 p.m. This message reads, "Cuz I don't have any, except for that 0 711 124 (Oak Industries)..."
- 10) September 19, 1983, 12:25 a.m. This message reads as follows, "The extent of Telemail is incredible. I found my way into GTE, TRW Memorex First Interstate Weyerhaeuser, NASA JPL Rockwell and so many others. My mother wants me to get into TRW Credit. I bet you don't have a p/w and account to get into their system. (Or do you?) Oh well, this is great, and thanks for getting me on Telemail." Signed [redacted]
- 11) September 19, 1983, 8:13 p.m.
- 12) September 20, 1983, 10:01 p.m.
- 13) September 21, 1983, 11:01 a.m. This message reads, "I am up to 554-7474 (I started out at 554-0311), and I have over 75 computer numbers. The last 2,500 numbers out tonight and then post all of the computers in that prefix." Signed [redacted], ccps."

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b7C

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/13/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 1984-
by SA [redacted] :btl Date dictated 12/13/83

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

- 12) September 21, 1983, 12:05 a.m.
13) September 21, 1983, 12:07 a.m.
14) September 21, 1983, 12:19 a.m.
15) September 21, 1983, 1:40 a.m.
16) September 22, 1983, 2:28 a.m.
17) September 22, 1983, 2:30 a.m. This message reads,
"Read this and then log back in and read a MSG
that I left for you too: Admin/Promo. Also,
say hi to [redacted] for me." Signed
[redacted] (SCPP)" b6 b7C
18) September 21, 1983, 10:53 p.m. This message reads,
"Think about it, cuz momma wants me to play with
her credit. (Or at least check it)"
19) September 22, 1983, 2:26 a.m.
20) September 22, 1983, 2:23 a.m.
21) September 24, 1983, 11:12 a.m.
22) September 24, 1983, 9:41 p.m.
23) September 24, 1983, 9:48 p.m.
24) September 25, 1983, 2:29 a.m.
25) September 25, 1983, 1:03 p.m.
26) September 25, 1983, 2:33 a.m.
27) September 25, 1983, 1:08 p.m.
28) September 26, 1983, 1:06 a.m.
29) September 26, 1983, 10:39 p.m. This message reads,
"That is okay. Cuz I decided that the SCPP Board
was enough. I will just try to hack out somebody
else's PWD. (I downloaded the hold uscr list and
the whole Admin. List. Gee, wouldn't it be funny
if I hacked the PWD for Admin/Telemail!??)"
30) September 27, 1983, 9:11 p.m.
31) September 27, 1983, 9:13 p.m.
32) September 22, 1983, 9:17 p.m.
33) September 27, 1983, 10:06 p.m. This message reads
in part, "Well, you have finally made it to the most
elite BBS there is. Telemail. Do not mention names
or anything else on here, just in case the FBI wanted
to make an example of the group. (SCPP)"
34) September 28, 1983, 9:13 p.m.
35) September 29, 1983, 12:48 a.m.
36) September 29, 1983, 1:01 a.m.
37) October 1, 1983, 12:05 p.m.
38) October 2, 1983, 2:42 a.m.

39) October 7, 1983, 9:52 p.m. This message reads, b6
"Well, as far as I know, [redacted] is no b7C
longer a member of the SCPP. Ask [redacted] if you
should delete him." Signed [redacted] /// [redacted]"

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/1/83

The following is a summary of a review of the evidence seized in a duly authorized search warrant conducted at the residence known as [REDACTED]. This is the home address of [REDACTED].

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The following is a summary of evidence that is relevant to this case. All evidence from print-outs, etc., were obtained from a single black three ring binder. The following items were contained within that binder:

- (1) A computer print-out with approximately 30 metro phone access codes.
- (2) A lined sheet of paper with 32 names and numbers written on it. Of particular interest is number 03 which reflects the name [REDACTED] followed by the phone numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Number 04 is [REDACTED] followed by the phone number [REDACTED]. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were illegitimate users of the Telemail System and the node known as SCPP. This sheet of paper also contains the names [REDACTED] with telephone number [REDACTED]. It also contains the name [REDACTED] and the phone number [REDACTED]. These previous people were also the subject of searches conducted by the FBI on October 12, 1983.
- (3) A computer print-out listing approximately 20 MCI access codes.
- (4) A list of Telemail commands.
- (5) An unlined white sheet of paper bearing the name [REDACTED] Underneath that is the name [REDACTED] and the telephone number [REDACTED].


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b7C

Investigation on 11/15/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633

by SA [REDACTED] :plw Date dictated 11/15/83

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- (6) A computer print-out with a list titled, "Users SCPP." That list then lists the names



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- (7) A computer print-out labeled Telenet Admins. This is approximately 20 pages that apparently lists every Telemail administrator.

- (8) A computer print-out that has the word Arpnet and the telephone number [redacted] written on it. This is followed by what appeared to be commands to access a host.

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- (9) A multiple page computer print-out that begins "[redacted] Presents ... the Complete Telenet Access Port Directory." This is followed by an extensive listing of what appeared to be very Telenet access dial in number.

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- (10) A computer print-out with additional handwritten notes on it. The notes began "558" and then the word prefix followed by approximately 50 four digit numbers. Some of these four digit numbers have the word Telenet written next to them. This computer print-out also contains the word nodes followed by the term Raytheon Promo-Promo and then the word "Bang" then the word SCPP. This print-out also contains the handwritten word nodes TRW. Both Raytheon and TRW were Telemail host companies that were illegally penetrated by Hackers.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/16/84

A review of the "floppy disk" seized during a search of the residence of [redacted] revealed that there was nothing on the floppy disk that pertained to Telemail or any other illegal activities.

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Investigation on 1/10/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted]gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7C

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

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Sub G [redacted]

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 12/19/83

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user known as [redacted] on GTF Telemail.

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The date and time of each message is provided with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

- 1) September 13, 1983, 9:51 p.m. (All times Eastern Daylight Time)
- 2) September 14, 1983, 1:16 a.m.
- 3) September 14, 1983, 1:27 a.m.
- 4) September 14, 1983, 12:23 a.m.
- 5) September 15, 1983, 1:48 a.m. This message reads in part, "Well, I have only read a few msgs that were not addressed to the SCPP. Most of the time I get the 'info. withheld for privacy' crap. I'm gonna keep trying though."
- 6) September 14, 1983, 6:25 p.m. This message reads, "Well, what do you think? Remember that there may always be someone up there watching, so be careful what you say. Try to access all the neat things you can, okay? I'll talk to [redacted] when I can."
- 7) September 14, 1983, 10:41 p.m. This message reads, "Watch what you say on here. Big Brother might be watching. Like, don't use people's first names and stuff. Neat system, huh?"
- 8) September 15, 1983, 1:55 a.m. This message reads, "Well, we now obviously have a great incentive for getting new members. (Guess) I already told [redacted] but we need to start going for recruitment fast before this thing goes out. [redacted] and I were even talking about setting up a private SCPP Board in someone's house after awhile."
- 9) September 16, 1983, 2:15 a.m.
- 10) September 16, 1983, 7:37 p.m. This message reads, "I'd like to talk to you about a few things. Is it all right if I call you? I have your Ph#, mine is [redacted] and my name is [redacted] if you wanna call me."
- 11) September 17, 1983, 2:14 a.m.
- 12) September 17, 1983, 3:10 a.m.

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Investigation on 12/13/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-63
 by SA [redacted] :bt1 Date dictated 12/13/83 Sub G

- 13) September 17, 1983, 2:25 p.m.
- 14) September 17, 1983, 4:36 p.m.
- 15) September 15, 1983, 9:06 p.m.
- 16) September 15, 1983, 9:11 p.m.
- 17) September 16, 1983, 2:15 a.m.
- 18) September 16, 1983, 12:51 a.m.
- 19) September 16, 1983, 12:55 a.m.
- 20) September 17, 1983, 5:48 p.m.
- 21) September 17, 1983, 5:54 p.m. This message reads,
"Don't worry, I don't think there is anything to
worry about BECA; system interrupt mode;;; I know
who you are. You should know better! Telemail
deleting user: SYS 3471874/CUT Telemail disconnected
at 13:35 49 49 47 4 C."
- 22) September 17, 1983, 5:56 p.m. This message reads,
"Did you know that if you do a shift control P
anywhere that it will put you into Telenet and still
be connected to Telemail? Then you do a CONT at the
Prompt... later."
- 23) September 17, 1983, 6:02 p.m.
- 24) September 17, 1983, 6:37 p.m.
- 25) September 18, 1983, 6:18 p.m. This message reads,
"I need some addresses for VAX on Telenet." This
message is asking for connect addresses for a
particular type of computer system (VAX) on Telenet.
- 26) September 18, 1983, 11:06 p.m. This message reads,
"No I don't have a new method of hacking VAX LAMC,
it is called someone gave me some passwords, Jesus
Christ, why couldn't you have just given them to me
without having to ask such a lame question?"
- 27) September 20, 1983, 2:10 a.m.
- 28) September 20, 1983, 10:20 p.m.
- 29) September 21, 1983, 1:01 a.m.
- 30) September 21, 1983, 1:05 a.m.
- 31) September 21, 1983, 6:22 p.m.
- 32) September 21, 1983, 11:13 p.m.
- 33) September 22, 1983, 1:48 a.m.
- 34) September 21, 1983, 6:32 p.m.
- 35) September 21, 1983, 9:22 p.m.
- 36) September 21, 1983, 7:21 p.m.
- 37) September 22, 1983, 8:00 p.m.
- 38) September 22, 1983, 8:05 p.m.
- 39) September 23, 1983, 12:58 a.m.
- 40) September 23, 1983, 1:07 a.m.
- 41) September 22, 1983, 9:29 p.m.

- 42) September 22, 1983, 10:16 p.m. This message is to: [REDACTED] and reads, "Can you please tell me how to make free calls?" b6 b7C
- 43) September 23, 1983, 12:58 a.m.
- 44) September 23, 1983, 1:02 a.m.
- 45) September 23, 1983, 1:02 a.m.
- 46) September 24, 1983, 12:23 p.m.
- 47) September 23, 1983, 1:07 a.m.
- 48) September 23, 1983, 6:09 p.m.
- 49) September 24, 1983, 1:10 a.m.
- 50) September 24, 1983, 2:31 a.m.
- 51) September 24, 1983, 11:57 a.m.
- 52) September 25, 1983, 12:39 a.m.
- 53) September 25, 1983, 2:02 a.m.
- 54) September 25, 1983, 11:25 a.m.
- 55) September 25, 1983, 6:20 a.m.
- 56) September 25, 1983, 12:44 a.m.
- 57) September 26, 1983, 1:00 a.m.
- 58) September 26, 1983, 11:54 p.m. This message reads in part, "The major crackers are probably beginning to notice [REDACTED] starting to make a name for themselves and this scares them, so they try to do anything they can to disrupt this." [REDACTED] is a self reference.
- 59) September 27, 1983, 10:40 a.m.
- 60) September 27, 1983, 12:32 a.m. b6 b7C
- 61) September 28, 1983, 1:34 a.m.
- 62) September 28, 1983, 9:41 p.m.
- 63) September 29, 1983, 1:30 a.m.
- 64) September 29, 1983, 6:12 p.m.
- 65) September 30, 1983, 9:34 p.m.
- 66) October 1, 1983, 10:25 a.m.
- 67) October 4, 1983, 6:29 p.m.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/28/83

The following is a report of a review of evidence seized pursuant to a duly authorized Federal Search Warrant conducted at the residence known as [redacted]

[redacted] This is the residence of [redacted] aka [redacted]

b6
b7C

The following is a summary of the evidence contained on hand-written sheets of paper and computer print-outs:

1.) A computer print-out beginning with the words [redacted] and containing a sign-off as follows, [redacted]

b6
b7C

2.) Two sheets of paper with the words, [redacted] printed out on it.

3.) A two-page computer print-out titled [redacted] Telenet Addresses. This contains numerous connect addresses and names of various telenet hosts including Citibank Cash Manager, Nasa Reconnaissance and E.F. Hutton.

b6
b7C

4.) A computer print-out titled [redacted] Telenet Access Codes. This consists of numerous connect addresses and names of host systems, including Nasa Reconnaissance, Stanford University, Dartmouth College and Irving Trust Cash Register.

b6
b7C

5.) A computer print-out of numerous names and phone numbers, including [redacted] telephone number [redacted]

b6
b7C

6.) This is a computer print-out of a message from [redacted] dated 9/17/83, listing a source account and password and three other computer accounts and passwords.

b6
b7C

7.) A computer print-out containing a message left by [redacted] dated July 10, no year, listing Metronphone codes and access numbers. [redacted] is [redacted] the subject of a search in this matter.

Investigation on 11/17/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
Sub G
by SA [redacted]:gaj Date dictated 11/17/83

b6
b7C

8.) A computer print-out with a message from [redacted]
[redacted] dated 9/9/83, stating in part, "My number: [redacted]"
Underneath the number is hand-written the word [redacted]

b6
b7C

9.) A sheet of white paper with the word [redacted]
written on it followed by the word Carrier - [redacted] and then
the word Voice - [redacted].

10.) A sheet of white paper with the hand-written
note on it "Real Names: [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted]"

b6
b7C

11.) This is a computer print-out containing the
following names and phone numbers: [redacted]
[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/16/84

During the months of November and December, 1983, [redacted], a computer programmer, examined various software and "floppy disks" in connection with this case.

b6
b7C

[redacted] found the following information that is of interest:

b6
b7C

On the "floppy disk" labelled 196-633-Sub G 1B2, Number 7, the words "Osuny BBS 'text'" is found. When this floppy disk was placed in the computer it revealed the following information: Under the title "File2", [redacted] found various and assorted messages from a home "bulletin board". These messages include a listing of various credit card long distance access numbers and instructions on how to break into a computer system known as RSTS.

b6
b7C

In a section labelled "MSG3", [redacted] found assorted messages from a bulletin board. [redacted] found additional messages from a home bulletin board in sections labelled "MSG5" and "MSG6".

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/10/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/16/84

Review of evidence seized in the search of []
[] the residence of []
[] revealed one duo fone dialer. This is a hand-held
device which simulates the tones produced by a touch tone
phone. This type of device is often used by hackers and
phone phreaks to by-pass billing procedures used by the
phone company and obtain free long distance phone calls.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/10/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [] :gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7C

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	RESC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		\$127.58	
[redacted]	CSOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		\$3.00	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/19/83

The following is a summary of messages left by the illegal user known as [redacted] on GTE Telemail. The date and time of each message is provided with a synopsis of particularly significant messages included.

b6
b7C

- 1) September 17, 1983, 7:24 p.m.
- 2) September 24, 1983, 1:07 a.m.
- 3) September 24, 1983, 2:58 a.m.
- 4) September 24, 1983, 2:54 a.m.
- 5) September 27, 1983, 9:21 p.m. This message reads in part, "We decided that the party will start at 11:00 and this is for the SCPP Members who want to join. Then around 12:30 we will start the distribution of the newest stuff! We will have about five or six computers. One will be displaying Telemail for the new SCPP Members, one will be used for Prom-Blasting."
- 6) September 28, 1983, 1:07 p.m.
- 7) October 9, 1983, 2:21 p.m.
- 8) October 9, 1983, 2:22 p.m.

Investigation on 12/13/83 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :btl Date dictated 12/13/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 12/9/83

This report is a review of evidence seized pursuant to a duly authorized Federal Search Warrant executed at the residence known as [REDACTED] on October 12, 1983. This address is the residence of [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED].

b6
b7C

The following is a summary of hand-written notes or printed information of relevance to this investigation:

1.) A white sheet of paper containing a hand-written note beginning with the words "Hi boys" and ending with the signature "Love Dad". A quote from that letter is as follows, "You told me about your ability to access other computers with the phone and right after you left those computer raiding stories developed. Some of those kids could get into a lot of trouble. I hope you two are using good judgement and not doing that type of thing. Think! I know you will."

2.) A yellow scrap of paper with the words [REDACTED] printed on it.

b6
b7C

3.) A yellow sheet of paper with the words [REDACTED] printed on it.

4.) A computer print-out containing instructions about how to use a Telemail account.

5.) A computer print-out containing a message from [REDACTED] dated September 17, 1983, in which he gives a source account, user name and password.

b6
b7C

6.) Two sheets of lined paper with hand-written notes listing names and phone numbers. The names and numbers include the following: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 11/17/83 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [REDACTED]:gaj Date dictated 11/17/83

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/16/84

Review of evidence seized in the search of [redacted]
[redacted], the residence of [redacted]
[redacted], revealed a brown manilla envelope with
a return address listed as [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/10/84 at Alexandria, Va. File # Alexandria 196A-633
by SA [redacted] :gaj Date dictated 1/11/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 1/30/84

Subsequent to a search pursuant to a duly authorized Federal Search Warrant at the residence known as [redacted] [redacted] the residence of [redacted] [redacted], a computer programmer, examined the "floppy discs" that were seized in this search.

b6
b7C

The following is a summary of the information that [redacted] found on those discs. On the disc labelled 196-633-Sub G 1B-3, [redacted] Number Two, a program called "MCI Place. MW" was found. This program contains an 800 phone number and a list of MCI access codes. Another program on that disc was called "Passwords. MW." This program contains phone numbers of bulletin boards as well as individuals. It also contains MCI, Metrofone, and ITT access codes. The next program on this disc was called "Names." This contained a listing of administrators for the GTE telemail network.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/13/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633
SubG
by SA [redacted] :mbe Date dictated 1/13/84

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/84

On January 24, 1984, [redacted]
[redacted] GTE-Telemail, provided a copy of the amount of money
lost by GTE Telemail from the unauthorized use by the hackers.
This document is broken down by user and by company.

b6
b7c

Many of the hackers had two or more user names,
therefore the following will be a summary of the above document,
indicating totals by each user, combining multiple user names
(this summary covers the months of July, August and September
for each company):

USER	COMPANY	AMOUNT	MONTHS
[redacted]	AHSC	\$62.29	July, August, September
	UAW	\$31.00	September
[redacted]	Maraven	\$16.00	August, September
	Telenet	\$108.00	July, August
[redacted]	BMW	\$0.29	September
		<u>\$127.58</u>	
[redacted]	CBOT	\$2.00	September
[redacted]	RADA	\$1.00	September
		<u>\$3.00</u>	
[redacted]	Maraven	\$24.00	August
	Telenet	\$325.00	July
	Telenet	\$151.00	August

b6
b7cb6
b7cb6
b7c

Investigation on 1/25/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria 196A-633

by SA [redacted] :sfk Date dictated 1/25/84

b6
b7c

AX 196A-633

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Summary of Activities ([REDACTED])	4	b7C
Summary of Activities ([REDACTED])	5	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/13/84

This is a summary of the activities of []
on GTE Telemail.

b6
b7C

[] used the name [] and [] and
was an unauthorized user in the accounts of RADA CORPORATION,
AHSC, and RAYTHEON COMPANY.

b6
b7C

He accessed the Telemail System at least 18 times
from approximately August 27, 1983 to September 10, 1983.

[] true name and home phone number were provided
to the FBI by confidential source.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/31/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633 Sub G
by SA [] plw Date dictated 2/2/84

b6
b7C

*Extra
Copy*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/13/84

This is a summary of the activity of [redacted]
on GTE Telemail.

b6
b7C

[redacted] used the name [redacted] and he was part of
a group known as SCPP and was an unauthorized user in the
account of RAYTHEON COMPANY.

b6
b7C

[redacted] accessed the Telemail System at least
39 times between September 14 and October 7, 1983.

b6
b7C

Trap and trace records provided by [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b7E
b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/31/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633 Sub G
by SA [redacted] plw Date dictated 2/2/84

b6
b7C*3*

433

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/13/84

The following is a summary of the activity of
[redacted] on GTE Telemail.

b6
b7C

[redacted] used the name [redacted] and was part
of a group known as SCPP, which was an unauthorized "node"
in the account of RAYTHEON COMPANY.

b6
b7C

[redacted] accessed the Telemail System at least
67 times from approximately September 13, 1983, to October 4, 1983.

b6
b7C

In a message on September 16, 1983, he states,
"My phone number is [redacted] and my name is [redacted]."

b6
b7C

Trap and trace records provided by [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b7E
b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/31/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandria
196A-633 Sub G-
by SA [redacted] plw Date dictated 2/2/84

b6
b7C

✓ 434

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 2/13/

This is a summary of the activity of [redacted]
[redacted] on GTE Telemail.

b6
b7C

[redacted] used the name [redacted]
and were unauthorized users in the account of RAYTHEON
COMPANY.

b6
b7C

[redacted] accessed the Telemail System at
least 44 times from September 15, 1983 to October 10, 1983.

Trap and trace information provided by [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b7E
b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/31/84 at Alexandria, Virginia File # Alexandri
196A-633
by SA [redacted] :plw Date dictated 2/2/84
b6
b7C

435*

AX0026 0461057Z

RECEIVED

TELETYPE UNIT

RR HQ AL BU DE LA NY OC OM PX SD

15 FEB 84 11 21

DE AX

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

R/170500Z FEB 84

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

ALBANY ROUTINE

BUFFALO ROUTINE

DETROIT ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEW YORK (BQ-MRA, HAUPPAUGE RA) ROUTINE

OKLAHOMA CITY ROUTINE

OMAHA ROUTINE

PHOENIX ROUTINE

SAN DIEGO ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; OO: AX

REFERENCE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING
OFFICES, JANUARY 20, 1984.

FOR INFORMATION, ON FEBRUARY 3, 1984, USA, EDVA, SENT LETTERS

70 FEB 16 1984

Exec AD-Adm.	
Exec AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	60A1K0
Ident.	
Insp.	
Intell.	
Lab.	
Legal Coun.	
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

b6
b7c

[Handwritten signature]

196-4713-33

45

[Handwritten signature]

6-40

PAGE TWO 196A-633 UNCLAS

TO ALL SUBJECTS OF SEARCHES IN THIS MATTER. THIS LETTER INDICATED THE REVIEW OF EVIDENCE WAS COMPLETE AND THAT MOST OF THE HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE WAS READY TO BE RETURNED. THE LETTER CONTINUED THAT A PROSECUTIVE DECISION WAS STILL PENDING AND THAT RETURN OF EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A DECLINATION OF CHARGES. FURTHER, IF NO RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED BY THE USA, EDVA, WITHIN TEN DAYS, THE MATERIAL WAS TO BE MAILED DIRECTLY TO THE OWNER.

ACCORDINGLY, ALEXANDRIA WILL BEGIN MAILING MATERIAL NOT CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY THE USA, EDVA, DIRECTLY TO THE OWNERS.

REFERENCED LETTER CONTAINED AN ITEMIZED LIST OF EQUIPMENT BEING RETURNED AND INSTRUCTED OWNERS TO CONTACT AUSA [REDACTED] [REDACTED], EDVA, WITH ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EVIDENCE.

b6
b7C

LEADS FOR ALL RECEIVING OFFICES:

ANY EQUIPMENT IN POSSESSION OF AUXILIARY OFFICES MAY NOW BE RETURNED TO THE OWNER BY MAIL OR OTHER METHOD IF CONVENIENT TO THE AUXILIARY OFFICE.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE "HOLD HARMLESS" AGREEMENT MENTIONED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE IS NOT NECESSARY AND SHOULD NOT BE EXECUTED.

ANY QUESTIONS IN REFERENCE TO EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REFERRED

PAGE THREE 196A-633 UNCLAS

TO AUSA [REDACTED], EOVA, TELEPHONE NUMBER (703) 557-9100.

b6
b7c

BT

SAC, Alexandria

2/15/84

Director, FBI

mf
MAIN FRAME

FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY

OO: ALEXANDRIA

AX File Number: 196-A-633

[REDACTED]

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
ELECTRONICS (GTE); TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER
COMPUTERS; FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
OO: MILWAUKEE
MI File Number: 196-B-798
Bufile: 196-4578

b6
b7C

BUDED: 3/1/84

ReBulets to SAC, Alexandria, et. al. dated 10/27/83
and 1/12/84, captioned as above.

ReBulet 10/27/83 contained an original request for the
recipients to furnish information regarding computer hackers. As
of 1/12/84, only four recipients of that communication had
responded, making it necessary to prepare reBulet 1/12/84 as a
follow-up request. Responses from recipients of instant letter
have not yet been received at FBIHQ. Submit your responses by
close of business 3/1/84 to the Technical Services Division, Room
7159.

- 2 - Boston
- 2 - Detroit
- 2 - Newark
- 2 - New York
- 2 - Omaha

Exec AD Adm. 1 - [REDACTED] Rm. 3841, TL #231
Exec AD Inv. 1 - [REDACTED] Rm. 1376, TL #153
Exec AD LES [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. RSM
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Insp.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y



1 FEB 29 1984

MAR 6 1984

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 196-4578

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 1/19/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(Attn: Technical Services, Division, Room 7159)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (196A-3225) (WCC-1) (P)

RE: MAIN FRAME;
FBW; CONSPIRACY
OO: Alexandria

b6
b7c

Re Bureau letter to SAC Alexandria and Los Angeles dated 10/27/83 and Bureau letter from Director to SAC Alexandria and Los Angeles dated 1/12/84.

For the information of Technical Services Division, prior to receiving Bureau letter dated October 27, 1983, Los Angeles Division had already packaged and forwarded to Alexandria Division all evidence seized in the searches conducted by Los Angeles. Alexandria Division is still in custody of this evidence and any review of the material seized would have to be accomplished by Alexandria Division.

3 - Bureau
2 - Alexandria
2 - Los Angeles

DRH/BAR
(7)

267

JAN 23 1984

Approved: RTO/Ry Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

Memorandum



To : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ROOM 7159)

Date 1/30/84

From : SAC, BALTIMORE (196B-1048) (SQ. 7) (RUC)

Subject : MAIN FRAME
FRAUD BY WIRE; CONSPIRACY
OO: ALEXANDRIA
AX File Number: 196A-633

b6
b7C



b6
b7C

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY TO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
ELECTRONICS (GTE); TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER
COMPUTERS; FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
OO: MILWAUKEE
MI File Number: 196B-798
Bufile: 196-4578


Re Bureau letters to SAC Alexandria, et al dated
10/27/83 and 1/12/84.

Recipients of the referenced communication of
10/27/83 were requested to furnish information regarding
any possible link between the evidence seized in the Hackers
matter and the Department of Defense computer systems.
Baltimore Division neither seized any evidence in the Hackers
matter nor was advised of any such evidence seized by other
divisions. Therefore, Baltimore Division can provide no
opinion as to any possible link between the evidence seized
and the Department of Defense computer systems.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

2 - Bureau
1 - Baltimore
MDL:ds

64 APR 11 1984



Memorandum



To : DIRECTOR, FBI Date 1/19/84
ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ROOM 7159

From : SAC, OKLAHOMA CITY (196A-1270) (P)

Subject : MAIN FRAME
FBW; CONSPIRACY
AX file number 196A-633



b6
b7C

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE
AND ELECTRONICS (GTE); TELENET SYSTEM
CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
FBW; ITSP
OO: Milwaukee
MI FILE NUMBER (196-798)
Bufile: 196-4578

Re Bureau letters to Alexandria 10/27/83 and 1/12/84.

Oklahoma City Division has reviewed the enclosures of
the Bureau letter of 10/27/83.

Oklahoma City Division sees no significance in the
enclosures, but it should be noted that all the data and
information seized was forwarded to the Alexandria Division.
Therefore, Oklahoma City Division does not have an extended base
of information by which to review the enclosures.

196-4578-
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

② - Bureau
2 - Oklahoma City
JRD:rgm
(4)

64 MAY 1984

196-4713-35x1
4/2
JAN 27 1984

ODAG EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT CONTROL DATA

From: CRANSTON, SENATOR ALAN
To: OLA

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Date Received: 02-13-84 Date Due: 03-01-84 Control #: 4021307107
Subject & Date:
02-08 LETTER ON BEHALF OF [REDACTED]
OBJECTING TO METHODS USED BY FBI IN A RECENT INCIDENT IN
IRVINE.

b6
b7C

MAIN FRAME

Referred To:	Date:	Referred To:	Date:	File:
(1) FBI;WEBSTER	02-15-84	(5)		
(2)		(6)		
(3)		(7)		Pnty:
(4)		(8)		2
Interim By:		Date:		Opr:
Sig. For: FBI		Date Released:		HED

Remarks:
CC OLA. OLA TO MAIL INTERIM RESPONSE.
RETURN THIS FORM W/2 COPIES OF REPLY TO EXEC. SEC.,
ROOM 4416, EXT. 5305.

Other Remarks:

b6
b7C

*Originals returned
3-2-84
NB:gw*

DE-168
V-46

196 - 4713 - 36

MAR 6 1984

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

57 APR 12 1984

do/mh

34



36

196-4713-36

196-4713-36

ALAN CRANSTON
CALIFORNIA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 8, 1984

Congressional Liaison
To: Department of Justice
Constitution Avenue and
10th Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20350

Enclosure from:



8404002

b6
b7C

Re: Please respond to this constituent's concerns re the
FBI's methods and their response to charges re enclosure.

I forward the attached for your consideration.


Your report, in duplicate, along with the return of the enclosure
will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Alan Cranston
Alan Cranston

Please address envelope to:
Senator Alan Cranston
112 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510


Attn:



b6
b7C

196-4713-36

*Back to Justice Dept
for inv. of methods
& their response
to charges
#16*



Dear Senator Alan Cranston,

b6
b7C

As a resident of Irvine, I am deeply concerned with the tactics the FBI used in our city a few days ago. I feel the local newspaper "The Register" has hit the nail on the head. I have enclosed a copy of the article for you to read. The laws were not made to harass people, but to protect them.

You as an elected official are put into office by the people in essence you are our voice. I would like you to look into this incident and see what can be done about the FBI. Please find out why they acted in the manner described. If this is allowed to pass by without an outcry from us, they will feel they can continue to confiscate anything they please in the future. I am looking forward to hearing from you on this matter and seeing what action you will take.

Thank you in advance for your attention in this matter.

Sincerely,



b6
b7C

196-4713-36

February 14, 1984

Honorable Alan Cranston
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

ATTN:

b6
b7C

Dear Senator Cranston:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 8, 1984, received by the Department on February 13, 1984, on behalf of .

b6
b7C

A further response will be forthcoming as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Robert A. McConnell
Assistant Attorney General

CC: Exec. Sec. File, OLA
4021307107

196-4713-36

The Register

A division of Freedom Newspapers, Inc.

"There is no security on this earth; there is only opportunity."

Gen. Douglas MacArthur

R. David Threshie Jr., publisher
K. E. Grubbs Jr., editorial pages editor
N. Christian Anderson, editor

R.C. Hoiles, co-publisher 1935-1970
C.H. Hoiles, co-publisher 1935-1979
Harry Hoiles, co-publisher 1975-1979

FBI storm tactics in Irvine

A few weeks ago the Woodbridge area in Irvine was leafletted by local police. Residents were warned to be careful about opening the door to strangers. The purpose, everyone thought, was a rash of rapes in the area. In light of subsequent developments, does it almost seem like an advance warning that the FBI was planning a dawn raid on teenage computer hackers? No, it couldn't be.

The way the FBI conducted those raids, even the fact that raids were conducted at all, raises disturbing questions. You might not be surprised at such activities in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. But in Irvine?

Based on information released to date, the four Irvine teen-agers were among perhaps a dozen in different parts of the country who may have tapped into the commercial Telemail system run by GTE, using it to send messages without paying the fees commercial clients pay.

If that's the extent of their wrongdoing, some law enforcement officials could have talked to the boys and their parents, explaining what they had done and informing them they would receive bills for their unauthorized use.

Perhaps something more serious is afoot. Perhaps these boys have, inadvertently or not, tapped into something else. Perhaps federal authorities really want to get at the mysterious San Diego fellow they know as The Cracker, who reportedly told the Irvine boys how to get into the Telemail system and may be into heavier things. If so, the low-key approach, seeking cooperation, could well have been the best way to do it.

Instead, the FBI conducted a heavy-handed, heavy-footed raid at dawn. When one family didn't answer the door (at 6:15 in the morning!), an agent actually broke into a boy's bedroom. FBI agents seized computers and com-

puter equipment, much of it expensive. There's doubt now about when (if ever!) the boys will get their equipment back.

Were these boys running a murder ring or something to justify such tactics? Hardly. To date they haven't been arrested or even charged with a crime. Yet the FBI has stolen (yes, that's the proper word) their equipment and may or may not give it back.


This should be a real shocker to anybody who believes the United States is, or ought to be, a free country.

It's difficult to see why the computer terminals were seized. In and of themselves, they can do little to establish what the boys did with them. If the FBI needed to establish that the boys had terminals, they could have made out a sworn statement to that effect and had the boys and their parents sign them.

Furthermore, if the boys really were up to something devious, taking their computers is a small deterrent. Access to computer terminals is relatively easy. Is the FBI prepared to confiscate everyone's home computer?

It is a sad day when law enforcement can walk into someone's home and seize property for an undetermined amount of time when a case is in its initial stages and indictments may not be sought for months. Yet some attorneys believe that if no indictment is issued, the parents may have to sue the government to get their boys' property back!

The FBI should put up or shut up: Either charge these boys with a crime and start prosecution immediately, or give them back their property. If no indictment is sought, the computers should be accompanied with a contrite apology and compensatory damages. Those responsible for this outrage should be punished or fired.

Otherwise, the FBI is operating on the same moral level as a burglar. 

March 2, 1984

Honorable Alan Cranston
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Senator Cranston:

MAINFRAME

Your February 8th communication on behalf of [redacted] has been referred to the FBI for reply.

b6
b7C

Since the investigation to which your constituent refers is ongoing, it would be inappropriate for me to comment specifically on any aspects of the case at this time. However, I would like to explain the FBI's investigative procedures and responsibilities in such investigations.

When we receive information indicating that a violation of a Federal law has occurred, is occurring or will occur and we determine there are items of evidentiary value, we obtain a judicially authorized search warrant for the premises where the evidence is believed to be located. As with any search warrant, the evidence being sought must be specifically described, as must the location to be searched. The time of execution of the search warrant is usually decided upon between the investigating Agent and the Federal prosecutor based on several needs, the most important of which would be the protection of the evidence. Although personal convenience to the subjects is a consideration, it is secondary to protection of the evidence. When the FBI is conducting an investigation, the fact that some of the alleged perpetrators may be juveniles does not diminish the seriousness of the crime, nor does it lessen the FBI's responsibility to protect the victims from further illegal activity.

I hope this information will assist you in responding to [redacted], and I am returning your enclosures as requested.

b6
b7C

Sincerely yours,

151

Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

Enclosures (2)

196-4713-37

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

2 - Executive Secretariat - Enclosures (5)
Room 4416, DOJ
1 - Alexandria (196A-633) - Enclosures (3)
1 - Los Angeles - Enclosures (3)
1 - [redacted] - Enclosures (5)
1 - Administrative Unit, CID, Room 5121
1 - Congressional Affairs Unit - detached

NB:rfr (12) SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAR 6 1984

b6
b7C

MAIL ROOM

FBI/DOJ

Honorable Alan Cranston

NOTE: [redacted], who is not identifiable in Bufiles, writes to Senator Cranston to show his dissatisfaction with the manner in which the FBI recovered computer equipment which was allegedly used in tapping into the commercial Telemail system run by GTE. He enclosed a newspaper article entitled "FBI storm tactics in Irvine." Reply coordinated with SA [redacted] [redacted], White-Collar Crimes Section, CID, and portion of response taken from response to a similar letter referred to the FBI by Congressman Robert E. Badham.

b6
b7C

APPROVED: *RDP* *A/g*

Director	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.	
Exec. AD Adm.	Crim. Inv. <i>OBG/</i>	Plan. & Insp.	
Exec. AD Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgnt.	
Exec. AD LES	Intell.	Tech. Servs.	
	Laboratory	Training	
		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	

WOT

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/22/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

MAINFRAME

FBW; CONSPIRACY

OO:ALEXANDRIA

Re Bureau letter to Alexandria dated 2/15/84.

Enclosed for the Bureau is Alexandria airtel dated 11/14/83.

Enclosed airtel is Alexandria's response to Bureau letter dated 10/27/83.

② - Bureau (Enc. 1)
 2 - Alexandria
 CMK:llv
 (4)

196-4913-38

12 FEB 23 1984

1*

Approved:

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

b6
b7c

8-10
 Room 7/59

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

MAIN FRAME
FRAUD BY WIRE;
CONSPIRACY
(OO:AX)

[redacted], Et Al;
FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
(OO:MI)

b6
b7C

Re Director's letter to SAC, Alexandria, 10/27/83.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two packets containing copies of evidence obtained in the "Main Frame" investigation.

Packet number one contains copies of printed and hand-written material seized during the search of the residence located at [redacted]. This is the residence of [redacted] aka [redacted] is [redacted] years-old and quotes in a recent Detroit newspaper indicated he claims to have penetrated Arpanet. The printed material in packet number one is apparently a listing of every Arpanet and Milnet host with the "connect address" or host number for each. The hand-written material also contains host names, connect addresses and also includes some user names and passwords. There is reason to believe that this information was shared freely with other hackers.

b6
b7C

2-Bureau (Enc. 2)
2-Albany (Info)
2-Buffalo (Info)
2-Detroit (Info)
2-Los Angeles (Info)
2-New York (Info)
2-Oklahoma City (Info)
2-Omaha (Info)
2-Phoenix (Info)
2-San Diego (Info)
2-Alexandria
GDF:gaj
(22)

(Main file)

196A-633 ✓-53

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED [initials]



[initials]

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

196-4713-38

ENCLOSURE

Packet number two contains copies of messages left on telemail by hackers known as [redacted] and [redacted] (aliases). [redacted] has been tentatively identified as [redacted] [redacted] years-old). True identity of [redacted] is unknown. Information contained in packet number two was apparently obtained from some other sources (one being the Defense Data Network Newsletter) and then entered into telemail to be shared with other hackers.

b6
b7C

For information of the Bureau, all offices conducting searches in the Main Frame case (Albany, Buffalo, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Oklahoma City, Omaha, Phoenix and San Diego) were requested to forward all evidence to Alexandria for analysis, therefore this response may constitute completion of lead in referenced letter for those offices.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 3/19/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ADIC, NEW YORK (196B-2942) p

SUBJECT: MAINFRAME
FBW
(OO:AX)

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

2- Bureau
1- New York
JCM/jcm

MAR 20 1984

Approved:

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 196-4778-^e81

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/27/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (196-4578)
 (Atten: Technical Services Division-Room 7159)

FROM: SAC, DETROIT (28E-847) (C-6)

① MAIN FRAME
 FRAUD BY WIRE;
 CONSPIRACY;
 (OO: ALEXANDRIA)
 Alexandria File Number 196A-633

b6
 b7C

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
 TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS;
 TELENET SYSTEMS CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
 FRAUD BY WIRE;
 ITSP;
 (OO: MILWAUKEE)
 Milwaukee File Number 196B-798
 Bureau File Number 196-4578

b6
 b7C

Re Bulets to SAC, Alexandria, Et Al, dated 10/27/83,
 1/12/84, and 2/15/84, captioned as above and Alexandria
 airtel to Director, dated 11/14/83.

The information being requested of the Detroit
 Division was obtained as a result of executing a search
 warrant on 10/12/83, in the Main Frame investigation.

② - Bureau
 2 - Alexandria (Info)
 1 - Detroit
 MAH/mar. 83/ 84

Approved: DX lu

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 196-4578

DE 28E-847

Per instructions of the office of origin, all documents seized were forwarded to the office of origin on 10/21/83. The airtel from Alexandria to the Bureau, dated 11/14/83, advised that Alexandria was in possession of all documentation seized by auxiliary offices in the Main Frame matter and the package submitted by Alexandria was to constitute completion of the lead for Detroit and other offices involved.

There was no response to Bulet, dated 1/12/84, by Detroit due to statements in the Alexandria airtel to Director, assuming responsibility for covering the requested lead.

SA [] contacted [], Technical Services Division, Room 7159, on 2/24/84, referencing Bulet, dated 2/15/84. SA [] advised [] that the lead to Detroit had been satisfied by Alexandria in their airtel, dated 11/14/83.

b6
b7c

Memorandum



To : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: TSD, ROOM 7159)

From : SAC, BUFFALO (196A-529) (P)

Subject : MAIN FRAME
FBW; CONSPIRACY
(OO: ALEXANDRIA)
(AX File 196A-633)

Date 2/8/84

b6
b7c

[REDACTED]
ET AL
UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE);
TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
FBW; ITSP
(OO: MILWAUKEE)
(MI File 196B-798)
(Bureau file 196-4578)

Re Bureau let to Alexandria, 10/27/83, and Bureau let to Alexandria, 1/12/84.

The Buffalo Division's response to above captioned matters and referenced letters is negative. Investigation is continuing, however, in the Buffalo Division.

2 - Bureau
2 - Alexandria
2 - Buffalo

JK:bar
(6)

64 MAY 4 1984

4/2
FEB 18 1984

7159

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:


☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/22/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 (ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ROOM 7159)

FROM: SAC, BOSTON

SUBJECT: MAIN FRAME
 FBW; CONSPIRACY
 (OO: ALEXANDRIA)
 (AX: 196A-633)
 (BS: 196A-1229)



UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
 ELECTRONICS (GTE); TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS
 FBW; ITSP
 (OO: MILWAUKEE)
 (MI: 196B-798)
 (BS: 196B-1160)

 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
 196-4113-42

 b6
 b7c

Re Bureau airtels to SAC, Alexandria, 1/12/84 and
 2/15/84; Boston letter to the Bureau, 1/19/84, and Boston airtel
 to the Bureau, 11/29/83, regarding captioned matters.

Enclosed for the Bureau is a copy of referenced Boston
 letter dated 1/19/84, and Boston airtel dated 11/29/83, in response
 to above captioned matters which the Bureau is apparently not in
 receipt of.

ENCLOSURE

- (2) - Bureau (Enc. 2)
 2 - Boston (1 - 196A-1229)
 (1 - 196B-1160)

WGS/dw
 (4)

16 MAR 22 1984

Approved: [Signature]

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

Memorandum




To : DIRECTOR, FBI

Date 1/19/84

From : SAC, BOSTON (196B-1160) (RUC)

Subject : MAIN FRAME;
FBW; CONSPIRACY
OO: ALEXANDRIA
AX: 196A-633



b6
b7C

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE AND
ELECTRONICS (GTE); TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
FBW; ITSP
OO: MILWAUKEE
MI: 196B-798
BU: 196-4578

Re Bureau letter to Alexandria, 1/12/84 and Boston
airtel to the Bureau, 11/29/83.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of Boston's
RUC airtel dated 11/29/83, which responded to Bureau letter
to Alexandria, Et Al, dated 10/27/83. The airtel is self-explanatory
in that Boston, merely being a lead office for Milwaukee,
had no information relative to the request of the Bureau.

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Alexandria (196A-633)
- 2 - Milwaukee (196B-798)
- ① - Boston

WGS/dw

(7)


196-4713-612

ENCLOSURE

Airtel

11/29/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, BOSTON (196B-1160) (RUC)
SUBJECT: MAIN FRAME
FEW; CONSPIRACY
(OO: ALEXANDRIA)
AX File: 196A-633



b6
b7C

UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL
TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONICS (GTE);
TELENET SYSTEM CUSTOMER COMPUTERS;
FRAUD BY WIRE; ITSP
(OO: MILWAUKEE)
MI File: 196B-798
BU File: 196-4578

Re Director airtel to Alexandria dated 10/27/83.

Boston functioned as an auxiliary office in the above captioned Milwaukee case. Therefore, Boston is not in possession of any seized materials to review.

It is noted that the above referenced communication indicated that two enclosures of a sensitive nature were attached to the airtel. However, Boston received only one enclosure which was a blue covered pamphlet containing a list of letters and numbers titled alphabetical listing. It appears from the above referenced communication that Boston did not receive a separate enclosure which contains a numeric listing that is a "sign on" sequence to

2 - Bureau
1 - Alexandria
1 - Boston
GJD/elm
(4)

elm

C

196-473-1172
ENCLOSURE

the computer. A search was conducted at the Boston Division for the missing enclosure. It is believed that the enclosure was inadvertently left off the airtel.

No further investigation outstanding in Boston. This matter has been placed in an RUC status.

AX0015 104 0125Z

RR HQ NY

DE AX

R 012 2100Z APRIL 84

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

NEW YORK ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

13 APR 84 01 33z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	<i>05/2/84</i>
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

ATTN: NEW YORK - BQMRA, HAPPAUGE RA, SA [REDACTED]

"MAINFRAME"; FBW; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED AUGUST 27, 1983;
AND ALEXANDRIA PROSECUTIVE SUMMARY DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1984.

PERMISSION IS REQUESTED FOR SA [REDACTED] TO TRAVEL TO
NEW YORK ON APRIL 19, 1984, TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

AUSA [REDACTED] EDVA, HAS DRAWN UP AN AGREEMENT WITH
THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING BOTH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] IN RETURN FOR
THEIR STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF [REDACTED] AKA
[REDACTED] ON GTE TELEMAL, AUSA [REDACTED] WILL DECLINE PROSECUTION
OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED].

176-4713-43

16 APR 19 1984

APR 15 1984

*0-93 to 1984267
NY [unclear] Alexandria
8/6 MAY 13/84*

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

[] IS THE MOST SERIOUS OFFENDER THAT HAS BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND [] OF THE "PHALERS". THE "PHALERS" THROUGH THEIR ILLEGAL USE OF TELEMAIL SHARED STOLEN ACCOUNT CODES AND PASSWORDS FROM NUMEROUS COMPUTER NETWORKS INCLUDING GTE TELEMAIL, IBM, AUDIO DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS AND THE DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH AND PLANNING AGENCY SYSTEM CALLED "ARPANET". [] HAS [] IN WHICH HE DETAILS THE INVESTIGATION INTO THIS MATTER.

b6
b7C

[] CAN PROVIDE FIRST HAND INFORMATION ABOUT [] METHODS AND FREQUENCY OF ILLEGALLY ASSESSING VARIOUS COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND HIS METHOD OF DEFRAUDING VARIOUS LONG DISTANCE PHONE SYSTEMS.

b6
b7C

[] CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE SAME ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS [] THAT RESULTED IN [] [] IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE FBI EXECUTED A SEARCH WARRANT IN THAT ROOM.

b6
b7C

THESE TWO INTERVIEWS ARE EXPECTED TO BE VERY DETAILED AND TO REQUIRE THE INTERVIEWER TO HAVE PRECISE AND EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ENTIRE CASE. FOR THAT REASON, PERMISSION IS REQUESTED FOR SA [] TO CONDUCT THE INTERVIEWS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF SA

b6
b7C

PAGE THREE AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

HAPPAUGE RA.

b6
b7C

SAC'S ALEXANDRIA AND NEW YORK CONCUR.

BT

099

0.44/ TG ocr
A
B

1 1

4/13/84

UNCLAS

ROUTINE

5F099TRR AX NYIDE HQ H0099 5H0YU0R 131810Z APR 84

FM DIRECTOR, FBI

TO FBI ALEXANDRIA {196A-633} ROUTINE

FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY; 00: ALEXANDRIA.

RE ALEXANDRIA TEL TO THE BUREAU DATED 4/12/84.

FBIHQ AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE TRAVEL OF SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FROM ALEXANDRIA TO NEW YORK AS SET FORTH IN
REFERENCED TELETYPE.

BT

1

b6
b7C

6

196-4713 44

1 + NAB/B

JCS:KLA {4}

4/13/84

3841/6

5594

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - FOF

b6
b7C

16 APR 19 1984

66 MAY 8 1984
267

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

APR 17 1984

AX0010 1291827Z

RR HQ AL BU CG DE LA NY ~~TELETYPE UNIT~~ CC OM PX SD

DE AX

R 081806Z MAY 84

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
8 MAY 84 19 25Z
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

ALBANY ROUTINE

BUFFALO ROUTINE

CHICAGO ROUTINE

DETROIT ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

NEWYORK (MANHATTAN) ROUTINE

OKLAHOMA CITY ROUTINE

OMAHA ROUTINE

PHOENIX ROUTINE

SAN DIEGO ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: NEW YORK--BROOKLYN-QUEENS MRA (HAUPPAUGE RA)

MAINFRAME; FBW; CONSPIRACY (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1984.

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

b6
b7c

63 JUN 1984

196-4713 -45

4 MAY 9 1984

PAGE TWO AX 196A-633 UNCLAS

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND ALL RECEIVING OFFICES, ON MAY 7, 1984, THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WERE INDICTED BY THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY, EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, FOR VIOLATION OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1343, AS FOLLOWS: [REDACTED] (10

COUNTS); [REDACTED] (5 COUNTS); [REDACTED] (3 COUNTS); [REDACTED] (5 COUNTS).

b6
b7C

AUSA [REDACTED] ALSO FILED CRIMINAL INFORMATION ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS FOR VIOLATION OF TITLE 47, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 223 (1) (B); [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED].

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b7C

PROSECUTIVE SUMMARIES ON THE FOLLOWING JUVENILES WILL BE FORWARDED FROM THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, EDVA, TO THE APPROPRIATE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR DISSEMINATION TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

AND [REDACTED]

BT

[redacted]
[redacted]
(LNU); INNER CIRCLE; OPERATIONS
CIRCLE; PHALERS; [redacted] ET AL;
UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GENERAL TELEPHONE
ELECTRONICS (GTE) TELEMAIL SYSTEM; FBW;
CONSPIRACY; OO: ALEXANDRIA

b6
b7C

PURPOSE:

To provide update information including the return of four indictments and the filing of four informations concerning this investigation of unauthorized access into the General Telephone and Electronics Company (GTE) Telemail system.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED: [signature]
Adm. Serv. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. [signature] Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ CH. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

DETAILS:

GTE owns and operates a computer network known as Telenet which links various subscriber businesses and government agencies in numerous cities. Within Telenet is a service known as Telemail which offers computerized message capability between Telemail customers. During September, 1983, GTE learned that their Telemail system had been accessed by unauthorized intruders. The intruders obtain subscriber passwords and create "bulletin boards" which provide access and other information to other intruders.

JCS: [signature] (10)

- 1 - Mr. Baker
- 1 - Mr. Revell
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

16 JUN 6 1984
b6
b7C

(CONTINUED - OVER)

[redacted] to Mr. Revell Memorandum
RE: UNSUBS; [redacted]

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b7C

Investigation by Alexandria identified three loosely organized groups or circles of intruders. The "Inner Circle" consisted of younger intruders some of whom are in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin area, and who are known as the 414s (telephone area code); the "Phalsers" have penetrated and eliminated some records and communications associated with Coca Cola Company and Raytheon; and the [redacted] group (short for [redacted]) which operate out of the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma area. These groups are known to have penetrated Telemail user companies and agencies such as IBM; NASA; Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Time, Incorporated; TRW; Hughes Aircraft Corp.; Northrop Corp.; U. S. Department of Agriculture; BMW; and National Systems Management, Inc. Additionally, the "Phalsers" gained access to the Department of Defense (DOD) ARPNET system.

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On May 7, 1984, the Federal grand jury, Alexandria, Virginia, returned true bills of indictment charging [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted], with multiple violations each of violating Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1343 (Fraud by Wire - Felony). Criminal informations were also filed charging [redacted], and [redacted], with violation of Title 47, U. S. Code, Section 223(1)(B) (Harassing Telephone Calls, a Misdemeanor). Prosecutive summaries on the following juveniles will be forwarded by the United States Attorney (USA), Eastern District of Virginia, to the appropriate USA for dissemination to local authorities: [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted], and [redacted].
Further, prosecutions in the Milwaukee area concerning intrusions into GTE are as follows: [redacted], and [redacted], have either pled guilty, or indicated they will plead guilty to Title 47, U. S. Code, Section 223(1)(B). Further, one to five additional subjects will be given the opportunity to plead to this misdemeanor and those who decline to do so will be prosecuted for Fraud by Wire violations (Felony) according to the USA.

b6
b7C

Any significant developments will be brought to your attention.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

14 JUN 84 21 25Z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

AX0024 1662134Z

RR HQ

DE AX

R 142030Z JUN 84

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME; FBW (OO:AX)

RE ALEXANDRIA REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1984.

ON JUNE 14, 1984, [REDACTED] APPEARED BEFORE JUDGE JAMES C.

CACHERIS, EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, AND
PLED GUILTY TO TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF TITLE 18, SECTION 1343.

SENTENCING WAS SET FOR JULY 12, AT 9:00 AM.

BT

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	0514
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Lab.	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

b6
b7C

196-471346

12 JUN 19 1984

66 JUL 13 1984

196-471346

b6
b7C

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~
☐ ~~SECRET~~
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/16/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

MAINFRAME;
 FBW; CONSPIRACY
 (OO:AX)

Re Bureau routing slip to Alexandria dated
 5/8/84.

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of an
 LHM suitable for dissemination as requested in referenced
 routing slip.

ICC LHM/via 5/8/84
 TO CIA
 JS/LAZ
 6/28/84

ENCLOSURE

1-2 Bureau (Enc. 6)
 2-Alexandria
 GDF:gaj
 (4)

MAY 18 1984

1*

Approved: 

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

46 SEP 11 1984



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Alexandria, Virginia
May 16, 1984

MAINFRAME;
FRAUD BY WIRE;
CONSPIRACY

Investigation in this matter was initiated based upon information received from the General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) Telemail Service indicating that numerous unauthorized users has been detected in the accounts of approximately 18 customers. Telemail is an electronic mail service with approximately 150 user companies including some federal agencies.

The unauthorized users (hackers) gained access to Telemail by calling the local GTE Telenet number and entering the word "mail" upon prompt by the Telenet computer. Using legitimate user names provided by other hackers, subjects in this matter would search (manually or by a computer program) for a "default" password. In this case, new users had their passwords set at "A" and were urged by Telemail to create their own confidential password. Many users, however, left the password at "A" or used their first names as a password. This information was routinely available on numerous computer "bulletin boards" around the country.

While this investigation did not encompass other computer systems, frequent references and information concerning the Department of Defense Arpanet and Milnet systems were found. The names of every Arpanet and Milnet host computer and the "connect address" of each were shared freely among hackers. Further, actual user names and passwords for access to at least one Arpanet host (Mitre Corporation) were also available.

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

196-
ENCLOSURE 7713 - 47

RE: MAINFRAME

The hackers also routinely obtained information from the Defense Data Network Newsletter and shared this with other hackers.

The unauthorized computer accesses discovered in this matter were in computer systems designed to be "user friendly" and available to users through local telephone numbers.

MAINFRAME;
EBW, CONSPIRACY
OO:AX

3

☐ - X if a joint FBI/DEA (or other Federal Agency **) operation.

☐ - X if case involves corruption of a public official (Federal, State or Local).

1 = Used, but did not help
2 = Helped, but only minimally
3 = Helped, substantially
4 = Absolutely essential

16. Show Money Rating Usage	
-----------------------------	--

1. Acctg Tech Assistance	Rating	6. ELSUR - Title III	Rating	11. Lab Div Field Support	Rating	17. Surveil. Sqd Asst
2. Aircraft Assistance		7. Hypnosis Assistance		12. Pen Registers		18. SWAT Team Action
3. Computer Assistance		8. Ident Div Assistance		13. Photographic Coverage		19. Telephone Toll Records
4. Consensual Monitoring		9. Informant Information		14. Polygraph Assistance		20. Undercover Operation
5. ELSUR - FISC		10. Lab Div Exams		15. Search Warrants Executed		21. Visual Invest - Analysis (VIA)

A. Preliminary Judicial Process (Number of subjects)	Complaints	Informations	Indictments	D. Recoveries, Restitutions, Court Ordered Forfeitures or Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP)					
		4	4	Property or PELP Type Code *	Recoveries	Restitutions	Court Ordered Forfeitures	Potential Economic Loss Prevented	
B. Arrests, Locates, Summonses & Subpoenas (No. of subjects)	Subject Priority (See Reverse)								
	A	B	C						
FBI Arrests -				\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
FBI Locates -				\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Physically Resisted _____				\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Were Armed _____				\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
Criminal Summons <u>7</u>				\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	
Subpoenas Served _____									
C. Release of Hostages: (Number of Hostages Released)				E. Civil Matters		Government Defendant		Government Plaintiff	
Hostages Held By Terrorists _____; All Other Hostage Situations _____				Amount of Suit		\$	\$		
				Settlement or Award		\$	\$	Enter AFA Payment Here	

F. Final Judicial Process: Judicial District

--	--

 (Use two letter state abbreviations per U.S. Post Office Guide. For Example - The Northern District of Texas as **NO TX**; The District of Maine as **ME** in the state field only.)

[illegible][illegible]

Subject 3 - Name -		Subject's Description Code *										
<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction			In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		File # \$ JUN 5 1984
			Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	
			1910-4111-3-									

Attach additional forms if reporting final judicial process on more than three subjects.

Remarks: On 5/7/84, four subjects indicted by FGJ, EDVA for violation of T 18, USC, Section 1343, as follows: [redacted] (10 counts), [redacted] (five counts), [redacted] (five counts), [redacted] (three counts). Violation of T. 47 USC, S 223 (1).

2 - BUTERU
2 - Field Office

* See codes on reverse side. Subject description codes in Section F are required only when reporting a conviction.

* * Identify the other Federal Agency(ies) in the Remarks Section.

(1-196A-633) (1-Statistics In Process) GDF:llv (4)

b6
b7C

Property Type Codes*

Code No	Description
1	Cash (U.S. and foreign currency)
2	Stock, Bonds or Negotiable Instruments (checks, travelers checks, money orders, certificates of deposit, etc)
3	General Retail Merchandise (clothing, food, liquor, cigarettes, TVs, etc)
4	Vehicles (autos, trucks, tractors, trailers, campers, motorcycles, etc)
5	Heavy Machinery & Equipment (heavy equipment, computers, etc)
6	Bulk Materials (grain, fuel, raw materials, metals, wire, etc)
7	Jewelry (including unset precious and semiprecious stones)
8	Precious Metals (gold, silver, silverware, platinum, etc)
9	Art, Antiques or Rare Collections
10	Dangerous Drugs
11	Weapons or Explosives
12	Businesses or Assets Forfeited
20	All Other Recoveries (not falling in any category above)

Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP) Type Codes *

Code No	Description
21	Blank Negotiable Instruments or Tickets
22	Counterfeit Stocks, Bonds, Currency or Negotiable Instruments
23	Counterfeit or Pirated Sound Recordings or Motion Pictures
24	Bank Theft Scheme Aborted
25	Ransom, Extortion or Bribe Demand Aborted
26	Theft From, or Fraud Against, Government Scheme Aborted
27	Commercial or Industrial Theft Scheme Aborted
30	All Other Potential Economic Loss Prevented (not falling in any category above)

AUG 22 1984

* The case file must contain an explanation of the computation of the recovery value or loss prevented. An explanation airtel must accompany this report if the recovery is \$1 million or more, or if the PELP is \$5 million or more.

Subject Description Codes *

- Enter Description Code Only When Reporting a Conviction -

Organized Crime Subjects:

- 1A Boss, Underboss or Consigliere
- 1B Capodecina or Soldier
- 1C Possible LCN Member or Associate
- 1D OC Subject Other Than LCN

Known Criminals (Other Than OC Members):

- 2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
- 2B Top Thief
- 2C Top Con Man

Foreign Nationals:

- 3A Legal Alien
- 3B Illegal Alien
- 3C Foreign Official Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3D U.N. Employee Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3E Foreign Students
- 3F All Others

Terrorists:

- 4A Known Member of a Terrorist Organization
- 4B Possible Terrorist Member or Sympathizer

*If a subject can be classified in more than one of the categories, select the most appropriate in the circumstance.

Union Members:

- 5A International or National Officer
- 5B Local Officer
- 5C Union Employee

Government Official Or Employees:

- 6A Federal - Elected Official
- 6B Federal - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6C Federal - All Other
- 6D State - Elected Official
- 6E State - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6F State - All Other
- 6G Local - Elected Official
- 6H Local - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6J Local - All Other

Bank Officers Or Employees:

- 7A Bank Officer
- 7B Bank Employee

All Others:

- 8A All Other Subjects (not fitting above categories)

Instructions

Subject Priorities for FBI Arrest or Locates:

- A - Subject wanted for crimes of violence (i.e. murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- B - Subjects wanted for crimes involving the loss or destruction of property valued in excess of \$25,000 or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- C - All others

Claiming Convictions Other Than Federal:

It is permissible to claim a local (state, county or local) conviction if the FBI's investigation significantly contributed to the successful local prosecution. A succinct narrative setting forth the basis for claiming a local conviction must accompany this report. When claiming a conviction other than Federal, enter the word "LOCAL" in the "Conviction-Section" block, disregard the number of conviction counts, but enter the sentence in the appropriate blocks. Enter "LF" in the "In-Jail" block for all life sentences and "CP" for all capital punishment sentences.

Reporting Convictions:

Convictions should not be reported until the sentence has been issued. There are two exceptions to this rule. The conviction information can be submitted by itself if:

- 1. The subject becomes a fugitive after conviction but prior to sentencing.
- 2. The subject dies after conviction but prior to sentencing.

An explanation is required in the Remarks section for either of the above exceptions.

Rule 20 Situations:

The field office that obtained the process (normally the office of origin) is the office that should claim the conviction, not the office where the subject enters the plea in cases involving Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.

Investigative Assistance or Techniques (IA/Ts) Used:

Since more than one IA/T could have contributed to the accomplishment, each IA/T must be rated.

The IA/T used must be rated each time an accomplishment is claimed. (For example - if informant information was the basis for a complaint, an arrest, a recovery and a conviction and if separate FD-515s are submitted for each of the aforementioned accomplishments, the "Informant Information" block must be rated on each FD-515 even if it was the same information that contributed to all the accomplishments.)

AX 196A-633

by following subjects:

[redacted]

and

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Date 5/17/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA

SUBJECT: MAINFRAME

FBW; CONSPIRACY
OO:AX

Bureau File Number

196A-633
Field Office File Number

3
Squad or RA Number

- ☐ - X if a joint FBI/DEA (or other Federal Agency) operation.
☐ - X if case involves corruption of a public official (Federal, State or Local).

Investigative Assistance or Techniques Used

Were any of the investigative assistance or techniques listed below used in connection with accomplishment being claimed? ☐ No ☐ Yes - If Yes, rate each used as follows:
1 = Used, but did not help
2 = Helped, but only minimally
3 = Helped, substantially
4 = Absolutely essential

1. Acctg Tech Assistance	Rating	6. ELSUR - Title III	Rating	11. Lab Div Field Support	Rating	16. Show Money Rating Usage
2. Aircraft Assistance		7. Hypnosis Assistance		12. Pen Registers		17. Surveill. Sqd Asst
3. Computer Assistance		8. Ident Div Assistance		13. Photographic Coverage		18. SWAT Team Action
4. Consensual Monitoring		9. Informant Information		14. Polygraph Assistance		19. Telephone Toll Records
5. ELSUR - FISC		10. Lab Div Exams		15. Search Warrants Executed		20. Undercover Operation
						21. Visual Invest - Analysis (VIA)

A. Preliminary Judicial Process (Number of subjects)	Complaints	Informations	Indictments	D. Recoveries, Restitutions, Court Ordered Forfeitures or Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP)				
B. Arrests, Locates, Summonses & Subpoenas (No. of subjects)	Subject Priority (See Reverse)			Property or PELP Type Code *	Recoveries	Restitutions	Court Ordered Forfeitures	Potential Economic Loss Prevented
FBI Arrests	A	B	C		\$	\$	\$	\$
FBI Locates					\$	\$	\$	\$
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Physically Resisted					\$	\$	\$	\$
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Were Armed					\$	\$	\$	\$
Criminal Summons					\$	\$	\$	\$
Subpoenas Served					\$	\$	\$	\$
C. Release of Hostages: (Number of Hostages Released)				E. Civil Matters		Government Defendant		
Hostages Held By Terrorists				Amount of Suit		\$		
				Settlement or Award		\$		
						Enter AFA Payment Here		

F. Final Judicial Process: Judicial District ED, VA (Use two letter state abbreviations per U.S. Post Office Guide. For Example - The Northern District of Texas as ND TX; The District of Maine as ME in the state field only.)

Subject 1 - Name

Subject's Description Code *

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction	In-Jail Term	Suspended	Probation	Fine
			Title Section Counts	Yrs Mos	Yrs Mos	Yrs Mos	
			47 2231ab 1			1 0	\$

Subject 2 - Name

Subject's Description Code *

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction	In-Jail Term	Suspended	Probation	Fine
			Title Section Counts	Yrs Mos	Yrs Mos	Yrs Mos	

Subject 3 - Name

Subject's Description Code *

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction	In-Jail Term	Suspended	Probation	Fine
			Title Section Counts	Yrs Mos	Yrs Mos	Yrs Mos	

Attach additional forms if reporting final judicial process on more than three subjects.

Remarks: On 5/8/84, subject [redacted] pled guilty to one count of Title 47, USC, Section 223 (a) (1) before U. S. Magistrate CURTIS SEWELL.

2 - Bureau
2 - Field Office

(1-196A-633) (1-Statistics In Process) GDF:llv (4)

* See codes on reverse side. Subject description codes in Section F are required only when reporting a conviction.

** Identify the other Federal Agency(ies) in the Remarks Section.

FBI/DOJ

Property Type Codes*	
Code No	Description
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Code No	Description
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AUG 2 1984

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- 2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
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- 2C Top Con Man

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- 3A Legal Alien
- 3B Illegal Alien
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- 3D U.N. Employee Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3E Foreign Students
- 3F All Others

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- 4B Possible Terrorist Member or Sympathizer

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- 5B Local Officer
- 5C Union Employee

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- 6A Federal - Elected Official
- 6B Federal - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6C Federal - All Other
- 6D State - Elected Official
- 6E State - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6F State - All Other
- 6G Local - Elected Official
- 6H Local - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6J Local - All Other

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- 7A Bank Officer
- 7B Bank Employee

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- 8A All Other Subjects (not fitting above categories)

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- C - All others

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The field office that obtained the process (normally the office of origin) is the office that should claim the conviction, **not** the office where the subject enters the plea in cases involving Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.

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-Since more than one IA/T could have contributed to the accomplishment, each IA/T must be rated.

-The IA/T used must be rated **each time** an accomplishment is claimed. (For example - if informant information was the basis for a complaint, an arrest, a recovery and a conviction and if separate FD-515s are submitted for each of the aforementioned accomplishments, the "Informant Information" block must be rated on each FD-515 even if it was the same information that contributed to all the accomplishments.)

AXO 012 201 19527

RR HQ

DE AX

RR 19 1830Z L JULY 84

FM ALEXANDRIA (196A-633) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

MAINFRAME: FBW, OO: AX

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, JUNE 14, 1984.

ON JULY 12, 1984, [REDACTED] WAS SENTENCED BY JUDGE JAMES C. CACHERIS, EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA, VA., ON TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF TITLE 18, USC 1343. [REDACTED] WAS SENTENCED TO ONE (1) YEAR SUPERVISED PROBATION ON BOTH COUNTS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY. HE WAS ALSO ORDERED TO MAKE RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF \$225.17.

BT

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	<i>DEP</i>
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

b6
b7C

Q

196-4713-48

2 JUL 24 1984

13 SEP 05 1984

b6
b7C

6- [REDACTED]
6- [REDACTED]
1-3185

Date 7/24/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (P)

SUBJECT: MAINFRAME

FBW
(OO: AX)

Bureau File Number
196A-633
Field Office File Number
2
Squad or RA Number

- ☐ - X if a joint FBI/DEA (or other Federal Agency **) operation.
☐ - X if case involves corruption of a public official (Federal, State or Local).

Investigative Assistance or Techniques Used

Were any of the investigative assistance or techniques listed below used in connection with accomplishment being claimed? ☐ No ☒ Yes - If Yes, rate each used as follows:
1 = Used, but did not help
2 = Helped, but only minimally
3 = Helped, substantially
4 = Absolutely essential

1. Acctg Tech Assistance	6. ELSUR - Title III	11. Lab Div Field Support	16. Show Money Usage
2. Aircraft Assistance	7. Hypnosis Assistance	12. Pen Registers	17. Surveill. Sqd Asst
3. Computer Assistance	8. Ident Div Assistance	13. Photographic Coverage	18. SWAT Team Action
4. Consensual Monitoring	9. Informant Information	14. Polygraph Assistance	19. Telephone T. Records
5. ELSUR - FISC	10. Lab Div Exams	15. Search Warrant Executed	20. Undercover Operation
			21. Visual Inves Analysis (V)

A. Preliminary Judicial Process (Number of subjects)	Complaints	Informations	Indictments	D. Recoveries, Restitutions, Court Ordered Forfeitures or Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP)				
B. Arrests, Locates, Summonses & Subpoenas (No. of subjects)	Subject Priority (See Reverse)			Property or PELP Type Code *	Recoveries	Restitutions	Court Ordered Forfeitures	Potential Economic Loss Prevented
FBI Arrests -	A	B	C		\$	\$ 225.17	\$	\$
FBI Locates -					\$	\$	\$	\$
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Physically Resisted					\$	\$	\$	\$
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Were Armed					\$	\$	\$	\$
Criminal Summons					\$	\$	\$	\$
Subpoenas Served					\$	\$	\$	\$
C. Release of Hostages: (Number of Hostages Released)				E. Civil Matters				
Hostages Held By Terrorists				Amount of Suit		Government Defendant		Government Plaintiff
All Other Hostage Situations				Settlement or Award		\$		\$
						Enter AFA Payment Here		

F. Final Judicial Process: Judicial District ED VA (Use two letter state abbreviations per U.S. Post Office Guide. For Example - The Northern District of Texas as ND TX; The District of Maine as ME in the state field only.)

Subject 1 - Name

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction		In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine
Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos			
18	1343	2			1		1		\$		
									\$		
									\$		
									\$		

Subject 2 - Name

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction		In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine
Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos			
									\$		
									\$		
									\$		
									\$		

Subject 3 - Name

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction		In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine
Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos			
									\$		
									\$		
									\$		
									\$		

Attach additional forms if reporting final judicial process on more than three subjects.

Remarks:

66 OCT 1984

JUL 26 1984

2 - Bureau
2 - Field Office (1-196A-633) (1-Statistics in Process) PIN:kar (4)

* See codes on reverse side. Subject description codes in Section F are required only when reporting a conviction.

** Identify the other Federal Agency(ies) in the Remarks Section.

FBI/DOJ

Property Type Codes *

Code No	Description
1	Cash (U.S. and foreign currency)
2	Stock, Bonds or Negotiable Instruments (checks, travelers checks, money orders, certificates of deposit, etc)
3	General Retail Merchandise (clothing, food, liquor, cigarettes, TVs, etc)
4	Vehicles (autos, trucks, tractors, trailers, campers, motorcycles, etc)
5	Heavy Machinery & Equipment (heavy equipment, computers, etc)
6	Bulk Materials (grain, fuel, raw materials, metals, wire, etc)
7	Jewelry (including unset precious and semiprecious stones)
8	Precious Metals (gold, silver, silverware, platinum, etc)
9	Art, Antiques or Rare Collections
10	Dangerous Drugs
11	Weapons or Explosives
12	Businesses or Assets Forfeited
20	All Other Recoveries (not falling in any category above)

Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP) Type Codes *

Code No	Description
21	Blank Negotiable Instruments or Tickets
22	Counterfeit Stocks, Bonds, Currency or Negotiable Instruments
23	Counterfeit or Pirated Sound Recordings or Motion Pictures
24	Bank Theft Scheme Aborted
25	Ransom, Extortion or Bribe Demand Aborted
26	Theft From, or Fraud Against, Government Scheme Aborted
27	Commercial or Industrial Theft Scheme Aborted
30	All Other Potential Economic Loss Prevented (not falling in any category above)

* The case file must contain an explanation of the computation of the recovery value or loss prevented. An explanation airtel must accompany this report if the recovery is \$1 million or more, or if the PELP is \$5 million or more.

Subject Description Codes *

- Enter Description Code Only When Reporting a Conviction -

Organized Crime Subjects:

- 1A Boss, Underboss or Consigliere
- 1B Capodecina or Soldier
- 1C Possible LCN Member or Associate
- 1D OC Subject Other Than LCN

Known Criminals (Other Than OC Members):

- 2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
- 2B Top Thief
- 2C Top Con Man

Foreign Nationals:

- 3A Legal Alien
- 3B Illegal Alien
- 3C Foreign Official Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3D U.N. Employee Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3E Foreign Students
- 3F All Others

Terrorists:

- 4A Known Member of a Terrorist Organization
- 4B Possible Terrorist Member or Sympathizer

* If a subject can be classified in more than one of the categories, select the most appropriate in the circumstance.

Union Members:

- 5A International or National Officer
- 5B Local Officer
- 5C Union Employee

Government Official Or Employees:

- 6A Federal - Elected Official
- 6B Federal - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6C Federal - All Other
- 6D State - Elected Official
- 6E State - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6F State - All Other
- 6G Local - Elected Official
- 6H Local - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6J Local - All Other

Bank Officers Or Employees:

- 7A Bank Officer
- 7B Bank Employee

All Others:

- 8A All Other Subjects (not fitting above categories)

Instructions**Subject Priorities for FBI Arrest or Locates:**

- A - Subject wanted for crimes of violence (i.e. murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- B - Subjects wanted for crimes involving the loss or destruction of property valued in excess of \$25,000 or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- C - All others

Claiming Convictions Other Than Federal:

It is permissible to claim a local (state, county or local) conviction if the FBI's investigation significantly contributed to the successful local prosecution. A succinct narrative setting forth the basis for claiming a local conviction must accompany this report. When claiming a conviction other than Federal, enter the word "LOCAL" in the "Conviction-Section" block, disregard the number of conviction counts, but enter the sentence in the appropriate blocks. Enter "LF" in the "In-Jail" block for all life sentences and "CP" for all capital punishment sentences.

Reporting Convictions:

Convictions should not be reported until the sentence has been issued. There are two exceptions to this rule. The conviction information can be submitted by itself if:

- 1. The subject becomes a fugitive after conviction but prior to sentencing.
- 2. The subject dies after conviction but prior to sentencing.

An explanation is required in the Remarks section for either of the above exceptions.

Rule 20 Situations:

The field office that obtained the process (normally the office of origin) is the office that should claim the conviction, **not** the office where the subject enters the plea in cases involving Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.

Investigative Assistance or Techniques (IA/Ts) Used:

- Since more than one IA/T could have contributed to the accomplishment, each IA/T must be rated.

- The IA/T used must be rated **each time** an accomplishment is claimed. (For example - if informant information was the basis for a complaint, an arrest, a recovery and a conviction and if separate FD-515s are submitted for each of the aforementioned accomplishments, the "Informant Information" block must be rated on each FD-515 even if it was the same information that contributed to all the accomplishments.)

FD-515 (Rev. 9-24-82)
ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT

(Submit within 30 days from date of accomplishment)

Date

9/19/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (P)

SUBJECT: MAINFRAME
FBW
(OO: AX)

Bureau File Number

196A-633

Field Office File Number

2

Squad or RA Number

☐ - X if a joint FBI/DEA (or other Federal Agency **) operation.☐ - X if case involves corruption of a public official (Federal, State or Local).

Investigative Assistance or Techniques Used

Were any of the investigative assistance or techniques listed below used in connection with accomplishment being claimed? ☐ No ☒ Yes - If Yes, rate each used as follows:

- 1 = Used, but did not help
2 = Helped, but only minimally
3 = Helped, substantially
4 = Absolutely essential

1. Acctg Tech Assistance	6. ELSUR - Title III	11. Lab Div Field Support	16. Show Money Usage
2. Aircraft Assistance	7. Hypnosis Assistance	12. Pen Registers	17. Surveil. Sqd Asst
3. Computer Assistance	8. Ident Div Assistance	13. Photographic Coverage	18. SWAT Team Action
4. Consensual Monitoring	9. Informant Information	14. Polygraph Assistance	19. Telephone T. Records
5. ELSUR - FISC	10. Lab Div Exams	15. Search Warrant Executed	20. Undercover Operation
			21. Visual Inves Analysis (V)

A. Preliminary Judicial Process (Number of subjects)	Complaints	Informations	Indictments	D. Recoveries, Restitutions, Court Ordered Forfeitures or Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP)				
B. Arrests, Locates, Summonses & Subpoenas (No. of subjects)	Subject Priority (See Reverse)			Property or PELP Type Code *	Recoveries	Restitutions	Court Ordered Forfeitures	Potential Economic Loss Prevented
FBI Arrests -	A	B	C		\$	\$ 34.00	\$	\$
FBI Locates -					\$	\$	\$	\$
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Physically Resisted					\$	\$	\$	\$
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Were Armed					\$	\$	\$	\$
Criminal Summons					\$	\$	\$	\$
Subpoenas Served					\$	\$	\$	\$
C. Release of Hostages: (Number of Hostages Released)				E. Civil Matters		Government Defendant		Government Plaintiff
Hostages Held By Terrorists				Amount of Suit		\$		\$
All Other Hostage Situations				Settlement or Award		\$		\$
						Enter AFA Payment Here		

F. Final Judicial Process:	Judicial District	SO IOWA	(Use two letter state abbreviations per U.S. Post Office Guide. For Example - The Northern District of Texas is ND TX; The District of Maine as ME in the state field only.)										
Subject 1 - Name				Conviction		In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine	
<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.			Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	\$ 2,500
	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial			47	223	5							\$
													\$
													\$
													\$
													\$

Subject 2 - Name				Conviction		In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine	
<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.			Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	\$
	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial												\$
													\$
													\$
													\$

Subject 3 - Name				Conviction		In-Jail Term		Suspended		Probation		Fine	
<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	- Convictions - Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant.			Title	Section	Counts	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	\$
	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial												\$
													\$
													\$
													\$

Attach additional forms if reporting final judicial process on more than three subjects.

Remarks:

2 - Bureau (1-196A-633) (1-Statistics in Process) PIN:kar
2 - Field Office (2)

* See codes on reverse side. Subject description codes in Section F are required only when reporting a conviction.

** Identify the other Federal Agency(ies) in the Remarks Section.

FBI/DOJ

Property Type Codes*

Code No	Description
1	Cash (U.S. and foreign currency)
2	Stock, Bonds or Negotiable Instruments (checks, travelers checks, money orders, certificates of deposit, etc)
3	General Retail Merchandise (clothing, food, liquor, cigarettes, TVs, etc)
4	Vehicles (autos, trucks, tractors, trailers, campers, motorcycles, etc)
5	Heavy Machinery & Equipment (heavy equipment, computers, etc)
6	Bulk Materials (grain, fuel, raw materials, metals, wire, etc)
7	Jewelry (including unset precious and semiprecious stones)
8	Precious Metals (gold, silver, silverware, platinum, etc)
9	Art, Antiques or Rare Collections
10	Dangerous Drugs
11	Weapons or Explosives
12	Businesses or Assets Forfeited
20	All Other Recoveries (not falling in any category above)

Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP) Type Codes *

Code No	Description
21	Blank Negotiable Instruments or Tickets
22	Counterfeit Stocks, Bonds, Currency or Negotiable Instruments
23	Counterfeit or Pirated Sound Recordings or Motion Pictures
24	Bank Theft Scheme Aborted
25	Ransom, Extortion or Bribe Demand Aborted
26	Theft From, or Fraud Against, Government Scheme Aborted
27	Commercial or Industrial Theft Scheme Aborted
30	All Other Potential Economic Loss Prevented (not falling in any category above)

*The case file must contain an explanation of the computation of the recovery value or loss prevented. An explanation airtel must accompany this report if the recovery is \$1 million or more, or if the PELP is \$5 million or more.

Subject Description Codes *

- Enter Description Code Only When Reporting a Conviction -

Organized Crime Subjects:

- 1A Boss, Underboss or Consigliere
- 1B Capodecina or Soldier
- 1C Possible LCN Member or Associate
- 1D OC Subject Other Than LCN

Known Criminals (Other Than OC Members):

- 2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
- 2B Top Thief
- 2C Top Con Man

Foreign Nationals:

- 3A Legal Alien
- 3B Illegal Alien
- 3C Foreign Official Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3D U.N. Employee Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3E Foreign Students
- 3F All Others

Terrorists:

- 4A Known Member of a Terrorist Organization
- 4B Possible Terrorist Member or Sympathizer

Union Members:

- 5A International or National Officer
- 5B Local Officer
- 5C Union Employee

Government Official Or Employees:

- 6A Federal - Elected Official
- 6B Federal - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6C Federal - All Other
- 6D State - Elected Official
- 6E State - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6F State - All Other
- 6G Local - Elected Official
- 6H Local - Nonelected Executive Level
- 6J Local - All Other

Bank Officers Or Employees:

- 7A Bank Officer
- 7B Bank Employee

All Others:

- 8A All Other Subjects (not fitting above categories)

*If a subject can be classified in more than one of the categories, select the most appropriate in the circumstance.

Instructions**Subject Priorities for FBI Arrest or Locates:**

- A - Subject wanted for crimes of violence (i.e. murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- B - Subjects wanted for crimes involving the loss or destruction of property valued in excess of \$25,000 or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- C - All others

Claiming Convictions Other Than Federal:

It is permissible to claim a local (state, county or local) conviction if the FBI's investigation significantly contributed to the successful local prosecution. A succinct narrative setting forth the basis for claiming a local conviction must accompany this report. When claiming a conviction other than Federal, enter the word "LOCAL" in the "Conviction-Section" block, disregard the number of conviction counts, but enter the sentence in the appropriate blocks. Enter "LF" in the "In-Jail" block for all life sentences and "CP" for all capital punishment sentences.

Reporting Convictions:

Convictions should not be reported until the sentence has been issued. There are two exceptions to this rule. The conviction information can be submitted by itself if:

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An explanation is required in the Remarks section for either of the above exceptions.

Rule 20 Situations:

The field office that obtained the process (normally the office of origin) is the office that should claim the conviction, not the office where the subject enters the plea in cases involving Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.

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Since more than one IA/T could have contributed to the accomplishment, each IA/T must be rated.

The IA/T used must be rated **each time** an accomplishment is claimed. (For example - if informant information was the basis for a complaint, an arrest, a recovery and a conviction and if separate FD-515s are submitted for each of the aforementioned accomplishments, the "Informant Information" block must be rated on each FD-515 even if it was the same information that contributed to all the accomplishments.)

Property Type Codes*

Code
No Description

- 1 Cash (U.S. and foreign currency)
- 2 Stock, Bonds or Negotiable Instruments (checks, travelers checks, money orders, certificates of deposit, etc)
- 3 General Retail Merchandise (clothing, food, liquor, cigarettes, TVs, etc)
- 4 Vehicles (autos, trucks, tractors, trailers, campers, motorcycles, etc)
- 5 Heavy Machinery & Equipment (heavy equipment, computers, etc)
- 6 Bulk Materials (grain, fuel, raw materials, metals, wire, etc)
- 7 Jewelry (including unset precious and semiprecious stones)
- 8 Precious Metals (gold, silver, silverware, platinum, etc)
- 9 Art, Antiques or Rare Collections
- 10 Dangerous Drugs
- 11 Weapons or Explosives
- 12 Businesses or Assets Forfeited
- 20 All Other Recoveries (not falling in any category above)

*The case file must contain an explanation of the computation of the recovery value or loss prevented. An explanation airtel must accompany this report if the recovery is \$1 million or more, or if the PELP is \$5 million or more.

Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP) Type Codes*

Code
No Description

- 22 Counterfeit Stocks, Bonds, Currency or Negotiable Instruments
- 23 Counterfeit or Pirated Sound Recordings or Motion Pictures
- 24 Bank Theft Scheme Aborted
- 25 Ransom, Extortion or Bribe Demand Aborted
- 26 Theft from, or Fraud Against, Government Scheme Aborted
- 27 Commercial or Industrial Theft Scheme Aborted
- 30 All Other Potential Economic Loss Prevented (not falling in any category above)

Subject Description Codes*

- Enter Description Code Only When Reporting a Conviction -

Organized Crime Subjects:

- 1A Boss, Underboss or Consigliere
- 1B Capodecina or Soldier
- 1C Possible LCN Member or Associate
- 1D OC Subject Other Than LCN

Known Criminals (Other Than OC Members):

- 2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
- 2B Top Thief
- 2C Top Con Man

Foreign Nationals:

- 3A Legal Alien
- 3B Illegal Alien
- 3C Foreign Official Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3D U.N. Employee Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3E Foreign Students
- 3F All Others

Terrorists:

- 4A Known Member of a Terrorist Organization
- 4B Possible Terrorist Member or Sympathizer

*If a subject can be classified in more than one of the categories, select the most appropriate in the circumstance.

Union Members:

- 5A International or National Officer
- 5B Local Officer
- 5C Union Employee

Government Officials Or Employees:

Federal	State	Local
6A Presidential Appointee	6J Governor	6R Mayor
6B U.S. Senator	6K Lt. Governor	
6C U.S. Representative	6L Legislator	6S Legislator
6D Judge	6M Judge	6T Judge
6E Prosecutor	6N Prosecutor	6U Prosecutor
6F Law Enforcement Officer	6P Law Enforcement Officer	6V Law Enforcement Officer
6G Fed Exec - GS 13 & above	6Q All Others - State	6W All Others - Local
6H Fed Empl - GS 12 & below		

Bank Officers or Employees:

- 7A Bank Officer
- 7B Bank Employee

All Others:

- 8A All Other Subjects (not fitting above categories)

Instructions

Subject Priorities for FBI Arrest or Locates:

- A - Subject wanted for crimes of violence (i.e. murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- B - Subjects wanted for crimes involving the loss or destruction of property valued in excess of \$25,000 or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- C - All others

Claiming Convictions Other Than Federal:

It is permissible to claim a local (state, county or local) conviction if the FBI's investigation significantly contributed to the successful local prosecution. A succinct narrative setting forth the basis for claiming a local conviction must accompany this report. When claiming a conviction other than Federal, enter the word "LOCAL" in the Conviction-Section" block, disregard the number of conviction counts, but enter the sentence in the appropriate blocks. Enter "LF" in the "In-Jail" block for all life sentences and "CP" for all capital punishment sentences.

Reporting Convictions:

Convictions should not be reported until the sentence has been issued. There are two exceptions to this rule. The conviction information can be submitted by itself if:

1. The subject becomes a fugitive after conviction but prior to sentencing.
2. The subject dies after conviction but prior to sentencing.

An explanation is required in the Remarks section for either of the above exceptions.

Rule 20 Situations:

The field office that obtained the process (normally the office of origin) is the office that should claim the conviction, not the office where the subject enters the plea in cases involving Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.

Investigative Assistance or Techniques (IA/Ts) Used:

-Since more than one IA/T could have contributed to the accomplishment, each IA/T must be rated.

-The IA/T used must be rated each time an accomplishment is claimed. (For example - if informant information was the basis for a complaint, an arrest, a recovery and a conviction and if separate FD-515s are submitted for each of the aforementioned accomplishments, the "Informant Information" block must be rated on each FD-515 even if it was the same information that contributed to all the accomplishments.)

ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT (Effective 10/1/84)

(Submit within 30 days from date of accomplishment)

Date 12/21/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (P)

SUBJECT: MAIN NAME

FBW
(OO: AX)

Bureau File Number

196A-633

Field Office File Number

2

Squad or RA Number

Agent's Social Security No.

- ☐ X if a joint operation with another Federal, State or Local LE agency **
- ☐ X if case involves corruption of a public official (Federal, State or Local).

Investigative Assistance or Technique Used

Were any of the investigative assistance or techniques listed below used in connection with accomplishment being claimed? ☐ No ☒ Yes - If Yes, rate each used as follows:

- 1 = Used, but did not help
2 = Helped, but only minimally
3 = Helped, substantially
4 = Absolutely essential

1. Acctg Tech Assistance	6. ELSUR - Title III	11. Lab. Div. Field Support	16. Show Money Usage
2. Aircraft Assistance	7. Hypnosis Assistance	12. Pen Registers	17. Surveil. Sqd Asst
3. Computer Assistance	8. Ident Div Assistance	13. Photographic Coverage	18. SWAT Team Action
4. Consensual Monitoring	9. Informant Information	14. Polygraph Assistance	19. Telephone To Records
5. ELSUR - FISC	10. Lab Div Exams	15. Search Warrants Executed	20. Undercover Operations
			21. Visual Investigation (VIA)

A. Preliminary Judicial Process (Number of subjects)	Complaints	Informations	Indictments	D. Recoveries, Restitutions, Court Ordered Forfeitures or Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP)				
	Subject Priority (See Reverse)			Property or PELP Type Code	Recoveries	Restitutions	Court Ordered Forfeitures	Potential Economic Loss Prevented
B. Arrests, Locates, Summonses & Subpoenas (No. of subjects)	A	B	C					
	FBI Arrests							
	FBI Locates							
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Physically Resisted								
Number of Subjects of FBI Arrests Who Were Armed								
Criminal Summons								
Subpoenas Served								
C. Release of Hostages or Children Located: (Number of Hostages or Children Located)				E. Civil Matters		Government Defendant		Government Plaintiff
Hostages Held By Terrorists				Amount of Suit				
Missing or Kidnapped Children Located				Settlement or Award				
								Enter AFA Payment Here

F. Final Judicial Process:	Judicial District	ED	VA	Dates	Convictions (or Final Judicial Process) Date	Sentence Date
Subject 1 - Name						

<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	-Convictions- Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant. Do not report conviction until sentence has been pronounced.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction			Combined Sentence						
			Title	Section	Counts	In-Jail Term	Suspended	Probation	Total Fines			
			18	1343	1	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	\$
Consecutive Sentences - Add all consecutive sentences together. Concurrent Sentences - Enter longest single term. Do not add concurrent sentences together. If the sentence is 10 years in custody of the Atty Gen. but 8 years are suspended, the In-Jail term would be 2 years.												

Subject 2 - Name	Subject's Description Code											
<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	-Convictions- Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant. Do not report conviction until sentence has been pronounced.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction			Combined Sentence						
			Title	Section	Counts	In-Jail Term	Suspended	Probation	Total Fines			
						Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	\$
Consecutive Sentences - Add all consecutive sentences together. Concurrent Sentences - Enter longest single term. Do not add concurrent sentences together. If the sentence is 10 years in custody of the Atty Gen. but 8 years are suspended, the In-Jail term would be 2 years.												

Subject 3 - Name	Subject's Description Code											
<input type="checkbox"/> Pretrial <input type="checkbox"/> Diversion <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Acquittal	-Convictions- Enter conviction and sentence data in space at right. If more than four sections are involved, limit to the four most relevant. Do not report conviction until sentence has been pronounced.	<input type="checkbox"/> Felony <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor <input type="checkbox"/> Plea <input type="checkbox"/> Trial	Conviction			Combined Sentence						
			Title	Section	Counts	In-Jail Term	Suspended	Probation	Total Fines			
						Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	Yrs	Mos	\$
Consecutive Sentences - Add all consecutive sentences together. Concurrent Sentences - Enter longest single term. Do not add concurrent sentences together. If the sentence is 10 years in custody of the Atty Gen. but 8 years are suspended, the In-Jail term would be 2 years.												

Attach additional forms if reporting final judicial process on more than three subjects, and submit a final disposition form (R-84) for each subject.

Remarks:

was sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. He was ordered to make restitution in the amount of \$87.00 and to serve 200 hours of community service.

2 - Bureau
2 - Field Office

(1-196A-633) (1-Statistics in Process) PIN:kar (4)

* See codes on reverse side. Subject description codes in Section F are required only when reporting a conviction.
** In joint operations, identify the other Federal, State or Local Law Enforcement (LE) agency in the Remarks Section.

Property Type Codes*

Code
No Description

- 1 Cash (U.S. and foreign currency)
- 2 Stock, Bonds or Negotiable Instruments (checks, travelers checks, money orders, certificates of deposit, etc)
- 3 General Retail Merchandise (clothing, food, liquor, cigarettes, TVs, etc)
- 4 Vehicles (autos, trucks, tractors, trailers, campers, motorcycles, etc)
- 5 Heavy Machinery & Equipment (heavy equipment, computers, etc)
- 6 Bulk Materials (grain, fuel, raw materials, metals, wire, etc)
- 7 Jewelry (including unset precious and semiprecious stones)
- 8 Precious Metals (gold, silver, silverware, platinum, etc)
- 9 Art, Antiques or Rare Collections
- 10 Dangerous Drugs
- 11 Weapons or Explosives
- 12 Businesses or Assets Forfeited
- 20 All Other Recoveries (not falling in any category above)

Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP) Type Codes*

Code
No Description

- AIR - 8 1985
- 22 Counterfeit Stocks, Bonds, Currency or Negotiable Instruments
 - 23 Counterfeit or Pirated Sound Recordings or Motion Pictures
 - 24 Bank Theft Scheme Aborted
 - 25 Ransom, Extortion or Bribe Demand Aborted
 - 26 Theft from, or Fraud Against, Government Scheme Aborted
 - 27 Commercial or Industrial Theft Scheme Aborted
 - 30 All Other Potential Economic Loss Prevented (not falling in any category above)

*The case file must contain an explanation of the computation of the recovery value or loss prevented. An explanation airtel must accompany this report if the recovery is \$1 million or more, or if the PELP is \$5 million or more.

Subject Description Codes*

- Enter Description Code Only When Reporting a Conviction -

Organized Crime Subjects:

- 1A Boss, Underboss or Consigliere
- 1B Capodecina or Soldier
- 1C Possible LCN Member or Associate
- 1D OC Subject Other Than LCN

Known Criminals (Other Than OC Members):

- 2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
- 2B Top Thief
- 2C Top Con Man

Foreign Nationals:

- 3A Legal Alien
- 3B Illegal Alien
- 3C Foreign Official Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3D U.N. Employee Without Diplomatic Immunity
- 3E Foreign Students
- 3F All Others

Terrorists:

- 4A Known Member of a Terrorist Organization
- 4B Possible Terrorist Member or Sympathizer

Union Members:

- 5A International or National Officer
- 5B Local Officer
- 5C Union Employee

Government Officials Or Employees:

Federal	State	Local
6A Presidential Appointee	6J Governor	6R Mayor
6B U.S. Senator	6K Lt. Governor	
6C U.S. Representative	6L Legislator	6S Legislator
6D Judge	6M Judge	6T Judge
6E Prosecutor	6N Prosecutor	6U Prosecutor
6F Law Enforcement Officer	6P Law Enforcement Officer	6V Law Enforcement Officer
6G Fed Exec - GS 13 & above	6Q All Others - State	6W All Others - Local
6H Fed Empl - GS 12 & below		

Bank Officers or Employees:

- 7A Bank Officer
- 7B Bank Employee

All Others:

- 8A All Other Subjects (not fitting above categories)

*If a subject can be classified in more than one of the categories, select the most appropriate in the circumstance.

Instructions**Subject Priorities for FBI Arrest or Locates:**

- A - Subject wanted for crimes of violence (i.e. murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- B - Subjects wanted for crimes involving the loss or destruction of property valued in excess of \$25,000 or convicted of such crimes in the past five years.
- C - All others

Claiming Convictions Other Than Federal:

It is permissible to claim a local (state, county or local) conviction if the FBI's investigation significantly contributed to the successful local prosecution. A succinct narrative setting forth the basis for claiming a local conviction must accompany this report. When claiming a conviction other than Federal, enter the word "LOCAL" in the Conviction-Section block, disregard the number of conviction counts, but enter the sentence in the appropriate blocks. Enter "LF" in the "In-Jail" block for all life sentences and "CP" for all capital punishment sentences.

Reporting Convictions:

Convictions should not be reported until the sentence has been issued. There are two exceptions to this rule. The conviction information can be submitted by itself if:

1. The subject becomes a fugitive after conviction but prior to sentencing.
2. The subject dies after conviction but prior to sentencing.

An explanation is required in the Remarks section for either of the above exceptions.

Rule 20 Situations:

The field office that obtained the process (normally the office of origin) is the office that should claim the conviction, **not** the office where the subject enters the plea in cases involving Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.

Investigative Assistance or Techniques (IA/Ts) Used:

-Since more than one IA/T could have contributed to the accomplishment, each IA/T must be rated.

-The IA/T used must be rated **each time** an accomplishment is claimed. (For example - if informant information was the basis for a complaint, an arrest, a recovery and a conviction and if separate FD-515s are submitted for each of the aforementioned accomplishments, the "Informant Information" block must be rated on each FD-515 even if it was the same information that contributed to all the accomplishments.)

Packet #2

8/29/83 AM

Posted: Sun Aug 28, 1983 9:19 PM EDT
From: [REDACTED] /DP/BMW
To: DP
Subj: ARPA

Mss: XGID-1614-8371

b6
b7c

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is an arm of the Pentagon, with the responsibility of fostering military aspects of state of the art electronic and nuclear research. DARPA HQ is located in the 'Architect Buildings' in Camp Springs, MD. The FTS locator number for DARPA is 43077. The agency's director is Robert R. Fossum, and he along with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] occupy suite 802 in the building, codenamed A.E. by the DoD.

b6
b7c

The actual administration of the agency's computer network (ARPA-NET) is divided among several persons. The Programming and Analysis division, run by a man whose name is kept secret, is located in suite 823 of the building, and is responsible for overall network management.

The Defense Sciences Office administers the day to day affairs of the network under the guidance of [REDACTED] (Room 641) [REDACTED] with the various participating installations maintains network status and operation. It's [REDACTED], is located in Room 730.

b6
b7c

The Strategic Technologies Division is interesting in that it's purpose is classified. But to give you an idea of the STD's mission, it seems to be responsible for 'Surveillance' and 'Advanced Concepts'.

Other DARPA projects include 'Nuclear Monitoring Research', 'Materials Sciences', 'Directed Energy', 'Laser and Particle Beam Technology', 'Ocean Monitoring and Control' and 'Target Acquisition and Engagement'.

Command?

196-4713-16

ZGID-%H064F-%H11AB

SMN: ZGID-1615-4523

Posted date: August 29, 1983 4:17 PM

Delivery Options: 0000000000000000

Field	Type	Offset	Length
From	1	0	8
To	1	8	12
Subj	1	34	6
MIDL	1	20	14
Body	1	40	348

From
5142 4B38 3038 3320

* DBK8083

b6
b7c

To
532E 5354 4557 4152 540D 0A0D

* [REDACTED] .. *

Subj
4152 5041 2020

* ARPA *

MIDL
000E 0100 8000 424E 4731 3635 3020

*ENG1650 *

Body
5375 652C 0D0A 0949 2063 6865 636E 6564
206F 7574 2074 6861 7420 6578 7465 6E73
696F 6E20 796F 7520 706F 7374 6564 206F
6E20 7468 6520 6275 6C6C 6574 696E 2061
6E64 2074 6865 790D 0A61 6E73 7765 7265
6420 2243 6F6D 6D61 6E64 2050 6F77 6572
2220 6F72 2073 6F6D 6574 6869 6E67 2073
696D 696C 6172 2E20 2049 2077 6173 2061
626C 6520 746F 2067 6574 2069 6E73 6964
650D 0A74 6865 6972 2063 656E 7472 6578
2075 7369 6E67 2074 6861 7420 3830 3020
2320 4920 746F 6C64 2079 6F75 2061 626F
7574 2E20 2049 2066 6967 7572 6564 206F
7574 2074 6861 7420 7468 650D 0A65 7863
6861 6E67 6520 796F 7520 6765 7420 7768
656E 2079 6F75 2064 6961 6C20 362D 7878
7878 2069 7320 3230 322D 3639 362E 2020
5768 6174 2064 6F20 796F 7520 6D61 6B65
206F 660D 0A74 6865 2074 7261 6E73 6665
7272 6162 6C65 2064 6961 6C2D 746F 6E65
2049 206D 656E 7469 6F6E 6564 206F 6E20
424C 4143 4B3F 0D0A 6263 0D0A

* [REDACTED] ...I checked *
* out that extens *
* ion you posted o *
* n the bulletin a *
* nd they..answere *
* d "Command Power *
* " or something s *
* imilar. I was a *
* ble to get insid *
* e..their centrex *
* using that 800 *
* # I told you abo *
* ut. I figured o *
* ut that the..exc *
* hange you set wh *
* en you dial 6-xx *
* xx is 202-696. *
* What do you make *
* of..the transfe *
* rable dial-tone *
* I mentioned on *
* BLACK?..bh.. *


b6
b7c

Enter SMN or <CR> to stop:

196-4713-16



Board



MIS/BMWNA/B

1
osted: Thu Sep 8, 1983 10:15 PM EDT

Mss: EGID-1621-2306

rom: ADMIN/BMW

o:

C:

ubj: Monthly Update

b6
b7C

The situation at Telenet continues to be unsettled, as those of you in the FA System can see on the BBs. Therefore, the moratorium againstacking Telemail accts has been extended until the end of September. At that time, we can continue on with a vengeance, and introduce the new people into the ways of the 'Usercode'.

A new Arpa update has been sent to those currently involved in the AC HACK project. We still do not have a date on the password cutover, although the end of the year has been hinted at for MILNET implementation. We STILL NEED guest accts on MIT and SRI hosts, as well as the new FTP acs. Anyone with info on any of these should pass it on via the ARPA list.

And last but not least -- another reminder NOT to take the Telemail customer survey they are touting on the BB. It is partly designed as a trap to validate authorized system users, and our unregistered area would stand out like a sore thumb should they take a closer look...

ter, all.



b6
b7C

: Osany lives!

mmmand?

196-4713-16

No such command: .

b6
b7C

Command? S PURGED

Bulletin Board contains:

No.	Delivered	From	Subject	Lines
3	Sep 8 22:02	[REDACTED]	ARPA*NET UPDATE Purged	478

Command? R PURGED 3

b6
b7C

Posted: Thu Sep 8, 1983 10:02 PM EDT
From: [REDACTED] MIS/BMWNA/BMW
To: [REDACTED]
CC:
Subj: ARPA*NET UPDATE

Mss: EGID-1621-2254

Same newsletter

DATE: WED 7 SEP 83 12:40:00-PDT
FROM: NIC@SRI-NIC
SUBJECT: DDN NEWSLETTER NO. 32

DDN-NEWS 32
7 SEP 83
(415) 859-3695

NETWORK INFO CENTER FOR
DCA DDN PROGRAM MGMT OFFICE
NIC@SRI-NIC

DEFENSE DATA NETWORK NEWSLETTER

[MAXIMUM DISTRIBUTION REQUESTED. THE DDN NEWSLETTER IS PUBLISHED BY THE NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER UNDER DCA CONTRACT. FOR SUBSCRIPTION, CONTACT NIC@SRI-NIC. BACK ISSUES OBTAINABLE BY FTP FROM THE DIRECTORY <DDN-NEWS> AT SRI-NIC [10.0.0.73].]

SECTION I. OFFICIAL

- TOPIC: - TAC-NEWS SERVICE
- MILNET/ARPANET HOST AND TAC ALIGNMENT LIST

TAC-NEWS SERVICE

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196-4713-16

MILNET/ARPANET HOST AND TAC ALIGNMENT LIST

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- 10 IS THE NETWORK NUMBER OF THE HOST BEING ACCESSED (10 FOR ARPANET, 26 FOR MILNET);
- 1 IS THE PORT NUMBER OF THE HOST BEING ACCESSED;
- 0 IS RESERVED AND CURRENTLY IS USUALLY 0;
- 40 IS THE NUMBER OF THE IMP TO WHICH THE HOST IS CONNECTED.

-----END-OF-MESSAGE-----

DATE: 6 SEP 1983 13:53:20 EDT (TUESDAY)
FROM: BEN LITTAUER <LITTAUER@BBN-UNIX>
SUBJECT: TAC SPLIT INFO !!

***** MILNET/ARPANET HOSTS

Command?

196-4713-16

email/Telenet

Posted: Thu Sep 8, 1983 5:49 PM EDT

Mss: OGID-1621-1328

From:

To:

Subj: BITNET [CMT]

b6
b7c

HELP BITNET

BITNET NODES

NODENAME University Name
System MACHINE

01 CUNYVM City University of New York
VM/SP
IBM 4341-II

02 CUNYJESS City University of New York
MVS/JES3 IBM 3033

03 BM002 CUNY - Boro of Manhattan Comm Col
VM/SP
IBM 4331-II
BMADMN2 Alias to BM002

04 BX001 CUNY - Bronx Community College
VM/SP
IBM 4331

05 KB001 CUNY - Kingsborough Comm College
VM/SP
IBM 4331

06 SI001 CUNY - College of Staten Island
VM/SP
IBM 4341

07 QB001 CUNY - Queensborough Comm College
VM/SP
IBM 4341

08 NY001 CUNY - NYC Technical College
VM/SP
IBM 4331-II
NY002 Alias to NY001

09 LC003 CUNY - Lehman College
VM/SP
IBM 4341

10 BB003 CUNY - Baruch College
VM/SP
IBM 4331

11 BMACADM CUNY - Boro of Manhattan Comm Col
VM/SP
IBM 4331

12 BBADMIN CUNY - Baruch College
VM/SP
IBM 4331

13 BKLYN CUNY - Brooklyn College
VM/SP
IBM 4341
BC003 Alias to BKLYN
BC008 Alias to BKLYN

14 HUNTER CUNY - Hunter College
VM/SP
IBM 4341

15 CCNY CUNY - City College
VM/SP
IBM 4341

16 YALEVM Yale University

196-4713-16

VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II
 17 YALEMVS Yale University MVS/JES3 IBM 370/168
 20 PSUVM Penn State University
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341
 21 PSUVAX1 Penn State University
 VMUNIX VAX 11/780
 22 PSUMVS Penn State University
 MVS/JES2 IBM 3081
 23 PSUPDP1 Penn State University
 UNIX R6 PDP 11/34
 24 BROWNVN Brown University
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II
 BROWNVN1 Brown University
 BROWNVN2 Brown University
 BROWNVN3 Brown University
 25 CORNELLC Cornell University
 VM/SP
 IBM 370/168
 CORNELL Alias to CORNELLC
 CUNVM1 Alias to CORNELLC
 26 CORNELLA Cornell University
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II
 CUNVM2 Alias to CORNELLA
 27 CORNELLB Cornell University
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II
 CUNVM3 Alias to CORNELLB
 28 CRNLMVSB Cornell University
 MVS/JES2 guest @ CUNVM3
 CUNMVS3 Alias to CRNLMVSB
 29 CUMC Cornell University Medical Center
 VM/SP
 IBM 4331-1
 30 CRNL20A Cornell University
 TOPS/20 DEC 2060
 CUN2060 Alias to CRNL20A
 31 CUVMA Columbia University
 VM/BSEPP IBM 4341-II
 32 CUVMB Columbia University
 VM/BSEPP IBM 4341-II
 CU20A Columbia University
 TOPS-20 DEC 2060
 CU20B Columbia University
 TOPS-20 DEC 2060
 CU20C Columbia University
 TOPS-20 DEC 2060
 CWRU20 Case Western Reserve University
 TOPS-20 DEC 2060
 33 PUCC Princeton University
 VM/SP
 IBM 3081
 34 YALEADS3 Yale University
 VM/SP
 AS3-5
 35 YALEADS1 Yale University
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II
 36 ROCKVAX Rockefeller University
 VMUNIX VAX 11/780

196-4712-16

37 BOSTONU Boston Univeristy
 VM/SP(MP)IBM 3081-D

38 UCBVMA University California at Berkeley
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II

39 UCBUNIXA Univ. California at Berkeley
 2.8 BSD PDP 11/70California at Berkeley
 2.8 BSD PDP 11/70

43 UCBUNIXE Univ. California at Berkeley
 2.8 BSD PDP 11/70

44 UCBUNIXF Univ. California at Berkeley
 2.8 BSD PDP 11/70

45 UCBUNIXG Univ. California at Berkeley
 4.0 BSD VAX 11/780

46 SFASYS Univ. California San Francisco
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341

47 SFBSYS Univ. California San Francisco
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341

48 MITVMA Massachusetts Institute of Tech.
 VM/SP
 IBM 370/168

49 MITVMB Massachusetts Institute of Tech.

50 MITVMC Massachusetts Institute of Tech.

51 MITVMD Massachusetts Institute of Tech.

52 MITMULT Massachusetts Institute of Tech.

53 CRNLCS Cornell Computer Science Dept.
 UNIX
 VAX 11/780

54 UORVM University of Rochester
 VM/SP
 IBM 3032

55 SUNYBING SUNY at Binghamton
 VM/SP
 NAS AS6

56 HARVARDA Harvard University
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II
 YKTVMV
 YKTVMX IBM Yorktown
 PORTLAND University of Maine at Portland
 GWUVM George Washington University
 CUVMC Columbia University
 VM/SP
 IBM 4341-II
 CUVMD Columbia University
 VM/SP
 IBM 3031
 CUCHEM Columbia University Chemistry Dept.
 DEC VAX 11/780

Posted: Thu Sep 8, 1983 5:55 PM EDT
 From:
 To:
 Subj: DECNET [CM]

b6
 b7c

INTRODUCTION TO DECNET

DECNET is a network facility, provided by DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION,

196-4713-16

which enables users to do work involving access to another system in the network. For a brief description of the facilities which call upon DECNET, type or print the file, HLP:DECNET.DOC . Each of these programs involves specifying the network node you wish to communicate with. Below are the names of all the currently available nodes.

DECNET NODE NAMES

DECNET currently recognizes the following as valid node names:

Carnegie Mellon University -

Computation Center:

CMCCRA - "RSTS-A"	CMCCRB - "RSTS-B"	CMCCTA - "TOPS-A"
CMCCTB - "TOPS-B"	CMCCTC - "TOPS-C"	CMCCTD - "TOPS-D"
CMCCTE - "TOPS-E"	CMCCTF - "TOPS-F"	CMCCVA - "VAX-A"

Chemistry Department:

CMCHEM - "VAXC"

Computer Science Department:

CMCSC - "CMUC" CMCSPS - "Production Systems"

Physics Department:

CMPHYS - "VAXP"

Psychology Department:

CMPSYA - "PSYA" CMPSYB - "PSYB"

Columbia University -

Center for Computing Activities:

CU20A CU20B CU20C CU20D

Chemistry Department:

CUCHEM

Case-Western-Reserve University -

Jennings Computing Center:

CWRU20 CWR20B

Programs which use DECNET include HOST, NFT, WHERE, and the mail program MS. For more information on these programs, type HELP, a space, and the name of the program you wish to learn more about.

Carnegie-Mellon is on another network, BITNET, which can be used only for mail. Type HELP BITNET for details.

To learn which DECNET links are available at a particular moment, type

INFORMATION DECNET NODES

For a description of the operating system at each DECNET node, type

INFORMATION DECNET DESCRIPTION

or you may print the file, HLP:DECNET-DESCRIPTION.TXT .

196-4713-16

@INFORMATION DECNET NODES

Local DECNET node: CMCCTA

Accessible DECNET nodes are:

CMCCVA	CMCCVB	CMCCXA	CMCSC	CMCSP1	CMPHYB	CMPHYS	CMPSYA	CMPSYB	CMPSYC
CMPSYD	CMSTAT	CU20A	CU20B	CU20C	CU20D	CUCHEM	CUCHMB	CUTC20	CWR20B
CWR20C	CWRU20	DN20							

@INFORMATION DECNET DESCRIPTION

Carnegie Mellon University:

Computation Center:

CMCCRA - PDP-11/45 RSTS V7 - "RSTS-A"
CMCCRB - PDP-11/45 RSTS V7 - "RSTS-B"
CMCCTA - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-A"
CMCCTB - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-B"
CMCCTC - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-C"
CMCCTD - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-D"
CMCCTE - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-E"
CMCCTF - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-F"
CMCCVA - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0 - "VAX-A"

Chemistry Department:

CMCHEM - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0

Computer Science Department:

CMCSC - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "CMUC"
CMCSPS - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0 - "Production Systems"

Physics Department:

CMPHYS - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0

Psychology Department:

CMPSYA - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0
CMPSYB - VAX-11/750 VMS V3.0

Columbia University:

Center for Computing Activities:

CU20A - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5
CU20B - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5
CU20C - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5
CU20D - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5

Chemistry Department:

CUCHEM - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0

Autologout

Killed Job 48, TTY 72, at 8-Sep-83 17:16:05

Carnegie-Mellon University, UCC MICOM-A

PORT GROUP? 1

1

UNASSIGNED

PORT GROUP? 1

1

Secondary micom for CMCCTA

30

Carnegie-Mellon University TOPS-A on node CMCCTA, TOPS-20 Monitor 5.1(5050)-2

@INFORMATION DECNET DESCRIPTION

Carnegie Mellon University:

Computation Center:

196-4713-16

CMCCRA - PDP-11/45 RSTS V7 - "RSTS-A"
CMCCRB - PDP-11/45 RSTS V7 - "RSTS-B"
CMCCTA - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-A"
CMCCTB - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-B"
CMCCTC - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-C"
CMCCTD - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-D"
CMCCTE - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-E"
CMCCTF - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "TOPS-F"
CMCCVA - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0 - "VAX-A"

Chemistry Department:

CMCHEM - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0

Computer Science Department:

CMCSC - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5.1 - "CMUC"

CMCSPS - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0 - "Production Systems"

Physics Department:

CMPHYS - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0

Psychology Department:

CMPSYA - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0

CMPSYB - VAX-11/750 VMS V3.0

Columbia University:

Center for Computing Activities:

CU20A - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5

CU20B - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5

CU20C - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5

CU20D - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V5

Chemistry Department:

CUCHEM - VAX-11/780 VMS V3.0

Case-Western-Reserve University:

Jennings Computing Center:

CWRU20 - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V4

CWR20B - DECsystem-2060 TOPS-20 V4

Posted: Thu Sep 8, 1983 9:48 PM EDT Msg: IGID-1621-2232

From:

To:

Subj: Arpa*News

b6
b7c

DATE: WED 7 SEP 83 12:40:00-PDT

FROM: NIC@SRI-NIC

SUBJECT: DDN NEWSLETTER NO. 32

=====

DDN-NEWS 32

7 SEP 83

(415) 859-3695

NETWORK INFO CENTER FOR
DCA DDN PROGRAM MGMT OFFICE
NIC@SRI-NIC

DEFENSE DATA NETWORK NEWSLETTER

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=====

SECTION 1. OFFICIAL

TOPIC: - TAC-NEWS SERVICE

196-4713-16

- MILNET/ARPANET HOST AND TAC ALIGNMENT LIST

TAC-NEWS SERVICE

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TAC USERS ARE ALSO REMINDED THAT THEY MUST USE THE COMPLETE INTERNET ADDRESS SCHEME IF THEY WISH TO CONNECT TO A HOST ON A DIFFERENT NETWORK FROM THE TAC THEY ARE USING. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS FORM OF ADDRESS IS: 10.1.0.40, WHERE

10 IS THE NETWORK NUMBER OF THE HOST BEING ACCESSED (10 FOR ARPANET, 26 FOR MILNET);

1 IS THE PORT NUMBER OF THE HOST BEING ACCESSED;

0 IS RESERVED AND CURRENTLY IS USUALLY 0;

40 IS THE NUMBER OF THE IMP TO WHICH THE HOST IS CONNECTED.

-----END-OF-MESSAGE-----

DATE: 6 SEP 1983 13:53:20 EDT (TUESDAY)

FROM: [REDACTED]@BBN-UNIX>

SUBJECT: TAC SPLIT INFO !!

b6
b7c

***** MILNET/ARPANET HOSTS AND TACS *****

THE FOLLOWING LISTS ARE PROVIDED TO ENABLE TAC USERS TO DETERMINE THE NETWORK ALIGNMENT, ARPANET OR MILNET, OF THE TAC(S) AND HOST(S) WHICH THEY NORMALLY USE. FOLLOWING THE MILNET/ARPANET SPLIT (4 OCT 83) AND ON THE TEST DAYS (8 AND 15 SEP 83), EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO USE A TAC ON THE SAME NETWORK AS THE HOST BEING ACCESSED.

TAC USERS ARE ALSO REMINDED THAT ON THE TEST DAYS, AND FOLLOWING THE SPLIT, THEY MUST USE THE FULL INTERNET ADDRESS OF THE HOST THEY WISH

196-4713-16

TO ACCESS IF IT IS NOT ON THE SAME NET AS THE TAC THEY ARE USING. FOR
EXAMPLE, TO ADDRESS THE HOST DDN1 FROM AN ARPANET TAC, IT WOULD BE
NECESSARY TO ENTER THE COMMAND TO THE TAC:

20 26.3.0.82

WHERE 26 IS THE NETWORK NUMBER FOR MILNET,

3 IS PORT NUMBER FOR DDN1,

0 IS A RESERVED POSITION, CURRENTLY ALWAYS A "0",

AND 82 IS THE IMP NUMBER FOR DDN1.

THE INFORMATION IN THESE LISTS IS CURRENT AS OF 8 AUGUST 83. A REVISION
WILL BE POSTED APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK PRIOR TO 4 OCT WHICH WILL BE CURRENT
AS OF THE DATE POSTED.

-----MILNET HOSTS-----

IMP #. HOSTS ON IMP.

3. NOSC-CC, LOGICON, NPRDC, NOSC-TECR.
8. NRL, NRL-AIC, NSWC-WO, NRL-ARCTAN, NRL-CSS, NRL-TOPS10.
13.
14. CMU-10A
16. AMES-TSS, AMES-VMSA, AMES-VMSB.
17. MITRE.
18. RADC-MULTICS, RADC-TOPS20, RADC-UNIX, GE-CRD.
19. NBS-VMS, NBS-SDC, NBS-UNIX, NBS-PL, NBS-AMRF, NBS-SSI.
20. DCA-EMS, DCEC-BRIDGE.
21. LLL-TIS, LLL-MFE, LLL-ZDIVISION.
22. USC-ISI.
23. USC-ECL, USC-ECLB.
24. NADC.
29. BRL, APG-1, BRL-GATEWAY.
33. NPS, FNOC-SECURE.
34. LBL-NMM, LBL-CSAM.
35. NOSC-SECURE2, NOSC-TECR, NOSC-SECURE3.
36. COINS-TAS, CINCPACFLT-WM.
43. OFFICE-1, OFFICE-2, OFFICE-3, OFFICE-7.
44. MIT-MC.
45. PICA.
46. OKC-UNIX.
47. WPAFB, WPAFB-AFWAL.
48. AFWL.
49. BBN-TENEXB, BBN-TENEXC.
52. USC-ISIE, ISI-VAXB.
53. AFSC-AD, AFSC-DEV, NCSC, MARTIN.
54. ACC, JPL-VAX.
55. ANL-MCS.
57. TYCHO, COINS-IG.
58. NYU, BNL.
61. STL-HOST1, ALMSA-1.
64. MARTIN-B, ROBINS-UNIX.
65. AFSC-SD, AEROSPACE.
66. MITRE-BEDFORD, AFGL1.
67. AFSC-HQ.

b6
b7C

196-4713-16

- 68. USGS1-MULTICS, USGS1-AMDAHL.
- 69. USGS2-MULTICS.
- 70. USGS3-MULTICS, USGS3-VMS.
- 72. BBNP.
- 73. SRI-NIC, SRI-WARF.
- 74. WSMR-70A, WSMR-70B, SIMTEL20.
- 75. YUMA.
- 78. MCCLELLAN.
- 81. NEMS, NALCON, NSRDCOA.
- 82. BBNT, BBN-RSM, DDN1, TEST-MAILBRIDGE.
- 83. TAC-NEWS, TEST-BRIDGE.
- 84. NSWC-DL, NSWC-G, NSWC-OAS.
- 85. NWC-387A, NWC-387B.
- 87. SANDIA.
- 88. NLM-MCS.
- 90. LANL.
- 92. NUSC-NPT, NUSC.
- 93. OFFICE-8, OFFICE-10, OFFICE-15.
- 95. S1-GATEWAY, S1-A, S1-B, S1-C.
- 97. PAXRV-NES.

-----MILNET TACS-----

IMP #. TAC

- 13. GUNTER-TAC.
- 16. AMES-TAC.
- 17. MITRE-TAC.
- 18. RADC-TAC.
- 20. DCEC-TAC.
- 26. PENTAGON-TAC.
- 28. ARPA1-TAC, ARPA2-TAC.
- 29. BRL-TAC.
- 30. BROOKS-TAC.
- 33. NPS-TAC.
- 35. ACCAT-TAC.
- 36. ALOHA-TAC.
- 40. NCC-TAC.
- 41. REDSTONE-TAC.
- 45. ARRADCOM-TAC.
- 47. WPAFB-TAC.
- 48. AFWL-TAC.
- 50. DARCOM-TAC.
- 53. EGLIN-TAC.
- 59. SCOTT-TAC.
- 60. CRDCM1-TAC, CRDCM2-TAC.
- 61. STLA-TAC.
- 64. ROBINS-TAC.
- 65. AFSD-TAC.
- 66. AFGL-TAC.
- 67. ANDRWS-TAC.
- 68. USGS1-TAC.
- 69. USGS2-TAC.
- 70. USGS3-TAC.
- 74. WSMR-TAC.
- 75. YUMA-TAC.
- 80. SAC2-TAC.
- 81. DAVID-TAC.

196-4712-16

- 84. NSWC-TAC.
- 85. CHINA-TAC.
- 97. PAXRV-TAC.

-----ARPANET HOSTS-----

IMP #. HOSTS ON IMP.

- 1. UCLA-CS, UCLA-ATS, UCLA-CCN, UCLA-SECURITY.
- 2. SRI-NSC11, SRI-KL, SRI-CSL, SRI-TSC.
- 4. UTAH-CS, UTAH-20.
- 5. BBNF, BBNG, BBN-PTIP, BBNA.
- 6. MIT-MULTICS, MIT-DMS, MIT-AI, MIT-ML.
- 7. RAND-RELAY, RAND-UNIX.
- 9. HARV-10, YALE.
- 10. LL, LL-XN, LL-VLSI, LL-EN, LL-GATEWAY, LL-11.
- 11. SU-AI, SU-SCORE, STANFORD-GW.
- 14. CMU-10B, CMU-GATEWAY, CMU-20C.
- 15. ROCHESTER.
- 17. DCN-GATEWAY, MITRE-GATEWAY, MITRE-LAN.
- 18. RADC-PSAT-IG.
- 20. DCEC-GATEWAY, EDN-UNIX, DCEC-PSAT-IG.
- 22. ISI-SPEECH11, USC-ISIC, ISI-PSAT-IG.
- 23. USC-ECLC.
- 24. WHARTON-10.
- 25. SEISMO, CSS-SAT-IG.
- 27. USC-ISID, ISI-PNG11, ISI-VAXA, ISI-GWY.
- 28. ARPA-DMS, ARPA-PENGUIN.
- 31. CCA-UNIX, CCA-VMS.
- 32. PARC-MAXC, KESTREL.
- 37. PURDUE-IG, CSNET-PURDUE.
- 38. BRAGG-GWY1, BRAGG-STAI, NET5-GW.
- 40. BBN-PSAT-IG, BBN-VAN-GW.
- 44. MIT-XX, MIT-TST-IG.
- 46. COLLINS-PR, COLLINS.
- 49. CHRONUS, CLARK-IG, BBN-CLXX.
- 51. SRI-C3PO, SRI-UNIX, SRI-R2D2, ST-NIC.
- 52. USC-ISIF, USC-ISIB.
- 54. CIT-20, CIT-VAX.
- 56. SUMEX-AIM, SU-DSN, AIDS-UNIX.
- 58. RUTGERS.
- 62. UTEXAS-11, UTEXAS-20, UTEXAS-780.
- 63. BBN-TEST0-GW, BBN-TEST2-GW, BBN-TEST3-GW.
- 72. BBN-NU, BBN-UNIX, RCC-IG.
- 73. SRI-AI, SRI-IU.
- 77. MIT-LCS-GW, MIT-OZ, MIT-DEVMULTICS.
- 78. UCB-ARPA, UCB-VAX.
- 79. DEC-TOPS20, DEC-MARLBORO.
- 80. HI-MULTICS, SAC-SAT-IG.
- 82. BBN-VAX, BBN-NOC2.
- 89. COLUMBIA-20.
- 91. WASHINGTON, UW-VLSI.
- 94. WISC, CSNET-SH.
- 96. UDEL-RELAY, UDEL-TCP, UDEL-EE, CORNELL.

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-----ARPANET TACS-----

IMP #. TAC.

4. UTAH-TAC.
7. RAND-TAC.
11. SU-TAC.
23. USC-TAC.
31. CCA-TAC.
38. BRAGG-TAC.
46. COLLINS-TAC.
63. BBN-TAC.
77. MIT-TAC.
80. SAC1-TAC.
91. WASH-TAC.

-----END OF FILE-----

DATE: THU 1 SEP 83 15:47:17-PDT
FROM: NIC@SRI-NIC
SUBJECT: DDN MGT BULLETIN # 12

DDN MGT BULLETIN # 12
1 SEP 83
(415) 859-3695

NETWORK INFO CENTER FOR
DCA DDN PROGRAM MGT OFFICE
NIC@SRI-NIC

DEFENSE DATA NETWORK

MANAGEMENT BULLETIN

THE DDN MANAGEMENT BULLETIN IS PUBLISHED BY THE NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER UNDER DCA CONTRACT AS A MEANS OF COMMUNICATING OFFICIAL POLICY, PROCEDURES AND OTHER INFORMATION OF CONCERN TO MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL AT DDN FACILITIES. BACK ISSUES MAY BE OBTAINED BY FTP FROM THE DIRECTORY <DDN-NEWS> AT SRI-NIC [10.0.0.73].

PUBLIC HOST AVAILABLE FOR SOFTWARE VERIFICATION

AS BRIEFED IN THE RECENT HOST ADMINISTRATOR/TECHNICAL LIAISON MEETINGS, A PUBLIC HOST HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE NETWORK AS A GENERAL-PURPOSE TCP/IP HOST FOR NETWORK SOFTWARE TESTING. THE ADDRESS OF THE HOST IS 8.7.0.4. SINCE THIS IS ON BBN-NET, NOT ARPANET, USE OF A GATEWAY WILL BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH A CONNECTION. THE INTENT OF PROVIDING THIS HOST IS TO ALLOW ARPANET HOST NETWORK SOFTWARE MAINTAINERS TO VERIFY THAT THEIR SOFTWARE IS CAPABLE OF ACCESSING A HOST ON A DIFFERENT NETWORK AND RESPONDS PROPERLY TO ICMP CONTROL MESSAGES. THE GUEST ACCOUNT NAMES AND PASSWORDS ARE NAME: "GUEST", PASSWORD: "ANONYMOUS"; OR NAME: "ANONYMOUS", PASSWORD: "GUEST".

-----END-OF-MESSAGE-----

196-4713-16

DATE: THU 1 SEP 83 15:33:00-PDT
FROM: NIC@SRI-NIC
SUBJECT: DDN NEWSLETTER NO. 31

=====

DDN-NEWS 31
1 SEP 83
(415) 859-3695

=====

NETWORK INFO CENTER FOR
DCA DDN PROGRAM MGMT OFFICE
NIC@SRI-NIC

DEFENSE DATA NETWORK NEWSLETTER

[MAXIMUM DISTRIBUTION REQUESTED. THE DDN NEWSLETTER IS PUBLISHED BY THE NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER UNDER DCA CONTRACT. FOR SUBSCRIPTION, CONTACT NIC@SRI-NIC. BACK ISSUES OBTAINABLE BY FTP FROM THE DIRECTORY <DDN-NEWS> AT SRI-NIC [10.0.0.73].]

=====

SECTION I. OFFICIAL

TOPIC: - MILNET/ARPANET SPLIT - TEST DAYS

AS DESCRIBED IN NEWSLETTERS 26 THROUGH 29, THE ARPANET WILL BE SPLIT INTO THE MILNET AND THE EXPERIMENTAL ARPANET ON OCTOBER 4, 1983. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS SPLIT, TWO FULL SCALE TEST DAYS HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED IN SEPTEMBER. THESE TEST DAYS ARE THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8 AND THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15. THE TESTS WILL INVOLVE COMPLETE CUTOVER TO THE SPLIT CONFIGURATION OF THE TWO NETWORKS. THE TESTS COMMENCE AT 12:00 NOON EST AND TERMINATE AT 12:00 NOON EST THE FOLLOWING DAY.

HOST ADMINISTRATORS MUST ENSURE THAT NEW HOST NAME TABLES ARE LOADED AT THE START AND FINISH OF THE TESTS. (AN UPCOMING MANAGEMENT BULLETIN WILL HAVE FURTHER DETAILS ON HOST TABLE UPDATING.) FOR HOSTS MOVING TO MILNET, ADMINISTRATORS MUST ALSO ENSURE THAT THEIR HOST USES ITS NEW NETWORK 26 ADDRESS DURING THE TEST PERIOD.

DURING THE TESTS, USERS OF TACS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE NETWORK ALIGNMENT OF THE TACS AND HOSTS THEY USE. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO USE A TAC ON THE SAME NETWORK AS THE HOST BEING ACCESSED.

FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING THE SPLIT, AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS FOR USERS AND ADMINISTRATORS, MAY BE FOUND IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED NETWORK NEWSLETTERS.

-----END-OF-MESSAGE-----

DATE: THU 1 SEP 83 14:38:34-PDT
FROM: NIC@SRI-NIC
SUBJECT: DDN MGT BULLETIN # 11 (LONG)

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DDN MGT BULLETIN # 11
1 SEP 83

=====

NETWORK INFO CENTER FOR
DCA DDN PROGRAM MGT OFFICE

196-4713-16

DEFENSE DATA NETWORK

MANAGEMENT BULLETIN

THE DDN MANAGEMENT BULLETIN IS PUBLISHED BY THE NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER UNDER DCA CONTRACT AS A MEANS OF COMMUNICATING OFFICIAL POLICY, PROCEDURES AND OTHER INFORMATION OF CONCERN TO MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL AT DDN FACILITIES. BACK ISSUES MAY BE OBTAINED BY FTP FROM THE DIRECTORY <DDN-NEWS> AT SRI-NIC [10.0.0.73].

GATEWAY (MAILBRIDGE) HOMINGS FOR
MILNET/ARPANET SPLIT AND TEST DAYS

WHEN THE ARPANET IS SPLIT INTO THE MILNET AND THE ARPANET, ALL TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE TWO NETWORKS WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL VIA A GATEWAY, OR MAIL BRIDGE. BECAUSE OF THE LARGE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC WHICH IS EXPECTED, 6 GATEWAYS WILL BE PLACED BETWEEN THE TWO NETWORKS. IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY DIVIDE THE TRAFFIC AMONG THESE GATEWAYS, HOSTS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO A "PRIMARY" GATEWAY AND A "SECONDARY" GATEWAY. THE LATTER IS TO BE USED IN THE EVENT THAT THE PRIMARY GATEWAY IS NOT AVAILABLE. HOSTS WHICH SEND TRAFFIC TO THE WRONG GATEWAY WILL RECEIVE AN ICMP REDIRECT MESSAGE INFORMING THEM OF THE APPROPRIATE GATEWAY TO BE USED.

IN THE TABLES WHICH APPEAR BELOW, COMPLETE INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ABOUT WHICH GATEWAY SHOULD BE USED BY EACH HOST DURING THE SEPTEMBER 8 TEST OF THE LOGICAL SPLIT OF THE ARPANET. THE FIRST TABLE PROVIDES THE NAMES OF EACH OF THE GATEWAYS BETWEEN THE ARPANET AND THE MILNET. IN ADDITION, THE ARPANET ADDRESS OF BOTH NETWORK INTERFACES ARE PROVIDED FOR EACH GATEWAY. THE SECOND TABLE DESCRIBES WHICH OF THE GATEWAYS SHOULD BE USED BY HOSTS ON EACH IMP. FOR EXAMPLE, A HOST WHICH IS ASSIGNED TO THE MILNET AND WHICH IS HOMED TO IMP 3 (NOSC) SHOULD SEND TRAFFIC TO THE ARPANET VIA THE MILNET INTERFACE OF THE MILISI GATEWAY. SIMILARLY, AN ARPANET HOST AT RCC5 SHOULD SEND TRAFFIC TO THE MILNET VIA THE ARPANET INTERFACE OF THE MILBBN GATEWAY.

TWO THINGS ARE WORTHY OF SPECIAL ATTENTION. FIRST, IN THESE TABLES, ALL HOSTS AT A GIVEN IMP ARE HOMED TO THE SAME GATEWAY. FUTURE TABLES MAY NOT HAVE THIS PROPERTY. LOAD-SHARING AMONG GATEWAYS IS CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTED SO THAT ALL MILNET HOSTS AT A GIVEN IMP ARE HOMED TO THE SAME GATEWAY AND ALL ARPANET HOSTS AT A GIVEN IMP ARE HOMED TO THE SAME GATEWAY. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE THAT AN ARPANET HOST AND A MILNET HOST AT A GIVEN IMP WILL USE THE SAME GATEWAY. SECOND, IN THE TABLES WHICH FOLLOW, NO INFORMATION IS GIVEN ABOUT BACKUP GATEWAYS. THE SECONDARY GATEWAY MECHANISM WILL BE IN PLACE FOR THE ACTUAL SPLIT OF THE NETWORK ON OCTOBER 4, BUT NOT FOR THE FIRST TEST ON SEPTEMBER 8. THUS, NEW TABLES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 4.

MAIL BRIDGE ADDRESSES

SHORT NAME	L O N G NAME	ARPANET ADDRESS	MILNET ADDRESS
MILARPA	ARPA-MILNET-GWY	10.2.0.28	26.0.0.106
MILBBN	BBN-MILNET-GWY	10.5.0.5	26.2.0.49
MILDCEC	DCEC-MILNET-GWY	10.7.0.20	26.0.0.104
MILISI	ISI-MILNET-GWY	10.2.0.22	26.0.0.103

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MILSAC	SAC-MILNET-GWY	10.2.0.80	26.0.0.105
MILSRI	SRI-MILNET-GWY	10.4.0.51	26.2.0.73

ASSIGNMENTS OF HOST TO GATEWAYS

<---SEVERAL HUNDRED LINES OF REALLY BORING SHIT--->

-----END-OF-MESSAGE-----

Command?

196-4713-16

Cables

Skylar
549117

Lexitel
547630

metaphone

LAUSE (100,000 CASINO) 21576-8000

60	3/11	STANFORD SCORE
60	3/14	CMU-CS-C
60	3/16	NASA Ames Research JUPITER
60	3/17	DENI-ANPA Telnet Service
60	3/18	Rome Air Development Center
60	3/20	EDN-UNIX
60	3/23	USC-ECL SYSTEMS
60	4/20	DCA-Emt C70 UNIX
60	3/52	ISI-SYSTEM B
60	3/43	Augment OFFICE-7
60	3/44	MIT MACSYMA CONSORTIUM
60	3/49	BBN-TENEX SYSTEM-C
60	3/54	JPL Vllsi VAX-V3.2

196-4713-16

milnet TACS

60283.0 80

Winter-Fall:

1. Access-Info

1. Inter-Tac

5 RADC-TAC

du DCC-TAC

26 Petagon-TAC

28 $\text{ATPM}^0\text{-TAC}$, ACPAD-TAC

29 BrI-TAC

30 Brooks-TAC

33 NPS-TAC

35. Accrual-TAC

38 $AlOHA \rightarrow TAC$

40 NCC-TAC

4. Red Stone-TAC

45 ARRA DCOM-TAC

47 WPAFB-TAC

50 DARCOM-TAC

48 AEWI-TAC

53 Edin-TAC

59 SCOT-TAC

60 CrDcm1, CrDcm2-TAC

81 STLA-TAC

84 ROBINS-TAC

65 AFSB-TRC

196-4713-16

SKI-A
 301-8692
 301-8690-

18-8-0-16
 18-8-0-4
 18-2-0-18
 18-2-0-7
 14-0-0-6
 10-7-0-20
 10-6-0-19
 10-5-0-47
 10-5-0-18
 10-5-0-2
 10-4-0-47
 10-4-0-2
 10-3-2-73
 10-3-0-99
 10-2-0-28
 10-2-0-51
 10-2-0-55
 10-2-0-68
 10-2-0-70
 10-2-0-78
 10-2-0-92
 10-2-0-97
 10-3-0-2
 10-3-0-17
 10-3-0-47
 10-3-0-54
 10-3-0-81
 10-3-0-85

66 AFgl-TAC
 67 ANDRWS-TAC
 68 USgSI-TAC

10-0-0-57 NSA

SF-Pr-1-TEMP
 BBN-RCC

3-1-0-50

10-1-124-27
 10-1-125-27
 10-2-0-16 VAX

8-1-0-8
 8-2-0-5
 8-3-0-8
 8-3-0-14
 9-0-0-11

10-0-0-20 VAX
 10-0-0-34 VAX
 10-0-0-50
 10-0-0-52 VAX
 10-0-0-62
 10-0-0-78

SATNET
 NTARE-gateway
 TANUM-MONITOR
 MOS

FUCINO 10-1-89-27
 10-1-0-81 10-1-4-51 VAX
 10-1-0-95 waits
 H-316 10-1-0-
 10-1-0-56 10-0-0-
 10-1-0-51
 10-1-0-35 VAX
 10-1-0-31 VAX
 10-1-0-19 VAX
 10-0-0-85 VAX
 10-0-0-96 UNIX
 10-1-0-18

ANOMAL
 FBI Thief -


Log 11
 JAN 50000

5-11

196-4713-16

USER NAMES

600/24 MITRE



15066, 15070
15066, 15016
131013107
711223

b6
b7C

MITRE

MITRE

MITRE

600/65 Assigned El Primero JAX

600/12 MITRE

MITRE USER=JDR 111=JDA

600/27 VIRTUAL

MITRE

USER=RTS

PASS=RTS

COSY CNP

USER=MBT

PASS=MBT

RTS JTO

USER=RAS

PASS=RF'S

MIT JAS

USER=IRS

PASS=IRS

RTS SPADOC

USER=MTZ

PASS=MTZ

IRS WXC

USER=MLC

PASS=MLC

MTZ GRS

USER=MAI

PASS=MAI

MLC Jch

USER=MTI

PASS=MTI

MAI RUS

USER=RUS

PASS=RUS

MTI JSW

USER=JSD

RUS LM

JSW

LM

196-4713-16

18.10.0-66

18.10.0-68

18.10.0-77

18.10.0-78

18.10.0-88

21.0.0-2

28-10.0.0

28.18.0.0

30.40.0-192

36.40.0-207

39.108.1-230

39.108-3-59

45-0-32-2

40.0.0/6

47.0-32.3

50.0.0-4

100.2-254-128

100.2-254-132

108.0 254.144

108.0 254.144 VAX

108-3-0-24

128.4.0.2

128.4.0.6

128.5.0.1

128.5.0.8

128.5.0.9 VAX (FORD-VAX)

INNA

196-4713-16

1000026	PENTAGON TAC
1000040	NCC-TAC
1000045	ARRADCOM-TAC
1000098	PLA-TAC
1010016	AMES-TAC
1010028	ARPA-TAC
1010038	HDL-TAC
1010042	RAM-TAC
1010051	SCOTT-TAC
1010060	CORADCOM-TAC
1010063	BRN-TAC
1010065	ATSC-SD-TAC
1010069	USO52-TAC
1010070	USO53-TAC

196-4713-16

Arpanet Notes

10.2.0.10 LL-XN series UUTP
10.2.0.16 NASA Ames Research
10.2.0.8 NSWC-WO Arpanet
10.2.0.9 Yale computer science Department
10.14.x.x.x
10.21.x.x.x
18.x.xx = Tymnet
28.x.xx = COMSTAT
47.x.xxx = 2-0 119

Telenet

C 41518 SYSTAR corporation
C 41665 Edmonton Prime computer system
C 41630 High energy physics (nrc)
C 41639 Primnet miller computing services
C 41646 VM370
C 41649 RST/E DPL SPEEDBALL
C 41651 Apex VM3/VAX
C 41653 SSL VAX720
C 41659 HP3000
C 41660 northern dynamics computing
C 41667 Hardy Assoc.
C 41621 University of B.C.
C 20420 VM370
C 20423 Univ of Alberta computing
C 20459 Prime sid JEEVES

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C 20467	mcgill
C 20472	Prime ISC (INDEPENDENT SURVEY)
C 20473	RST/E IAS
C 20474	Prime KAS
C 20477	UTCS DATAPAC
C 20481	RST/E CCL ONTARIO
C 20485	Prime PSICAL
C 204105	RST/E COMPUSEARCH
C 204112	Prime UMA UMAVAN
C 204127	HP3000
C 204141	TIL VAX system #2 (Demo)
C 204161	LABATT Brewing and PASS-Demo US&D
C 204171	RST/E CAN Test Sys A
C 204188	Prime PRIMOS INFORMATION
C 204190	HP 3000
C 204192	Prime Prc12
C 204197	Prime CIO sys91
C 416140	Prime MD-TST
C 416139	Prime MD-CDN
C 71724	Prime C Ecs
ARPANET	1-800-638-4870

/OUTPUT	/Prompt	ATTACH	ADVANCED
BASIC	DEASIGN	EXIT	FILENAME
HEEDIT	SYSTAT	Switch	Fit
DISMOUNT	Type	Set	RESX

196-4713-16

A	AC	ADD-user	ADDUSE
BBaill	CAT	ChDir	ChlogDir
Dcheck	Dir	EXec	Florida
glor	distances	guide	last
Info	WIN	login	login
msg	msg	Net-Test	Netor
Neton	NetProc	NetStat	NEWS
PWD	Pwdcheck	Query	Send
Search	Submsg	Talksh	Telnet
TOP	WHO	WHOIS	

GO 3/66 Mitre Bcc VAX Facility

GO 3/78 maclellan USER=Operator PASS=Operator

GO 3/78 maclellan USER=IZAD PASS=IZAD

GO 3/78 maclellan USER=Knutec PASS=FAUTUM

GO 3/78 maclellan USER=... PASS=CAST...

C 9/11/78 ... LOGIN CMCC

196-4713-16

Access codes
G O X.X.X
C 21254 User=BANK PASS=BANK
Dialog C 55 ID DIAO19012 117-20
BLUE BOX
202101-117-116
212101-117-116
APPENDIX 2
S O 100-117-116

UCA 117-116
UCA-1
MIT MATCH LIBRARY PI
RAND INFORMATION SYSTEM
1-800-621-1057
813 96-141

Allnet Service
mit

Lerner credit card check (05/54) 1-800-745-5350
ADMIN/CCUSA PASS=CCUSA
ADMIN/CUP PASS=CUP
ADMIN/RESEARCH PASS=LOU

BLO
MIT
HINDS
HINDS

394-3670

302-717
313-954-6500
617-255-8313
617-732-1251
617-732-1802

C 9162
OIEP
APPENDIX
117-116

313-828 7141
313-214-5300
313-214-3670

196-4713-16

ITT City Line 1-800-321-1128
 Bell Telephone 1-800-321-3121
 UNKNOWN 1-800-321-164
 UNKNOWN 1-800-321-1111
 UNKNOWN 1-800-321-1111
 Den. of. 1-800-321-1111
 Unknown 1-800-321-1111
 SkyLine 1-800-321-1111
 Tymnet 1-800-321-1111
 Autonet 1-800-321-6764
 Autonet 1-800-321-6765
 Whit. House. 1-800-451-1000
 VISA/Master Charge System 1-800-321-1111
 UNKNOWN 1-800-321-1147
 UNKNOWN 1-800-321-3074
 UNKNOWN 1-800-321-3052
 UNKNOWN 1-800-321-1111

CONT-111 3007

Source Systems C 3012, C 3011a4
 C 3013, C 301117

APPANet

6	C	1/1	YRE-UL	TAN-X
6	O	2/3	ARPANet	UN NSUIS-WO VAX/VNIX
6	O	2/8	UPR	Comp. Science
6	O	3/0	UPRDC	Network VAX/VNIX
6	O	3/3	UCLA-ATS	(CAXXAN) LOCUS
6	O	3/1	UPI-TSC	
6	O	3/2		

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Hosts:

Hosts:

Host:

Job 26 JUI-AI WAITS 9.16/R Assembled 09/25/83

Host table generated by JJW on 10/07/83 13:59:00

RCC-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*3.0.0.5	BBNF	DEC-2040T	TOPS20
*1.0.0.49	BBNB	DEC-10	TENEX
*3.1.0.5	BBNG	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
3.1.0.50	ALTA-COMA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
1.2.0.5	BBN-PTIP-GATEWAY	PLURIBUS	UNKNOWN
*1.3.0.5	BBNA	DEC-2050T	TOPS20
*3.3.0.49	BBNC	DEC-10	TENEX

* means this site is a server

SATNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
4.0.0.0	SATNET	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
1.0.0.1	ETAM-EXPAK	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.2	GOONHILLY-EXPAK	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.3	TANUM-EXPAK	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.24	DCEC-GATEWAY	PDP-11/45	MOS
4.0.0.30	CLARKSBURG-IG	C/30	SIMP
4.0.0.37	SATNET-SINK	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
4.0.0.38	NTARE-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	MOS
4.0.0.40	SATNET-ECHO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
4.0.0.41	ETAM-MONITOR	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.42	GOONHILLY-MONITOR	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.43	TANUM-MONITOR	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.60	UCL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	MOS
4.0.0.61	CSS-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	MOS
4.0.0.62	ETAM-ECHO	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.63	GOONHILLY-ECHO	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.64	TANUM-ECHO	H-316	SIMP
1.0.0.72	RAISTING	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
4.0.0.76	DFVLR-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	MOS
4.0.0.77	RAISTING-ECHO	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.78	RAISTING-MONITOR	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.79	RAISTING-EXPAK	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.88	FUCINO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
4.0.0.92	FUCINO-IG	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.93	FUCINO-ECHO	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.94	FUCINO-MONITOR	H-316	SIMP
4.0.0.95	FUCINO-EXPAK	H-316	SIMP

* means this site is a server

DEMO-PR-1-TEMP Network: no hosts

BBN-NET Networks:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*8.0.0.2	BBNCCA	C/70	UNIX
*8.0.0.3	BBNCCG	C/70	UNIX

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*9.0.0.4	BBNCCF	C/70	UNIX
*9.0.0.5	BBN-CDNOC	C/70	UNIX
*9.0.0.7	BBNCCS	C/70	UNIX
*9.0.0.8	BBNCCX	C/70	UNIX
9.0.0.10	BBNCC4-TAC	C/30	TAC
*9.0.0.14	CSNET-CIC	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*9.1.0.2	BBNCCB	C/70	UNIX
*9.1.0.4	BBN-UNIX	C/70	UNIX
*9.1.0.5	BBN-CD	C/70	UNIX
*9.1.0.6	BBN-ADMIN	C/70	UNIX
*9.1.0.7	BBNZ	C/70	UNIX
*9.1.0.8	BBN-VAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*9.1.0.14	BBN-NOC	C/70	UNIX
*9.2.0.2	BBNCCC	C/70	UNIX
9.2.0.3	BBNCC2-TAC	C/30	TAC
*9.2.0.4	BBNP	C/70	UNIX
9.2.0.5	BBNCC1-TAC	C/30	TAC
*9.2.0.6	BBN-INOC	C/70	UNIX
*9.2.0.7	BBNCCQ	C/70	UNIX
*9.2.0.8	BBNCCY	C/70	UNIX
9.2.0.9	BBNCC3-TAC	C/30	TAC
9.2.0.14	DIV6-TAC	C/30	TAC
*9.3.0.2	BBNCCD	C/70	UNIX
*9.3.0.4	BBNCCI	C/70	UNIX
*9.3.0.6	BBNCCW	C/70	UNIX
*9.3.0.7	BBNCC T	C/70	UNIX
9.3.0.8	BBN-NET-GATEWAY	LSI-11/2	MOS
9.3.0.14	BBN-FIBER-GATEWAY	LSI-11/2	MOS
*9.4.0.4	BBNH	C/70	UNIX
*9.6.0.4	BBNCCJ	C/70	UNIX
*9.7.0.4	TAC-NEWS	C/70	UNIX

* means this site is a server

BRAGG-PR-TEMP Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
9.0.0.11	BRAGG-GWY1	LSI-11/2	MOS

* means this site is a server

ARPANET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*10.0.0.1	UCLA-CS	VAX-11/750	LOCUS
*10.0.0.2	SRI-NSC11	PDP-11/40	UNIX
*10.0.0.4	UTAH-CS	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*10.0.0.4	UTAH-GATEWAY	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*10.0.0.5	BBNF	DEC-2040T	TOPS20
*10.0.0.6	MIT-MULTICS	HONEYWELL-DPS-8/70M	MULTICS
*10.0.0.9	HARV-10	DEC-10	TOPS10
*10.0.0.10	LL	PDP-11/44	UNIX
*10.0.0.11	SU-AI	DEC-1080	WAITTS
*10.0.0.15	ROCHESTER	VAX-11/750	UNIX
10.0.0.22	ISI-SPEECH11	PDP-11/45	EPOS
*10.0.0.25	SEISMO	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*10.0.0.27	USC-ISID	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
*10.0.0.31	CCA-UNIX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*10.0.0.32	PARC-MAXC	MAXC	TENEX
*10.0.0.37	FURDUE	VAX-11/780	UNIX

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10.0.0.38	BRAGG-GWY1	LSI-11/2	MOS
*10.0.0.44	MIT-XX	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
10.0.0.46	COLLINS-PR	PDP-11/34	ELF
*10.0.0.51	ST-NIC	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*10.0.0.52	USC-ISIC	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*10.0.0.54	CIT-20	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*10.0.0.56	SUMEX-AIM	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*10.0.0.62	UTEXAS-11	VAX-11/780	UNIX
10.0.0.63	BBN-TESTO-GW	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*10.0.0.72	BBN-NOC	C/70	UNIX
10.0.0.77	MIT-GW	PDP-11	MOS
*10.0.0.78	UCB-ARPA	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*10.0.0.79	DEC-TOPS20	DEC-2060T	TOPS20AN
*10.0.0.80	HI-MULTICS	DPS8/70M	MULTICS
*10.0.0.89	COLUMBIA-20	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*10.0.0.91	WASHINGTON	DEC-2060	TOPS20
10.0.0.94	WISC-GATEWAY	PDP-11/34	MOS
*10.0.0.96	UDEL-RELAY	VAX-11/750	UNIX
10.0.0.98	DLA-TAC	C/30	TAC
10.0.21.22	ISI-MCON	PDP-11/44	EPOS
10.0.22.22	ISI-SPEECH11	PDP-11/45	EPOS
10.0.23.22	ISI-WBC11	PDP-11/45	EPOS
*10.1.0.1	UCLA-CCN	IBM-370/3033	OS/MVS
*10.1.0.2	SRI-KL	DEC-1090T	TOPS20
*10.1.0.5	BBNG	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
*10.1.0.6	MIT-DMS	DEC-1040	ITS
*10.1.0.7	RAND-RELAY	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*10.1.0.10	LL-VLSI	VAX-11/780	UNIX
10.1.0.11	STANFORD-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	MOS
*10.1.0.14	CMU-CS-A	DEC-1080	TOPS10
*10.1.0.17	MITRE-GATEWAY	C/70	UNIX
10.1.0.18	RADC-PSAT-IG	PLURIBUS	UNKNOWN
10.1.0.20	DCEC-GATEWAY	PDP-11/45	MOS
*10.1.0.23	USC-EDLC	DEC-1090B	TOPS20
10.1.0.27	ISI-PNG11	PDP-11/40	EPOS
*10.1.0.31	CCA-VMS	VAX-11/780	VMS
*10.1.0.38	BRAGG-STAI	PDP-11/34	ELF
10.1.0.46	COLLINS-GW	PDP-11/34	ELF
10.1.0.49	BBN-CGTWY	LSI-11/2	MOS
10.1.0.51	SRI-C3FO	LSI-11/2	MOS
*10.1.0.54	CIT-VAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*10.1.0.54	CIT-CS-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*10.1.0.56	SU-DSN	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*10.1.0.62	UTEXAS-20	DEC-2060	TOPS20
10.1.0.63	BBN-TAC	H-316	TAC
*10.1.0.72	BBN-UNIX	C/70	UNIX
*10.1.0.77	CISL-SERVICE-MULTICS	H-68/80	MULTICS
*10.1.0.79	DEC-MARLBORO	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
10.1.0.80	SAC1-TAC	C/30	TAC
*10.1.0.82	BBN-VAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*10.1.0.94	CSNET-SH	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*10.1.0.96	UDEL-TCP	VAX-11/750	UNIX
10.1.1.51	SRI-STAG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
10.1.3.51	SRI-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*10.1.4.51	SRIJOYCE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
10.1.21.27	ISI-MCON	PDP-11/44	EPOS
10.1.22.27	ISI-SPEECH11	PDP-11/45	EPOS
10.1.23.27	ISI-WBC11	PDP-11/45	EPOS
10.1.25.27	ISI-MAINT11	PDP-11/40	EPOS
*10.1.33.27	ISI-VAXA	VAX-11/780	UNIX

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10.1.89.27	ISI-SETTING	CADLINC	V	
*10.1.90.27	ISI-LORETTA	CADLINC	V	
*10.1.91.27	ISI-PALLAS-ATHENE	CADLINC	V	
10.1.97.27	ISI-AIKANE	PERQ	PERQ-OS	
10.1.98.27	ISI-CZAR	PERQ	PERQ-OS	
10.1.99.27	ISI-MYCROFTXXX	PERQ	PERQ-OS	
10.1.124.27	ISI-CMR	H89	HDOS	
10.1.125.27	ISI-IHM	IMSAI	ZMOS	
10.1.156.27	ISI-PNG11	PDP-11/40	EPOS	
10.1.254.27	ISI-ECHO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
*10.2.0.1	UCLA-LOCUS	VAX-11/750	LOCUS	
*10.2.0.2	SRI-CSL	FDONLY-F4	TENEX	
10.2.0.4	UTAH-TAC	H-316	TAC	
10.2.0.5	BBN-PTIP-GATEWAY	FLURIBUS	UNKNOWN	
10.2.0.6	MIT-AI-RESERVED	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
10.2.0.7	RAND-TAC	H-316	TAC	
*10.2.0.9	YALE	VAX-11/750	UNIX	
*10.2.0.10	LL-XN	PDP-11/70	UNIX	
10.2.0.11	SU-TAC	H-316	TAC	
10.2.0.14	CMU-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	UNKNOWN	
10.2.0.22	ISI-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS	
10.2.0.23	USC-TAC	C/30	TAC	
10.2.0.25	CSS-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	MOS	
*10.2.0.27	ISI-VAXA	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
10.2.0.28	ARPA-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS	
10.2.0.31	CCA-TAC	C/30	TAC	
10.2.0.32	PARC-GW	ALTO	ALTO-OS	
10.2.0.37	PURDUE-CS-GW	PDP-11/34	MOS	
10.2.0.38	BRAGG-TAC	H-316	TAC	
10.2.0.40	BBN-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
10.2.0.44	MIT-TSTGW	PDP-11	MOS	
10.2.0.46	COLLINS-TAC	C/30	TAC	
*10.2.0.51	SRI-UNIX	PDP-11/70	UNIX	
*10.2.0.52	USC-ISIF	DEC-1090T	TOPS20	
*10.2.0.56	AIDS-UNIX	VAX-11/750	UNIX	
*10.2.0.58	RUTGERS	DEC-2060T	TOPS20	
*10.2.0.62	UT-SALLY	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
10.2.0.77	MIT-TAC	C/30	TAC	
*10.2.0.78	UCB-VAX	VAX-11/750	UNIX	
10.2.0.80	SAC-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS	
*10.2.0.82	BBN-INDC	C/70	UNIX	
10.2.0.91	WASHINGTON-TAC	C/30	TAC	
*10.2.0.96	UDEL-EE	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
*10.2.0.98	PURDUE-X25	VAX-11/750	UNIX	
*10.2.1.58	RU-GREEN	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
*10.2.2.58	RU-BLUE	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
*10.3.0.1	UCLA-ATS	VAX-11/750	LOCUS	
*10.3.0.2	SRI-TSC	PDP-11/44	UNIX	
*10.3.0.4	UTAH-20	DEC-2060T	TOPS20	
*10.3.0.5	BBNA	DEC-2050T	TOPS20	
*10.3.0.6	MIT-ML	DEC-10	ITS	
*10.3.0.7	RAND-UNIX	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
10.3.0.10	LL-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
*10.3.0.11	SU-SCORE	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
*10.3.0.14	CMU-CS-C	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
*10.3.0.17	DCN1	LSI-11/23	FUZZ	
10.3.0.17	DCN-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	FUZZ	
*10.3.0.20	EDN-UNIX	PDP-11/70	UNIX	
10.3.0.22	ISI-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
*10.3.0.24	WHARTON-10	FLURIBUS	VDA	

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10.3.0.27	ISI-GATEWAY	PDP-11/23	MOS	
*10.3.0.28	ARPA-PNG11	PDP-11/34	EPOS	
*10.3.0.30	KESTREL	FOONLY-F3	TENEX	
10.3.0.38	NET-5-GATEWAY	LSI-11/2	MOS	
10.3.0.40	BBN-VAN-GW	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
*10.3.0.44	MIT-MC	DEC-1080	ITS	
10.3.0.51	SRI-R2D2	LSI-11/2	MOS	
*10.3.0.52	USC-ISIB	DEC-1090T	TOPS20	
10.3.0.72	BBN-NET-GATEWAY	LSI-11/2	MOS	
10.3.0.80	SAC-GATEWAY	PDP-11/23	MOS	
*10.3.0.91	UW-VLSI	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
*10.3.0.91	UW-VLSI-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
*10.3.0.96	CORNELL	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
*10.3.0.96	CORNELL-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
10.3.1.51	SRI-STAZ	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
*10.3.2.51	SRI-PRMH	PDP-11/44	UNIX	
*10.4.0.2	SRI-AI	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
*10.4.0.10	LL-EN	PDP-11/44	UNIX	
*10.4.0.17	MITRE-LAN	PDP-11/70	UNIX	
*10.4.0.49	BBN-CLXX	C/70	UNIX	
10.4.0.51	SRI-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS	
*10.5.0.2	SRI-IU	VAX-11/780	VMS	
10.5.0.5	BBN-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS	
10.5.0.10	LL-GW	PDP-11/44	EPOS	
10.5.0.20	DCEC-PSAT	PLURIBUS	UNKNOWN	
10.5.0.20	DCEC-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
10.5.0.49	CLARKSBURG-IG	C/30	SIMP	
*10.5.2.2	SRI-VAX	UNKNOWN	VMS	
*10.6.0.10	LL-SST	VAX-11/780	UNIX	
*10.6.0.82	BBN-NOC2	C/70	UNIX	
10.7.0.20	DCEC-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS	

* means this site is a server

ALT Network: no hosts

FDN Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*14.0.0.1	PURDUE-TN	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*14.0.0.1	CSNET-PURDUE-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*14.0.0.2	UWISC-TN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*14.0.0.3	UDEL-TN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
14.0.0.4	UCL-VTEST	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*14.0.0.5	UCL-TG	UNKNOWN	LOGICAL-HOST
14.0.0.6	UK-SATNET	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*14.0.0.7	WISC-IBM	IBM-4341	VM/CMS
*14.0.0.8	RAND-TN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*14.0.0.9	UCL-CS	UNKNOWN	LOGICAL-HOST
14.0.0.10	BBN-VAN-GW	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

* means this site is a server

MIT Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
18.2.0.7	MIT-BR-ETHERNET	PDP-11	MOS
18.2.0.15	MIT-TIU	PDP-11	MOS
18.2.0.18	MIT-ALTO-509	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.20	MIT-ALTO-510	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

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18.2.0.21	MIT-TIU	PDP-11	MOS
18.2.0.32	MIT-ALTO-524	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.56	MIT-ALTO-214B	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.72	MIT-ALTO-511	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.80	MIT-MURIEL	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.96	MIT-ALTO-508	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.100	MIT-ALTO-503	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.128	MIT-SPOOLER	ALTO	TFTPSP
18.2.0.129	MIT-NP-ALTO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.130	MIT-ALTO-502	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.134	MIT-ALTO-828	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.2.0.170	MIT-ALTO-520	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
18.8.0.4	MIT-GW-LCS	PDP-11	MOS
18.8.0.5	MIT-BRIDGE	PDP-11	MOS
*18.8.0.9	MIT-RTS	PDP-11	UNIX
18.8.0.10	MIT-RTS40	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*18.8.0.16	MIT-VAX	VAX-11/750	UNIX
18.8.0.32	MIT-XX-11	PDP-11	UNKNOWN
18.8.0.40	MIT-TIU	PDP-11	MOS
18.9.0.128	MIT-TIU	PDP-11	MOS
18.10.0.4	MIT-GW	PDP-11	MOS
18.10.0.5	MIT-BRIDGE	PDP-11	MOS
*18.10.0.8	MIT-CSR	PDP-11/45	UNIX
18.10.0.10	MIT-RTS40-V2	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*18.10.0.64	MIT-AJAX	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.65	MIT-BORAX	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.66	MIT-COMET	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.67	MIT-DUTCH	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.68	MIT-MRCLEAN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.69	MIT-BOLD	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.70	MIT-FAB	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.71	MIT-PRJ	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.72	MIT-DUZ	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.73	MIT-DASH	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.74	MIT-TIDE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.75	MIT-FLA	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.76	MIT-CLS	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.77	MIT-GRAPE-NEHI	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*18.10.0.78	MIT-HEINEKEN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.79	MIT-OA	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.80	MIT-MACEWAN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.81	MIT-KIRIN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.82	MIT-MOLSON	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.86	MIT-MILO	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.87	MIT-OPUS	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*18.10.0.88	MIT-RINSO	VAX-11/750	UNIX

* means this site is a server

MITRE Network: no hosts

MINET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*24.0.0.1	MINET-OBL-EM	C/70	UNIX
*24.0.0.8	MINET-NAP-EM	C/70	UNKNOWN
24.1.0.1	MINET-OBL-TAC	C/30	TAC
24.1.0.2	MINET-STT-TAC	C/30	TAC
24.1.0.3	MINET-RAM-TAC	C/30	TAC
24.1.0.4	MINET-HDL-TAC	C/30	TAC

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24.1.0.5	MINET-BRM-TAC	C/30	TAC
24.1.0.6	MINET-RDM-TAC	C/30	TAC-107
*24.2.0.2	MINET-STT-EM	C/70	UNIX
24.3.0.14	BBN-MINET-A-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS

* means this site is a server

RSRE-EXF Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
25.6.0.0	RSRE-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	EMMOS
25.8.0.0	RSRE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
25.13.0.0	RSRE-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	EMMOS

* means this site is a server

MILNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*26.0.0.3	NOBC-CC	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.0.0.8	NRL	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.0.0.14	CMU-CS-B	DEC-1050	TOPS10
*26.0.0.16	AMES-TSS	IBM-360/67	TSS/360
*26.0.0.17	MITRE	C/70	UNIX
*26.0.0.18	RADC-MULTICS	HONEYWELL-DPS-8/70M	MULTICS
*26.0.0.19	NBS-VMS	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.0.0.20	DCEC-ITEL	NAS-AS/5	MVS/SF
*26.0.0.21	LLL-TIS	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.0.0.23	USC-ECLB	DEC-1090B	TOPS20
*26.0.0.24	NADC	VAX-11/780	UNIX
26.0.0.26	PENTAGON-TAC	H-316	TAC
26.0.0.28	ARPA-TAC2	H-316	TAC
*26.0.0.29	BRL	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.0.0.29	BRL-GATEWAY2	PDP11	UNIX
26.0.0.30	BROOKS-AFB-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.0.0.33	NPS	PLURIBUS	PLI
*26.0.0.34	LBL-NMM	VAX-11/780	VMS
26.0.0.35	NOBC-SECURE2	PLURIBUS	PLI
26.0.0.36	COINS-TAS	PLURIBUS	PLI
26.0.0.40	NCC-TAC	H-316	TAC
*26.0.0.43	OFFICE-1	FOONLY-F4	TENEX
26.0.0.45	ARRADCOM-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.0.0.47	WPAFB	PDP-11/50	RSX11M
*26.0.0.49	BBNB	DEC-10	TENEX
*26.0.0.50	DARCOM-TEST	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.0.0.53	AFSC-AD	PDP-11/45	RSX11M
*26.0.0.57	TYCHO	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.0.0.58	NYU	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.0.0.58	NYU-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.0.0.61	STL-HOST1	DEC-2040	TOPS20
26.0.0.65	AFSC-SD	DEC-2020T	TOPS20
*26.0.0.67	AFSC-HQ	DEC-2040T	TOPS20
*26.0.0.68	USGS1-MULTICS	H-60/68	MULTICS
*26.0.0.69	USGS2-MULTICS	H-60/68	MULTICS
*26.0.0.70	USGS3-MULTICS	H-6880	MULTICS
*26.0.0.73	SRI-NIC	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*26.0.0.74	SIMTEL20	DEC-2040T	TOPS20
*26.0.0.81	NEMS	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.0.0.81	DTNSRDC-GW	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.0.0.82	BBNCCT	C/70	UNIX

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*26.0.0.84	NSWC-DL	PDP-11/40	RSX11M
*26.0.0.85	NWC-387A	VAX-11/750	VMS
*26.0.0.87	SANDIA	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
*26.0.0.88	NLM-MCS	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
*26.0.0.90	LANL	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.0.0.93	OFFICE-8	FOONLY-F4	TENEX
26.0.0.95	S1-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	UNKNOWN
26.0.0.100	TEST-TAC	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
26.0.0.103	ISI-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS
26.0.0.104	DCEC-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS
26.0.0.105	SAC-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS
26.0.0.106	ARPA-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS
*26.1.0.8	NRL-AIC	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.1.0.13	GUNTER-ADAM	DEC-2060	TOPS20
26.1.0.16	AMES-TAC	MLC	TAC
*26.1.0.19	NBS-SDC	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.1.0.21	LLL-MFE	DEC-1090	TOPS10
26.1.0.28	ARPA-TAC1	C/30	TAC
*26.1.0.29	APG-1	C/70	UNIX
*26.1.0.34	LBL-CSAM	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.1.0.35	NOSEC-TECR	VAX-11/780	VMS/EUNICE
26.1.0.36	CINCPACFLT-WM	RSM	PLI
26.1.0.40	BBN-MINET-A-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS
*26.1.0.43	OFFICE-2	FOONLY-F4	TENEX
*26.1.0.45	ARDC	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.1.0.47	WPAFB-AFWAL	PLURIBUS	VDA
*26.1.0.48	AFWL	PDP-11/50	RSX11M
*26.1.0.53	NCSC	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.1.0.55	ANL-MCS	VAX-11/780	UNIX
26.1.0.57	COINS-GATEWAY	PLURIBUS	PLI
*26.1.0.58	BNL	PDP-11/44	UNIX
26.1.0.59	SCOTT-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.1.0.60	CORADCOM-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.1.0.61	ALMSA-B	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.1.0.64	MARTIN-B	VAX-11/750	VMS
26.1.0.65	AFSC-SD-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.1.0.66	AFGL	PDP-11/50	RSX11M
26.1.0.67	AFSC-HQ-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.1.0.69	USGS2-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.1.0.70	USGS3-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.1.0.73	SRI-WARF	PLURIBUS	PLI
*26.1.0.74	WSMR70A	C/70	UNIX
*26.1.0.81	NALCON	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.1.0.84	NSWC-G	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.1.0.95	S1-A	FOONLY-F2	WAITS
*26.1.0.103	USC-ISIE	DEC-1090T	TOPS20
26.1.0.105	SAC2-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.3	LOGICON	PDP-11/45	UNIX
*26.2.0.8	NSWC-WD	VAX-11/750	UNIX
26.2.0.13	GUNTER-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.16	AMES-VMSA	VAX-11/780	VMS
26.2.0.17	MITRE-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.18	RADC-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.19	NBS-UNIX	PDP-11/45	UNIX
26.2.0.20	DCEC-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.21	LLL-ZDIVISION	PDP-11/70	UNIX
26.2.0.29	BRL-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.33	NPS-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.35	ACCAT-TAC	H-316	TAC
26.2.0.36	CINCPAC-TAC	C/30	TAC

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26.2.0.41	REDSTONE-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.43	OFFICE-3	FOONLY-F3	TENEX
26.2.0.47	WPAFB-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.48	AFWL-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.49	BBN-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS
26.2.0.50	DARCOM-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.53	AFSC-DEV	PDP-11/44	RSX11M
*26.2.0.54	ACC	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.2.0.55	COMPION-VMS	VAX-11/750	VMS
*26.2.0.57	MARYLAND	VAX-11/780	UNIX
26.2.0.60	CORADCOM2-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.61	STLA-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.64	ROBINS-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.65	AEROSPACE	VAX-11/780	UNIX
26.2.0.66	AFGL-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.68	USGS1-AMDAHL	AMDAHL-V7	IBM/VMS
*26.2.0.70	USGS3-VMS	VAX-11/780	VMS
26.2.0.73	SRI-MILNET-GW	LSI-11/23	MOS
26.2.0.74	WSMR-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.75	YUMA-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.81	DAVID-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.84	NSWC-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.2.0.85	NWC-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.2.0.92	NUSC-NPT	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.2.0.93	OFFICE-15	FOONLY-F4	TENEX
*26.2.0.95	S1-B	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.2.0.97	PAXRV-NES	VAX-11/730	VMS
*26.2.0.103	ADA-VAX	VAX-11/780	VMS
26.2.0.117	KOREA-TAC	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*26.3.0.3	NPRDC	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.3.0.8	NRL-TOPS10	DEC-10	TOPS10
*26.3.0.16	AMES-VMSB	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.3.0.18	RADC-TOPS20	DEC-2040T	TOPS20
*26.3.0.19	NBS-RL	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.3.0.23	USC-ECL	DEC-1090B	TOPS20
26.3.0.29	BRL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/34	MOS
26.3.0.33	FNOC-SECURE	PLURIBUS	PLI
26.3.0.35	NOSC-SECURE3	PLURIBUS	PLI
*26.3.0.43	OFFICE-7	FOONLY-F3	TENEX
*26.3.0.46	OKC-UNIX	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.3.0.47	WPAFB-INFO1	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.3.0.49	BBNC	DEC-10	TENEX
26.3.0.53	AFSC-AD-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.3.0.54	JPL-VAX	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.3.0.64	ROBINS-UNIX	PDP-11/45	UNIX
*26.3.0.65	MARTIN-ED	PDP-11/45	RSX11M
*26.3.0.66	MITRE-BEDFORD	VAX-11/780	UNIX
26.3.0.68	USGS1-TAC	C/30	TAC
*26.3.0.74	WSMR70B	C/70	UNIX
26.3.0.75	YUMA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*26.3.0.78	MCCLELLAN	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*26.3.0.81	DTRC	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.3.0.81	NSRDCOA-GW	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.3.0.82	DDN1	C/70	UNIX
26.3.0.83	TEST-BRIDGE	LSI-11/23	UNKNOWN
*26.3.0.84	NSWC-OAS	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.3.0.85	NWC-387B	VAX-11/780	VMS
26.3.0.92	NUSC	PDP-11/40	ELF
*26.3.0.95	S1-C	VAX-11/750	UNIX
26.3.0.97	PAX-RV-TAC	C/30	TAC

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*128.8.0.9	UMD9	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.8.0.10	UMDA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.8.0.11	UMDB	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.8.0.12	UMDC	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.8.0.13	UMDD	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.8.0.14	UMDE	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.8.0.15	UMDF	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

* means this site is a server

ISI-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
128.9.0.24	ISI-ACCUTEST	LSI-11/23	RSX-11M
*128.9.0.41	ISI-ELVIRA	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.9.0.42	ISI-HOBGOBLIN	VAX-11/750	VMS
*128.9.0.43	ISI-MOE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.9.0.44	ISI-TROLL	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.9.0.45	ISI-CURLY	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.9.0.46	ISI-SHEMP	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.9.0.47	ISI-ZOMBIE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.9.0.48	ISI-XORN	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.9.0.49	ISI-VLSIA	VAX-11/750	VMS
*128.9.0.50	ISI-VLSIB	VAX-11/750	VMS
128.9.0.81	ISI-GATEWAY	PDP-11/23	MOS
*128.9.0.92	ISI-DAWN	SMI	UNIX
*128.9.0.93	ISI-RISING	SMI	UNIX
*128.9.0.112	ISI-SPANKY	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.113	ISI-ALFALFA	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.114	ISI-DARLA	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.115	ISI-BUCKWHEAT	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.116	ISI-STYMIE	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.117	ISI-FARINA	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.118	ISI-PETE	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.119	ISI-FROGGIE	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.121	ISI-WABZ	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.122	ISI-RANDY	IBM-PC	MS-DOS
*128.9.0.123	ISI-RAGZ	IBM-PC	MS-DOS

* means this site is a server

PURDUE-CS Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*128.10.0.1	PURDUE	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.10.0.2	PURDUE-MORDRED	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.10.0.2	CSNET-PURDUE-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX
128.10.0.3	PURDUE-CS-GW	PDP-11/34	MOS
*128.10.0.6	PURDUE-MERLIN	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

BBN-CRONUS Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
128.11.0.1	BBN-CGTWY	LSI-11/2	MOS
*128.11.0.2	BBN-CVAX	VAX-11/750	VMS
*128.11.64.1	BBNV1	VAX-11/780	VMS

* means this site is a server

*26.3.0.103	USC-ISI	DEC-1090T	TOPS20
*26.4.0.20	DCA-EMS	C/70	UNIX
26.4.0.35	NOBC-F4	FOONLY-F4	FOONEX
*26.4.0.40	WPAFB-JALCF	VAX-11/780	VMS
26.4.0.73	SRI-TACACS	FOONLY-F4	TENEX
*26.4.0.82	BBN-RSM	PLURIBUS	PLI
*26.5.0.18	RADC-UNIX	PDP-11/45	UNIX
*26.5.0.47	WPAFB-AFITA	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.5.0.53	MARTIN	PDP-11/45	RSX
26.5.0.81	TEP-TAC	C/30	TAC
26.6.0.6	NRL-ARCTAN	PDP-11/40	RSX11
*26.6.0.18	GE-CRD	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.6.0.19	NBS-AMRF	VAX-11/780	VMS
*26.7.0.8	NRL-CSS	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*26.7.0.19	NBS-SBI	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*26.7.0.50	ETL-AI	VAX-11/780	VMS
26.7.0.82	TEST-MAILBR	LSI-11/23	UNKNOWN

* means this site is a server

NOBC-LCCN Network: no hosts

WIDEBAND Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
28.8.0.0	ISI-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
28.9.0.0	LL-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
28.10.0.0	ISI-MCON	PDP-11/44	EPOS
28.10.0.0	DCEC-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
28.11.0.0	SRI-PSAT-IG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
28.12.0.0	RADC-PSAT-IG	PLURIBUS	UNKNOWN
28.18.0.0	LL-GW	PDP-11/44	EPOS
28.19.0.0	LL-GW	PDP-11/44	EPOS

* means this site is a server

UCL-TAC-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
32.2.0.42	UCL-TAC	H-316	TAC
32.3.0.42	UCL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	MOS

* means this site is a server

RSRE-NULL Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
35.6.0.0	RSRE-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	EMMOS
35.7.0.0	UCL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	MOS

* means this site is a server

SU-NET-TEMP Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
36.40.0.62	STANFORD-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	MOS
*36.40.0.192	SU-SHASTA	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*36.40.0.193	SU-HNV	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*36.40.0.194	SU-AI	DEC-1080	WAITS
*36.40.0.195	SU-SCORE	DEC-2060	TOPS20

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*36.40.0.203	SU-NAVAJO	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*36.40.0.204	SU-WHITNEY	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*36.40.0.205	SU-GLACIER	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*36.40.0.207	SU-STAR	VAX-11/780	VMS
*36.40.0.212	SU-CARMEL	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*36.40.0.213	SU-SIERRA	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*36.45.0.85	SU-ARDVAX	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*36.45.0.86	SU-SAFE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*36.45.0.87	SUMEX-AIM	DEC-2060	TOPS20

* means this site is a server

SRI-LOCAL Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*39.128.1.230	SRI-TSC	PDP-11/44	UNIX
*39.128.3.150	SRI-TSCA	PDP-11/44	UNIX

* means this site is a server

BBN-TEST-A Network: no hosts

AMPRNET Network: no hosts

CS-PR Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
45.0.0.11	SRI-R2D2	LSI-11/2	MOS
*45.0.32.2	SRI-SPAM	VAX-11/780	UNIX
45.0.32.4	SRI-ROLM	ROLM-1666	RMX/RDOS

* means this site is a server

BERKELEY Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*46.0.0.4	UCBARPA	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*46.0.0.5	UCBCAD	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*46.0.0.6	UCBERNIE	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*46.0.0.7	UCBMONET	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*46.0.0.9	UCBESVAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*46.0.0.10	UCBVAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*46.0.0.11	UCBKIM	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*46.0.0.12	UCBCALDER	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*46.0.0.13	UCBDALI	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*46.0.0.14	UCBMATISSE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*46.0.0.15	UCBMEDEA	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*46.0.0.19	UCBINGRES	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*46.0.0.28	UCBCORY	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

SAC-PR-TEMP Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
47.0.0.11	SAC-GATEWAY	PDP-11/23	MOS
*47.0.32.3	SAC-VAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

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NDRE-TIU Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
48.0.0.4	NTARE-GATEWAY	FDP-11/40	MOS
*48.3.1.41	NDRE1	LSI-11/23	FUZZ

* means this site is a server

NTA-RING Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
50.0.0.4	NTARE-GATEWAY	FDP-11/40	MOS
*50.0.0.8	NTA-VAX	VAX-11/70	UNIX

* means this site is a server

BBN-TEST-B Network: no hosts

CMU-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*128.2.251.2	CMU-EE-FARADAY	VAX-11/780	UNIX
128.2.254.36	CMU-GATEWAY	FDP-11/40	UNKNOWN
*128.2.254.128	CMU-CS-IUS	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.2.254.129	CMU-CS-VLSI	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.2.254.130	CMU-CS-PS1	VAX-11/780	VMS
*128.2.254.131	CMU-CS-ZOG	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.2.254.132	CMU-CS-G	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.2.254.133	CMU-CS-CAD	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.2.254.136	CMU-CS-K	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.138	CMU-RI-FAS	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.139	CMU-CS-SPICE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.140	CMU-CS-GANDALF	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.143	CMU-RI-ISL1	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.144	CMU-CS-J	VAX-11/750	VMS
*128.2.254.145	CMU-CS-SPEECH	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.146	CMU-CS-PS2	VAX-11/780	VMS
*128.2.254.150	CMU-CS-UNH	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.151	CMU-RI-ARM	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.152	CMU-RI-ISL2	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.153	CMU-CS-CFS	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.154	CMU-RI-ISL3	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.155	CMU-CS-PT	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.2.254.156	CMU-CS-H	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.2.254.157	CMU-RI-ROVER	VAX-11/750	UNIX

* means this site is a server

LBL-CSAM Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*128.3.0.24	LBL-CSAM	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

DCNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*128.4.0.1	DCN1	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
128.4.0.1	DCN-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	FUZZ

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*128.4.0.2	DCN2	VAX-11/730	VMS
*128.4.0.3	DCN3	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.4.0.4	DCN4	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.4.0.5	DCN5	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.4.0.6	DCN6	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.4.0.7	DCN7	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.4.0.8	DCN8	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.4.0.9	DCN9	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

* means this site is a server

FORDNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*128.5.0.1	FORD1	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
128.5.0.1	DCN-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.0.2	FORD2	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.0.3	FORD3	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.0.4	FORD4	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.0.8	FORD-LAB	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.0.9	FORD-VAX	VAX-11/780	VMS
*128.5.0.10	FORD-RES	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*128.5.0.11	FORD-ECC	H-68	MULTICS
*128.5.0.12	FORD-SRL	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.0.13	FORD-ERS	LSI-11/23	UNKNOWN
*128.5.0.14	FORD-EED	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.0.15	FORD-FOE	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.5.32.1	FORD-WDL1	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.5.32.2	FORD-WDL2	PDP-11/45	UNIX
*128.5.32.3	FORD-WDL3	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*128.5.32.4	FORD-WDL4	ONYX-C8001	UNIX
*128.5.32.5	FORD-WDL5	ONYX-C8001	UNIX
*128.5.32.6	FORD-WDL6	PDP-11/34	DCN

* means this site is a server

RUTGERS Network: no hosts

DFVLR Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*128.7.0.1	DFVLR1	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.7.0.2	DFVLR2	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.7.0.3	DFVLR3	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.7.0.7	DFVLR7	LSI-11/23	FUZZ

* means this site is a server

UMDNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*128.8.0.1	UMD1	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
128.8.0.1	DCN-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.8.0.2	UMD2	UNIVAC-1100	OS1100
*128.8.0.3	UMD3	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.8.0.4	CVL	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.8.0.5	UMD5	LSI-11/23	FUZZ
*128.8.0.6	UMD6	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.8.0.7	UMD7	UNIVAC-1100	OS1100
*128.8.0.8	UMD-CSD	VAX-11/780	UNIX

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SU-NET Network: no hosts

MATNET Network: no hosts

BRN-SAT-TEST Network: no hosts

SINET Network: no hosts

UCLNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
128.16.0.0	UCL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	MOS
128.16.1.67	UCL-LSIH	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.1.106	UCL-LSIL	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.1.110	UCL-LSIM	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.1.112	UCL-LSII	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.1.113	UCL-LSIJ	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.1.115	UCL-LSIK	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.2.174	UCL-LSIJ	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.2.241	UCL-LSIM	LSI-11/23	MOS
128.16.3.2	UCL-TERMINAL-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*128.16.9.0	UCL-SAM	LSI-11/23	
MOS			
128.16.9.1	UCL-PROBE	UNKNOWN	LOGICAL-HOST
*128.16.9.2	UCL-TG	UNKNOWN	LOGICAL-HOST
*128.16.9.3	UCL-CS	UNKNOWN	LOGICAL-HOST
128.16.9.4	UCL-NIFTP	UNKNOWN	LOGICAL-HOST

* means this site is a server

MATNET-ALT Network: no hosts

BRINET Network: no hosts

EDN Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
128.19.0.2	DCED-GATEWAY	PDP-11/45	MOS
*128.19.1.1	EDN-HOST1	PDP-11/45	UNIX

* means this site is a server

BRLNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
128.20.0.1	BRL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/34	MOS
*128.20.0.2	BRL-VAT	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.20.1.1	BRL-VGR	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.20.1.2	BRL-HEP	PDP-11/44	UNIX
128.20.2.1	BRL-TAC1	C/30	TAC
128.20.2.2	BRL-TAC2	C/30	TAC
128.20.2.3	BRL-TAC3	C/30	TAC
128.20.2.4	BRL-TAC4	C/30	TAC
*128.20.3.1	AMGAA	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*128.20.3.2	BRL-VDC	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*128.20.3.4	HEL-ACE	VAX-11/750	UNIX

* means this site is a server

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128.21.0.11	SRI-C3P0	LSI-11/2	MOS
128.21.0.12	SRI-R2D2	LSI-11/2	MOS
*128.21.32.2	SRI-SPAM	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

SF-PR-2 Network: no hosts

BBN-PR Network: no hosts

ROCKWELL-PR Network: no hosts

ERAGG-PR Network: no hosts

SAC-PR Network: no hosts

DEMO-PR-1 Network: no hosts

C3-PR-TEMP Network: no hosts

MIT-NET Network: no hosts

MIT-RES Network: no hosts

UCP-ETHER Network: no hosts

CISLTESTNET1 Network: no hosts

YALE-NET Network: no hosts

YPG-NET Network: no hosts

NSWC-NET Network: no hosts

BBN-TEST-C Network: no hosts

BBN-FIBRENET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
192.1.2.1	BBN-FIBER-GATEWAY	LSI-11/2	MOS
192.1.2.3	BBN-CGTWY	LSI-11/2	MOS
*192.1.2.66	BBNF	DEC-2040T	TOPS20
*192.1.2.67	BBNG	DEC-2060T	TOPS20
*192.1.2.68	BBNA	DEC-2050T	TOPS20

* means this site is a server

CISLHYPERNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.1.0	CISL-DEVELOPMENT-MULTICS	H-68/80	MULTICS
*192.5.1.1	CISL-SERVICE-MULTICS	H-68/80	MULTICS

* means this site is a server

WISC Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
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*192.5.2.2	WISC-DB	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.2.3	CSNET-SH	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.2.6	WISC-GATEWAY	PDF-11/34	MOS
*192.5.2.7	WISC-CRYS	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

HF-DESIGN-AIDS Network: no hosts

HF-TCG-UNIX Network: no hosts

CIT-CS-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.7.2	CIT-VAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*192.5.7.2	CIT-CS-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*192.5.7.3	CIT-750	VAX-11/750	UNIX

* means this site is a server

WASHINGTON Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.8.1A	UW-BEAVER	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.8.2	UW-LUMPY	VAX-11/730	UNIX
*192.5.8.3	UW-WALLY	VAX-11/750	UNIX
	UW-JUNE	VAX-11/780	UNIX
	UW-VLSI	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*192.5.8.5	UW-VLSI-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*192.5.8.6	UW-EDDIE	VAX-11/730	UNIX

* means this site is a server

AERONET Network: no hosts

ECLNET Network: no hosts

CSS-RING Network: no hosts

UTAH-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.12.21	UTAH-CS	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.12.21	UTAH-GATEWAY	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.12.22	UTAH-GR	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.12.23	UTAH-SP	VAX-11/750	UNIX

* means this site is a server

CCNET Network: no hosts

RAND-NET Network: no hosts

NYU-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.15.5	NYU-CMCL1	VAX-11/780	VMS
*192.5.15.9	NYU-ACF2	VAX-11/780	VMS

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*192.5.15.129	NYU	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*192.5.15.129	NYU-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

LANLLAND Network: no hosts

NRL-NET Network: no hosts

IPTO-NET Network: no hosts

UCIICS Network: no hosts

CISLTTYNET Network: no hosts

BRLNET1 Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.21.1	BRL-BMD	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*192.5.21.2	BRL-VLD	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*192.5.21.3	BRL-SVG	PDP-11/34	UNIX
*192.5.21.4	BRL-TGR	VAX-11/780	UNIX
192.5.21.5	BRL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/34	MOS
*192.5.21.6	BRL-VGR	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

BRLNET2 Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.22.1	BRL-VDC	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.22.2	BRL	PDP-11/70	UNIX
*192.5.22.2	BRL-GATEWAY2	PDP11	UNIX

* means this site is a server

BRLNET3 Network: no hosts

BRLNET4 Network: no hosts

BRLNET5 Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
192.5.25.2	BRL-GATEWAY	PDP-11/34	MOS

* means this site is a server

NSRDCOA-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.26.0	NSRDCOA-GW	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.26.1	DTNSRDC3	VAX-11/750	UNIX

* means this site is a server

DTNSRDC-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.27.0	DTNSRDC-GW	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*192.5.27.1	DTNSRDC1	VAX-11/750	UNIX

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*192.5.27.0 DTNSRDC2 VAX-11/750 UNIX

* means this site is a server

NULL-NET Network: no hosts

RSRE-ACC Network: no hosts

RSRE-PR Network: no hosts

SIEMENS-NET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
192.5.31.1	CMU-GATEWAY	PDP-11/40	UNKNOWN

* means this site is a server

CISLTESTNET2 Network: no hosts

CISLTESTNET3 Network: no hosts

CISLTESTNET4 Network: no hosts

RIACS Network: no hosts

CORNELL-CS Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
*192.5.36.4	CORNELL-PVAX	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*192.5.36.5	CORNELL	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*192.5.36.5	CORNELL-GW	VAX-11/780	UNIX

* means this site is a server

UR-CS-NET Network: no hosts

SRI-CETHER Network: no hosts

UDEL-EECIS Network: no hosts

PUCC-NET-A Network: no hosts

WISLAN Network: no hosts

SU-ETHERNET Network:

Host number	Official Name	Machine	System
SU 47#3	TEST-BRIDGE	LSI-11/23	UNKNOWN
SU 47#103	PORTOLA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 47#216	YIN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#1	BOISE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#2	SUN-MJ416	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#3	SUN-MJ428	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#4	TIF-CIS	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#5	SUN-ERL414	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#6	SUN-MJ408	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#7	SUN-MJ460	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#10	SUN-MJ330	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#11	SUN-MJ422	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#12	TIF-MJHA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

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SU 50#13	TEST-BRIDGE	LSI-11/23	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#14	TIP-ERL-SWITCHER	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#15	SUN-GE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#16	TIP-EE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#17	SUN-ERL407	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#20	SUN-MJ342	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#21	SUN-ERL259B	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#22	SUN-CISA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#23	SUN-ERL409A	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#24	SUN-ERL408A	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#25	SUN-ERL409C	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#26	SUN-CISB	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#27	SUN-ERL259A	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#30	TIP-TEST	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#31	FUMAROLE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#32	SUN-MJ420	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#33	SUN-MJ416A	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#34	SUN-MJ402	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#35	SUN-MJ424	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#36	TIP-ERL-CIS	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#37	SUN-TEX	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#40	SEQUOIA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#41	SEQUOIA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#42	TERMAN-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#44	SUN-ERL409D	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#45	SUN-ERL409E	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#46	SUN-MJ450	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#47	SUN-ERL409F	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#50	SUN-MJ021	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#51	TIP-MJHB	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#52	SEQUOIA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#53	TIP-TERMANA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#54	TIA-CIT	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#55	TIP-GINZTON	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#56	SUN-ERL411A	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#57	SUN-ERL411B	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#60	HP9836	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#61	SUN-ERL411	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#62	SUN-ERL444A	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#63	SUN-ERL408	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#64	SUN-ERL445	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#65	SUN-ERL456B	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#66	SUN-ERL409B	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#67	SUN-MJ426	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#70	SUN-TEST	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#71	SUN-TEST	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#72	SUN-TERMAN565	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#73	TIP-GSB	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#74	SCANNER	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#75	SUN-SETI	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#76	STANFORD-GATEWAY	LSI-11/23	MOS	
SU 50#77	PINE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#100	CYPRESS	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#101	YOLO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#102	INYO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#103	PORTOLA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#104	MOND	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#105	DIEGO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#106	MOJAVE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 50#107	YOSEMITE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	

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SU 50#111	MARIN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#111	MONTEREY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#111	TRINITY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#114	TORO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#115	NAPA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#116	ALMANOR	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#117	PALOMAR	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#120	TIOGA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#121	ERL-BRIDGE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#122	ERL-BRIDGE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#123	ERL-BRIDGE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#124	TIP-AEL	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#125	TIP-MJHC	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#126	CIS-BRIDGE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#127	CIS-BRIDGE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#130	GREEN-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#131	MORDOR	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#200	LASSEN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#201	TAHOE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#202	EUREKA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#216	YANG	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#262	PACIFICA	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#263	SUMEX-DOLPHIN-2	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#264	SUMEX-DOLPHIN-4	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#265	SUMEX-DOLPHIN-5	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*SU 50#300	SU-SHASTA	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*SU 50#301	SU-HNV	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*SU 50#302	SU-AI	DEC-1080	WAITTS
*SU 50#303	SU-SCORE	DEC-2060	TOPS20
SU 50#304	UBEHEBE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#305	CIT1	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#306	CIT2	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 50#307	HELENS	FDP11	UNIX
*SU 50#310	SU-DSN	VAX-11/780	UNIX
SU 50#311	ISL	VAX-11/780	UNIX
SU 50#312	PSYCH	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*SU 50#313	SU-NAVAJO	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*SU 50#314	SU-WHITNEY	VAX-11/780	UNIX
*SU 50#315	SU-GLACIER	VAX-11/750	UNIX
SU 50#316	FUJI	FDP11	UNIX
SU 50#320	CIT-RELAY	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*SU 50#321	GSB-WHY	DEC-2060	TOPS20
*SU 50#322	GSB-HOW	DEC-2060	TOPS20
SU 50#323	PISGAH	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
*SU 50#324	SU-CARMEL	VAX-11/750	UNIX
*SU 50#325	SU-SIERRA	DEC-2060	TOPS20
SU 50#326	IMSSS	DEC KI-10	TENEX
*SU 50#327	COYOTE	VAX-11/750	UNIX
SU 54#30	SUN-TB113B	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 54#40	SUMEX-10MB-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#30	SUN-TB113	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#31	S101-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#32	SUMEX-10MB-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#33	SUN-S101	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#34	SUN-S007	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#35	TIP-S101	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#36	SUN-TB105	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#111	PINE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#112	SUMEX-ALTO	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 55#124	SUMEX-2020	DEC-2020	TOPS20

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*SU 55#126	SU-ARDVAX	VAX-11/750	UNIX	
*SU 55#126	SU-S AFE	VAX-11/750	UNIX	
*SU 55#127	SUMEX-AIM	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
SU 55#200	SUMEX-DOLPHIN-1	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 55#201	SUMEX-DOLPHIN-3	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 56#30	SUN-TB113A	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 56#32	S101-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 56#33	WELCH-ROAD-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 57#34	WELCH-ROAD-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SU 60#1	LOTS-A	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
SU 60#2	LOTS-B	DEC-2060	TOPS20	
SU 60#11	SUN-CERAS125	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 60#43	TERMAN-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 60#51	TIP-CERAS	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 60#52	TIP-CERAS125	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 60#54	TIP-TERMANB	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 60#55	TIP-TERMANC	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 62#1	TERMAN-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 63#1	TERMAN-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 64#3	GREEN-GATEWAY	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	
SU 64#5	TIP-MEYER	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	

* means this site is a server
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